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ABSTRACT 
 
Issues as to the suitability of executive compensation packages have obtained an ever 
increasing profile in recent years. Whilst there has been quite extensive empirical 
investigation of pay-performance sensitivity, the framework of performance-pay has 
received less attention in the literature and examination to date. Besides this - whilst there 
has been a quantum of investigation of relationships between compensation and 
performance, there has been less focus on case study based analysis. 
In this context, the current study makes a twofold contribution to the examination of 
executive directors’ remuneration in FTSE 350 companies. First, this research aims to 
empirically investigate linkages between the nature and amount of compensation packages 
and company performance with a particular focus on examining the extent of 
interrelationships between pay and performance over a ten year period from 1999 to 2008. 
Within the scope of a variety of theoretical perspectives, this deductive study puts a focus 
on addressing the question of whether managerial compensation is the greater influence on 
firm performance or whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on the former. 
Second, this study seeks to qualitatively add to the relevant literature by means of a 
longitudinal case study of remuneration at UK based major multi-national company, BP, 
over a ten year period from 2001 till 2010. Within the context of a variety of theoretical and 
institutional perspectives, this inductive study explores, by means of investigation of BP’s 
Directors Remuneration Reports, the role of the BP remuneration committee in setting the 
mechanisms and structures which determine the nature and extent of executive 
remuneration packages at BP and considers the wider generalisability of the findings 
therefrom.  Overall the current study utilises a mixed methods approach via a combination 
both quantitative and qualitative modes of analysis – an approach which is relatively rare in 
the discipline of research into corporate governance and related issues. 
The outcomes from the empirical work show evidence of the presence of dual positive 
associations between executive compensation and company performance. However, the 
results do indicate that executive compensation is more influential in its effect on firm 
performance than the framework of performance-related pay. This finding is interpreted as 
lending support to the stewardship and/or tournament theories as to underlying drivers of 
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executive remuneration in comparison with agency theory, represented by agent-principal 
or managerial hegemony perspectives, as an explanatory of the construction of executive 
remuneration and the link with firm performance. Similar to prior literature, the empirical 
findings indicate that equity-based compensation is more robust in the linkage with firm 
performance than cash pay dominated packages. However, the results showed that the 
existence of remuneration committees in general reveals insignificant and negatively 
related to total CEO/executive remuneration. This finding highlights therefore the need to 
put a focus on the actual role of compensation committee in setting the type and extent of 
executive pay packages in a large UK company. 
The outcomes from the archival case study also suggest that it is difficult to find significant 
support for a pure agency theory approach whereby shareholders seek to align their 
interests directly with those of their managers as a driver of executive compensation 
packages. There is more evidence suggestive of a managerial power/hegemony perspective 
which is heavily mediated by the presence of powerful non-executive directors and the 
institutional presence of the remuneration committee. Perhaps the most significant aspects 
to emerge from the case study are the importance of personal relationships and power at 
boardroom level. Beyond this the inferences of the supplementary content analysis 
conducted specifically on the Directors Remuneration Reports are suggestive of a focus on 
overall BP performance rather than on the specific activities and achievements of individual 
executive directors.  
In conclusion, the findings of the present study provide a wealth of detail both quantitative 
and qualitative as to the manner in which executive remuneration has been set in the UK in 
recent years and as to linkages both with corporate performance and underlying theories of 
the determinants of executive remuneration. As such it sheds light on an area of importance 
and one of continued private and public concern and may be of interest to those responsible 
for governance within firms and to wider public and regulatory interest as well as future 
researchers in the field. 
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STUDY INTRODUCTION 
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Chapter One 
Study Introduction 
1.1 Background and Overview 
In recent years issues as to board room compensation have been extensively aired in the 
popular media, the academic literature and periodically in the regulatory arena.1 In the UK 
the media has tended to focus on single high profile cases, for example in the 1990s the ‘fat 
cat’ controversy surrounding Cedric Brown’s remuneration at British Gas,2 the 2003 
shareholder revolt at GlaxoSmithKline directed at Jean-Pierre Garnier’s compensation 
package,3 in 2008 the outcry associated with the revelation that Sir Fred Goodwin chief 
executive of the failed Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) would walk away at the age of 50 
with a pension entitlement valued at anything up to £30m,4 in 2012 the media and political 
furore surrounding the award of a bonus of just under a million pounds (subsequently 
declined) to the chief executive of the reconstituted RBS and the possible bonus packages 
for directors and senior executives of the publicly funded Network Rail (also subsequently 
declined).  
Apart from these specific cause celebres there has been increasing concern as to the overall 
level of senior executive remuneration and the widening gap between remuneration at the 
top of both private and public sector organizations and that of the average worker in those 
organizations – concerns expressed for example in recent reports of the High Pay 
Commission (2011a, 2011b). This has led to questioning as to whether the structure in 
place within organizations which acts to determine senior executive pay is appropriate and, 
related to this, whether clear linkages can be established between the composition and 
amount of executive compensation packages and organisational performance. 
                                                          
1  See for instance, the recent report of the ‘High Pay Commission’ available at: 
http://highpaycommission.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HPC-DPperformance.pdf 
Another example, The economist report under the title of ‘Executive Pay: Money for nothing’ available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21542802?fsrc=scn%2Ftw%2Fte%2Far%2Fmoneyfornothing%0A%0A%0AThank 
2  See, the Independent report:   
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/cedric-brown-fat-cat-in-the-dog-house-1611078.html 
3  See, the New York Times report:  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804EFD9133EF933A15756C0A9659C8B63 
4  See, the Telegraph report: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/4861923/Sir-Fred-
Goodwin-True-cost-of-pension-is-30m.html. In January 2012, Fred Goodwin was stripped of his knighthood. 
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Parallel to this institutional performance itself has attracted ever increasing attention 
especially in the light of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 reverberations from which are 
still being felt today. This crisis had a number of underlying causes including mismatches 
of financing positions and poor lending decisions accompanied by excessive management 
optimism and the issuance of misleading information (Polo, 2007; Turner, 2009; Walker, 
2009). The associated wave of collapses in the financial sector further heightened concerns 
of both institutional shareholders and regulators alike as to both the quality of managerial 
decision making and the linkages between that decision making and the composition and 
nature of executive remuneration packages. This itself was encompassed within enhanced 
focus on the role of corporate governance more widely in ensuring both effectiveness in the 
manner in which companies were run for the benefit of their shareholders and other 
stakeholders and also associated transparency thereof (Solomon 2007). 
In this respect, the manner in which interrelationships between managerial compensation 
and company performance can be established within an appropriate structure of corporate 
governance has been extensively considered in previous literature (such as Conyon and 
Leech, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Core et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2008 etc.). Clearly 
senior level pay and its determination are only one aspect of a wider governance framework 
and in the examination of pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks and related 
linkages it is important to control the effect of different corporate governance mechanisms 
in explaining the variability in such frameworks and practices and the overall effect on 
institutional performance.  
This introductory chapter commences with an overview of the arguments and issues 
surrounding executive compensation which themselves provide motivation for this study. 
The second section covers the research objectives and identifies the research questions 
adopted in the current study. The motivations underlying both the selection of research 
questions and the methodology to be utilised in the study are discussed in more detail in the 
third section. The fourth section highlights the manner in which it is intended that the study 
should make an incremental contribution to existing knowledge. The fifth section develops 
this further by means of a review and summary of the key findings consequent to carrying 
to the research and relates these to the actual contribution to knowledge and understanding. 
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The final section of the chapter sets out the structure and organisation of the thesis as it 
develops in future chapters. 
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
For many years received wisdom in respect to the appropriate setting of compensation 
packages for senior executives has been that the package, comprising both options and 
incentives, should be relevant and sufficient in terms of acting as an effective motivation 
mechanism for aligning the professional managers’ rewards with the institutional 
shareholders’ returns in an attempt to enhance corporate performance. As such they would 
normally comprise both options and specifically targeted incentives as appropriate to the 
circumstances of the individual company (Kim and Nofsinger, 2007). Within this wider 
compass the need for address and explore further the interrelationships between managerial 
compensation and company performance has been an important motivating factor 
underpinning this current study. 
Two main frameworks have been advanced in terms of explaining the relationship between 
executive pay and firm performance. These are both contrasting and to an extent 
interlinked. The first structure is the pay-performance framework. Here the main focus of 
the literature, extending back more than eighty years, has been perspectives derived from 
pure agency (Berle and Means, 1932), which envisages a positive relationship between an 
agency based contract and firm performance, and from managerial hegemony (Bebchuk et 
al., 2002), which suggests the possibility of a negative relationship in circumstances when 
executive directors have significant influence over the setting of their contracts. 
Implications of agency based contracts are that executive directors will only obtain high 
rewards when certain targets relating to company performance are reached, whereas 
managerial hegemony suggests that high rewards may be obtained largely irrespective of 
company performance. 
The second structure - the performance-pay framework - has shifted the emphasis away 
from incentivisation per se toward a more direct link between company performance and 
executive director remuneration, a link which might not be related to managerial 
performance in itself but instead to a whole range of environmental and institutional factors 
which impact company performance. Here the interactions may be complex and with 
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exceptions (such as Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Devers et al., 2007; Falato et al., 2011) there 
has been more limited research work done as compared with that investigating other 
paradigms. Notions of performance-pay link more to the underlying perspectives offered by 
stewardship theory (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and in particular, in recent years, 
tournament theory (Lazear, 1998). Here the emphasis has been on the manner by which 
board room executives are attracted and motivated by a sufficient set of incentives 
regarding their managerial talents and experience and also by the ambition of lower-level 
executives to advance their careers for the purpose of achieving the rewards obtainable at 
higher points in the corporate ladder.  
Although the nature of the performance-pay framework has received less attention in the 
literature compared with pay-performance framework, the emphasis shifts toward the future 
in the light of the interaction between the mechanism and structure of executive pay and 
company performance, and the manner in which firm performance as a whole will be 
enhanced through providing prospect reward schemes for their board members. In this 
respect, one key research question which is addressed in the empirical part of the current 
study is: whether managerial compensation is the greater influence on firm performance or 
whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on the former? 
Exploration of the manner by which decisions as to remuneration packages are set has led 
to more detailed probing of relationships within corporate entities. In particular the role and 
composition of remuneration committees within those entities has been explored from an 
empirical perspective (Main and Johnston, 1993; Narasimhan and Jaiswall, 2007 etc.). This 
literature has drawn attention to questions relating to the size and composition of 
remuneration committees and their perceived increased power and influence within the 
boardroom. However there is still scope for further investigation of the actuality of practice 
and the interactions in terms of relationships with executive directors, institutional 
shareholders etc. With relatively few exceptions (Bender, 2003, 2007), case study analysis 
of how remuneration committees operate has been sparse in prior research and their role in 
both defining and mediating the relationship between managerial compensation and firm 
performance has received relatively little attention from a qualitative perspective. In this 
regard, the second key research question asked is: do behavioural and institutional factors, 
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in particular those relating to the remuneration committee, play an important role in 
determining the composition and size of executive compensation?  
Accordingly, the current study has two key research objectives. First, an empirical 
examination is conducted to extend the existing experiential investigations beyond the 
focus on the typical one-way impact of institutional performance on the amount and 
structure of executive compensation or vice versa. This research objective is established by 
examining the interrelationships between executive directors’ remuneration and corporate 
performance in FTSE 350 companies over a ten year period, while controlling for a variety 
of corporate governance mechanisms and institutional characteristics. Second, an 
institutional archive-base case study is employed to enable a greater depth of understanding 
of the mechanisms and structures which have determined executive director pay in one 
large UK company. The case study is in turn based upon information contained in the 
Directors Remuneration Reports (DRRs) of that company over a ten year period 
supplemented by both wider information sources and more specifically by content analysis 
of the remuneration reports.  
1.3 Research Motivations, Methodology and Methods 
Whilst the majority of prior literature puts more focus on the pay-performance structure, 
little research has been conducted that directly investigates the impact of executive 
compensation on corporate performance, and very few studies have addressed such separate 
associations in the UK context. Besides this the empirical investigation of the 
interrelationships between managerial compensation and company performance has not 
been addressed within the UK context. Furthermore - while there has been quite extensive 
quantitative examination of such associations between executive compensation and 
business performance, there has been less focus on case study analysis of the actual role of 
the remuneration committee to set the mechanisms and structures that determine boardroom 
compensation packages at singular companies. 
In this respect, this present study has two separate but interrelated research motivations. 
The first is to investigate the extent of linkages between the nature and amount of 
compensation packages and company performance to address the question of whether 
managerial compensation is the greater influence on firm performance or whether it is the 
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latter which has the greater influence on the former. The second is a desire to understand in 
greater depth the mechanisms and structures which determine senior executive pay in a 
large UK multinational organisation and the manner in which these mechanisms and 
structures have changed in recent years through providing an overall review on what it is 
possible to learn from the information contained in the directors’ remuneration reports.  
In terms of its underlying methodological foundations the study may be seen as adopting a 
positivist approach linked in to notions of ontological realism (further discussion of these 
fundamental assumptions is set out in Chapter 4). This translates into research which seeks 
to objectively describe, examine and explore the perceived reality of executive 
compensation and corporate performance. To fulfil these research objectives and 
motivations, the current study adopts both the deductive and inductive approaches. This 
ambition calls for a mixed methods (i.e. abductive) approach, which is used extensively in 
pragmatically oriented fields of social science research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Johnson et al., 2007; and Creswell and Clark, 2011) but to date has been more restricted in 
its application to corporate governance research.  
Regarding the research techniques, the present study comprises a number of different, but 
complementary, research analyses which are identified based on the extant phenomenon 
being analysed for achieving the study objectives. The quantitative study is undertaken to 
examine the extent of the interrelationships between managerial compensation and 
institutional performance for FTSE 350 companies from 1999 to 2008 by employing two 
modelling plans by which the research findings are discussed in terms of the adopted 
theoretical perspectives. First a fixed-effect analysis framework is adopted through utilising 
two separate multiple regression equations incorporating by a set of appropriate categories 
of control variables relevant to executive pay and firm performance - such as internal 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms, nature and composition of firm ownership, 
leverage ratios as proxies for company risk-taking behaviour, as well as a variety of 
corporate characteristics and expertise indicators. Second a set of simultaneous or structural 
equations modelling is developed in attempt to examine jointly the influence of executive 
pay or company performance on a number of corporate governance mechanisms, by which 
the twofold relationships between pay and performance are combined.  
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The qualitative study is undertaken to investigate the actual role of remuneration committee 
in setting the mechanisms and structures which determine executive director pay in BP (a 
FTSE 350 company) from 2001 to 2010 by adopting two different research methods. First 
the archival-base case study is conducted to review the nature of remuneration practice at 
BP with a particular focus on changes in the amount and nature of remuneration packages 
over the years under examination, and explore the role of the remuneration committee in 
effectively determining the type and extent of those packages. Second the archival case 
study is supplemented by a practical content analysis which provides a more specific 
empirical analysis of the directors’ remuneration reports. 
1.4 Research Contribution to Knowledge  
This thesis contributes to the knowledge regarding the topic of executive directors’ 
remuneration through two different, but complementary, modes of examination. The first 
part of the research provides updated documentary and empirical evidence on the linkages 
between the amount and composition of managerial compensation and the accounting-
based indicators of company performance in FTSE 350 companies, while controlling for 
corporate governance mechanisms, boardroom members’ features and corporate 
characteristics. The second research reviews the nature of remuneration practice at BP for 
the purpose of highlighting the changes in the amount and nature of remuneration packages 
over the years under examination and exploration of the role of the remuneration committee 
in setting out the mechanisms and structures which determine the type and extent of those 
packages. 
Within the scope of the first mode of examination the study contributes to knowledge in a 
number of ways. To the author’s knowledge no other published study combines empirical 
investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and seeks to 
measure the separate extent of associations between executive compensation and corporate 
performance in a single piece of research. The endogenous estimations through using Two-
Stage Least Square (2SLS), in addition to sub-period and sub-sector analyses are also 
provided in the present research. This is not in itself novel but the analysis builds on and 
develops previous research in this area. Beyond this, the study develops a system of six 
simultaneous equations in order to examine the interrelationships between managerial 
remuneration and company performance via employing data available on four control 
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variables through using Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) estimation technique. Again to 
the author’s knowledge this study is the only study to date which has adopted this technique 
using UK data. Underlying this empirical analysis the study provides a quite detailed 
analysis and investigation of the institutional and regulatory background relating to 
executive compensation and the associated literature. This is informed by consideration of a 
number of the diverse, but interrelated, theoretical perspectives that have been developed 
which have sought either to normatively establish appropriate mechanisms and procedures 
for setting senior executive remuneration or to act as explicators for the type of structures 
that exist and the manner in which they have developed and changed.   
The second mode of examination, the archival case study, adds to the quite limited array of 
previous case study/qualitative research in the governance arena in the UK. It does this by 
means of investigation with the ambition to understand in greater depth the mechanisms 
and structures which determine executive pay in one large UK based multinational 
company, BP. Although pay structures at BP have attracted comment and discussion in 
recent years they have not been subjected to more rigorous analysis based primarily on the 
contents of the BP Directors Remuneration Reports. The findings of this analysis are 
considered and interpreted within the context of the theoretical perspectives underlying 
questions as to how boardroom and senior executive remuneration are or perhaps ‘should 
be’ set. Emphasis is also given to the wide ranging, and sometimes competing, institutional 
influences and processes which impact upon remuneration at a major multinational 
company – and which on occasion lead to conflict as for example reflected in the 38% of 
the voting BP shareholder body which did not support the Directors Remuneration Report 
tabled at the company’s Annual General Meeting held in April 2010? 
To recap the key contributions of the present study in terms of its research approach are its 
novelty in terms both of the combination of both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods and also of originality both in the mode of empirical analysis and the use of a 
qualitative case study. Mixed methods research, which attempts to maintain generalisation 
while capturing the specificity of the context (Johnson et al., 2007), is not that common in 
the field of corporate governance research and it is suggested that is an avenue or approach 
to research which might be more widely employed by future researchers. 
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As compared with previous empirical UK studies (such as Conyon et al., 1995; Main et al., 
1996; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Conyon and Murphy, 2000 etc.) this study benefits from an 
enhanced data set with more than 2,700 observations in consequence both of using the 
FTSE 350 as the base sample and a greater longitudinal series of observations, ten years, 
than previous studies which were limited by a greater need to collect data manually. 
Moreover the supplementary content analysis, using NVivo as an available data analysis 
program which is contained within the archival-based case study, is relatively novel in that 
the author is not aware of previous studies which have employed this technique formally in 
the context of directors’ remuneration reports. 
Overall the current research has the potential of attracting the attention of those concerned 
about the level and structure of executive directors’ remuneration packages and how far the 
linkages and the direction are or were between the executive pay packages and corporate 
performance, as well as the role of the remuneration committee in setting the mechanisms 
and structures which determine the types of boardroom compensation packages.  
1.5 Summary of Main Findings 
The findings of the empirical study show evidence of the presence of dual positive 
associations between executive compensation and company performance. The findings 
imply also that, perhaps not surprisingly, the remuneration committees of FTSE 350 
companies put more focus on the link between the non-cash compensation of boardroom 
members to company performance rather than the direct cash remuneration package. There 
is also evidence that the CEO remuneration package is more sensitive to firm performance 
than that of executive board directors, a result which is consistent with that of (Sapp, 2008).  
The results of the fixed-effect equation modelling suggest that the pay-performance 
framework supports the influence of agent-principal relationships rather than those 
indicative of managerial hegemony. In this narrative CEOs and boardroom executives are 
compensated for their apparent intention to act in the best interests of the owners based on 
the prior levels of corporate performance. However the findings in respect to the 
performance-pay framework lean toward support for a tournament and/or stewardship 
theoretical underpinning to remuneration whereby corporate performance is enhanced when 
executive remuneration is relatively higher in previous years. The mechanisms whereby 
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achieve this are less clear but may be linked into prospects (Lazear, 1998) or actual 
managerial talents (Hendry and Kiel, 2004). 
The results of simultaneous equation modelling are again in line with scenarios which fit 
better into an underlying framework associated with either tournament or stewardship 
theory, i.e. there is a better fit with a performance –pay framework than with a pay-
performance framework although in both instances there were statistically significant 
positive associations. One slightly surprising finding was that the existence or otherwise of 
a remuneration committee was not significantly related to executive compensation. If 
anything there was a negative association albeit not statistically significant – although as by 
the end of the period under examination almost all the sample companies had remuneration 
committees this result, though of interest, may be of limited relevance. 
The outcomes of the case study yet again suggest that it is difficult to find significant 
support for a pure agency theory approach whereby shareholders seek to align their 
interests with those of their managers as a driver of executive compensation packages. 
There is more evidence supportive of a managerial hegemony perspective, albeit one which 
in BP was heavily mediated by the presence of powerful non-executive directors and the 
institutional presence of the remuneration committee. There was also little evidence that the 
pay packages were dictated by mobility within the international labour market, although 
very significant one-off ‘retention payments’ were made to two directors in one year the 
circumstances were suggestive that the motivation for these payments was inextricably 
connected to wider issues relating to boardroom compensation in that particular year.  
Perhaps the most significant findings to emerge from the case study are the importance of 
personal relationships and power at boardroom level and the evident malleability of 
remuneration structures – in particular the willingness to ‘shift the goal-posts’ subsequent 
to events usually to the benefit of the executive directors. The formal content analysis 
provided additional insights – one being a documented focus by the remuneration 
committee on overall BP performance rather than on the specific activities and 
achievements of individual directors. The case study also reflects on the role of the 
remuneration committee and its nature as an institutional construct, and considers whether 
it constrains, obscures, or adds pseudo legitimacy to boardroom compensation. Overall the 
case study adds richness to the empirical work by means of the ability to identify a wider 
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range of factors and circumstances, some of them one-off, some which persisted for a 
number of years which influenced executive director compensation at the company under 
examination and suggests that both similar patterns and individual reasons for variance 
apply across the wide range of companies.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This section depicts the structure of the current study by providing an overview of its 
contents. The study is organised in seven chapters. Chapter one is an introductory chapter 
that presents the background of the study along with the research objectives and questions. 
It outlines the motivations underlying the research undertaking, identifying and discussing 
the methodological assumptions and the research methods. It highlights the contribution to 
existing knowledge and concludes with a brief summary of the key findings of the research. 
Chapter two provides a preparatory review of the literature to date which focuses on the 
institutional and regulatory background of boardroom executive compensation. It 
commences with an overview of UK corporate governance in general and executive 
compensation in particular. The structure and role of compensation committees in 
determining executive compensation in the UK are explored along with reviewing the 
composition and significance of executive compensation packages. This chapter also 
highlights issues and developments relating to executive pay disclosure in the UK. 
Chapter three provides a review of the pertinent literature on the linkages between 
executive compensation and company performance, and concludes with a discussion 
highlighting possible research gaps in existing academic literature. This chapter then 
identifies a variety of institutional and theoretical frameworks which have been utilised 
either normatively or explicitly in the context of boardroom level remuneration, and 
highlights the implications of these theoretical perspectives on pay-performance and 
performance-pay frameworks.  
Chapter four explains the research methodology employed by the current research to seek 
to fulfil the underlying the research purpose and objectives, as well as the research 
philosophy and how it justifies the chosen approaches used in carrying out the study. The 
research process of the empirical study is developed with reference to identification of 
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topic, highlighting research gaps, selection of variables, sample selection and data 
collection and preparation.  
Chapter five provides the main analysis and discussion of the results obtained from the 
empirical investigation. It reports the findings of the deductive study based on a variety of 
statistical tests and analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation analyses and two 
different sets of regression modelling analysis. First, the fixed-effect equation modelling is 
undertaken to test the developed hypotheses separately for investigating the relationships 
between executive compensation and company performance. Second, the simultaneous 
equation modelling is adopted to examine further the interrelations between pay and 
performance and in particular to establish whether executive remuneration has the greater 
influence on firm performance, or does firm performance has the greater effect. The 
empirical study’s findings are reported and also interpreted in the context of the underlying 
theoretical perspectives and conclusions are drawn therefrom depending on the statistical 
results. 
Chapter six constitutes the case study adopted in the present thesis. This chapter 
commences with introducing the strategy of this indicative study, including the research 
objective, hypothesis, and examination plan. It highlights also a number of related 
theoretical perspectives underlying the question of how boardroom and senior executive 
remuneration are, or perhaps ‘should be’, set. The chapter then reports the explanations of 
the outcomes based on two research techniques. First, the archival-base case study is 
adopted to review the nature of remuneration practice at BP with a particular focus on the 
years 2001-2010, and to detail changes in the amount and nature of remuneration packages 
and explore the role of the remuneration committee in effectively determining the type and 
extent of those packages. Second, content analysis is undertaken to shed some light on why 
38 per cent of the BP shareholder body failed to support the compensation committee’s 
report presented to the Annual General Meeting in April 2010. 
Chapter seven summarises the research project regarding both the quantitative and 
qualitative studies. The work in the context of prior literatures is also placed with an 
attempt to explain its contribution to knowledge and highlight the research findings. 
Finally, this chapter describes the work limitations, offers some recommendations for 
forthcoming research, and discusses the implications of this work for practitioners.  
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Chapter Two 
Institutional and Regulatory Background  
2.1 Introduction 
The past 20 years have witnessed an increasing focus on the requirements of a good 
corporate governance framework in order to maintain or even restore confidence in 
corporate management (Hossain et al., 1994; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006), re-
balance the corporate financial and administrative structures (Berger et al., 2005; Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Solomon, 2007), and broaden the phenomenon of a wide 
reaching investment culture (Fraser and Henry, 2003; Khurshed et al., 2011) within a 
knowledge economy (Gugler, 2001; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Abdullah and 
Page, 2009). One area of significant interest both in the public and academic arenas has 
been the manner whereby executive compensation is set and linkages between the nature 
and composition of executive compensation and corporate performance. This has led to a 
substantial extent of research in this field going back to the 1980s at least. This prior 
literature has focused on examination of the relationship with company performance 
(Conyon, 1997; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; McKnight and Tomkins, 1999), the mechanisms 
of corporate governance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Core et al., 1999; Berry et al., 2006; 
Lee et al., 2008), as well as the personnel- and/or firm-dependent effects (Smith and Watts, 
1992; Adams and Ferreira, 2004; McKnight and Tomkins, 2004; Devers et al., 2007 ) on 
the amount and composition of boardroom members’ pay packages. 
However, as discussed above, the framework of performance-pay has received relatively 
less attention in the literature to date as compared with studies that focus more directly on 
agency theory relationships between the nature of compensation packages and corporate 
performance. Furthermore there has been less emphasis on rigorous case study analysis of 
actual executive compensation within specific companies, analysis designed both to shed 
light on how relationships between executive directors’ remuneration and firm performance 
are shaped and formed and also to consider the actual role of the remuneration committee 
in terms of setting the policy for, and nature of, remuneration practice at individual 
companies. 
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This chapter aims to provide, primarily by means of a literature review, an introduction to 
the institutional and regulatory background relating to boardroom executive compensation. 
The chapter is organised as follows. After this short introduction the second section 
provides a review of the development of UK corporate governance in general and executive 
compensation in particular, in which the institutional and regulatory aspects in terms of 
approval, disclosure and governance requirements are outlined. The third section provides a 
review of UK remuneration code. The fourth section explores the structure and role of 
compensation committees in determining executive compensation in the UK. The fifth 
section reviews the composition of the typical executive compensation package in a large 
UK company. The sixth section sets out the current requirements for the disclosure of 
executive pay in the UK. The final concluding section provides an overall review and 
discussion of the institutional and regulatory framework underpinning on executive 
directors’ remuneration in the UK. 
2.2 UK Corporate Governance and Remuneration History  
In the UK, historically, executive pay was seen as a matter very largely internal to the 
individual company, its board of directors and ultimately the shareholders. Until the 1980s 
the institutional framework surrounding executive remuneration in the UK was all but 
vestigial (Fraser and Henry, 2003). Other than a long running Companies Act requirement, 
for the amount paid to the chairman and to the highest paid director (if not the chairman) to 
be disclosed together with disclosure of the number of employees in income bands above a 
certain level, there were no disclosure requirements nor was there any requirement for 
disclosure of options or other similar contingent remuneration. Over time the Stock 
Exchange began to require more disclosure in respect to directors’ remuneration in quoted 
companies. However, as noted in the introduction, from the 1990s onwards issues of 
corporate pay began to attract wider stakeholder attention which in turn led to more 
regulation - in particular in respect to disclosure requirements - but also as to internal 
governance structures for the determination of executive remuneration and the manner in 
which these should be referred to and approved by the shareholders.  
The Cadbury Report issued in 1992 provided the framework for governance which, subject 
to subsequent development and revision, underlies the present Governance Code (FRC, 
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2012)5. The report, which was commissioned in the wake of a number a high profile 
corporate collapses associated with the economic downturn of the early 1990’s, provided a 
series of recommendations seen as representing good corporate governance practice 
(Tricker, 1994; Gugler, 2001; Dedman, 2002; and Kim and Nofsinger, 2007). However it 
contained little specific guidance as to compensation, although the report did recommend 
that companies which did not already have a remuneration committee consisting wholly or 
mainly of non-executive directors should establish one (Cadbury, 1992)6 – the first quasi-
mandatory call for such a committee.  
However the Greenbury committee - whose report was issued in 1995 - focused specifically 
on public and shareholder concerns regarding executives’ pay. It endorsed the role of a 
remuneration committee comprising only of non-executive directors in setting, via 
recommendations to the whole board, a pay agenda for executive directors. Within this 
agenda pay packages should be constructed sufficient to attract, retain and motivate 
directors of the quality required, and based particularly on the performance-related pay 
components - whether by annual bonuses, share option schemes, or long-term incentive 
plans - which should be designed to align the interests of directors and shareholders 
according to the corporate compensation policy (Greenbury, 1995)7. As Solomon (2007, 
p.97) claimed, “… one important aim of the Committee (and of the earlier Cadbury Code 
of best practice) was to create remuneration committees that would determine pay 
packages needed to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required but should 
avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose”. Greenbury emphasised the need for 
contracts to incorporate aspects and measures relating to long term performance. It also 
recommended that contracts for executive directors should not exceed twelve months in 
duration. These recommendations were carried forward into the Combined Code issued in 
June 19988 and have been reiterated in subsequent revisions of the Code and, in relation to 
                                                          
5 The UK Corporate Governance Code link: http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-
Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx 
6 The Cadbury Report link: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf 
7 The Greenbury Report link: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf 
8 The 1998 Combined Code link: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/combined_code.pdf 
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financial sector firms, most recently in a separate remuneration code (FSA, 2010)9 
discussed further below.  
The recommendations of a separate committee, the Hampel Committee, also fed through 
into the revised Combined Code published in 1998. Hampel set forward recommendations 
related to disclosure issues, in particular on the need for companies to adopt a strategy of 
full transparency in which institutional shareholders have access to all the information 
required to enable them evaluate the corporate compensation policy. Inter alia this would 
entail disclosure of the full actual pay packages of boardroom members, details of 
remuneration committee membership and where necessary clarification of compliance by 
means of a clear statement identifying any areas of non-compliance (Hampel, 1998)10. 
For listed companies the requirements of the Combined Code, although not strictly 
speaking mandatory, were enforced initially by the London Stock Exchange/Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and then in statute by the 2002 UK Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Regulations (FRC, 2002)11 and now carried forward into the 2006 Companies Act12. 
The 2002 Act additionally introduced a requirement for the directors’ remuneration report 
to be put before the shareholders at the annual general meeting and for the shareholders to 
vote their approval or otherwise thereon - although the vote is advisory only and is not 
binding on the company (Deloitte, 2004). In relation to this Franks et al. (2001) argued that 
UK board members perform an advisory role rather than a monitoring function and this has 
an influence on the manner in which they review and control executive remuneration. 
Further governance recommendations were contained in the Higgs Report 200313 and these 
were incorporated into subsequent revisions of the Combined Code. Beyond this other 
stakeholders including the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) published guidance in 2009 and 2011 respectively as 
                                                          
9 The Remuneration Code (Policy Statement) link: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps10_20.pdf. This code 
in its final form contains thirteenth principles and aims mainly to ensure that firms have to establish, 
implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with and 
promote effective risk management. 
10The Hampel Report link: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel_index.htm 
11The UK DRRR Bulletin 2002/2 link: http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/57bb2af7-addd-43f6-8dcd-
d85e36857f94/Bulletin-2002-2-The-United-Kingdom-Directors-Remun.aspx 
12The 2006 UK Companies Act link: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents 
13 The Higgs Report link: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf 
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to how shareholders should evaluate the quality of the remuneration report for the purpose 
of deciding on voting behaviour.14 
2.3 Banking Remuneration Code  
As noted above, there has been a particular regulatory interest in executive compensation in 
the financial sector consequent to the series of banking failures which commenced in 2007 
and also the disclosure of high levels of corporate remuneration and executive bonuses in 
the financial institutions. This led to the publication of a separate remuneration code by the 
FSA in 2010 for the financial sector itself underpinned by the recommendations of the 
Walker Report (Walker, 2009) and supported to an extent by those of the Turner Report 
(Turner, 2009) 15. Following a consultation paper ‘Revising the Remuneration Code’ issued 
in July 201016, the final draft of the Code was published in December of that year17 and 
came into force in January 2011. Although still not statutory in terms of limiting executive 
levels of pay, it is quasi-mandatory and the FSA made clear that if any financial institution 
fails to follow the new remuneration code, it will be strictly prohibited from participating in 
the Government’s Asset Protection Scheme. In line with the Walker Report, the Code does 
not impose any absolute limit on executive remuneration, but focuses on the 
recommendations emanating from the Walker Report as to: the remuneration structure, 
aligning remuneration paid with performance, deferred pay packages, and further disclosure 
requirements (FSA, 2010). 
The key recommendation of the Walker Report in terms of the remuneration composition 
was that the remuneration committee should not only be entitled to set the policy for, and 
nature of, remuneration practice, but also be engaged in determining the compensation 
strategy of the whole workforce in the company within an overall effective and efficient 
risk framework. However the linkage between executive directors and workforce members 
in terms of the nature of compensation has not been discussed in the FSA’s Remuneration 
Code. Besides this the remuneration committee should carefully examine the compensation 
                                                          
14In particular, those of the Association of British Insurers (ABI) “Executive Remuneration - ABI Guidelines 
on Policies and Practices” - 2009, and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) “Corporate 
Governance Policy and Voting Guidelines’’ - 2011. 
15The Walker Report link: http://group30.org/images/PDF/WalkerReview%20July%202009.pdf, and the 
Turner Report link: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf 
16The Remuneration Code (Consultation Paper) link: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp10_19.pdf 
17The Remuneration Code (Policy Statement) link: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps10_20.pdf 
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packages and policy of those executive directors whose total compensation is greatly above 
the median remuneration provided to other executive directors - those executives who are 
known as “high end” members due to their significant execution and impact on the risk 
profile of the company. The disclosure requirements of the “high end” pay packages require 
the remuneration committee to establish and confirm the performance of such high profile 
executives after a careful scrutiny via linking the achieved levels of performance to the 
related pay packages. The Walker Report suggested also that all executives should be 
awarded at least half of the expected value of variable pay in the form of LTIP subjected to 
some pre-awarding performance requirements, however these requirements would be 
challenging on eligibility - as 50 per cent of the awarded shares should not be available 
until at least 3 years and the remainder after a period of 5 years, in addition to the review 
did not propose any performance level or mechanism that has to be achieved by the board 
room executives. However the Code clarifies that the remuneration structure based on the 
deferment policy should not award a pay unless at least 40 per cent of it is deferred over a 
period not less than three to five years, while at least 60 percent of the amount should be 
deferred in the case of variable compensation component. 
As the same as no absolute limit on executive remuneration has been imposed, the Code 
does not propose a targeted level of performance that has to be achieved by the board room 
members to award variable remuneration package. Besides that the Code requires that 50 
per cent of any variable remuneration should be paid in shares, whilst the Walker Report 
recommended that the shares awarded as bonuses for the executive performance during the 
current year should be phased for a period of 3 years and the maximum amount should not 
exceed one-third of the total shares awarded in the first year. Furthermore the Code’s 
pension policy states that when a board executive member - who will leave the entity 
before the contract expiry - discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm in the form 
of instruments for a period of five years, while the Walker Report noted that any executive 
leaves the entity before retirement should not be entitled for a full pension whatever the 
pension size. The Walker Report recommended - based on the binding vote of firm 
shareholders - that the chair of the remuneration committee would need to stand for re-
election at the following Annual General Meeting, if less than 75 percent of shareholders 
did not approve the Directors Remuneration Report.  
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As noted above for all UK quoted companies, whether the financial or non-financial, 
statutory requirement for disclosure and related issues in respect to directors’ remuneration 
disclosure requirements in respect to directors’ remuneration are governed by the 
Companies Act 2006 which has incorporated the requirements of the 2002 UK Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations. Beyond this additional non-statutory but quasi-
mandatory requirements are contained within the Financial Service Authority’s listing rules 
– in particular in respect to the approval of share plans by shareholders, the UK Governance 
Code – in particular in respect to the role of the remuneration committee and the design of 
performance related remuneration – the specific financial sector remuneration code, as 
discussed above, and more indirectly by the guidelines of UK institutional investor bodies. 
Beyond this a likely future statutory development is that the shareholders vote on the 
Directors Remuneration Report will become binding. Recently the UK Prime Minister: 
David Cameron committed himself to this development18 – although as yet relevant 
legislation has not been enacted. 
2.4 The Structure and Role of Remuneration Committees in the UK 
Remuneration (compensation (US)) committees with a formalised structure and role were 
largely a child of developments in corporate governance in the US in the 1970s. UK 
companies followed the US model relatively quickly, influenced by globalisation and the 
development of uniform approaches to governance, and perhaps led by those with 
multinational operations and/or dual-listing in the UK and the USA (Main and Johnston, 
1993; Tricker, 1994; and Morck and Steier, 2005). As noted above, formal 
recommendations for companies and other similar entities to set up both audit and 
remuneration committees, if they did not already exist, were contained in the Cadbury 
Report together with guidance as to the structure and role of these committees. These 
recommendations have been carried forward with some revision in the various iterations of 
the Code through to the UK Governance Code of 2010. In that this study covers a number 
of years in which various Codes running through from 1999 to 2010 were operational, the 
                                                          
18See, the BBC interview on 8 January 2012: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16458570 
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description of the role and structure of the remuneration committee below is based on the 
2008 Code19 although differences in the various iterations are small.  
According to the UK Combined Code on corporate governance (FRC, 2008), the 
remuneration committee is a sub-committee of the main board consisting only of non-
executive directors as members. The number of members should be at least three (two for 
small companies) and not more than six. The committee should have a chairman from 
within its membership chosen by the board. The 2008 Combined Code does not specify the 
age of board room directors, but the Companies Act 2006 noted that board officers should 
not be less than 16 years old. Each remuneration committee should determine its meetings’ 
rules and procedures, the suitable time and place for such meetings in frequent format, and 
committee attendance must cover the majority of its members in all meetings so as to direct 
their responsibilities effectively. Members who wish to leave the remuneration committee 
should do so in a timely manner notifying their resignation in writing. The appointment of 
new members is by the consent of the board. All expenses related to the members’ 
attendance to compensation committee meetings would normally be paid, in addition to the 
fixed amounts in the light of the board policy regarding membership, accommodation, 
travel etc. As non-executive directors members of the remuneration committee will 
normally receive a fee but it is not unusual for a, normally relatively small, proportion of 
the fee to be dependent upon attendance at remuneration committee meetings. 
As set out in the Code, the remuneration committee should inter alia monitor, set and 
approve the remuneration plans for the executive directors, evaluate on a continual basis the 
suitability of these packages, assess where appropriate the performance of executive 
directors monitored against these plans and other relevant information, ensure that minutes 
and reports emanating from the meetings of the remuneration committee are available to all 
board members, prepare and adopt the remuneration committee report which will be 
presented to the shareholders having been approved by the whole board.  
As Reports and Codes from Cadbury and Greenbury onwards have stated the primary role 
of the remuneration committee is then to ensure that pay packages should be constructed 
sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required. They also 
                                                          
19The 2008 Combined Code link: http://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/The-
Combined-Code-on-Corporate-Goverance.aspx 
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emphasise the need to focus on the performance-related pay components of such packages 
which should be designed essentially to align the interests of directors and shareholders.  
As such remuneration committees are now firmly embedded in the UK corporate culture, 
and indeed far beyond extending as they do to a whole range of commercial and public 
sector entities. How successful they have been in their ascribed role has been questioned 
periodically with concerns expressed both at the macro level – Has the performance of 
corporate UK improved in the last twenty years? Have they contributed to the widening of 
the gap between the pay of senior executives and average corporate remuneration over this 
period? – to more micro level and operational concerns. These more specific concerns 
include definitions of what constitutes a non-executive director (Main and Johnston, 1993)? 
An issue brought into greater focus by the Walker Report recommendation that the 
chairman of a large financial institution should spend at least 50% of his or her time 
working on behalf of the company. There are also issues as to whether executive directors 
should be allowed to participate in remuneration committee meetings albeit in a non-voting 
capacity (Braiotta and Sommer, 1987; FRC, 2008), questions as to the role and motivations 
of compensation consultants within the pay agenda and beyond this the wider questions 
posed in Gwilliam and Marnet (2009) as to the viability and suitability of a whole 
governance paradigm so heavily dependent upon the role and activities of non-executive 
directors. A number of these questions are addressed and discussed in more detail later in 
this study. 
The establishment of a compensation policy to guide in the process of setting executive pay 
is an important part of the remuneration committee’s role. Based on the 1998 Combined 
Code, Bender and Porter (2003) noted that this policy should frequently be reviewed to 
confirm that remuneration programmes are in accordance with business strategy and assure 
balance in the requirements of their shareholders, regulators and executives. Such a policy 
should be in accordance with the general precepts underlying the setting of executive 
directors’ remuneration - essentially to preserve and attract those who will contribute 
successfully to better corporate progress (Hengartner, 2006). Beyond this overarching 
responsibility, the remuneration committee has the task of making recommendations to the 
board as to the implementation of the compensation policy in relation with setting the pay 
packages of individual directors. In this context the remuneration committee puts a focus on 
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addressing the composition of the reward package, i.e. the proportions of basic salary and 
performance-related payments, the components of performance-related payment, the 
amount of compensation paid to executives for expected performance, how should 
performance be measured, and how should performance targets be determined (Main and 
Johnston, 1993; Bender, 2004; FRC, 2008; Main el al., 2008; FSA, 2010 etc.).  
The remuneration committee also has responsibility, via the board, for appropriate 
disclosure of remuneration policy and specific packages in the directors’ remuneration 
report which is presented to the shareholders at the Annual General Meeting. At a 
minimum the disclosures must comply with the statutory requirements but there is no 
prohibition on further disclosure if the remuneration committee/directors consider that this 
is in the interests of the shareholders and/or wider stakeholders.  
2.5 The Composition of Executive Directors’ Remuneration Package  
In the UK executive directors’ remuneration package typically consist of a number of separate 
compensation components. Typically these will include a basic salary and a number of 
performance related benefits – benefits which may be in the form of cash and/or shares. These 
benefits are normally related to measures of corporate performance both short and long term. 
There may also be pure stock options although these are not as common in the UK as they are 
in the US. Besides these key remuneration components, senior officers might be additionally 
awarded by a supplement package of reimbursements – for instance pension contributions, 
monetary pay allowances for housing etc., performance shares, stock appreciation rights, as 
well as one-off payments such as retention plans, or camouflage payments.  
There is evidence that structures of executive directors’ remuneration are semi-convergent 
on a global basis – but there are still significant differences both in the relative importance 
of the various component parts and also the absolute levels of remuneration. Over time in 
the UK the proportion of remuneration represented by base salary appears to have fallen 
somewhat as compared with specific performance related measures. In 1997, the average 
UK CEO compensation package in the largest UK publicly traded companies consisted of 
53% base salary, 18% annual bonus, and 29% for non-cash items: including share options, 
LTIPs and other components; compared with 44%, 22% and 34% respectively in 2003. 
There was a similar trend in the US – although annual salary constitutes a small percentage 
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of the total than in the UK. The components of the average US CEO pay package from the 
S&P 500 firms contained 34% salary, 20% bonus, and the remainder for equity-based 
components in 1997; for 2003 the corresponding figures were 31%, 20% and 49% (Conyon 
et al., 2005). In fact Conyon et al’s data indicates that equity based remuneration in the US 
is approximately five times higher on average than that in the UK. Not dissimilar results 
were obtained by Fernandes et al. (2010) who using 2006 data for CEO compensation 
found that US CEOs receive a lower proportion of their remuneration in basic salary than 
their counterparts in 14 other countries. The US CEOs compensation packages on average 
comprised 28% salary, 27% bonus, 39% in the form of stock options and restricted shares, 
and 6% for other pay components; whereas the average UK CEO package consisted of 42% 
salary, 19% bonus, 30% options and restricted shares, and 9% other payments and 
allowances. This study suggests that by 2008 the proportion of total compensation of CEOs 
and executive directors (including CEOs) in UK FTSE 350 companies attributable to base 
salary were only 23% and 26% respectively (see Figure 8).  
In terms of overall remuneration there is evidence that US executive director remuneration 
is higher in that in the UK. Conyon et al (2005) suggest that on average it was 1.6 times 
higher in the US than in the UK in 2003. Here however comparisons are complicated by 
factors relating to size and also to differences in structure and composition between UK and 
US boardrooms (historically US boards have had a lower proportion of executive directors 
as compared to non-executive directors as compared with the UK). 
Within these broad categories there is a wealth of diversity in the manner in which 
packages are constructed to fit the circumstances of particular firms and individuals and 
this section seeks to consider further the nature of the separate components and to discuss 
their purpose and importance under the following headings: base salary; annual bonus; 
option grants; long-term incentive plans; retirement plans; benefit-in-kinds allowances; and 
camouflage payments. 
2.5.1 Base Salary  
Prior literature (Murphy, 1999; Paddock, 2003; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007 etc.) regards 
salary as the fundamental cash amount that should be paid for attracting suitably talented 
board members. This amount is determined both by market forces and by the experience 
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and background of the individual. It is normally set for a period of time, typically one year, 
and reviewed at the end of this period. Once agreed the sum is not normally open to 
adjustment in the relative period. Over time the basic pattern is that the base salary either 
holds steady or rises – it is unusual for base salary to be reviewed downward. Kim and 
Nofsinger (2007) noted that executive directors who are risk averse would prefer regular 
increases in basic salary rather than the raises in other pay components which are more 
variable and contingent in terms of outcome. Base salary is important not only in itself but 
because it is frequently benchmark for other bonuses, in particular the annual bonus which 
may well be a proportion or even a multiple of base salary (Murphy, 1999). As noted 
above, in recent years base pay has formed a smaller proportion of the overall remuneration 
package for executive directors – a shift which is normally attributed to a desire to align the 
remuneration of executive directors more closely with the interests of the shareholders.  
There is an extensive literature (Fabozzi and Peterson, 2003; Rogers, 2004; Banks, 2004; 
Mallin, 2007; Kim and Nofsinger, 2007 etc.) that has investigated the determinants of base 
pay. These studies suggest that salaries are dependent not only on the executive 
characteristics (e.g. age, experience, historical performance etc.), but also on a number of 
business features (such as corporate size, capital structure, profitability etc.). Murphy 
(1999) and Kim and Nofsinger (2007) emphasise further the role of comparison and 
benchmarking, usually with industry or sector competitors in the setting of base salaries – a 
trend which may be seen as underpinned by the increasing role and importance of 
remuneration consultants.  
2.5.2 Annual Bonus  
Reaching the appropriate, positive levels of company performance is clearly a major target 
of boardroom executives who are entitled to receive compensation in the form of bonus 
payments (Paddock, 2003). In the UK, bonuses normally comprise either an annual 
payment in cash (cash bonus) or a reward based on the issue of fully paid shares 
(performance bonus) or both – the amount being determined by corporate and individual 
performance during the financial period. As such bonuses may be considered to be rewards 
for prior-achieved performance, while salaries might be seen as a payment contingent upon 
future, as yet unachieved, performance (Kim and Nofsinger, 2007). Therefore the higher 
27 
 
levels of corporate performance in the near-past periods will lead to the higher amounts of 
annual bonuses for executives in the near-future intervals.  
Fabozzi and Peterson (2003) suggest that ideally the assessment of executive bonuses 
should be based on current financial-performing measures as this will link in most directly 
with enhancement of the shareholders’ interests. However this is difficult to implement in 
practice and the majority of the literature (such as Conyon, 1997; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; 
McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Mallin, 2007; Ozkan, 2007; 
Sapp, 2008 etc.) identifies the link between annual bonuses and immediate past metrics 
(such as earnings per share (EPS), earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), economic 
value added (EVA), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), market share price 
etc.). The majority of these relate to accounting number metrics – although they may be at 
an immediate remove from financial numbers (as is the case with metrics involving market 
prices) or linked to non-financial metrics, for example environmental or safety data. In this 
context Murphy (1999) raised questions as to the reliability and value of executive bonus 
plans entirely reliant upon financial metrics as the accounting numbers are, to an extent, 
under the control of executive directors who may be tempted to misuse them in their own 
personal interests. Nevertheless a wealth of prior studies including those of Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Core and Larcker, 2002; Dalton et al., 2003; Adams 
and Mehran, 2005; Belkhir, 2009; Sigler, 2011; Coles et al., 2012 have highlighted the use 
of accounting-based performance indicators – and noted on occasion the role of governance 
structures including audit in controlling and mediating the manner in which the accounting 
numbers are produced.  
2.5.3 Option Grants  
Stock options (i.e. contracts that allow executives to buy and sell shares at a specified price) 
are a dominant equity-pay component in the US but, although certainly not unknown, the 
use of pure options has been much less common in the UK as compared with the issue of 
fully paid shares under a long term incentive plans (discussed further below). The reasons 
for this are not entirely clear but may be embedded in differences in corporate culture 
between the countries. Until now, the recent Code and prior versions did not address in 
detail how share options are determined? - but they highlighted that executive share options 
should not be offered at a discount save as permitted by the relevant listing rules’ 
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provisions, should be weighed against other kinds of long-term incentive scheme, and 
should not be exercisable, in less than three years. Further explanations are provided in 
Chapter 4 re the share options’ calculation according to the guidance of IFRS 2 (Christian 
and Ludenbach, 2013). 
Pure option contracts arguably are the most efficient means of directly aligning the interests 
of the managers with those of the shareholders but a number of factors have acted to limit 
their use within remuneration contracts. Risk averse managers may not wish to offer their 
services if options form a major or dominant part of their remuneration. Corporate 
outcomes are contingent upon a whole range of factors and managerial effort and ability 
does not in itself guarantee successful results. Option based remuneration might also have 
an impact on managerial choice of policy and strategy in that it might encourage managers 
to take more risky decisions than those desired by the shareholders and thereby increasing 
the firm’s risk exposure (Cohen et al., 2000). Conversely Rogers (2005) and Wilkinson 
(2005) argue that managerial stock holding is likely to make managers more risk averse. 
There is also the possibly of manipulation and impropriety. Udemgba and Igwebuike 
(2009) document the scandals surrounding the backdating of options for the benefit of the 
option holders which came to light in the US in 2005.20   
2.5.4 Long-Term Incentive Plans  
Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) are compensation schemes available to board members 
designed to provide motivation for achieving longer term corporate goals and objectives 
(Paddock, 2003; Kim and Nofsinger, 2007; Mallin, 2007 etc.). They are more prevalent in 
the UK than in the US and the majority of large UK companies will have executive director 
remuneration schemes which contain LTIP aspects and features. The linking of executive 
rewards to longer term achievement has been encourage in governance reports and codes 
from Greenbury onwards. Typically LTIPs are constructed so as to link the award of fully 
paid shares with the achievement of longer term targets, frequently updated on a rolling 
basis. These share will not vest – i.e. be transferred to the executives – until a period of 
time, normally three or five years or a combination thereof, after their award. There may 
                                                          
20As Udemgba and Igwebuike (2009) noted that Options’ backdating is regarded as an illegal practice in 
which the institutional shareholders are misled as a result of changing the share contracts due for gaining 
additional funds through issuing these contracts on a later date than which the options have listed, or the 
technique by which the company accounts for the options coincide with low underlying stock prices. 
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well be provisions for the cancellation of all or part of the award if performance outcomes 
turn down during this vesting period – although in practice it is very rare for this to happen.  
As Kim and Nofsinger (2007, p.15) stated, “restricted stock is common stock of the 
company that includes a limitation that requires a certain length of time to pass or a 
certain goal to be achieved before the stock can be sold”. Share restriction therefore is 
regarded as an essential compensation component for encouraging boardroom executives to 
run and act in the favour of company long-run interests (Murphy, 1999; Tyson and 
Bournois, 2005; Thomas et al., 2006; Kay and Van Putten, 2007 etc.). An extreme example 
was posited by Bhagat and Romano (2009) who suggested that managerial incentive 
schemes should comprise only of the potential award of restricted shares and options which 
cannot be sold or exercised until at least two to four years after the executive resignation or 
the last working day in the manner to assure the best efforts of board room members. 
Conventionally designed LTIPs are also seen as removing some of the contingent nature of 
compensation in that there will still be benefits from fully paid shares even if they fall in 
value whereas in the same situation options would be worthless (Tyson and Bournois, 
2005; and Thomas et al., 2006). 
2.5.5 Retirement Plans  
Retirement plans (pensions) for executive directors have received considerable publicity in 
recent years – most notably in relation to the generous pension entitlements available to 
departed executives of failed UK companies – for example RBS and HBOS. In previous 
years disclosures as to pension entitlements and the cost to the company of those 
entitlements were less than fully transparent and the cost of the schemes and this lack of 
transparency has given rise to a degree of conflict between boardrooms and institutional 
investors in some companies (GAO, 2004; and Global Investor, 2010). The great majority 
of schemes at boardroom level (non-executive directors do not normally have a pension 
entitlement) are defined benefit in nature and therefore give rise to a liability which is now 
brought onto the company balance sheet under IAS 19. In recent years these liabilities (and 
the associated charge to the income statement) have grown markedly as a consequence of 
increasing executive compensation, greater longevity and a sharp fall in the rate used to 
discount the liability forward. 
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2.5.6 Benefits-in-kind Allowances 
Benefits-in-kind (such as accommodation benefit, company car allowance, relocation 
expenses, private medical insurance etc.) are generally regarded as indirect benefits 
whereby executive directors receive goods or services free or at greatly reduced cost 
(Murphy, 1999; Paddock, 2003; Kim and Nofsinger, 2007; Mallin, 2007 etc.). Such 
benefits are substantial in nature as they may also incorporate tax advantages either for the 
recipient or for the company (Alcouffe and Alcouffe, 2000). The level of such benefits, 
although not insignificant, is usually a relatively small proportion of overall compensation 
and only occasionally do they attract specific concern and publicity (Murphy, 1999). As the 
1998 Combined Code mentioned that levels of benefits-in-kind and related allowances are 
normally determined by the remuneration committee in accordance with the particular 
circumstances of the company and of individual employees. They are also influenced by the 
nature of the packages offered by industry or sector competitors or by other companies of a 
similar size.  
2.5.7 Camouflage Payments 
The term ‘Camouflage payments’ covers a range of payments and pay related agreements 
which do not appear directly within the basic remuneration package – and as the name 
suggests may be less transparent to shareholders and other stakeholders (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004b). Amongst the range and variety of such payments are included: golden 
hellos; goodbye payments; and executive loans.  
A “golden hello” is, as the name suggests, an incentive offered to attract talented executives 
to join the corporate board room. As such they are relatively transparent in that they would 
normally entail an upfront cash payment or the immediate grant of shares or options 
(Murphy, 1999). To take a US example James McNerney Jr received two separate golden 
hellos from his new employer General Electric as well as compensation for the loss of 
bonuses, options, stocks and options from his previous employer (Creswell, 2006)21. In the 
UK, for instance, AstraZeneca provided a special bonus as “golden hello” worth £4 million 
                                                          
21 See, the New York Times report: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/29/business/29whole.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=138244
3264-JmpoTxitT4wMteu+tq9tBQ 
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for its new CEO, Pascal Soriot, as a compensation for his bonuses’ sacrifice when he left 
Roche.22 
Conversely “golden goodbye” or “parachute” payments refer to rewards received on the 
departure, voluntary or otherwise, of senior executives. In a number of instances these have 
attracted significant adverse publicity being seen as rewards for underachievement or poor 
performance. In the past transparency relating to these payments has been limited 
particularly in relation to whether these payments related to contractual arrangements 
previously entered into or were genuinely ex gratia in nature (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In 
France, for example, Philippe Jaffre´, the former PDG (i.e. Président-directeur général23) of 
Elf Aquitaine Oil Company, received FF 40 million as parachute payment (Alcouffe and 
Alcouffe, 2000). 
Executive loans, frequently granted at preferential rates, have been quite widely used as a 
form of executive compensation in the US in the 1990s and early 2000s but they were 
banned in 2002 – normally for the nominal purpose of assisting senior executives to 
purchase shares or bonds in the company (Kahle and Shastri, 2004). As Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004a) discussed that the companies granting executive loans either at no interest or at 
below the market rate, and in either cases the loans might often be forgiven. WorldCom is 
the most notable case of granting loans to executives which loaned millions of dollars, 
worth approximately 20% of the cash on the firm's balance sheet, to its CEO, Bernard 
Ebbers. Their use in the UK has been much more limited especially in relation to directors 
because of the long standing company law prohibition on companies lending money to 
officers of the company (now contained in CA2006 s197-214). However loans are in fact 
possible subject to agreement by a resolution of the members of the company (CA2006, 
section 197) - but this is rare, if not unheard of, for quoted companies. 
Beyond this a range of implicit or explicit remuneration might be available, for example 
making up tax clawbacks on pension arrangements, future consultancy work or work as a 
director of an associate or related pension company etc. Again although the numbers are 
not normally very large proportionate to the main remuneration package they do again raise 
                                                          
22 See, the FiercePharma report:   
http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/uk-funds-lambaste-astrazeneca-ceos-4m-golden-hello/2013-04-16 
23This title is a French business title and office equivalent to both the chairman of a board of directors and a 
chief executive officer. 
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issues of approval, disclosure and transparency. Here one particular example is the common 
practice of executive directors being allowed, and on occasion encouraged, to take up non-
executive director positions with other companies. 
To conclude – the nature of the executive remuneration package is typically twofold. The 
first part – which might be characterised as the stable element is that constituted by base 
executive compensation (for example salaries, pensions and allowances) which are to an 
extent independent of the level of company performance. The second part, which is likely 
to exhibit much greater variability (for example bonuses, options, LTIPs and other equity 
incentives) which have a more direct relationship with corporate progress and success 
(Greenbury, 1995). As such performance-related compensation is seen as more efficient in 
aligning the interests of executives and shareholders as compared with the more fixed 
elements of remuneration. As Spong and Sullivan (2007, p.4) stated, “Owner managers will 
not only benefit financially from their salaries in running a bank, but, as stockholders, they 
will also be rewarded for good performance through their claim to bank earnings and 
capital appreciation. Hired managers with little or no stockholdings, on the other hand, 
will have their principal compensation coming through their salary”. Therefore, the 
ownership package of executive directors is regarded as an important instrument of 
corporate governance in mitigating the agency problem between the agents and the 
principals. 
2.6 The Transparency of Executive Directors’ Remuneration in the UK 
Do corporate stakeholders, and in particular the shareholder body, actually receive 
sufficient information about executive directors’ remuneration in a comprehensible and 
understandable form? In the US, Kim and Nofsinger (2007) called for further disclosures to 
institutional shareholders as to the amounts and composition of the remuneration obtained 
by corporate CEOs and other boardroom executives – suggesting that disclosures were less 
detailed when company performance was at a low ebb. Others too have noted a contrast 
between the trend toward increased CEO remuneration and relatively flat overall economic 
performance. For example, Hall and Liebman (1998) reported that the CEOs’ direct 
remuneration (including salary, bonus, and option grants) increased by 136% at the median 
and 209% at the mean in a sample of the largest US companies from 1980 to 1994, while 
the overall firm profitability was decreasing. Another example, Fabozzi and Peterson 
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(2003) noted that the CEO of AT&T Company received salary and bonus of $5.2 million 
and options valued at $11 million in 1995 – but the shareholder body were unhappy as the 
average annual return on AT&T shares from 1996 till 2001 was negative by 23.19%. 
In the UK Greenbury (1995) highlighted disclosure and transparency as a fundamental 
principle underlying the governance aspects of board room compensation. As noted above, 
historically the statutory requirements were very limited and disclosure beyond these 
requirements was largely voluntary albeit more recently strongly encouraged by Greenbury 
and the Combined Code. For quoted companies the level of statutory disclosure was greatly 
enhanced by the requirements of the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002). 
This required a special report to be laid before the shareholders at an annual general 
meeting which should, inter alia, contain disclosure of individual amounts paid to each 
director differentiated between fixed, variable and share-based compensations. These 
requirements are now contained in the Companies Act 2006.  
According to the Section 420(1) of the UK Companies Act (2006), UK quoted companies 
have to prepare Directors Remuneration Reports (DRRs) for each accounting period. 
Details as to the disclosure requirements are contained in Schedule 8 of the Act. A checklist 
of these requirements for quoted companies under the Companies Act (2006) is to be found 
in Deloitte (2008)24. Following a developed proposal for the reform of the disclosure and 
corporate governance framework for executive directors’ remuneration of quoted 
companies was issued by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) in June 
201225, a second version of the draft was published on 12 March 201326 and is coming into 
force on 1st October 2013. This amended draft proposed that the directors’ remuneration 
report will be categorised in two key parts. First part contains a prospect policy of 
remuneration which should be approved by the shareholders at least every three years, 
                                                          
24Deloitte (2008, April), Directors’ Remuneration Disclosure Checklist for Quoted Companies: 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Services/Audit/Corporate%20Governance/Checklists/uk-
audit-cg-directors-remuneration-checklist-nov11.pdf 
25Directors’ Pay – Consultation on Revised Remuneration Reporting Regulations: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31358/12-888-directors-pay-
consultation-remuneration-reporting.pdf 
26The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 
2013: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/138335/bis-13-717-
draft-large-and-medium-sized-companies-and-groups-accounts-and-reports-amendment-regulations-
2013.pdf 
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under the proposed new Section 439A of the Act. Second part comprises of an 
implementation report of remuneration which will be required per annum and will be 
subject to an advisory vote in accordance with Section 439 of the Act. 
Responsibility for the preparation of the DRR lies immediately with the company registrar 
(Section 441(1) CA 2006). The DRR should be presented to all interested parties - such as 
institutional shareholders, debenture holders, and other members - at the Annual General 
Meetings (Section 423(1) - Companies Act, 2006). Section 439(4) of the Companies Act 
2006 requires that the shareholders should vote to approve or otherwise the DRR presented 
to them. Although this vote is advisory only nevertheless any significant opposition to a 
DRR is taken as a signal of shareholder dissatisfaction and may well influence company 
behaviour in respect to actual or future remuneration packages. Recent examples of 
shareholder dissatisfaction include votes at Aviva, Centrica and Barclays27 and, as 
documented in Chapter 6 of this thesis, at BP case study analysis.  
According to Schedule 7A of the Companies Act 1985 which sets out the content of 
Directors’ Remuneration Report and by which the 2002 UK Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Regulations (FRC, 2002) 28 contained further guidance, certain parts of the DRR are 
required to be audited by the company’s statutory auditor. Information that has to be 
audited includes the numerical amounts relating to emoluments and compensations, stock 
options, LTIPs, pensions and retirement benefits, and external directorship fees. Aspects 
which are not subject to audit include matters relating to directors’ remuneration, the 
remuneration policy statement, the performance review and details of service contracts 
which cover the associated factors for the pay framework. Section 497 of the Companies 
Act (2006) sets merely out those parts of the DRR which are subject to audit. This auditable 
part is further identified under Section 421 of the Act (2006) which highlights that the 
                                                          
27See, the Guardian report:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/may/03/aviva-shareholder-rebellion-executive-pay 
See, the Telegraph report: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/9261237/Centrica-
shareholders-revolt-against-executive-pay.html 
See, the Telegraph report: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9229527/Third-of-Barclays-
shareholders-set-to-vote-against-chief-Bob-Diamonds-remuneration-package.html 
See, the Huffington Post report:  
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/05/25/hsbc-10-of-shareholders-v_n_1545586.html 
28The UK DRRR 2002 – Statutory Instruments link: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/pdfs/uksi_20021986_en.pdf 
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possibility of Secretary of State to make provision by regulations as to what is to be the 
auditable part of the DRR. Further insights has been included in the 2013 proposed draft of 
the disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration reports regarding the auditable aspects 
of the DRR, including total amounts of remuneration for each director and their related 
definitions, additional disclosure of the payment amounts, pension entitlements, variable 
pay awarded in relation the achievement of performance conditions in the future, statement 
of performance targets, and loss of office payments – but still certain aspects are not subject 
to audit, such as statement of directors’ shareholding and share interests, the performance 
review, percentage increase in remuneration of CEO, matters relating to directors’ 
remuneration, and statement of shareholder voting.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an introductory overview of the institutional and regulatory 
background of boardroom executive compensation. It sketches out the relevant history as it 
has developed from a situation where directors’ remuneration was very much a matter 
internal to the company, its board and the shareholders to the present day situation where 
there are wider influences from both guidance and statute. Guidance has come with the 
recommendations of various reporting bodies, most notably the Greenbury Committee 
(Greenbury, 1995), carried forward in various iterations of the Combined Code and now 
incorporated into the UK Governance Code (FRC, 2012). It is also contained in statute, 
most notably in the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulation (FRC, 2002) now carried 
forward into the 2006 Companies Act. Particular provisions relating to the banking sector 
building on the work of the Walker Report are also considered. 
Further to this the focus turns to remuneration committees, their composition and structure, 
and their role in setting a framework for executive director compensation. Beyond this the 
remuneration committee has the task of sustaining the alignment of executive directors’ pay 
to company performance. This association opens the arguments on the performance role of 
remuneration committees not only in designing and policing the executive pay contracts 
(Main and Johnston, 1993), but also in choosing and arranging a compensation package in a 
manner that ensure the effectiveness of boardroom members in taking efficient decisions in 
the best favour of the corporate performance (Main el al., 2008). This in turn leads on to 
consideration of components of the typical remuneration package either linked or not to 
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performance with reference to: base salary, annual bonus, share options, long term 
incentive plans, retirement benefits, benefits in kind and finally a general category loosely 
termed camouflage payments. 
 The final section of the chapter focuses on requirements for disclosure and wider aspects 
of transparency as contained within the Directors Remuneration Report. The importance of 
this Report as a means of communication between the company and its wider stakeholders, 
in particular the shareholders, was highlighted. There was also reference to the increasing 
willingness of shareholders to register dissatisfaction with all or part of the remuneration 
policy and structure of the company by voting against the Directors Remuneration Report 
at a company general meeting. In this context the proposals to make the relevant 
shareholder vote binding not advisory were noted. 
Going forward the next chapter provides a more detailed review of literature covering 
linkages between managerial compensation and company performance identifying a 
number of gaps in the extant literature. Literature relating to underlying conceptual issues 
and theoretical perspectives is reviewed so as to ground the present study within a wider 
framework from which relevant hypotheses can be developed and tested. In this respect 
chapter three explores prior literature on executive compensation and firm performance 
associations, identifies any gaps in the existing literature, outlines the theoretical 
framework adopted by the current study, and provides the implications of the underlying 
conceptual structure on pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks.  
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework on 
Executive Compensation and Company Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the introduction and background contained in Chapters One and 
Two in two ways. First, it identifies prior literature which has examined the relationships 
between executive pay and firm performance, noting areas which to date have been 
relatively under-researched. Second, it provides a review of underlying theoretical 
perspectives which are employed by prior literature as a means either to establish the 
appropriate procedures for setting executive compensation or to act as explicators for the 
type of structures of these pay packages. Such theoretical framework provides support in 
depicting the conceptual structure for the study's objectives and the required guidance in 
explaining such linkage between managerial compensation and company performance. 
This chapter therefore is organised as follows. After this brief introduction the second 
section provides a review of the implications of relevant prior literature on the linkages 
between executive compensation and company performance. The third section highlights 
the gaps in existing academic literature, and explores possible reasons for the failure of 
prior studies to establish consistent results. The fourth section covers a number of diverse, 
but interrelated, theoretical perspectives which support either the examination of the 
interrelationships between executive pay and firm performance (that would conform with 
the purpose of the empirical study) or the assessment of the appropriate mechanisms and 
procedures for setting executive remuneration (that would fit with the nature and scope of 
the case study). The fifth section emphasises the implications of these theoretical 
perspectives on pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks. The final section 
provides an overall conclusion regarding the literature review and theoretical framework. 
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3.2 Literature Review– Discussion of Prior Research on Executive Compensation 
and Company Performance Relationships 
Associations between boardroom compensation and institutional performance have 
frequently been a key axis of debates within the overall corporate governance framework 
and the last two decades have witnessed a widening and intensification of academic study 
and investigation of the relevant phenomena. Accordingly this review of the prior literature 
highlights recent empirical research on the linkage between pay and performance (in the 
UK and elsewhere), with a particular focus on the contribution of academic literature in  
examining the two-way relationships between the level and structure of executive pay and 
corporate performance within a set of corporate governance mechanisms.  
The primary focus of prior studies has been on the pay-performance link which highlights 
the effect of firm performance levels on the type and amount of executive directors’ 
remuneration based on the theoretical perspectives of pure agency and managerial 
hegemony, thereby largely abstracting from the potential endogenous associations between 
performance and compensation packages. Across the spectrum of empirical studies the 
results have overall been mixed with a dichotomy between those studies which report a 
direct association between executive compensation and firm performance and those which 
find at best a weak relationship or indeed none at all when other interconnected indicators 
(such as corporate size, mechanisms of governance and ownership etc.) are taken into 
account.  
Perhaps the majority of early UK empirical studies on executive pay and company 
performance fall into the latter category. These include those of Gregg et al., 1993, 2011; 
Conyon et al., 1995; Conyon, 1997; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Conyon and Peck, 1998; 
Conyon and Sadler, 2001. Whilst finding some direct linkage between pay and performance 
the relationship tended to be a weak one and many other factors were also identified as 
intervening in or influencing the relationship as direct, but heavily linked by weak 
sensitivity. For example, Gregg et al. (1993) reported a weak sensitivity in pay-for-
performance association for 288 firms over the years 1983-1991. Gregg et al. (2011) found 
that the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial companies (comprising 
banks, insurance companies, and real estate and speciality finance firms) is not significantly 
higher than non-financial firms for 415 UK companies, included 59 financial institutions, 
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over the period 1994 to 2006. Conyon et al. (1995) also reported that the pay-for-
performance link was neither strong nor consistent by providing an example of one UK 
Company (i.e. Arjo Wiggins Appleton PLC, as ranked 71 in the Times Top 1000) in 1995 
because it did provide good information on executive compensation at that year. Conyon 
(1997) looked only at cash pay for a sample of 213 large UK companies between 1988 and 
1993, and again found only a weak relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
current and pre-dated shareholder returns highlighting in this instance the importance of 
remuneration committees in influencing remuneration. Cosh and Hughes (1997) concluded 
that executive compensation positively related to both shareholder profitability and share 
returns and to size but that the latter was the most significant influence for 64 UK electrical 
engineering companies over the years 1989-1994. Conyon and Peck (1998) found the 
alignment between top management pay and firm performance is weak in companies 
without outsiders-dominated boards and remuneration committees for a sample of 94 FTSE 
100 companies over the period 1991-1994. Conyon and Sadler (2001) found the link 
between managerial pay and performance was small and weak for 532 executive within 100 
large UK stock market companies in 1997. Beyond this they also considered a preliminary 
framework for study of the alternative performance-pay association reviewing the 
theoretical evidence on the tournament models and their role in incentivising lower level 
executives by means of generous remuneration packages for higher level executives. 
A number of studies have gone beyond immediate cash compensation to include equity 
based compensation and other benefits. In the UK Main et al. (1996) was among the first 
academic studies that utilised the value of option grants as an indicator of equity-based 
compensation besides the cash pay components to yield a comprehensive total 
remuneration figure for the highest paid director for a sample of 60 companies for the 
period 1983–1989. They found limited sensitivity of total compensation including share 
options to share performance. In contrast McKnight and Tomkins (1999) demonstrated a 
strong pay-performance link between executive director remuneration and accounting 
profits and total shareholder return across a sample of 109 companies from 1991-1995. 
They were the first academic study for the UK context to split total remuneration into 
salary, annual bonus and share options to verify how each component is related to 
performance. They also found significant results when they broke down the compensation 
packages into their separate components, in particular noting that base salary was largely 
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influenced by company size and that although the linkage between base salary and firm 
performance was positive it was weak in nature and significance.  
Although the results of UK focused research have been mixed and inconclusive, research in 
the US has suggested a clearer link between senior level compensation and firm 
performance. These studies include those of Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 
1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Attaway, 2000; Rupp and Smith, 2002; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003, 2004b; Conyon et al., 2005 etc. Jensen and Murphy (1990) reported no 
correlation between pay and performance for a sample of 2,213 US CEOs from 1,400 
companies over the period between 1974 and 1986 – as chief executive officers’ wealth 
rises by only $3.25 for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth. In this line, Attaway 
(2000) found again a weak association between compensation (salary plus bonus) and firm 
performance, measured by ROE, for a relatively small sample of 215 US CEOs from 42 
firms in the computer and electronics industry over the years 1992-1996. In the contrast, 
Hall and Liebman (1998) found a strong significant link between compensation, measured 
by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and options, and performance for 15-year 
panel data set (1980-1994) of CEOs in 478 large US companies. They reported an increase 
of the remuneration of the median CEO by more than 50% for a moderate change in 
company performance, which represents an in CEO wealth of $1.8 million. Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) found also positive link between total compensation for the top five 
executives (ranked annually by salary and bonus) and performance at 1500 of the largest 
US publicly traded corporations over the period between 1993 and 1996. Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003) reported that weak corporate governance structure leads to an inefficient 
design of compensation contracts due to the influence of managerial power. For instance, 
compensation for CEOs and top executive members will be higher in firms where they have 
more power, or the board is relatively weak. In 2004 they analysed theoretically stealth 
compensation, known as camouflage payments, in terms of retirement benefits provided to 
directors of public companies in the US context, and suggested several changes in 
disclosure requirements aimed at putting retirement payments on shareholders’ radar 
screens. They reported also that high compensation may reflect the power of managers in 
designing their pay packages and indeed indicates weak governance of the company. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter Two, Conyon et al. (2005) provided an empirical comparative 
study between US and UK CEO compensation - comprising the total of cash pay, stock and 
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option grants, and other pay - in cross section and in time for two separate years 1997 and 
2003, based on 1,663 US and 235 UK CEOs in 1997 and 1,495 US and 240 UK CEOs in 
2003. They examined whether the US CEO pay appears unusually high by utilising the UK 
CEO compensation as a benchmark, and reported that US CEOs have higher compensation 
and much higher incentives than UK CEOs. 
Executive compensation studies have been carried out against a background of changes in 
the overall governance paradigm, as described in Chapters One and Two. A number of 
studies have sought to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms over time 
on the level and structure of executive compensation (Ozkan, 2007; Sapp, 2008 etc.), or the 
indicators of firm performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Berger et al., 2005; Abdullah 
and Page, 2009; Brown and Caylor, 2009 etc.), or the relationship between pay and 
performance (Conyon, 1997; Lee et al., 2008 etc.). Regarding the pay-governance link, 
Ozkan (2007) investigated the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the level 
of CEO compensation for a sample of 414 large UK companies for the fiscal year 2003/4. 
Ozkan (2007) found that firms with larger board size and higher proportion of non-
executive directors pay their CEOs higher compensation, while there is a significant 
negative relationship between institutional ownership and block-holder ownership and CEO 
compensation. Sapp (2008) examined the relationship between the compensation of the top 
five executives at a set of 416 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and 
external corporate governance-related factors over the period from 2000 to 2005. Sapp 
(2008) concluded that variances in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation 
committee, and board of directors as internal measures of corporate governance do 
influence both the amount and structure of executive compensation; whilst different types 
of shareholders and competitive environments as external indicators of governance do 
affect executive compensation.  
According to performance-governance relationship, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) used 
seven factors of corporate governance and suggested that these factors are interdependent 
and that no one governance structure suits all firms. They found significant linkages 
between firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, and four of the governance 
mechanisms for a sample of 383 large US companies in 1987. Abdullah and Page (2009) 
found variability in the association between governance mechanisms (i.e. board 
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independence and size, and block and directors’ holdings) and performance indicators (e.g. 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ratio of sales to total assets) in FTSE 350 companies over two three-
year sub-periods 1999-2001 and 2002-2004. They also found little evidence that 
independence or board size is related to either Q or ROA, whereas they both have a strong 
negative association with Sales Asset Turnover during both sub-periods. Brown and Caylor 
(2009) utilised 51 individual governance factors provided by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) and related them to operating performance measures (i.e. ROA and ROE) 
for 2363 US firms in 2003. They found six corporate governance provisions that are 
significantly and positively associated with ROA, ROE or both. 
Regarding the link of governance mechanisms on the linkage between compensation and 
performance, Conyon (1997) concluded that large UK companies that adopted 
remuneration committees are seen generally to have lower growth rates in top managerial 
compensation, whilst the separation of CEO and chairman roles appeared to play no part in 
shaping directors’ remuneration. Lee el al. (2008) looked only at a compensation element 
(i.e. dispersion of compensation across managers) and its impact on firm performance, 
measured by Tobin’s Q or stock performance, for the listed US firms over the years 1992–
2003. They found company performance is positively linked to the dispersion of 
managerial compensation, and good structure of corporate governance in terms of board 
independence strengthens the positive relationship between firm performance and pay 
dispersion. 
Academic literature using data from countries other than the UK and US (Kaplan, 1994a, 
1998; Kato, 1997 in Japan; Kaplan, 1994b, 1998 in Germany; Zhou, 2000; Sapp, 2008 in 
Canada; Matolcsy, 2000 in Australia) have again suggested mixed relationship between 
boardroom remuneration package and company performance although significance levels 
have not always been that high. The findings of these studies also indicate that trend of pay-
performance sensitivity may not only be company specific, but are also likely to be 
influenced by country-level institutional and cultural features. For example, Kaplan (1994a) 
found a negative linkage between managerial pay and firm efficiency for 119 large 
Japanese companies over the period 1982-1984, while in 1997 Kato found positive 
relationship between CEO compensation of 154 large Japanese firms and company 
performance, measured by ROA, during the 1985 year. Also Zhou (2000) reported positive 
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and robust association between executive compensation (measured by salary and bonus, 
and total cash pay including long-term incentives) and corporate performance for a sample 
of 775 Canadian companies over the period 1991-1995. Sapp (2008) demonstrated similar 
direct links between higher executives’ pay and firm performance for 416 Canadian 
companies over the years 2000-2005. In Germany Kaplan (1994b) reached similar findings 
to the results of his research in Japan context. Matolcsy in 2000 reported that executive 
directors’ bonuses are the largest component of compensation in major Australian 
companies and are based mainly on the accounting performance measures rather than the 
market indicators. It also highlighted the influence of the status of the economy on the 
setting of target annual performance. In terms of a link between pay and performance, no 
significant association between cash compensation and corporate performance were found 
during periods of economic downturn but positive associations did exist during the periods 
of economic growth for a random selected sample of 100 Australian companies, in which 
the finance sector (including banking, investment, and insurance firms) is represented by 15 
companies, over the period between 1987 and 1995.  
In recent years a growing number of researchers have investigated the influence of 
executive directors’ remuneration on firm performance via conceptualising remuneration as 
a promotion tool (Devers et al., 2007) - in which compensation package can be adopted as a 
predictor rather than a predicted variable. Consequently the theoretical perspectives of 
stewardship and/or tournament might perhaps be introduced as alternative approaches to 
the linkage between executive directors’ remuneration and firm performance through 
adopting attractive and/or sufficient incentive plan for enhancing prospect company 
performance. The majority of academic studies which adopted the impact of executive 
directors’ remuneration on company performance are largely witnessed in the US. For 
example, Falato et al. (2011) examine empirically the linkage between CEO productive 
abilities and their compensation, and conclude that total compensation of CEOs is 
positively associated with their talents for a sample of 2,195 US CEO succession events 
from 20,904 firm-year observations over the period 1993-2005, which is consistent with the 
argument that talented CEOs have superior ability to make value-added decisions for 
shareholders. An earlier study Leonard (1990) examined the effects of executive 
compensation policy on the corporate performance, and reported a strong significant link 
between long-term incentives of executive directors and ROE for a sample of 439 large US 
45 
 
companies over the period between 1981 and 1985. Mehran (1995) examined the executive 
directors’ remuneration structure of 153 US manufacturing companies over a two-year 
period (1979-1980), and found that the percentage of equity, shares and options held by 
executive members was directly related to firm value proxies (Tobin’s Q and ROA). Smith 
(2008) focuses on the compensation packages of a large sample, 15,611, of CEOs of US 
firms over the period 1993 till 2002 to determine whether equity “flow” incentives improve 
company performance. The study found CEOs’ stock options and bonuses were positively 
related to both market valuation measures (Tobin’s Q) and operating performance measures 
(ROA). As noted above, Lee el al. (2008) investigated the performance-pay framework for 
the listed US firms over the years 1992–2003, and reported a positive and robust 
association between corporate performance and the dispersion of managerial compensation. 
To date there have been few, if any, UK empirical studies which have investigated this 
phenomenon although as noted above Conyon and Sadler (2001) did extend their pay-
performance approach toward a performance-pay basic framework by reviewing the 
evidence on tournament theory, but did not carry out a consistent empirical investigation in 
relation to the latter. They established a relationship between company performance and 
managerial incentives controlled only by volatility and market value, and reported a 
positive and robust association between ROA and total board pay-performance sensitivity 
for 100 large UK companies in the fiscal year 1997/8. After showing findings, they stated 
on page 164 that “However, we are keen to emphasize the exploratory nature of our results 
and our desire to stimulate further research in this area. The effect of incentives on firm 
performance is perhaps the acid test of whether the corporate governance system is 
working well or not.”   
To date the performance-pay association has received less attention in prior literature, 
although the focus of modern management strategies has shifted toward an emphasis on the 
manner in which the overall company performance will be enhanced through providing an 
attractive and/or sufficient reward scheme for their board room members (Falato et al., 
2011; and Lazear, 1998), consistent with stewardship and/or tournament perspectives.  
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3.3 Literature Gap in Executive Compensation and Company Performance 
Relationships 
Relationships between managerial compensation and corporate performance have been 
widely aired, considered and investigated in academic literature since the 1970s. The 
research has focused on normative (i.e. explicative) studies of how executive compensation 
packages should be, or are actually, set, based on a number of theoretical perspectives 
including agency, managerial hegemony, tournament, legitimacy, institutional, social 
networks, stewardship, etc. The majority of empirical studies have tried to relate the 
amount and type of executive pay packages to certain company related variables (such as 
shareholders’ ownership, boardroom size, duality role, etc.), or to establish relationships 
between the nature of executive remuneration and firm performance. These studies have 
yielded conflicting results and are beset by issues of causality, timing, data availability and 
structure, etc. 
This literature utilised executive pay as either a predictor, or a predicted variable within the 
framework of the relationship between managerial compensation and company 
performance; and also the manner in which this relationship is influenced by a variety of 
other variables (including corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure, 
boardroom structure and composition, and a variety of firm related characteristics – size, 
growth, leverage, sector etc.). However in these studies the direction and size of the 
relationship between executive pay and firm performance has been considered largely from 
the perspective of a pay-performance framework, with less focus in the literature on 
theoretical or empirical examination within a performance-pay framework. Therefore, the 
current research seeks first to extend the existing empirical investigation beyond the focus 
on a single impact between pay and performance by conducting a detailed comparative 
study using a large sample of more recent UK data subsequent to a series of UK reports 
being issued to strengthen the internal corporate governance (including the 1992 Cadbury 
report, the 1995 Greenbury report, the 1998 Hampel report, the 2002 UK Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations, the 2003 Higgs report, the 2006 Companies Act, and the 
2008 Combined Code).  
As noted above, with relatively few exceptions, there has been little empirical or qualitative 
based work focused within a performance-pay framework. In the UK a single quantitative 
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empirical study has been identified (Conyon and Sadler, 2001), while the academic 
literature contains little in the way of qualitative type archival work which seeks to obtain a 
greater understanding of the reality of the manner in which executive compensation is set. 
Bender (2003, 2007) and Main et al. (2008) are seen as intended to approach such issues 
from either a theoretical or qualitative perspective through utilising the interview-based 
approach in the UK context. Bender (2003) addressed the question ‘how is the directors’ 
remuneration determined?’ by conducting 11 interviews with executives, non-executive 
directors and their consultants involved in the remuneration-setting process to determine 
the processes undertaken and the factors affecting their decisions at two UK utility 
companies. Bender (2003) analysed the results through two theoretical lenses (institutional 
and legitimacy theories), and found that the amount and composition of compensation were 
generally influenced by the market, however two separate market-based indicators were 
used - salaries were determined based on the market comprising companies in the same 
sector, or in the same FTSE grouping; whilst a different market is utilised to determine 
company performance when evaluating LTIPs. Bender (2007) examined a number of the 
underlying reasons for the continued increase in executive compensation by reporting the 
findings of 40 interviews with the key people involved in the remuneration debate at twelve 
UK listed companies. Based on agency and expectancy theories, Bender (2007) reported 
that remuneration policies have become more performance-related, and showed that 
changes in schemes are made to motivate the board executives for obtaining rewards when 
they can meet the required targets. Main et al. (2008) explored the adequacy of the agency 
approach in representing how remuneration committees design executive compensation 
contracts by interviewing 22 members of various UK remuneration committees in 2006. 
They suggested that remuneration committees seek legitimacy for their decisions by 
recourse to norms and rules for the purpose of isomorphism in process and practice. 
This study then seeks to address this perceived gap in the existing literature in the UK by 
providing initial results of a large scale quantitative study which encompasses aspects of 
both the pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks with the ambition to determine 
whether managerial compensation is the greater influence on firm performance or whether 
it is the latter which has the greater influence on the former? It also seeks to extend existing 
qualitative research by means of case study work using a major UK based multi-national as 
the research site – again approaching the relevant issues within a wider theoretical field 
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than that utilised by the majority of previous studies. Therefore, the second ambition of the 
current research is to conduct an archive-based case research with the aim to investigate, if 
any, the behavioural and institutional factors, in particular those relating to the 
remuneration committee, which play a significant role in determining the composition and 
size of executive compensation by reviewing what is possible to learn from the information 
contained in the Directors Remuneration Reports. These issues have not specifically been 
addressed by previous studies. 
Overall, the major contribution or originality of the extant study is to empirically examine 
the interrelationships between managerial compensation and company performance in 
FTSE 350 companies, and to qualitatively investigate and understand the mechanisms and 
structures which determine executive compensation packages in the particular multinational 
company in question. Therefore, a collaborative study is needed to quantitatively and 
qualitatively examine the associations between executive directors’ remuneration and 
company performance. 
3.4 Underlying Theoretical Frameworks - Executive Compensation and Company 
Performance 
Over the years a number of diverse, but interrelated, theoretical structures that have been 
developed which have sought either to normatively establish appropriate mechanisms and 
procedures for setting senior executive remuneration or to act as explicators for the type of 
structures that exist and the manner in which they have developed and changed. These 
theoretical approaches are themselves rich and varied but here it is sought to categorise 
them in terms of their general approach and tenor under the following headings: agency; 
managerial hegemony; stewardship; tournament; and institutional. 
3.4.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory - widely defined - has had a very significant influence in the economics and 
finance literature extending back for many decades (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Its 
specific application to the theory of the firm and managerial compensation in particular 
emphasises, in its most simplistic form, the contradictory motivations of professional 
managers of firms (the agents) who are hypothesised to be seeking to obtain high rewards 
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whilst minimising their effort and the owners of firms (the principals) whose ambition is to 
maximise their returns from ownership within appropriate risk categories. In their classic 
book Berle and Means (1932) drew to the wider public attention the increasing separation 
between the class of professional managers and a diverse collection of owners, individuals, 
institutional shareholders etc and provided an initial discussion of the problems arising 
therefrom. From the 1970s onwards the application of agency theory notions to the theory 
of the firm and issues of compensation became increasingly more sophisticated with a 
particular focus on the information asymmetry between agents and principals. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) provided a more formalised analysis of the incentives of the various 
parties and how they might be resolved by the writing of appropriate contracts 
incorporating both incentive based pay and monitoring. They also highlighted the 
incentives for managers operating in a rational expectations type world to voluntarily 
engage in signalling or monitoring activities to demonstrate to their intention to act in the 
best interests of the principals. As relating to management compensation per se and the 
endeavour to align the interests of principals and agents, the agency theory literature has 
developed two separate strands. One focuses on behaviour-based contracts where 
compensation is related to organisational hierarchies, the other on outcome-related 
contracts whereby rewards are more closely related to actual or perceived performance. The 
former type of contract is primarily fixed in its structure and amount whereas the latter 
contains far more variation in structure and amount (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, for both 
types of contract the underlying issue is how to design an agreement which will be optimal 
in seeking to align the interests of the agents and principals and to mitigate agency costs 
associated with the fundamentally different desires and utility functions of managers and 
principals within a world of asymmetric information (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1995; Subramaniam, 2006 etc.).  
3.4.2 Managerial Hegemony Theory 
In recent years perspectives as to the power and influence exerted directly and indirectly by 
executive management, perspectives which may be loosely classified as managerial 
hegemony theory, have become more prominent in the literature relating to executive 
compensation and the theory of the firm more widely (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; 
Bebchuck et al., 2002; Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Sapp, 2008). Drawing on insights from 
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sociology and political science this literature, as it relates to executive compensation, 
emphasises both the behavioural nature of the process whereby executive compensation is 
determined and the manner in which executives at, or close to, board level are enabled to 
exercise influence over the nature of their contracts and obligations and directly or 
indirectly over their level of remuneration. Put simply executives’ power is seen as playing 
a significant role in designing the level and structure of their pay packages (Bebchuk et al., 
2002). As Bebchuk and Fried (2004b, p.80) noted, “… the managerial power approach 
predicts that compensation packages will be more favorable to managers in firms in which 
managers have relatively more power”. This power can take a number of forms, for 
example in terms of influence over the nomination of non-executive directors, the 
identification of the nature of remuneration contracts, and provision of information to board 
members and other parties - information which is likely to impact directly upon perceptions 
of activities and outcomes and feed through into decisions as to executive compensation. 
Within this general framework, Bebchuk et al. (2002) introduce and analyse specifically 
three relevant aspects which they term: rent extraction, outrage cost, and camouflage. ‘Rent 
extraction’ by senior executives is defined by Bebchuk et al. (2002; p.783) as, “... value in 
excess of that which they would receive under optimal contracting ...” - and is directly 
related to the more power senior executives have. ‘Outrage cost’ is seen as having a 
moderating influence on rent extraction - as Bebchuk et al. (2002; p.783) clarified: “... Rent 
extraction might give rise to outrage on the part of observers about whose views directors 
and managers care. This outrage can in turn impose costs on directors and managers, 
thereby discouraging the adoption of some arrangements favorable to managers.” Outrage 
costs – which may include costs associated with a concern to protect reputation and social 
position within and without the company – therefore act as a constraint on senior 
executives’ pay packages and in particular that of a CEO who is likely to be the highest 
profile senior executive. ‘Camouflage’ is a strategy whereby senior executives dress up and 
package their remuneration contracts so as to prevent or reduce outrage cost - as Bebchuk 
et al. (2002; p.783) stated: “... managers’ attempts to hide, obscure, and justify various 
aspects of their compensation in order to reduce outrage.” Camouflage may take the form 
of introducing sufficient complexity into the contractual arrangements so as to make it 
difficult to establish either the total amount of remuneration or the basis on which it is 
determined. It may also take the form of representing the nature of the remuneration 
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contract as one which is in accordance with the principles of optimal contracting in terms of 
aligning the interests of shareholders and other parties - representation which may itself 
entail suggestion of a need for complexity so as to best achieve this alignment. 
3.4.3 Stewardship Theory 
Whilst stewardship theory may be considered to lie within an agency framework, very 
widely defined, it derives and imports many of its insights from the disciplines of sociology 
and psychology (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and offers 
perspectives on issues of managerial compensation which can be quite different from those 
drawn from more conventional agency theory analysis. In particular it welcomes the 
reallocation of company control from principals to agents in order to help in enhancing the 
advancement and performance of complex organizations for the benefit of shareholders and 
wider stakeholders (Donaldson, 1985; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Donaldson, 1995; Davis 
et al, 1997; Alam, 2006). Whereas under conventional agency theory senior managers are 
characterised as individualistic and self-serving, stewardship theory perceives them to act 
collectively and to be trustworthy in the sense that they will not allow personal motivations 
to override their role as managing the assets of the entity for the benefit of owners and other 
stakeholders. In turn this greatly reduces the emphasis to be placed on the need to seek to 
robustly align their pay packages with company performance. 
Whilst both conventional agency theory and stewardship theory highlight the benefits that 
can be obtained from professional management in terms of knowledge, expertise, day to 
day operational control and the advantages that might be obtained therefrom (Barney, 1991; 
Castanias and Helfat, 1991), stewardship theory plays down the need for remuneration 
contracts to seek to mitigate the potentially dysfunctional aspects of the relationship 
between managers and owners and instead emphasises the need to consider human capital 
aspects in terms of knowledge and skills, qualifications and experience etc. In that senior 
management are anticipated to derive satisfaction/enhance their utility from the appropriate 
performance of a challenging and demanding role and the respect and appreciation of their 
peer group of competitors and other managers (Hendry and Kiel, 2004) then the focus 
should be toward the appointment and retention of the most suitable management team and 
less on the specification of contracts designed to direct their behaviour along paths that it 
would take anyway.  
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3.4.4 Tournament Theory 
In recent years tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) has become more prominent in 
the economic literature. As applied to senior executive remuneration the basic insight is that 
remuneration is a reward for advancement within the entity rather than necessarily directly 
related to either individual or entity performance. Although this might seem counter-
intuitive, the argument is that it is the knowledge that advancement will lead to superior 
rewards which will inspire and motivate more junior employees. In consequence they will 
work harder and be more focused to achieve entity goals and objectives – and in this, 
indirect, way compensation will be aligned with entity performance. As Lazear (1998; 
p.249) stated, “A firm’s compensation system should be viewed as an entire structure. An 
individual compensation not only affects his or her own behavior, but more important, the 
behavior of those below who aspire to be promoted into the job”. Tournament theory 
embraces a number of behavioural and institutional nuances – for example if remuneration 
for senior executives is at a level higher than their performance might deserve – because of 
the need to create motivational effects for more junior employees - what incentives are 
there for senior executives to leave? In that, the model is based upon the aspirations of 
lower level employees then unless they perceive a realistic chance of replacing more senior 
executives within a reasonable time frame then they may adjust their behaviour accordingly 
(Rosen, 1986). Here there is a role for institutional mechanisms which ensure review of 
senior management performance both in terms of the actuality of their performance and 
also the need to ensure suitable turnover of senior management whether age or otherwise 
related.  
Although tournament theory has appealing characteristics as an explicator of senior 
management compensation, there has been to date relatively little empirical work which has 
sought to rigorously examine and test related hypotheses – although some related work, for 
example Smith (2008) has highlighted the association between CEO incentives, risk taking 
behaviour and incentivisation of operating performance. Also the findings of Main et al. 
(1993) and Conyon et al. (2001) suggest that there is a positive relationship between the 
number of contestants in the ‘tournament’ and remuneration. In some areas of commercial 
activity, for example large accounting firms which traditionally have employed a pyramid 
approach to personnel structure whereby staff who are not advancing through the hierarchy 
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leave on a voluntary or involuntary basis, insights from tournament theory are likely to be 
highly relevant, the extent to which compensation in mainstream industrial and commercial 
organisations is determined on this basis is a matter which is open to further investigation 
and research.  
3.4.5 Institutional Theory 
In one form or another ‘institutional theory’, with its focus on sociological and behavioural 
attributes of, and within, organisations, has been an underpinning of research into, and 
explication of, organisational behaviour for very many years. As such it emphasised the 
sociological factors which provided a broad explanation of why a myriad of corporations, 
end up with adapting similar organizational structures and practices (so called: 
isomorphism). More recently it has been formalised in what might be termed the ‘new 
institutionalism’ which itself has various strands and directions (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, 1991; Moll et al., 2006). More specifically, ‘old institutional economics/theory’ 
focuses on a uniform paradigm in why and how particular behaviours or structures - 
including rules, habits, routines etc - emerge, influence, shape and re-shape through time; 
while ‘new institutional economics/theory’ may comprise a network of different 
perspectives and sub-perspectives without a specific uniform paradigm but within an 
overall framework of seeking out explanations for the reasons behind the existence and 
disappearance of institutions which are assumed to be seeking to maximise corporate 
profits on the basis of  rational optimizing behaviour. Beyond this ‘new institutional 
sociology/theory’ defines institutions in terms of external pressures through reference to 
outside rules, procedures, models, pressures etc rather than in terms of the cost-minimising 
objectives designed to enhance the level of internal efficiency. 
DiMaggio and Powell’s seminal 1983 paper – which has spawned a major body of 
literature in this field - introduced three distinct types of isomorphism which they termed: 
coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive isomorphism - in which homogeneity results 
from political influences - stems from pressures by other institutions, cultural expectation, 
government mandates, and reporting requirements. Mimetic isomorphism - wherein 
homogeneity results from similar responses to uncertainty - associates with corporations 
not knowing what to do in an ambiguous environment - for example when a new 
technology introduced - in which circumstances copying what other companies are 
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perceived to be doing seems to be an easy way out of this complexity. Normative 
isomorphism - in which homogeneity relates to professionalism as a third form of 
legitimization to control corporate professional practices - stems from hiring personnel 
from similar background even from other companies in the same industry and increasing 
competition between corporate staff members so as to make themselves look more 
prestigious.  
Clearly institutional theory in its various forms and guises has the possibility of explaining 
a number of aspects of senior management compensation - whether in terms of levels of 
compensation packages or their construction and form - and of similarities, and perhaps 
differences, between organisations in the manner in which they approach compensation 
issues (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) and these issues will be developed further in the 
thesis.   
3.5 Implications of Theoretical Perspectives on Pay-Performance and Performance-
Pay Frameworks 
The theoretical perspectives discussed above are diverse and interrelated and their 
implications as they relate to executive compensation and the linkages between pay and 
performance are not clear cut. Agency theory perhaps suggests the most direct relationship 
between pay and performance - which is not surprising in that its outcomes are predicated 
upon relating incentive based contracts and performance. This is supported by theoretical 
studies - for example Jensen and Meckling (1976), Hossain, et al. (1994, 1995), Muth and 
Donaldson (1998), Solomon (2007) - and some empirical studies - for example Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), Murphy (1991, 1999), Kay and Van Putten (2007) - but other studies - for 
example, Bebchuk and Fried (2004a) - throw doubt upon the relationship between pay and 
performance.  
The managerial hegemony perspective suggests linkages between managerial power and 
compensation structures. This is supported theoretically by Bebchuk et al. (2002) who posit 
executive directors utilise their power in influencing their own remuneration packages and 
rent extraction - but not necessarily in a manner which has positive connotations in respect 
to this association. As Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) note, “... the power of CEOs to 
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influence boards provides a better explanation for the lack of pay-performance sensitivity 
than alternative explanations”29 – a perspective endorsed by Sapp (2008).  
Stewardship theory offers a very different perspective emphasising as it does innate human 
qualities - a desire for one’s own self esteem, a desire for peer group esteem and perhaps a 
wish to work and contribute toward the wider goal of benefit for society and the 
organisations which constitute that society (Donaldson, 1985 and 1995; Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Alam, 2006). Whilst not ignoring the normal human aspirations for 
command over resources and the ability to follow a particular lifestyle, it is at a remove 
from the idea that direct financial incentives will necessarily result in improved 
performance - or indeed that enhanced rewards for ‘high’ performance are anything other 
than a congratulatory exercise which in itself may not be more than an expression of thanks 
rather than an incentive to better future performance.   
Tournament theory does not necessarily identify a specific relationship between 
compensation and performance - other than within a general framework whereby the 
payment of high rewards to those at the top of the ladder is seen as encouraging 
performance at all levels within the firm (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986; Conyon 
and Sadler, 2001). Lazear (1998) note “A firm’s compensation system should be viewed as 
an entire structure. An individual compensation not only affects his or her own behavior, 
but more important, the behavior of those below who aspire to be promoted into the job”.30  
Institutional theory again offers a variety of perspectives on the linkages between pay and 
performance, and performance and pay - but none of these are necessarily definitive nor 
even complementary. It emphasises the range of intervening factors in terms of social 
interaction and networks which might come between such an association/relationship 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Moll et al., 2006; Mulligan, 
2012) - but also the likelihood that firms will have similar remuneration structures whether 
or not these are necessarily the most appropriate in terms of either incentivisation or 
rewarding exceptional managerial performance. At a distance from agency theory with its 
clear identification of connection between performance and economic reward, institutional 
theory may be seen as highlighting the range of issues and factors which interpose 
                                                          
29 p.320 
30 p.249 
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themselves between such an association - thereby perhaps suggesting alternative lines of 
explication and research enquiry. 
To conclude - agency theory may be seen as supporting a pay-performance framework, 
while the managerial hegemony perspective interposes significant intervening factors 
consistent with executive authority and control. In contrast tournament and stewardship 
perspectives are perhaps directly related to the notion of performance-pay. Although the 
incentives regarding the tournament theory are primarily for those lower in the executive 
hierarchy to aspire to the rewards achieved by those at the very highest level, stewardship 
perspective highlights the human capital aspects in terms of personnel knowledge and 
skills, qualifications and experience for boardroom members. Institutional theory offers 
overarching perspectives in terms of the relevance of regulatory oversight, organisational 
structures, social interaction and networks, etc - but again these are likely to mediate and 
perhaps mitigate direct pay-performance or performance-pay relationships. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a review of literature as to the frameworks of pay-performance and 
performance-pay and highlights the literature gap as it relates to prior studies which seek to 
provide recent empirical evidence on the relationships between executive compensation and 
firm performance. The chapter also reviews a range of theoretical perspectives as to 
executive compensation developed in prior literature and considers their implications for 
the analysis and investigation of senior level remuneration packages. 
 The considerable body of prior literature concluded that executive pay could be adopted 
either a predictor, or a predicted variable through examining the relationships between 
managerial compensation and company performance. However, no comparative study 
using UK data has been conducted so far to investigate directly the frameworks of pay-
performance and performance-pay to address the question of whether managerial 
compensation is the greater influence on firm performance or whether it is the latter which 
has the greater influence on the former, while at the same time controlling for a variety of 
explanatory factors (such as corporate governance mechanisms and ownership, board room 
members’ features, and company characteristics) following a series of corporate 
governance contributions in the UK. In addition – although a number of academic 
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literatures based on interview-based approach conducted in the way of qualitative research 
as to the manner in which executive compensation is set, no archive-based case study 
analysis has been conducted so far to review what it is possible to learn from the 
information contained in the Directors Remuneration Reports (DRRs).  
Therefore, the key purpose of the first trend of the extant research is to empirically examine 
the interrelationships between executive compensation and company performance in 
FTSE350 companies, whilst the main objective of the second trend of the current research 
is to qualitatively investigate the role of remuneration committees in setting the executive 
pay in an attempt to understand the mechanisms and structures that determine managerial 
compensation at one large UK company.  
Based on the review of prior literature, a wide range of theoretical backgrounds have been 
adopted to explain such relationships between executive pay and firm performance. 
According to pure agency theory, firm performance plays a key role in mitigating the 
conflicts of interest between the agents and the principals through sound corporate 
governance mechanisms, whilst managerial power perspective provides a contradictory 
view in which executives’ authority is seen as playing a significant role in designing the 
level and the structure of their pay packages without taking into consideration the 
performing levels of the company. Alternatively executive remuneration may be regarded 
as an instrument for achieving the wider goal of benefit for the company in terms of 
rewarding the level of knowledge and skills that the boardroom members have (stewardship 
theory), or encouraging the board members to win a prospect title in the nearest future 
(tournament theory). Furthermore, institutional theory here offers overarching perspectives 
in terms of the relevance of regulatory oversight, organisational structures, and social 
interaction and networks which might perhaps mediate the interrelationships between 
executive pay and corporate performance.  
The next chapter presents the research methodology which utilises mixed methods 
(abductive) approach, identifies the development of the empirical research hypotheses and 
variables based on the theoretical framework and prior literature, and covers the modelling 
plan and data employed to investigate quantitatively the mutual relationships between 
executive pay and company performance. 
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Chapter Four 
Relationships between Executive Compensation and 
Company Performance – Methodology, Modelling and Data  
4.1 Introduction 
After highlighting the institutional and regulatory background, reviewing the relevant prior 
literature, and outlining the underlying theoretical perspectives, the necessary 
methodological choices can be identified and the appropriate research design constructed. 
As discussed before this research study has two separate but interrelated motivations. The 
first is to investigate the linkages between the nature and amount of executive 
compensation packages and company performance, with a particular focus on examining 
the two-way relationships between pay and performance. The second is a desire to 
understand in greater depth the mechanisms and structures which determine senior 
executive pay in large UK private sector organizations and the manner in which these 
mechanisms and structures have changed in recent years. Therefore, the mixed methods 
(abductive) approach is followed as the first primary question is addressed by means of a 
more conventional positivist study, whilst the second primary question is addressed by 
means of a combination of institutional and archival work together with a specific 
longitudinal case study of remuneration at a major UK company. This methodology also 
shows the linkage between the empirical research and the case study in an attempt to 
combine both approaches in the current research to examine executive directors’ 
remuneration in FTSE 350 companies. 
In this chapter - due to the increasing significance of the degree and route of linkages 
between boardroom executive compensation and company performance, based mainly on 
the theoretical views under agency and tournament - the empirical part of the study aims to 
address the first key research question via examining the interrelationships between the 
two, in order to identify: whether managerial compensation is the greater influence on firm 
performance or whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on the former? This 
empirical research contributes to the current debate on the examination of executive 
compensation in FTSE 350 corporate performance by investigating the interrelationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance. This can be achieved by 
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addressing a number of distinctive compensation components and measures from one side 
and a variety of accounting-based indicators of performance from the other for the UK 
FTSE 350 companies over a period 1999-2008 (after the reform of the combined code). 
This preparatory chapter of the empirical study is organised as follows. After this short 
introduction the second section explains the research methodology employed by the present 
study, as well as the research philosophy and how it verifies the approaches chosen to carry 
out the study, including the deductive and indicative approaches. The third section covers 
the research examination process of the empirical study in detail in an attempt to explain 
the nature of the research, and how it will be conducted. The empirical research design 
comprises three stages: the first stage presents the research strategy (including the research 
question, the development of research hypotheses as well as the variables utilised, and the 
research modelling plan), the research data collection and preparation is covered in second 
stage, and finally the research data analyses (including the research findings and 
discussion) are found in chapter 5. The final section provides an overall conclusion 
regarding the research methodology and the empirical examination process. 
4.2 Research Methodology 
Bogdan and Taylor (1975, p.1) defined the term ‘methodology’ as, “the process, principles, 
and procedures by which we approach problems and seek answers”. Therefore, in order to 
conduct a valid study, a number of crucial steps and procedures should be highlighted and 
ordered rationally and accurately, as each procedure provides different sets of options and 
the choice of each option needs to be justified in terms of the objectives and nature of the 
research. In this section, the research methodology is discussed in detail and categorised in 
three sub-sections (research purpose, research philosophy, and research approach). 
4.2.1 Research Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the remuneration of executive directors in FTSE 
350 companies by adopting two interconnected studies (i.e. Empirical and Exploratory 
studies) in order to guide the research philosophy and approach thereafter (Ryan et al., 
2002; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Saunders et al., 2007, etc.).  
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The first research objective is to measure cause and effect (i.e. first primary research) in 
order to explain: how the interrelationships and influences underlying the setting strategy of 
executive compensation packages are shaped and how they work in practice. In this 
empirical study, the researcher aims to understand the nature of remuneration packages in 
enhancing firm performance by utilising a set of variables to test the hypothesised 
relationships between executive pay and firm performance in FTSE 350 companies in an 
attempt to answer a specific question: whether managerial compensation is the greater 
influence on firm performance or whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on 
the former?  
The second research objective is to shed the light on the mechanisms and structures that 
determine executive compensation packages and explore the role of remuneration 
committees in setting the type of these pay packages in a singular case, which is BP, as a 
complement study (i.e. second primary research) to the first empirical study. In this 
exploratory study, the researcher aims to depict a specific observable case, seek new 
insights, and present an accurate profile of how boardroom and senior executive 
remuneration are or, perhaps, ‘should be’ set, based on a number of underlying theoretical 
perspectives: What is the nature of remuneration practice which predicates the changes in 
the amount and nature of pay packages?, and What can be learnt from the information 
contained in the case remuneration reports and the potential explanations for the outcomes 
uncovered, in order to identify the institutional and regulatory factors which might 
influence the determination of executive pay? 
4.2.2 Research Philosophy 
As Saunders et al. (2007) noted, the development and understanding in greater depth of a 
specific knowledge is referred to as research philosophy, in which the methodological 
choices of any study are mainly determined by the assumptions of ontology (realism or 
nominalism) and epistemology (positivism or anti-positivism) based on the two key 
dimensions of methodological choices regarding the nature of social science: objectivism or 
subjectivism, consistent with Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework. The research 
paradigms are shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Science 
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) were among the first to highlight that the identification of the 
nature of the research’s social, political, and economical reality assists in setting the 
research’s ontological position (which is either realism or nominalism), in which the 
former, realism, regards the social world as a compound of real and tangible constructions, 
while the latter, nominalism, considers it as comprising names and terms that provide a 
construction for reality. By comparison the epistemological position (which is either 
positivism or anti-positivism) explains what constitutes the awareness level of acceptable 
knowledge (or how to gain knowledge), in which positivism31 aims to predict what happens 
in the social world by examining the relationships between its constituents, whilst anti-
positivism calls for an understanding of the differences between humans as social actors 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
                                                          
31Positivism is a social science philosophy of innovation in which positivist individuals propose the 
verification of meaningful statements via the observation pattern (Ryan et al., 2002). 
Source: Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.22) 
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Moreover, Saunders et al. (2007) indicate that the research paradigm is regarded as the 
direction for examining a social phenomenon from which explanations can be obtained, and 
is based on the ontological and epistemological status adopted which a study can adopt to 
distinguish between different forms of research. Accordingly, Burrell and Morgan’s 
framework classifies the research paradigms for the analysis of social theory into four 
categories: radical humanist, radical structuralist, interpretivist, or functionalist32, whilst the 
research philosophical dimensions can be categorised as subjectivist, objectivist, the 
sociology of radical change, or the sociology of regulation. 
In the empirical study, the phenomenon of examining the two-way relationships between 
executive pay and firm performance is understood, and the quantitative technique is 
adopted by forming and testing the study hypotheses derived from the ontological belief 
that social institutions exist independently in the same way as natural organisations by 
which the theoretical perspectives can be investigated and the model can be structured in 
order to observe reality and ultimately generate new insights. Therefore, the term 
‘functionalism’ here combines both the objective perspective of the environment and the 
extent and nature of regulation exercised (Ryan et al., 2002). Accordingly, based on Burrell 
and Morgan’s 1979 framework, the empirical study adopts the realist ontological 
perspective and the positivist epistemological status under the dimension of objectivism. 
Consequently, the source of the researcher’s belief is based on the testimony of variables 
(i.e. deductive belief), in which the process of inferring general truths relies on introspective 
(the process of introspection) and/or rational (the process of reason) belief. 
On the other hand, the exploratory study is the most appropriate structure for the second 
motivation, in which the researcher is seeking to employ an archive-based case study33 
analysis which is supplemented by an exploratory and/or explanatory content analysis 
adopting the qualitative method in order to understand the nature of remuneration practice 
                                                          
32On the other hand, Ryan et al. (2002) reported that mainstream (i.e. functionalism), interpretive, and critical 
studies are the three key categories (i.e. paradigms) of accounting research which provide the platforms for 
studying accounting phenomena. 
33Case studies in general are a means of collecting evidence relating to behaviours, institutional, and 
regulatory aspects which require a comprehensive conceptual framework so as to capture the interaction 
among a number of related activities and variables - such as strategy, culture, structure, systems, indoor-
outdoor environments, interdisciplinary relationships etc. It is imperative to define the starting point of the 
case study in order to help not only in shaping the research design and informing research inquiries, but also 
in supporting the evaluation of evidence collected so that the readers will understand the research pathway 
and outcomes (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
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at one global UK company and explore the role of the remuneration committees in 
determining the type of these packages. The researcher holds the positivist epistemological 
belief to be aligned with its mainstream counterparts, in which the observed cases (i.e. 
phenomena) are explored and explained in a scientific manner by introducing first a 
number of positive theoretical perspectives (Saunders et al., 2007) and then exploring the 
archival case analysis based on this set of theoretical views, as the researcher is concerned 
mainly with providing an explanation (what does actually happen?). Accordingly, the 
researcher’s belief is based on the positivism induction approach (i.e. inductive belief) 
through which the inductive approach is adopted for the case study analysis with the 
ambition to provide explanations in terms of the realist ontological perspective of the 
reality and the positivist epistemological status of the knowledge under the objectivist 
dimension. This is consistent with the perspective of Scapens (1990, p.5): “Positive 
researchers cannot assist in the choice of a decision model, but they can help the decision 
maker to understand how the relevant variables interact, i.e. how the world works.” 
In short, although research philosophy comprises a variety of organisational research 
categories, this research structure in general adopts the assumptions of realist ontology and 
positivist epistemology - as the empirical study focuses on the quantitative structure, 
aspiring to examine the two-way associations between executive directors’ remuneration 
and corporate performance (Chapters 4 and 5); while the archive-based case study covers 
the qualitative structure, aiming mainly to explore insights into the factors involved in 
setting the remuneration practice by examining directors’ remuneration reports (Chapter 6). 
Accordingly this research adopts the functionalist position through both the empirical and 
exploratory studies, by which the positivists examine objectively the observable social 
reality, in which the logical understanding and explanations lead to find logical solutions to 
social problems. 
4.2.3 Research Approach 
Knowledge can normally be gained by adopting various sources. Here the research 
approaches related to knowledge can generally be either deductive or inductive (Ryan et al., 
2002; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Saunders et al., 2007). Whilst deductive studies are 
associated with testing hypothesised relationships according to an existing theory or a set of 
theories by collecting and analysing data in order to reach a reasoned conclusion based on a 
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known fact; inductive studies are conducted by observing and examining an existing 
phenomenon in order to reach subsequently to conclusions based on the development of the 
suggested theoretical perspective(s), consistent with Saunders et al. (2007). 
As the deductive approach is frequently related to a quantitative framework and is linked 
more to positivist epistemological philosophy, the current empirical study is therefore based 
on the deductive frame in which the conceptual structure of the existing theory is studied, 
testable hypotheses are developed, and the empirical observations are discussed. 
Scientifically, this approach is also used to move from the general to the particular in an 
attempt to explain or investigate reality. Accordingly, the researcher aims to explore the 
prior literature and theoretical background on executive directors’ remuneration and 
corporate performance in order to test the developed research hypotheses on the two-way 
relationships between executive pay and firm performance in FTSE 350 companies. 
On the other side the appropriate approach to study, explain, and explore reality is more 
likely to be inductive rather than deductive, especially when the theory is not well 
developed, very hesitant, or outdated. Inductive studies normally start with data collection, 
move on to the analysis, and end with the results which could lead to the development of 
the existing theory or the formation of a new theory underpinning the phenomena being 
examined, therefore the data would be followed after investigating the theory (Saunders et 
al., 2007). Based on the inductive framework, the researcher seeks to utilise the qualitative 
examination of relationships and factors underlying the question of how executive 
compensation packages are, or perhaps ‘should be’, set in order to investigate the directors’ 
remuneration reports at one major multinational UK company registered in the FTSE 350 
index.  
Accordingly, by adopting both deductive and inductive approaches, the research 
methodology calls for a mixed method (abductive) approach, in which the existing study 
moves constantly from empirical to theoretical dimensions of analysis, and contributes by 
combining both quantitative and qualitative studies, which is rare in the discipline of 
corporate governance. As Johnson et al. (2007, p.120) stated, “Mixed methods research is 
the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study or 
set of related studies.” Mixed methods research is currently regarded as the third 
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approach to social research and is utilised extensively in pragmatically oriented fields 
based on the purposes of complementarity (in which the results of one method is used to 
illustrate and enhance the results of other methods) and expansion (in which the breadth 
and range of inquiry are expanded by using different methods for different inquiry 
components), consistent with Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004). The current research 
therefore seeks to collect multiple data by utilising different strategies and methods in an 
attempt to result in complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses. The 
overall research methodology is illustrated in Figure 2. 
4.3 Research Examination Process 
The central examination framework of the research process inspired by Collis and Hussey 
(2003) can be presented through three stages, stages followed directly or indirectly, by the 
majority of scientific papers and studies, whether deductive or inductive. Based on this 
examination structure, the researcher aims to discuss first the deductive study (chapters 4 
and 5) and second the inductive study (chapter 6), in which each stage will lead coherently 
and plausibly to the next stage. Failure at one stage will therefore require that earlier stages 
be revisited before commencing the investigation.   
The research examination process adopted here starts by outlining the research strategy of 
the empirical study (stage 1), which comprises three sections: the research question, the 
research hypotheses and variables, and the research modelling plan. Afterwards, the 
research data sample is collected and prepared (stage 2), before the study is completed 
with the data analysis and discussion of the results for both deductive and inductive 
studies in the final stage (stage 3). The research examination process overall is outlined in 
Figure 3.  
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Figure 2: Research Methodology  
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Figure 3: Research Examination Process  
  
Source: Prepared and constructed by the researcher, 
based on Collis and Hussey (2003) 
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4.3.1 Research Strategy34 - Empirical Structure 
In adopting the deductive approach, the empirical structure is followed in the planning 
phase for the first motivation of examining the interrelationships between executive 
compensation and firm performance, in which the research question is highlighted, the 
research hypotheses are developed and formulated, and the examination modelling is 
structured. These three main sections of the empirical strategy plan represent the guidelines 
as to how this research will be conducted with respect to the quantitative element. 
4.3.1.1 Research Question 
The first step of the empirical strategy plan aims to identify the research question. Based on 
the research gap in the academic literature regarding the relationships between the nature of 
executive remuneration and firm performance (as discussed before in Chapter 3), the 
current study seeks here to add to the literature with evidence regarding whether managerial 
compensation is the greater influence on firm performance or whether it is the latter which 
has the greater influence on the former?  
This research question is tested empirically by examining the two-way associations 
between both pay and performance in FTSE 350 companies during a time period 1999-
2008, which covers different phases of the UK stock market. In addition, this study 
investigates the role of corporate governance mechanisms and the features of company 
variables and those relating to boardroom structure and membership in controlling the 
interrelationships between compensation and performance.  
4.3.1.2 Research Hypotheses and Variables 
The second step of the empirical strategy plan seeks to specify the research hypotheses that 
will be tested and the research variables that will be utilised. This section is divided into 
two key sub-sections. The first shows the development of the empirical research 
hypotheses, while the second discusses in detail the adopted research variables.  
                                                          
34The research strategy refers to the plan that would be followed so as to answer the research questions. Each 
research strategy can be established according to the research purpose - such as exploratory, descriptive, and 
explanatory - and the research approach which might be deductive or inductive. In general the research 
strategy consists of a volume of accepted research methods - such as Experiment, Survey, Case Study, etc 
(Ryan et al., 2002; Collis and Hussey, 2003; and Saunders et al., 2007). 
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4.3.1.2.1 Research Hypotheses 
Regarding the interrelationships between CEO/board executive compensation and company 
performance, a set of hypotheses are developed based on different theoretical perspectives. 
According to the hypothesis regarding pure agency theory, the agent-principal perspective 
highlights the increasing conflict of interests between professional managers, who are 
hypothesised to be seeking to obtain high rewards, and the owners, whose ambition is to 
maximise their returns from ownership (Berle and Means, 1932). As Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) noted, these contradictory motivations emerged due to the information asymmetry 
between managers and owners, which can be resolved by monitoring and providing 
appropriate incentive based pay contracts based on firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Therefore, the focus should be on the action of agents in the best interests of the 
principals in order to obtain high incentives within a good structure of corporate 
governance.  
 (H1a): A higher level of company performance is positively related to future 
CEO/board executive pay35. 
Consistent with the managerial hegemony hypothesis, CEO/executives at or close to board 
level might exercise more authority and control over the nature of their compensation 
contracts (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003/4b), even when the levels of 
company performance is below the business targets, and especially when the corporate 
governance is weak. As Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) noted, 
executives’ power is seen as playing a significant role in designing the level and the 
structure of their pay packages regardless of the firm’s achievement. Accordingly, the 
lower levels of corporate performance within a weak corporate governance structure might 
perhaps lead to higher CEO/executive pay, according to the managerial hegemony 
perspective. 
(H1b): A lower level of company performance is negatively related to future 
CEO/board executive pay. 
                                                          
35CEO/board executives’ pay in year t+1 on company performance in year t are regressed in the empirical 
examination analysis. 
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Conversely, the stewardship hypothesis indicates that higher CEO/board executive pay 
based on the innate qualities (Barney, 1991; Castanias and Helfat, 1991) of the boardroom 
members may ultimately contribute to the wider goal of benefiting the company. As 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) highlight, the need to consider human capital aspects in terms of 
knowledge and skills, qualifications, and experience, is significant in enhancing the levels 
of company performance. As a result, the focus should be on the appointment and retention 
of the most suitable management team to maximise owners’ wealth and make a difference 
in decision making process that directly affects the future prospects of the firm. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis regarding tournament theory calls for encouraging lower-level 
members at boardroom level to work harder to win the CEO title including the related 
compensation package as a reward (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986; Lazear, 1998). 
As a result, the payment of high rewards to those at the top of the ladder is seen as 
encouraging performance at all levels within the firm, consistent with the findings of prior 
literature (such as Main et al., 1993; and Conyon et al., 2001), which report a direct 
relationship between pay inequality in the top management layer and corporate 
performance. 
(H2): A higher level of CEO/board executive pay is positively related to future 
company performance36. 
In general, the two-way relationships between CEO/executive pay and firm performance 
are basically derived here from a number of contradictory but interrelated theoretical 
perspectives: agent-principal, managerial hegemony, stewardship, and tournament. Figure 4 
demonstrates the empirical study’s development of the hypotheses, and shows the 
possibility of CEO/executive pay affecting the corporate performance more. Accordingly, 
the suggested hypothesis of the key research question can be structured based on 
hypotheses (1) and (2) as follows: 
(H3): The amounts of CEO/board executive pay have relatively greater 
influence on the levels of company performance. 
 
                                                          
36Company performance in year t+1 on CEO/board executive pay in year t is regressed in the empirical 
examination analysis. 
72 
 
Figure 4: Hypotheses Development Structure 
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Table 1: List of Indicators, Variables, Codes and Definitions 
Indicators Variables Codes Definitions 
CEOs and 
Board 
Executive 
Directors’  
Remuneration 
Package 
Cash Compensation Variables 
Salary SLRLOG Natural log of minimum fixed amounts received by both corporate CEO and 
executive directors, including fees paid for membership of corporate board 
committees, in UK£,000 (BoardEx: Salary). 
Bonus BNSLOG Natural log of annual reward received by both corporate CEO and executive 
directors, depending on prior performance, in UK£,000 (BoardEx: Bonus). 
Pension PNSLOG Natural log of pensions (retirement) schemes provided to both corporate 
CEO and executive directors when they are no longer earning a regular 
income from being in service, in UK£,000 (BoardEx: DC Pensions). 
Other OTHRLOG Natural log of other benefits and allowances received by both corporate 
CEO and executive directors, such as private medical insurance benefits, car 
allowance, as well as benefits-in-kind, in UK£,000 (BoardEx: Other). 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
TCCLOG Natural log of total cash value of first four pay components (Salary, Bonus, 
Pension, and Other), based on the pay of both CEO and executive directors 
scaled by the total number of board executives, in UK£,000. 
Equity-based (Non-Cash) Compensation Variables 
Equity Awarded EQAWLOG Natural log of the value of awarded performance shares provided to both 
corporate CEO and executive directors, in UK£,000 (BoardEx: Value of 
Equity Awarded). 
LTIP Awarded LTIPAWLOG Natural log of the value of restricted share grants awarded, according to 
board directors’  prolonged performance achievement provided to both 
corporate CEO and all executives, in UK£,000 (BoardEx: Value of LTIP 
Awarded). 
Intrinsic Options 
Awarded 
IOPAWLOG Natural log of options’  value awarded by both corporate CEO and executive 
directors at the value of the positive difference between the market price 
(i.e. fair value) of the share and the grant (strike) option exercise price, in 
UK£,000 (BoardEx: Intrinsic Value of Options Awarded). 
Estimated Options 
Awarded 
EOPAWLOG Natural log of contracts awarded to both corporate CEO and executive 
directors at an estimated exercise price, in UK£,000 (BoardEx: Estimated 
Value of Options Awarded). 
Total Equity-based 
Compensation 
TECLOG Natural log of total non-cash value of second of the four main pay 
components (Equity Awarded, LTIP Awarded, Intrinsic and Estimated 
Options Awarded), based on the pay of both CEO and executive directors 
scaled by the total number of board executives, in UK£,000. 
Total 
Remuneration 
during the Period 
(Cash + Non-Cash) 
TREMLOG Natural log of total cash and non-cash amounts of compensation for board 
directors during the accounting period, based on the pay of both CEO and 
executive directors scaled by the total number of board executives, in 
UK£,000. 
Firm 
Performance 
Indicators 
Tobin’s Q TQWINZ Ratio of corporate total market value on the stock market to its total book 
value assets after the winsorization process (Manually measured on the basis 
of T1B and DataStream data). 
Earnings Per Share EPSWINZ Corporate earnings for the 12 months ending in the fiscal year after the 
winsorization process (T1B and DataStream: EPS). 
Return on Equity ROEWINZ Ratio of operating income to common equity after the winsorization process 
(T1B and DataStream: ROE).   
Return on Assets ROAWINZ Ratio of operating income to total assets after the winsorization process 
(T1B and DataStream: ROA).   
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Total Assets 
Turnover 
TASSTWINZ Ratio of managing corporate total assets to its revenue generated after the 
winsorization process (T1B and DataStream: Assets Turnover). 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
(Controls) 
 
Duality Role  DR  Role of CEO and Chairman held simultaneously, (1 refers to  a duality role, 
i.e. the CEO and Chairman roles are held by the same person; whereas 0 
refers to the absence of a duality role, i.e. the two posts held by two 
different persons) (BoardEx: Duality). 
Board Size BS Total number of members on the board (BoardEx: Board_No). 
Non-executive 
Directors 
NXD Number of non-executive directors within the overall corporate boardroom 
(BoardEx: No. NONEXE_Board). 
Independent 
Directors 
ID Number of independent directors among the corporate board members 
(BoardEx: No. Independent_Board). 
The Existence of 
Board Committees 
AC, RC and 
NC 
Existence of Audit, Remuneration and Nomination committees separately (1 
indicates the committee exists; whereas 0 means the committee does not 
exist), BoardEx provides the committee size. 
Ownership 
Package 
(Controls) 
Wealth Share Plans WSP Accumulated Wealth Share Plan LTIPS Volume (Size). These ordinary 
Outstanding Shares (Stocks) represent the total number of shares which the 
member will own in the same year + those which the member was promised 
to hold in the following years, provided by BoardEx. 
Wealth Options 
(Exercised) 
EWO Volume (Size) of Options exercised in the current year which the member 
already held in previous years, provided by BoardEx. 
Wealth Options (Un-
exercised) 
UWO Volume (Size) of Un-Exercised Options which the member owns currently 
and will in the following years, provided by BoardEx. 
Wealth Equity 
(Exercised) 
EWE Volume (Size) of Exercised Equity which the member already had in 
previous years, provided by BoardEx. 
Wealth Equity (Un-
exercised) 
UWE Volume (Size) of Un-Exercised Equity which the member owns currently 
and will in the following years, provided by BoardEx. 
Board 
Member 
Features 
(Controls) 
Age AGE Age of boardroom CEO and executive directors. The researcher measures 
the average age for board executives (BoardEx: Age). 
Tenure TIR Time period for CEO and other boardroom members holding their current 
boardroom role. The researcher measures the average TIR for board 
executives (BoardEx: Time in Role). 
Gender  GNDR Distinguishes between male and female of CEO member; male=0 and 
female=1 (BoardEx: Gender). 
Firm 
Characteristics 
(Controls) 
Corporate Size TASSLOG Natural log of corporate total assets (T1B: Total Value of Assets). 
Corporate Growth CTASSLOG Natural log of corporate change in total assets (T1B: Total Value of Assets). 
Total Debt to 
Common Equity 
DE Proportion of funds provided by corporate creditors (T1B: Debt to Equity). 
Total Debt to Total 
Assets 
DA Percentage of assets financed by debt (T1B: Debt to Asset). 
Dummy 
Variables 
(Controls) 
Regulation Dummy  Dreg Dummy construction for the two sections of the FTSE 350 industries 
representing the sectors “Financials and Utilities” by zero and the non-
financial sectors by one. 
Time Dummy  Dt1-9 Dummy construction for the 10-year time period by removing one time 
period dummy. 
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4.3.1.2.2.1 Executive Directors’ Remuneration Package 
The current study employs a package of compensation variables chosen on the basis of the 
study theoretical perspectives and incorporating insights from prior literature. In practice, 
previous studies (such as Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lee et al., 2008, etc.) point out that 
total executive compensation is broadly comprised of two sums. First, the total cash 
remuneration (comprising the base salary (SLRi,t), annual bonus (BNSi,t), pension 
contribution (PNSi,t), and other monetary pay, such as benefits-in-kind, car and 
accommodation allowances, other perks etc. (OTHRi,t)). Second, the total non-cash or 
equity-based remuneration (including value of granted equity (EQAWi,t), value of awarded 
long-term incentive plans (LTIPAWi,t), and options awarded either as intrinsic (IOPAWi,t) or 
estimated (EOPAWi,t)). A detailed discussion of these components has been outlined in 
Chapter 2. In this study remuneration components are captured directly from the directors’ 
remuneration reports and therefore were computed on a before-tax basis. Inevitably this 
means that the tests largely abstract from the effect of taxation and tax clientele effects as 
they impact CEO and boardroom executive pay structure (Murphy, 1985). 
According to Fernandes et al. (2013), two aspects of compensation measurement via 
BoardEx database deserve special mention. First, BoardEx computes the value of options 
granted using the closing stock price on the last trading day of the fiscal year rather than the 
stock price on the grant date. Second, the calculation of the value of performance share 
plans (i.e. LTIPs) through BoardEx is based on the maximum (rather than the target or 
minimum) shares that can be awarded under the plan, multiplied by the end-of-fiscal-year 
closing stock price. Further to this, IFRS 2 relating to the share-based payments specifies 
two values of a share option, which are intrinsic value and time value (Christian and 
Ludenbach, 2013). The intrinsic option value is calculated by the positive difference 
between the share fair value and the price that has to be paid to acquire this share under the 
option, whilst time option is measured by the option fair value and its intrinsic value. The 
latter reflects probably that the intrinsic option value will increase or that that option will 
become profitable to exercise before it expires. This therefore might explain the definition 
of “Estimated Options Awarded” provided by BoardEx at an estimated exercise price.        
The current examination puts more focus on the three key components of executive 
directors’ remuneration (i.e. salary, bonus, and LTIPs) because of their dominant 
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significance in value composition for both CEOs and other boardroom executive members 
in the UK. Within this composition three distinct measures of CEO and boardroom 
executive pay are investigated, comprising the total cash compensation (TCCi,t) measure, 
the total equity-based compensation (TECi,t) measure, and the total remuneration (TREMi,t) 
measure, which incorporates both the cash and non-cash compensation measures, i.e. the 
sum of all pay components.  
4.3.1.2.2.2 Corporate Performance Indicators  
Murphy (1985) suggests that adopting firm performance measures based on relevant 
accounting and finance indicators is more appropriate than the absolute market-base 
measures. Shareholder returns are volatile and significant elements might be related to 
elements largely outside management control, for example the state of the economy overall, 
interest rates, commodity prices etc. These financial indicators have also to be associated 
with the overall market performance as aspects of market portfolio can overwhelm 
individual corporate aspects; in addition, companies with large risk categories are generally 
expected to realise high returns. Profitability, growth, and efficiency are separate, if 
interrelated,  performance measures, but the latter category, efficiency, is perhaps of greater 
significance focusing as it does on what created has corporate success and what is likely to 
do so in the future thereby creating the conditions for profitability and growth (Bull, 2008). 
Clearly here comparison with past achievement and with other companies in similar sectors 
and markets is also important in evaluating the success or otherwise of management. 
Lagged accounting-based measures of company performance have been widely utilised in 
the prior literature for two key reasons. Firstly, it is very likely that boardroom executive 
compensation in any one year will be directly influenced by the achievement of good 
performance during the previous year (Perry and Zenner, 2001). Secondly, lagged 
performance indicators assist in avoiding the problem of reverse causality between 
company performance and executive compensation, which in turn assist in managing 
endogeneity problems of pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks (Hermalin 
and Wallace, 2001).  
In this vein the study focuses primarily on two key performance measures (Tobin’s Q and 
ROA) supplemented by a number of other accounting-based performance indicators (such 
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as EPS, ROE, and Total Assets Turnover).While Tobin’s Q incorporates a market value 
element in the ratio numerator other accounting-based measures are more directly based on 
accounting numbers and ratios together with more direct operating data. The reason behind 
utilising a package of performance indicators is to gain more certainty as to the sensitivity 
of the findings as compared with the use of just one single performance indicator. It also 
seeks to alleviate to an extent issues associated with the heterogeneity of executive 
directors and their different motivations – which can only be controlled for in a simplistic 
fashion via the introduction of variables relating to age, gender, experience etc. 
Tobin’s Q37 is a commonly utilised metric in empirical accounting and finance contexts, 
which has been used very frequently in prior studies, such as Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), Adams and Mehran (2005), Habib and Ljungqvist (2005), 
Belkhir (2009), Ozkan (2007, 2011), by which the market value of a company is compared 
with the book value of its total assets (Fabozzi and Peterson, 2003). It has been interpreted, 
perhaps rather simplistically, that a high level of corporate Q ratio encourages institutional 
shareholders to invest more as the company resources are worth more than the price paid 
for the underlying assets (Fabozzi and Peterson, 2003; Bull, 2008).  
ROA38 essentially spans both the management of the company’s assets and the delivery of 
added value to its clients. It is also significantly influenced by the manner in which corporate 
assets are financed (Fabozzi and Peterson, 2003). Again ROA is very widely utilised in 
academic literature. Studies such as those by Bhagat and Black (1999), Core and Larcker 
(2002), Dalton et al. (2003), Adams and Mehran (2005), Belkhir (2009), Gregg et al. (2011), 
Coles et al. (2012), show its significance as an accounting-based indicator of financial 
performance relevant to  topics relating to, inter alia, corporate governance mechanisms, 
managerial ownership, and executive compensation. Essentially ROA is regarded as well proven 
metric for capturing aspects of the efficiency and profitability of company performance (Bull, 
2008). 
                                                          
37Tobin’s Q (Q ratio) is measured as the total market value of a company on the stock market divided by the 
replacement value of the firm’s assets, according to James Tobin’s formula. 
38ROA has been calculated as (Net income before preferred dividends + ((interest expense on debt-interest 
capitalized) × (1-tax rate))) / (last year’s total assets) × 100 (Thomson-One-Banker database). 
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EPS39 measures are normally calculated for companies with publicly traded shares (Bull, 
2008), as it refers to the amount of firm earnings allocated to each outstanding market 
share. EPS only measures one specific, albeit very important, aspect of performance but 
previous studies have indicated positive associations with the composition of equity-
holdings (Dalton et al., 2003) and with the total compensation of executive directors (Gregg 
et al., 2011). Overall, EPS is regarded as an acceptable indicator of corporate profitability, 
consistent with Fabozzi and Peterson (2003).  
Closely linked to EPS as a performance measure is return on equity (ROE) 40 – they are similar 
in terms of the measurement of income as both focusing on operating income which may be 
seen relevant in terms of efficiency and sustainability, however there are differences in the 
manner of reflecting the firm value. EPS’s dominator represents just the number of company 
shares, whilst the dominator of ROE stands for the corporate market valuation by measuring the 
value of these shares based on the last-year price. Therefore, it clearly reflects the impact of the 
means of company financing on the returns available to shareholders (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Dalton et al., 2003; Berger et al., 2005; Sigler, 2011 etc.). Shareholders, and institutional 
shareholders in particular, are interested in a combination of both risk and return as they manage 
either individual, or more normally portfolio, shareholdings (Palepu et al., 2004).  
Another not infrequently used measure of corporate efficiency is total assets turnover 
(TASST)41, in which all corporate asset accounts are considered, consistent with Brigham 
(1991). The relationship between TASST and wider notions of profitability and indeed 
efficiency is likely to be dependent upon asset composition, industry sector etc but there is 
a general perception that, ceteris paribus, higher asset turnover is linked both to greater 
managerial efficiency and value added within a framework of a higher profitability (Bull, 
2008). Although of undoubted importance in terms of the management of corporate 
operations TASST as a variable has yielded relatively few significant relationships with 
other variables of interest - however Bhagat and Black (1999) did identify asset turnover as 
                                                          
39EPS has been calculated as (Net income – Dividends on preferred stock) / Average outstanding shares × 100 
(Thomson-One-Banker database). 
40The percentage of ROE in all industries is equal to: (Net income before preferred dividends - preferred dividend 
requirement) / last year’s common equity × 100 (Thomson-One-Banker database). 
41The percentage of TASST in all industries is equal to: Net Sales / Corporate Total Assets × 100 (Thomson-
One-Banker database). 
79 
 
the only positive significant measure among a number of performance/profitability 
variables in their association with board independence. 
4.3.1.2.2.3 Underlying Control Variables 
Within the overall aim of the empirical exploration of whether executive pay has the greater 
influence on corporate performance or vice versa, it is crucial that an appropriate set of 
variables proxying for other influences on the level and structure of executive 
compensation and company performance are included for control purposes. A number of 
previous UK and US studies have been limited in their generality and means of 
interpretation because of their use of a relatively small set of such control variables (such as 
Mehran, 1995; Kubo, 2000; Abdullah and Page, 2009; etc.). Particular omissions have 
included those with internal and external governance mechanisms that can potentially affect 
the relationships between executive compensation and firm performance. 
This section discusses the nature of the control variables to be incorporated in this study. 
Although primarily utilised for control purposes the researcher is interested in investigating 
the effects of these variables on both remuneration and performance modelling equations, 
as well as the manner in which they mitigate the impact of omitted variables in explaining 
the dependent variables. 
A review of prior literature on executive compensation and company performance suggests 
a range of suitable control variables. These are grouped into the following categories: 
corporate governance and ownership mechanisms, board member features and firm 
characteristics. The majority of these variables are continuous in form but for ease of 
exposition (as in a number of previous studies: Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Adams and 
Mehran, 2005; Smith, 2008; etc.) related dummy variables within these categories and 
others are considered separately. For each variable the justification for inclusion and the 
expected nature of the relationship between the variable and measures of executive pay and 
corporate performance are discussed individually below. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.1 Governance and Ownership  
A growing stream of literature, from a wide spectrum of theoretical backgrounds, have 
considered that mechanisms of corporate governance are the cornerstone which both 
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supports and dictates the interrelationships between executive compensation and company 
performance (for example Conyon and Leech, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Core et 
al., 1999; Lee et al., 2008 etc.). These mechanisms themselves have become more complex 
and sophisticated for a number of reasons – including the wider nature and role of major 
corporations in business society, an increased emphasis on sustainability and environmental 
matters related to these corporations, in addition to issues raised by both greater diversity 
and globalization, - issues that include those relating to transparency and disclosure 
(Solomon, 2007). This reinforces the need to seek to understand how corporate governance 
mechanisms are associated with the amount and composition of boardroom compensation - 
a need to which attention has been drawn by many commentators.42  
Arguments have been advanced as to the need to commit to and practice a set of unified 
requirements for the structure and mechanisms of corporate governance in order to: restore 
confidence in corporate management (Hossain et al., 1994; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 
2006), rebalance the corporate financial and administrative structures (Berger et al., 2005; 
Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Solomon, 2007), broaden the phenomenon of 
investment culture (Fraser and Henry, 2003; Khurshed et al., 2011) and knowledge 
economy (Gugler, 2001; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Abdullah and Page, 2009). 
More specifically consideration has been given to the manner in which corporate 
governance, for example in relation to the size and composition of the firm boardroom, the 
existence of board committees, non-executives and independent directors, definition of role 
and the prohibition of role duality, impact on both executive directors’ remuneration and 
company performance for enhancing the internal control and monitoring role that prevents 
or limits opportunistic managerial behaviour (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Khatri et al., 
2002; Doucouliagos et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2008; etc.). Other factors that have been 
considered include the relevance of equity ownership by board members (including the 
value of stock, equity, and options owned by the corporate board of directors) both from an 
agency theory perspective and that of managerial power (Mehran, 1995; Loderer and 
Martin, 1997; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Berger et al., 2005; etc.).  
                                                          
42See, the Independent report: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/pressure-grows-on-europe-
to-do-more-to-help-euro-2354582.html?origin=internalSearch 
See, the Economist report: http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2012/02/fiscal-crisis 
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Thus the first set of control variables utilised and discussed separately below are the 
mechanisms of corporate governance which have been extensively referenced in the prior 
literature (such as Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999; Berry et 
al., 2006; Lee et al., 2008) as proxies for both pay-performance and performance-pay 
frameworks. The researcher aims to explore the types of association between the 
mechanisms of corporate governance on one hand, and executive compensation and 
company performance on the other, by categorising the former variables in terms of their 
significance under the headings: duality role; board size; non-executive directors; 
independent directors; board committees’ existence regarding the presence of audit, 
remuneration, and nomination committees; and boardroom ownership packages. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.1.1 Duality Role (DRi,t) 
Historically it was common both in the UK and in the US for the duality roles of chairman 
and chief executive to be performed by the same person. The present guidance as to 
governance in the UK calls for separation of these duties so as to prevent any one 
individual having dominant or even unfettered power in the boardroom (FRC, 2008). 
Where separation is not in place it might be predicted, from a managerial power 
perspective, that CEO-chairman duality increases the degree of executive control over the 
determination of the level and structure of managerial compensation (Core et al., 1999). In 
the UK Conyon (1997) concluded that there was no association between UK executive pay 
and the duality role although an earlier study (Main and Johnston, 1993) suggested that 
CEOs who are also chairmen received larger total compensation in the UK. Also, using UK 
data, Conyon and Peck (1998) reported that CEO duality as a measure of board monitoring 
had a limited effect on the amount of top management compensation. However Lee et al. 
(2008) find, on the basis of their empirical findings, that CEO-Chairman duality is 
negatively related with no significant effect to the enhancement of business performance, 
measured by Tobin’s Q, in the US context. 
Enhanced executive remuneration is just one avenue for opportunistic managerial 
behaviour (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Gubitta and Gianecchini, 2002). For example, 
Forker (1992) highlights the increased opportunity for control over information and even 
the possibility of withholding information when CEO-Chairman duality exists. Similarly 
Blackburn (1994) notes the possibility of control of board meetings, the ability to select the 
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agenda items, and the nomination of directors, both executive and non-executive, to the 
board. 
Essentially duality creates the opportunity for actions inimical to the interests of the 
shareholders which are likely to affect performance via inappropriate decision making 
(Messier, 2003). It may also allow for exaggerated compensation packages for executive 
directors including the CEO as managerial power is extended. Consistent with the findings 
of Lee et al (2008), the expectation is that duality of role is likely to be associated with an 
adverse influence on firm performance. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.1.2 Board Size (BSi,t) 
The recommendations of Cadbury Report (1992) are likely to have led to an increase in the 
average overall board size via its emphasis on the role of non-executive directors evidence 
as to the relationship between the size and composition of the board and company 
performance is mixed as it is in respect to the link with senior executive remuneration. For 
example using UK data Ozkan’s study (2007) found no clear evidence of any relationship 
between the size of the board of directors and corporate performance – however the study 
did find a positive relationship between the number of directors and CEO remuneration. 
Abdullah and Page (2009) reported some evidence that companies with bigger boards had 
higher values of Tobin’s Q for the period 1999-2001, but a weaker relationship, if anything 
negative, in the later period; whilst they found a negative relationship between board size 
and ROA. 
Similarly mixed results were found in prior studies in the US and elsewhere. These studies 
include those of Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Lawrence and 
Stapledon, 1999; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Raheja, 2005; Belkhir, 2009. This perhaps 
reflects the variety in the attempts to theorise the expected nature of the relevant 
associations and relationships. At one level increasing board size may lead to inefficiency 
and a lesser inclination to take a personal interest in monitoring the activities of other board 
members. For example Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) discuss the decreasing 
proficiency of board members in examining administrative roles as they grow in size and 
their control becomes inefficient. Pound (1995) considered the smaller the corporate board 
of directors, the more likely it is to be reliable in monitoring business operations whereas 
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the larger the board, the slower it is to react to decisions that require a direct and quick 
action. A review study by Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) concluded that previous 
empirical studies on board size have produced a number of consistent findings. For 
instance, board composition, as measured by the insider-outsider ratio, has no correlation 
with corporate performance, and board size is negatively related to a firm’s financial 
performance. Raheja (2005) too found that board size is negatively related to the proxies of 
monitoring the costs of insiders. 
In terms of expectations contained within this study the basic perspective along with that of 
Jensen (1993), Bhaghat and Black (1999) (for Bhaghat and Black the optimal board 
composition is approximately three and five executive members in a total board size of 
eleven) and many others is that above a certain size boards may become unwieldy and 
factional or even generate their own internal agency costs leading to less efficient and 
appropriate decision making. When other factors are controlled for the perspective adopted 
in this study is that enhanced board size is likely to be associated with lower rather than 
higher managerial and corporate performance. Whether on balance larger boards are likely 
to be less rigorous in their monitoring of executive remuneration packages or whether 
smaller boards are likely to be less independent and more under the control of executive 
directors in terms of the determination of executive compensation is left open to question at 
this stage.  
4.3.1.2.2.3.1.3 Non-Executive Directors (NXDi,t) 
Non-executive (outside) directors are members of the corporate boardroom who do not play 
a direct part in the day to day running of a company as part of the executive managerial 
team but who play a significant role in monitoring the performance of executive (inside) 
directors. They are seen by both regulators and the majority of commentators as an integral 
part of the structure of internal governance which ensures both propriety and efficiency in 
the manner in which companies operate and in which they fulfil their obligations to their 
shareholders and wider stakeholders – see for example Gugler, 2001; Fraser and Henry, 
2003; Kim and Nofsinger, 2007; Mallin, 2007. The Higgs’ report (2003) states that non-
executive directors have corporate policy responsibilities to contribute constructively to the 
improvement of company strategy and firm performance by scrutinising the managerial 
team’s efficiency in achieving the enumerated objectives.  
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Specific theorising as to how non-executive directors contribute to improved corporate 
performance has perhaps been more limited than one might expect given the widespread 
acceptance of their role within a paradigm of good or ‘better’ governance – albeit an 
acceptance with some dissenting voices for example Franks et al (2001), Spira (2003), 
Spira and Bender (2004), Gwilliam and Marnet (2009). Benefits are normally seen in acting 
to moderate and improve decision making at board room level, in part because of the 
experience and knowledge which non-executives can bring to boardroom discussion, in part 
because of their ability to stand at a remove as compared with executive directors in terms 
of risk taking and personal involvement in the outcome of decision making. They are also 
seen as an important part of the wider monitoring mechanisms via their involvement in 
audit, nomination and remuneration committees. As such they act to enhance controls 
within the company and also to bring wider transparency and communication with 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Consequently, non-executive directors are regarded as an agent for monitoring and 
controlling executive action and limiting their ability to indulge in opportunistic behaviour 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Mehran (1995) and Leung and Horwitz (2004) emphasise 
that one aspect of controlling opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the shareholders is 
ensuring that excessive remuneration packages are not awarded to corporate executives. 
However, others have argued, for example Fama and Jensen (1983), that non-executives 
should be mindful of the need to ensure that there are sufficient incentives for executive 
directors to maximise their efforts to ensure the effective and profitable running of the firm 
on behalf of the shareholders – and this is likely to result in higher remuneration packages 
if they are successful in this endeavour. Evidence from prior studies for example Ozkan 
(2007) using UK data report that companies with more non-executive directors in relative 
terms (as a percentage of board size) paid their CEOs more than the companies with a 
lower number of non-executive directors.  
Although noting that the role of non-executive directors within the corporate governance 
paradigm is not itself without its critics in this study the majority view is followed – i.e. the 
expectation is that the absolute number and relative proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board is likely to be positively related to measures of corporate performance in line 
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with, inter alia, Fama and Jensen, 1983; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Mura, 2007 etc. Again 
expectations as to any association with the level of executive compensation are not clear 
cut. At one level non-executive directors may act to prevent self seeking management 
enriching themselves inappropriately, at another implementation of appropriate incentive 
packages is likely to lead to better performance and associated higher payments to 
executive directors. At this stage the study takes this latter perspective which is in line with 
the theorising of Fama and Jensen (1983) and the empirical findings of Ozkan (2007). 
4.3.1.2.2.3.1.4 Independent Directors (IDi,t) 
In both the UK and the US non-executive directors can be categorised into those which are 
independent and those which are not. It is the former who are considered by many 
commentators as those who can effectively exercise their best opinions and decisions for 
the benefit of the company and are therefore an essential building block of and for good 
governance.43 In the UK directors are deemed to be independent if they satisfy the 
guidelines set out in the Higgs Report (2003) as to the absence of material pecuniary and 
other relationships with the company together with any additional requirements determined 
by the company itself. The overlap between the notion of a non-executive director and an 
independent director has been something of a grey area in terms of perceptions (Gubitta and 
Gianecchini, 2002) but it is the independent directors who might reasonably be expected to 
be situated to use their best judgment for the company’s interests, consistent with the 
guidelines of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2008)44.  
Although a priori theorising supports the notion of non-executive directors being 
independent, evidence from previous empirical studies is again somewhat mixed – both in 
                                                          
43See the LexVidhi article ‘Independent directors and corporate governance’: 
http://www.lexvidhi.com/article-details/independent-directors-and-corporate-governance-312.html 
See also the Synopses report: 
http://www.synopsys.com/COMPANY/ABOUTSYNOPSYS/CORPORATEGOVERNANCE/Pages/GovG
uidelines.aspx 
44According to the Code (2008; A.3.1), a director is considered not to be independent if he/she: 
• has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
• has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company; 
• has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee; 
• has close family ties with any of the company’s directors; 
• holds cross-directorships; 
• represents a significant shareholder; or 
• has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election. 
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terms of the relationship with performance and with executive compensation. For example, 
in the US, Core et al. (1999) document a positive association between the percentage of 
independent directors and firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, and also report that 
the higher the proportion of independent directors on the board, the more the CEO is paid. 
In the UK Conyon and Peck (1998) reported no correlation between CEO compensation 
and board composition, whilst Abdullah and Page (2009) found that board independence is 
positively related to Tobin’s Q – but it is negatively associated with ROA. In line with this 
negative relationship Bhagat and Black (1999) provide evidence of how companies with a 
high proportion of independent directors on their boards are less profitable than other firms 
for a sample of 928 large US companies over various sub-periods during 1985-1995 and in 
a later study (Bhagat and Black, 2002) reported that whilst poorly performing entities were 
more likely to enhance their board’s independence level there was no clear evidence that 
this resulted in an improvement in firm performance for the same sample utilised before 
(i.e. 928 large US companies) over two sub-periods 1988-1990 and 1991-1993. Using 
Australian data Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) found a positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and corporate performance – but they counselled that 
this relationship might itself be an artefact based on the relative better performance of 
larger firms whose boards comprised a higher proportion of independent directors.  
The Combined Code in 1998 stated that the board should comprise no less than one-third 
independent members, whilst the 2003 Combined Code Guidelines suggest that at least 50 
percent of the board should be independent members. This latter requirement was 
implemented after 30th June 2004. This study therefore aims here to explore the volume 
effect of independent directors on both pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks 
within a context in which the proportion of independent directors is likely to have been 
increasing over time. In terms of expectations the study, in line with the majority of 
theoretical insights/intuition and regulatory commitment, anticipates that an increased 
proportion of independent non-executive directors might act to improve corporate 
performance (consistent with Core et al., 1999; Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; and 
Abdullah and Page, 2009) and to moderate executive compensation packages - but is aware 
that the limited extent of prior empirical evidence does not support such a relationship.  
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4.3.1.2.2.3.1.5 Board Committees’ Existence (ACi,t, RCi,t, and NCi,t)  
Audit, remuneration, and nomination committees are considered by both commentators and 
regulators to be an integral part of what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘better’ corporate governance 
(Gwilliam and Marnet, 2009). The beneficial attributes of these committees, comprised 
wholly or largely of non-executive directors fit within a variety of theoretical perspectives 
both as to their effect on corporate performance and executive compensation packages. For 
example Hossain et al. (1994) discuss the manner in which an audit committee can support 
the principals (i.e. the shareholders) as they seek to monitor the activities of their agents 
(i.e. the managers) and endeavour to align the interests of both parties appropriately. 
Equally from a managerial power perspective these committees will act as a check on 
managerial opportunism (McDaniel et al., 2002). The specific role of a remuneration 
committee is considered earlier in Chapter Two - but there is an extensive range of prior 
literature including that of Braiotta and Sommer, 1987; Main and Johnston, 1993; Conyon 
and Peck, 1998; Narasimhan and Jaiswall, 2007; Main et al., 2008; Brown and Caylor, 
2009 which indicate the importance of the existence of remuneration committees. These 
committees provide assistance in the determination of executive pay packages in a fair and 
appropriate manner and again act to enhance the mechanisms of corporate governance and 
also, perhaps more tenuously, the level of firm performance, consistent with the principle of 
aligning the interests of agents and principals according to the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In the UK Main and Johnston (1993) reported that the proportion of the 
presence of remuneration committees is represented by 30% for a sample of 220 large 
publicly held British companies for the fiscal year 1989/90. This might explain the finding 
of Conyon and Peck (1998) as to board monitoring, measured by the presence of 
remuneration committees, had a limited effect on the level of top executive compensation 
in the UK context. However, the significance of the presence of remuneration committees 
has been highlighted in later periods, for example Brown and Caylor (2009) found the 
representation of remuneration committees for 2363 US firms in 2003 is 66 per cent. 
Nomination committees are set up for the purpose of ensuring that board appointments are 
made in an open and transparent manner and lead to the appointment of appropriately 
qualified and talented people to the board. This too is consistent with both an agency theory 
perspective and one which places greater emphasis on managerial power (Braiotta and 
Sommer, 1987).  
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In this light the expectations are that, consistent with the majority of previous theorising, 
albeit supported by limited empirical evidence, that the existence of such committees is 
likely to be linked, via improved monitoring and control, to enhanced corporate 
performance. As with other variables hypothesised, associations with executive 
compensation are difficult to formulate as there will be situations in which the appropriate 
compensation committees to aid enhanced performance leads to increased remuneration 
whereas in other circumstances these committees will act as a check on managerial 
profligacy and self serving activities. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.1.6 Boardroom Ownership Packages (WSPi,t, E/UWOi,t, and E/UWEi,t)   
The principal-agent problem between directors and owners arises when the former hold a 
small-part of corporate equity and have incentives to act in behaviour which is sub-optimal 
from the perspective of the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leftwich et al., 1981). The 
lower the levels of executive ownership, the likelihood is that agency issues will be more 
pressing and significant. Conversely a higher level of executive ownership will mitigate 
conflicts of interest and result in more suitable and appropriate corporate policies more in 
line with the expectations of the wider shareholder body (Watts, 1977; Craswell and 
Taylor, 1992; Ang et al., 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004), and thereby to enhance their 
company performance (Mehran, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 
1997; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Although the link with corporate performance is 
reasonably straightforward from a theoretical perspective again that with compensation is 
more mixed – but, as Ozkan (2007) noted, it is very likely that remuneration committees 
will incorporate perspectives as to the volume of shares, owned outright or with future 
option rights, held by boardroom executives, especially CEOs, in designing their incentive 
packages. Prior studies (e.g. Murphy, 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000) distinguish 
between compensation per annum (including current value of LTIPs and options) and 
wealth effects which refer to the change in value of these incentive plans and options. The 
current study adopts therefore a package of managerial ownership derived from the 
BoardEx database; namely, Wealth Share Plans (WSPi,t), Wealth Options as Exercised 
(EWOi,t) and Un-exercised (UWOi,t), Wealth Equity as Exercised (EWEi,t), and Un-
exercised (UWEi,t). 
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Here again there is consistency with perspectives deriving from managerial hegemony 
theory (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Using UK data Conyon and Sadler (2001) reported 
that corporate performance is positively associated with the change in firm-specific wealth 
owned by CEOs and other corporate executives. In the US Core and Larcker (2002) report 
also that the adoption of share incentive plans, which represent the managerial equity 
ownership, for top executives is significantly correlated directly with corporate 
performance for a sample of 195 US firms in fiscal year 1995. There are mixed results in 
terms of executive compensation from the US empirical studies. Whilst Allen (1981) 
indicate a negative association between the level of CEO compensation and the CEO stock 
ownership for a sample of 218 large US industrial corporations during 1975 and 1976, 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that officers with greater stockholdings in publicly 
traded companies received higher salaries for a sample of 114 US firms for at least two 
consecutive years between 1979 and 1984 – a finding which Ozkan (2007) interpreted to 
mean that executive directors with high equity holdings may have the authority and power 
to benefit themselves from the usage of company resources. 
Again in accordance with the majority of prior theory and commentary, albeit again noting 
the limited and mixed empirical evidence, the expectation is that a higher level of actual or 
potential share ownership by executive directors will be associated with enhanced corporate 
performance (consistent with Conyon and Sadler, 2001; and Core and Larcker, 2002). In 
respect to compensation packages, the theorising diverges in that one strand would suggest 
a positive relationship between insider ownership and remuneration whether driven by 
improved performance or managerial power, whereas another would suggest that higher 
share ownership would reduce the reliance of executive directors on fixed components of 
remuneration to achieve their rewards. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.2 Board Member Features 
The second set of control variables are a number of straightforward personnel/executive-
dependent effects which are regarded as the influences of the expertise and genus of top 
managerial members (such as age, tenure, and gender), which in turn might have synergetic 
effects, especially on the pay-performance framework. 
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The age of boardroom CEOs and other executives is regarded as an important explanatory 
factor influencing the amount and structure of their remuneration package. Why this should 
be is less clear, but previous literature (e.g. Hogan and McPheters, 1980; Devers et al., 
2007) suggests that age, perhaps proxying as an experience factor, has a significant and 
direct influence on managerial compensation. While Hogan and McPheters (1980) utilised 
a vector of personal and human capital characteristics, including CEO age, within the pay-
performance framework for a relatively a small sample of 45 US highest paid executives; 
Devers et al. (2007) highlights the importance to consider the importance of existence the 
time-dependent effects (i.e. CEO age, tenure, temporal incentives) on the pay for 
performance models. However the evidence again is mixed. For example, Deckop (1988) 
concluded that CEO age has no effect on and is negatively associated with compensation 
for a sample of 120 US large firms over the period 1977-1981. 
The tenure of corporate board CEOs and executives refers to the number of years that they 
have held their positions – the time-in-role (TIR) variable in the current study. The longer 
top-ranking officers have held their positions, the more efficient their track records, the 
more developed their contact lists and their key inside and outside personnel skills; in 
addition, longer tenure adds to their wealth accumulation in the form of stocks and options, 
consistent with McKnight and Tomkins (2004). As Hill and Phan (1991) argued, CEOs’ 
longer tenure of a role in the company may lead them to exercise more control over the 
remuneration setting process in harmony with their preferences. Consequently, CEOs 
respect, confidence, and vision is acquired consistent with the managerial power view of 
imposing more influence over the level and structure of their pay packages.  
Again in line with a priori theorising and the majority of the empirical evidence in this 
study the expectation is that both age and tenure are positively related to both corporate 
performance and executive compensation. 
The fact that women are paid less in amount and composition than men in similar jobs has 
been consistently recognised around the world (Blau and Kahn, 2000). In relation to the 
theorising of gender pay gap, Rubery (1995) suggests that individualising compensation is 
likely to increase fragmentation and diminution of women’s interests beyond that which 
would be obtained from the application of uniform pay scales to particular job categories. 
More specifically Adams and Ferreira (2004) document several significant correlations 
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between the variability of stock returns, the structure of director compensation, and the 
gender diversity of corporate boards for a sample of boards of directors of 1024 US 
publicly traded companies in fiscal year 1998. They deconstruct the findings of gender 
based studies into three categories: first, a greater variability of stock returns when fewer 
women are on the board; second, more diverse boards lead to more pay-performance 
incentives; and finally, more diverse boards are associated with a greater frequency of more 
board meetings.  
Without purporting to delve into the vast range of literature relating to gender and 
inequality the expectations of this study in accordance with the main thrust of this literature 
is that there will be a direct association between gender and CEOs’ compensation as the 
majority of boardroom seats in FTSE 350 companies are occupied by males. Whether there 
will be an association in terms of corporate performance is an open question – and one 
which might be mediated by the claimed greater risk aversion of women. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.3 Firm Characteristics 
Apart from personnel-dependent variables a number of common firm-dependent effects as 
represented by the influences of corporate size, growth, and leverage are likely to be 
influential in respect to both corporate performance and executive compensation. 
Consequently a number of such variables, derived from and consistent with previous 
literature, are utilised which might have relevance to the two aspects of the research 
approach, i.e. that of pay-performance and performance-pay. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.3.1 Corporate Size (TASSi,t) 
Understandably firm size is a variable that has received considerable attention in the 
literature of executive pay and company performance. As Conyon (1997) noted, firm size is 
significant in determining the level and structure of executive directors’ remuneration. He 
attributed this in part to a competitive labour market for professional managers which will 
attract more talented officers to higher positions in the corporate hierarchy. This in turn 
suggests that larger companies will be able to bid more highly for talent and expertise – and 
also that talented individuals will bid up their remuneration expectations and that these are 
more likely to be satisfied by larger companies. 
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There is support for this perspective in the empirical literature which shows a clear 
relationship between company size and remuneration and in some instances links this in to 
the market for executive talent (Core et al., 1999; Zhou, 2000). The relationship is 
necessarily complicated by the body of literature which also relates size to performance, 
although here the evidence is mixed. Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Zhou (2000) report a 
positive link between CEO pay and corporate size which they attribute in part to the better 
performance of larger firms. Punnose (2008) observes a direct relationship between size 
and performance. However, other studies, for example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find 
an inverse and significant relationship, between company size and profitability. Also 
Loderer and Martin (1997) report a negative association between firm size and both 
acquisition performance and Tobin’s Q. 
Various reasons have been suggested for the perceived better performance of larger 
companies some of which are linked to corporate governance, i.e. the likelihood that larger 
firms will have more clearly structured board and management networks and employ more 
suitable and talented personnel. Jensen and Murphy (1990) link this in to an agency 
framework whereby firms choose the governance structure most suitable to minimise 
agency costs and align CEO and executive directors’ compensation packages accordingly. 
Therefore the expectation is that larger-sized companies will be associated negatively with 
corporate performance (consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Loderer and 
Martin (1997)) and positively with executive remuneration (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; 
and Zhou, 2000). 
4.3.1.2.2.3.3.2 Corporate Growth (CTASSi,t) 
The majority of the literature supports the contention that companies with upward growth 
opportunities seek more highly qualified executives who in turn expect higher amounts of 
compensation (Rosen, 1982). One strand of this literature focuses on agency perspectives. 
It suggests that corporations with sustainable growth and opportunities to prosper are more 
likely to have a high level of information asymmetry between board room directors and 
institutional shareholders, as the top managerial executives have sensitive information 
about prospective profitable projects, while corporate investors are more concerned with 
monitoring their efforts in enhancing business operations and processes (Rosen, 1982; 
Smith and Watts, 1992). Consequently, company growth might reflect increase potential for 
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managerial opportunism and possibly higher agency expenditure to counteract this. Smith 
and Watts (1992) show that firms with upward growth pay higher compensation levels to 
their boardroom members compared with those with downward growth, perhaps not 
surprisingly, but also suggest that managers in faster growing firms may adopt excessive 
risk-taking strategies as they seek to enhance their market shares, sales volume, and levels 
of profitability. It is possible that in order to seek to restrict the potential for managerial 
opportunism that there might be greater similarity in the nature of the composition 
packages offered to executives in firms with greater growth opportunities as compared to 
those in firms operating in a more steady state environment. Therefore, the research 
expectation is that there are positive associations between company growth, performance, 
and executive compensation. 
4.3.1.2.2.3.3.3 Corporate Leverage (DAi,t45 and DEi,t46) 
A number of writers have highlighted the relevance of corporate leverage to issues of 
executive compensation both in terms of risk averse managers preferring cash-based 
compensation rather than equity-based packages (Harris and Raviv, 1979) and also 
shareholders seeking to align the likely levels of corporate risk taking with their looked for 
risk return pay-off via the setting of appropriate compensation packages and firm 
performance. Here again aspects of both managerial power as managers seek to set 
packages, and also debt strategies, to suit their own aspirations and agency theory as 
shareholders and other stakeholders seek to control the managers come into play. 
A variety of corporate leverage indicators are utilised as control variables in the prior 
literature. In this study the basic leverage control variables used are debt leverage 
indicators. They are significant in both operating and financing processes as they provide a 
good indication of the long-term solvency of the firm (Fabozzi and Peterson, 2003) – in 
which the debt operating47 indicates the use of debt to acquire additional assets, whilst the 
                                                          
45The DA percentage equal to: (Long term debt + short term debt + current portion of long term debt) / total 
assets × 100 (Source: Thomson-One-Banker database). 
46The percentage of DE commonly equal to: (Long term debt + short term debt + current portion of long term 
debt) / Common equity × 100 (Source: Thomson-One-Banker database). 
47Debt-to-asset ratio is the proportion of assets financed with debts, by which the percentage of funds 
provided by creditors within the overall assets is examined. In general, company creditors wish debt ratios 
to be low as the lower the ratio, the lower the chance of sustaining losses in the case of liquidation. 
Institutional investors, however, may prefer more leverage levels as this may increase the amount of 
expected earnings (Brigham, 1991). 
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debt financing48 has the advantage of debt over equity in the capital structure for assessing 
how much business risk has been taken on (Brigham, 1991). Jensen (1986) reported that the 
usage of more debts might perhaps affect the company’s capability to perform well. 
Bebchuk and Spamann (2009) also noted that the issuance of these debts to maximise 
corporate funds is regarded as an important sign of the excessive risk-taking behaviour of 
corporate executives, as a result of which the company performance is influenced. 
Therefore the expectation is that debt leverage is negatively related to company 
performance, consistent with (Jensen, 1986; and Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009). 
4.3.1.2.2.3.4 Dummy Variables 
As Wooldridge (2005) notes, one of the best ways to avoid the potential for threat of 
perfect multi-collinearity is to include one or more dummy (i.e. binary) indicators – which 
can be treated as numerical variables to represent subgroups of the sample – in an attempt 
to permit the slope differences across different sectors. In general, dummies are utilised as 
qualitative factors besides the quantitative factors to indicate the absence or presence of 
certain categorical effects that may be expected to shift the outcome, in addition to 
distinguishing different treatment groups.  
The current study employs two types of dummy. First, Dreg implies the dummy construction 
for the two sections of the FTSE 350 industries by representing the sectors “Financial and 
Utilities” by zero and the non-financial sectors by one, consistent with Koh and Liu (2012). 
Second, Dt1-9 refers to the dummy construction for the 10-year time period. 
4.3.1.3 Research Modelling Plan 
As previously noted and discussed in chapters Two and Three, there are a number of 
theoretical perspectives related to managerial pay packages and each are themselves based 
on diverse assumptions regarding the states of nature, the capital markets, managerial 
characteristics, etc. It is therefore not surprising that competing models should offer 
different sets of theoretical and empirical implications.  
                                                          
48Debt-to-equity is the ratio which investigates the proportion of funds (i.e. total liabilities, including both 
short- and long-term debts) provided by creditors within their overall investments (Brigham, 1991). 
Consequently, the indicator of debt-to-equity shows the financial risk in terms of the use of debt relative to 
the use of equity, as well as indicating how many pounds of debt are used in financing the firm for each 
pound invested by its shareholders (Palepu et al., 2004).  
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The third and final stage of the empirical research strategy focuses on the design of the 
examination modelling the interrelationships between executive compensation and firm 
performance. The modelling frameworks of the relationships between executive 
compensation and company performance are set out in the two main models, as outlined in 
Figure 5. The first model is that of fixed-effect equations, in which boardroom pay can be 
influenced by the company’s previous year performance (which structure hypothesis (1)) 
and has an effect on the forward year performance, whilst the levels of company 
achievement can be influenced by the prior year executive pay (which construct hypothesis 
(2)) and has an effect on the next year executive remuneration. A panel of fixed-effect 
regression techniques has been implemented to capture the unobservable officer and firm-
level differences (such as executive talent, corporate complexity, etc.), consistent with 
Main et al. (1996) and John et al. (2010), following earlier studies (for example, Benito and 
Conyon, 1999; and Sapp, 2008) in estimating the corporate fixed-effects model. The second 
model is a simultaneous equation framework, in which a set of corporate governance 
mechanisms is utilised in order to contribute explicitly to identifying the possible 
endogeneity issues, consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), that might arise from the 
potential simultaneous exercise of executive compensation and related corporate 
governance mechanisms (which outline hypothesis (3)) – as the former is one of the latter 
mechanisms, consistent with Mehran (1995), which companies utilise to mitigate or, at 
least, minimise agency conflicts. 
Figure 5: Framework of Relationships between Executive Pay and Firm Performance 
 
deficiencies  
Source: Prepared and constructed by the researcher. 
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in other words, 
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j=1 
ln (Remi,t) = β10 + ∑ β11 ln (Performi,t-1) + ∑ γ12 Controlsi,t-1 + ui + vi,t            (1) 
            ln (Yi,t) = β10 + ∑ β11 ln (Y*i,t-1) + ∑ γ12 Xi,t-1 + ui + vi,t                                    
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in other words, 
ln (Performi,t+1) = β20 + ∑ β21 ln (Remi,t) + ∑ γ22 Controlsi,t + ui + vi,t            (2) 
             ln (Yi,t+1) = β20 + ∑ β21 ln (Y*i,t) + ∑ γ22 Xi,t + ui + vi,t                                 
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4.3.1.3.1 Fixed-Effect Equations Model 
The current study aims to examine the interrelationships between executive remuneration 
and company performance by showing the impact of each aspect on the other through a set 
of corporate governance mechanisms, boardroom ownership structure, as well as board 
member and corporate features, as follows:  
  
 
 
 
 
where i denotes a company, t denotes a year, and ui denotes a firm-specific effect. Yi,t and 
Y*i,t  refer to the same set of variables which represent the main components and measures 
of executive compensation in terms of their significance and size for the CEO and 
boardroom members at FTSE 350 companies (i) in year (t). Y*i,t-1 and Yi,t+1 stand for the 
same group of variables which represent the accounting-based measures of corporate 
performance for FTSE 350 companies (i) in years (t-1) and (t+1). Xi,t represents the set of 
control variables at FTSE 350 companies (i) in year (t). vi,t is  the disturbance (i.e. error) 
term, which is independent across the FTSE 350 companies (i) in year (t).  
In respect to the slope coefficient β11 and β21 parameters measure the effect of performance 
of pay and the effect of pay on performance, respectively, during the year. In relation to the 
pay-performance association, β11 is the reaction coefficient of interest reflecting the 
sensitivity of executive directors’ remuneration to firm performance with the ambition to 
explore how does company performance influence executive compensation. Academic 
literatures indicate that the estimates (β11) of pay-performance vary in sensitivity. For 
instance Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that CEO pay increased by $3.25 for every 
$1,000 increase in stockholders’ wealth, while Hall and Leibman (1998) concluded that on 
average CEO pay sensitivity then was about $25.11 for every $1,000 increase in 
stockholders’ wealth. In this study the coefficient degree of β11 will be interpreted by 
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referring to the optimal contracting view of agency theory, in which positive values of β11 
suggest closer alignment between the interests of executive directors and shareholders 
(Conyon and Sadler, 2001) or a managerial hegemony perspective, in which negative 
values of β11 suggest the influence of boardroom members in constructing their pay 
contracts (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004b). In accordance with the performance-pay 
relationship, β21 is the reaction parameter of interest reflecting the sensitivity of company 
performance to variable executive directors’ remuneration with the ambition to investigate 
how does executive pay influence company performance? Prior studies highlight that  β21 
coefficient can be interpreted by referring to tournament and/or stewardship perspectives, in 
which positive values of β21 suggest that enhanced prospects of promotion approach will 
inspire corporate executives to strive harder for recognition and reward and/or to highlight 
the human capital aspects relevant to advancement in terms of their knowledge and skills. 
Therefore, the framework of performance-pay leads principally to the notion of 
enhancement of overall firm performance, paralleled by a closer alignment between the 
interests of executive directors and shareholders. 
Based on equations (1 and 2), a number of methodological thoughts and insights regarding 
the analysis of a package of panel data variables are highlighted below as they are 
considered essential analytical procedures before the data sample is analysed. 
The first methodological/analytical concern is the residuals for each company, by which 
they show evidence of correlation across years and also may be associated across 
corporations within a single period. According to the methodology of Black et al. (2006), 
three approaches can generally be followed to overcome concerns re the residuals: (1) firm-
clustering effects by using ID dummies consistent with Rogers’s clustered standard errors 
(Rogers, 1993); (2) firm-random effects; and (3) firm-fixed effects. However, the model of 
firm-specific fixed effects is regarded as the most appropriate statistical estimation as it 
stands for the observed individual observations in terms of the explanatory variables, which 
are treated as if the individual observations were non-random. As Benito and Conyon 
(1999) reported, comparing the validity and interpretation of company random and fixed 
effects, the latter is statistically preferred when both random and fixed effects models are 
presented. This is because the former requires the corporate effects to be unconnected with 
the independent variables (i.e. regressors), and therefore suffers from inconsistency, as well 
98 
 
as inefficiency, as the estimated standard errors are not effective in taking account the 
dependence of the error term within individual observations over time. On the other hand, 
the firm-cluster effect permits observations of the same company to be correlated across the 
period under examination, and therefore might suffer from problems associated with multi-
collinearity. More importantly the technique of fixed effects estimation is probably best 
when there are omitted variables and these variables might perhaps be correlated with the 
variables in the model within the analysis of panel data (Hausman and Taylor, 1981; and 
Black et al., 2006) – this is discussed later in this chapter in the section relating to data 
collection and preparation. Accordingly the suggestion of Hausman and Taylor (1981) to 
adopt the fixed-effects framework is followed as it represents an unbiased method of 
controlling for omitted variables in a panel data set. In this case, fixed effects estimation 
provides a mean for controlling for omitted variable bias, consistent with prior literature - 
including Hausman and Taylor (1981), Gujarati (2004), Wooldridge (2005), and (Black et 
al., 2006). 
The second methodological concern is the endogeneity of examining the relationships 
between executive directors’ remuneration and corporate performance by which, once any 
regressor is correlated with the disturbance term, the problem of endogeneity arises, 
causing a biased coefficient. These types of relationship can occur due to either an omitted 
variables bias or reverse causation; however, both panel data structure and appropriate 
estimation techniques assist in overcoming the problems related to omitted variable bias, 
consistent with Black et al. (2006). For the fixed effects to be unbiased, the regressors in all 
periods are tested to be uncorrelated with the unobserved individual effects in all periods. 
E (Ɛi,s  Y*i,t) = 0;  s= 1,…,T, t=1,…,T 
On the other hand, reverse causality might arise in the interrelationships between pay and 
performance. For instance, Conyon and Sadler (2001) noted that directors’ talent and/or 
background experience is thought to influence their pay package and corporate 
performance too. Palia (2001) also reported that CEO age and experience are superior 
instrumental indicators due to their relationship to CEO compensation. In addition, 
Yermack (2007) demonstrated that options might be endogenous because the corporate 
directors usually have better information than the market and they therefore may receive 
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options before the company performs well. However, the concern of reverse causality can 
be eliminated by avoiding running the regression model of relationships between pay and 
performance through the same time interval. Therefore, consistent with the theoretical 
perspectives noted and discussed, this study examines the pay-performance framework by 
estimating the current compensation package with the previous year levels of firm 
performance, whilst the framework of performance-pay stands for the current remuneration 
package with the forward year company performance. 
In practice, the instrumental variable technique is frequently applied to determine the 
endogeneity links between the regressors from one side and the disturbance term from the 
other, as it requires specifying the appropriate instruments which are both correlated with 
the endogenous variables and unconnected with the disturbance term of the original 
regression. In general the single-equation methods are utilised often as they can estimate a 
single-equation in a multi-equation model without confusing other equations in the 
framework. Prior studies (such as Dougherty, 2002; Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2005, 
etc.) demonstrated that Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) is one of the single-equation 
methods which is acceptable as the obtained estimates are consistent (i.e. the estimators 
converge to their true population values no matter how large the sample size), and 
unbiased (i.e. the regressor is uncorrelated with the error term).  
In this study, consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Loderer and Martin (1997), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2000), and Black et al. (2006), the estimation technique of two-
stage least squares is adopted to report the potential endogeneity relationships between 
corporate performance and executive compensation. For the pay-performance framework, 
the econometric application of lagged performance (e.g. perf.t-2, t-3) is applied to mitigate 
the extent of endogeneity links. This is consistent with prior econometric literature (such as 
Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2005, etc.), which recommend the lag approach when it might 
be difficult to identify the appropriate variables to serve as valid instruments. In 
accordance with the performance-pay framework, Smith (2008) used both age and tenure 
for CEOs and board executive members as endogeneity instruments; but both variables are 
utilised in the current study as control variables. Instead the lagged variable of 
compensation (e.g. comp. t-2), in addition to the unexercised wealth equity and options as 
ownership components for CEOs and board executives are utilised as endogeneity 
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instruments. The latter selection is consistent generally with the principal-agent concern 
which is likely to be arisen when the directors hold a small part of corporate equity and 
options (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, according to the framework of 
performance-pay, the executive remuneration indicators are regressed on their instruments 
and other control variables in the first stage, while the corporate performance measures are 
regressed on executive pay package, control variables, and the residuals from the first stage 
regressions in the second stage. Any significant coefficient reported in the first stage 
residual will be considered as evidence of the presence of the endogeneity links. 
The third methodological concern relates to testing the four principal assumptions (i.e. 
normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms) before and within 
applying the parametric modelling, consistent with Gujarati (2004), in order to justify the 
use of linear regressions for prediction purposes and achieve more accurate estimates. 
Although the ordinary least square (OLS) estimators are suitable when the analyses contain 
both dummy and continuous variables, adopting the OLS mechanism is conditioned by 
these assumptions. 
First, normality requires the data to be normally distributed. This study adopts two 
common tests to examine the variables’ normality: skewness and kurtosis. Consistent with 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), data are statistically regarded to be normally distributed when 
the values of skewness and kurtosis are ±1.96 and ±3, respectively; otherwise, the problem 
of non-normality will arise, which in turn requires the standard errors to be adjusted in all 
the regressions (White, 1980). This entails clustering the FTSE 350 companies to test the 
developed research hypotheses related to the entire data set - and this has been the 
approach adopted in this study. For example Belkhir (2009) adopted the same mechanism 
in all the regressions. Also Hoechle (2007) discussed that regression analyses with ‘robust’ 
standard errors are efficient when some of the assumptions of the underlying panel 
regression models, such as independence of distributed residuals and homoscedasticity, are 
not met, consistent with (Wooldridge, 2002 and 2005), whilst White (1980) indicated that 
adjusting the standard errors for heteroscedasticity will yield more robust estimates for the 
regression analyses. In addition, the procedure of data transformation using the natural 
logarithm will assist in avoiding not only the non-normality concern, but also the problems 
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of outliers, linearity, and heteroscedasticity, by synthetically creating a normal distribution 
structure (Wooldridge, 2002, 2005).  
Second, linearity requires that the model has linear parameters in which the associations 
between the dependent and explanatory variables must be linear. Using multiple regression 
techniques, log transformations, as well as the multicollinearity test, will provide more 
assurance in avoiding the concern of nonlinearity, consistent with the econometric literature 
(such as Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002, 2005, etc.). Third, homoscedasticity requires 
that the standard deviation or the variance of the dependent variable within the groups is 
equivalent or homogenous; otherwise the problem of heteroscedasticity will occur, which 
leads to biased standard errors. Fourth, the independence of error terms requires the error 
terms to be independent from each other, which means no serial correlation exists as the 
error terms are uncorrelated and so, therefore, are the variables; otherwise the problem of 
autocorrelation will arise. The possible presence of autocorrelation is detected based on a 
set of correlation analyses incorporating all underlying variables. As mentioned before, the 
current study adopts the regression analyses with an adjustment for standard errors to yield 
more robust estimates (White, 1980) and mitigate the issues related to homoscedasticity, 
consistent with (Wooldridge, 2002, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
The concern of multicollinearity is a fourth analytical issue which arises when there are 
high linear relationships between two or more independent variables. This statistical 
phenomenon causes difficulty in picking out the true association between the dependent 
variable and the collection of X-variables as the coefficient estimates may change 
erratically in response to small changes in the model. As a result, a strong degree of 
multicollinearity might affect the analytical software’s ability to estimate efficiently the 
regression coefficients, or it may render the results of matrix inversion inaccurate. The 
main consequence of higher multicollinearity is the increased standard error of estimates of 
the βs, which in turn will lead to a reduction in model reliability (Dougherty, 2002; 
Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002, 2005, etc.). Therefore, the technique of removing the X-
variable that is robustly correlated with one or more of other X-variables and less correlated 
with the dependent variable can provide more support in reaching a better estimation of the 
regression model. Besides this, the larger the sample size, the lower the standard errors, 
which reflects the fact that a large-size sample will provide more support in producing more 
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precise estimates of the regression coefficients. In addition, the present study adopts the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) test to detect the problem of multicollinearity in the 
regression models, by which the tolerance factor and variance inflation factor of each 
variable used are measured. The presence of multicollinearity concerns will be detected if 
the tolerance factor is less than 0.10 and the value of the variance inflation factor is above 
10 (Wooldridge, 2002, 2005; O’Brien, 2007). 
Finally, survivorship bias is a methodological concern, and means that the study is 
abstracting from data relating to companies which have ceased to exist, or exist for just a 
very brief time during the period under examination. This is not an insignificant problem 
as there is considerable movement in the constituents of the FTSE 350 index over the 
relevant period as companies are demoted, taken over, or de-listed, and therefore the 
outcomes of examining them all might be misleading. The researcher therefore follows the 
suggestion of Abdullah and Page (2009) by reviewing the changes of the FTSE 350 
composition through the published notes of the changes in “The FTSE Actuaries Share 
Indices”49 throughout the time period under investigation in order to assure the integration 
of FTSE 350 companies; rather than Korczak and Liu’s (2013) suggestion to remove the 
low frequency companies to put more focus on just the constituent companies for two main 
reasons. First, sample selection bias might be created even after removing the companies 
with low frequencies. Second, a large set of usable data might be underutilised in the 
current study. 
According to the above discussion, the fixed-effect model has the advantage of being able 
to capture any unobserved effect of an estimated intercept (α) which is constant over time 
for each entity in order to allow comparison of results, consistent with Dougherty (2002), 
Gujarati (2004), and Wooldridge (2002, 2005). Therefore, it provides the support in 
controlling the correlation across companies, in addition to the time-invariant firm effect. 
Additionally, this technique has the benefit of not needing the corporate effect to be 
unrelated with other regressors, unlike the random effects technique, as well as providing 
help in removing all cross-sectional variations from the data sample. For these reasons, this 
study employs the construction of explicit comparisons between the amount and structure 
                                                          
49See: http://www.ftse.com/Research_and_Publications/Index_Notes/index.jsp. 
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of executives’ pay packages among the levels of corporate performance measures by 
adopting the fixed-effect regression model with robust standard errors. 
4.3.1.3.2 Simultaneous Equations Model 
As mentioned above, the majority of recent empirical studies in the UK including: Main et 
al., 1996; Conyon, 1997; Benito and Conyon, 1999; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Dong and 
Ozkan, 2008; Gregg et al., 2011; Ozkan, 2011 have controlled the examination between 
executive compensation and firm performance by a set of corporate governance 
mechanisms, but generally report weak sensitivity associations. The reason for these 
findings might be that they did not properly address the possibility of endogeneity issues, as 
using a number of alternative mechanisms of corporate governance to mitigate agency 
problems leads largely to the interconnection between the variables utilised– therefore the 
findings of single equation models might lead to unreliable outcomes, consistent with 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). 
The second model has been developed to extend the examination of relationships between 
executive remuneration and company performance by developing a system of six 
simultaneous equations in order to allow for simultaneous interdependencies by employing 
data available on four control variables (comprising board size (BS), non-executive 
directors (NXD), leverage (DA), and boardroom ownership (WSP)), as well as accounting-
based indicators of company performance (i.e. Tobin’s Q and ROA separately) and total 
executive compensation (TREM) using the three-stage least square (3SLS) estimation 
technique, following Ntim et al. (2011). As Brooks (2008) suggests, 3SLS is utilised to 
estimate robust coefficients with a system of equations which are endogenous by 
controlling for cross-equation correlation among the error terms. Baltagi (2008) also noted 
that system estimations (by 3SLS) should be adopted rather than single-equation estimation 
(e.g. 2SLS) when the simultaneous equations modelling is utilised, which takes into 
account the zero restrictions in every equation, in addition to the variance-covariance 
matrix of the disturbances of the entire system. Table 2 contains a summary of variables 
employed by the simultaneous equations model.  
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Table 2: Summary of Variables Employed by Simultaneous Equations Modelling 
Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance within Corporate Governance 
(Endogenous) Variables 
TREM Natural log of total cash and non-cash amounts of compensation for CEO 
and boardroom executives scaled by the total number of board executives, 
in UK £,000. 
TQ Ratio of total corporate market value on the stock market to its total book 
value assets after the winsorisation process (Manually Measured). 
ROA Ratio of operating income to total assets after the winsorisation process 
(T1B and DataStream: ROA).  
BS Total number of members on the board (BoardEx: Board_No). 
NXD Number of non-executives within the overall corporate boardroom 
(BoardEx: No. NONEXE_Board). 
WSP Accumulated volume of Wealth Share Plan, provided by BoardEx. 
DA Percentage of assets financed with debts (T1B: Debt to Asset). 
Control (Exogenous) Variables 
DR Role of CEO and Chairman held simultaneously (BoardEx: Duality). 
ID Number of independent directors among the overall corporate board 
members (BoardEx: No. Independent_Board). 
AC Existence of Audit Committee, BoardEx provides the audit committee 
size. 
RC Existence of Remuneration Committee, BoardEx provides the 
remuneration committee size. 
NC Existence of Nomination Committee, BoardEx provides the nomination 
committee size. 
TASS Natural log of total corporate assets (T1B: Total Book Value of Assets). 
CTASS Natural log of corporate change in total assets (T1B: Total Book Value of 
Assets). 
DE Proportion of funds provided by corporate creditors with their overall 
investments (T1B: Debt to Equity). 
Dreg Dummy construction for the two sections of the FTSE 350 industries 
representing the sectors “Financials and Utilities” by 0 and the non-
financial sectors by 1. 
Dt1-9 Dummy construction for the 10-year time period by removing one time 
period dummy. 
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TREMi,t = β0 + β1 BSi,t + β2 NXDi,t + β3 WSPi,t + β4 DAi,t + β5 TQi,t  
+ ∑ βj Controlsi,t + vi,t                                                                (3)  
 
 10 
 j=1 
The underlying principle, therefore, is to explore how total CEO/executive pay influences 
corporate performance through a set of governance mechanisms in which TREM and 
performance indicators are endogenous, along with the governance mechanisms, by 
permitting each governance variable not only to influence TREM/performance, but also 
allowing TREM/performance to be influenced by each governance variable. The following 
six equations describe the development process of pay-performance simultaneous 
modelling.  
First, total executive compensation (TREM) is utilised as a dependent variable in the first 
simultaneous equation by adding the same set of performance control variables in equation 
(1) to examine the relationships between executive remuneration and company performance 
within a package of corporate governance mechanisms, as follows: 
 
 
Second, as mentioned above, boardrooms perform a significant role in sufficiently 
reimbursing professional managers to align their interests with those of institutional 
shareholders according to the perspective of agency. As noted above, the literature suggests 
that large-sized corporate boards compensate their CEOs more than small boards - 
consistent with Core et al. (1999) for US companies and Sapp (2008) for UK firms. 
Therefore, board size (BS) is utilised as a dependent variable in the second simultaneous 
equation.  
The research expectations are that corporate size (TASS) is positively related to board size 
consistent with Abdullah and Page (2009). As Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) noted, larger-
sized companies have lower growth opportunities. Here the research expectations predict 
that corporate change in total assets (CTASS) is negatively related to board size. Conyon 
(1997) reports that public scrutiny puts more pressure on large corporations and therefore 
the research investigates the likely positive link between board size, the number of 
independent directors (ID) and the existence of audit (AC), remuneration (RC), and 
nomination (NC) committees. However, board size is thought to be negatively associated to 
the duality role (DR). Finally, the research expectation is that board size will vary across 
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BSi,t = β0 + β1 TREMi,t + β2 NXDi,t + β3 WSPi,t + β4 DAi,t + β5 TQi,t  
+ ∑ βj Exogenousi,t + vi,t                                                           (4)  
 
  9 
 j=1 
financial and non-financial companies (Dreg), and years (Dt). Reflecting this, the second 
simultaneous equation includes nine exogenous variables as follows: 
 
 
 
Third, non-executive directors have a role in monitoring executives’ actions so as to 
prevent opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995) and they also have a duty to 
protect the interests of institutional shareholders (Leung and Horwitz, 2004) by not 
awarding excessive remuneration package to corporate executives (Mehran, 1995). As large 
boards of corporate non-executive directors compensate their CEOs more than their smaller 
counterparts, consistent with Core et al. (1999) and Ozkan (2007), non-executive directors 
(NXD) is utilised as a dependent variable in the third simultaneous equation.  
The earlier discussion in this chapter suggests a positive link between the number of non-
executive directors and corporate size (TASS) and the mechanisms of corporate governance 
(such as the existence of audit (AC), remuneration (RC), and nomination (NC) committees), 
consistent with Spira and Bender (2004) as they are a highly desirable inclusion on 
company boards; but conversely might be associated with duality (DR), consistent with the 
perspective of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), according to which large-sized companies 
have more credibility and visibility to attract potential high quality executives. However, in 
this research model a distinction has not been drawn between non-executive directors and 
independent directors (ID) because of the difficulties over time in establishing a clear 
dichotomy between the two (Gubitta and Gianecchini, 2002) (although it is recognised that 
now companies have to specify which of the directors are independent). The model also 
incorporates a prediction that corporate change in total assets (CTASS) is negatively related 
to the number of non-executive directors. Finally, the researcher hypothesises that the 
number of non-executive directors varies across financial and non-financial companies 
(Dreg), and years (Dt). In summary the third simultaneous equation includes eight 
exogenous variables as follows:  
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WSPi,t= β0 +β1 TREMi,t + β2 BSi,t + β3 NXDi,t + β4 DAi,t + β5 TQi,t 
+ ∑βjExogenousi,t + vi,t                                                                                             (6) 
 
  9 
 j=1 
NXDi,t= β0 +β1 TREMi,t + β2 BSi,t + β3 WSPi,t + β4 DAi,t + β5 Q/ROAi,t 
+ ∑βjExogenousi,t + vi,t                                                                                            (5) 
 
  8 
 j=1 
 
 
 
The fourth simultaneous equation detailed below contains a number of different control 
variables. As previously mentioned, the principal-agent problem is likely to be more 
pressing when the directors hold a small part of corporate equity (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).Therefore, higher levels of executive ownership can be regarded as a sign of a 
governance mechanism which may operate to increase the pay package of executive 
directors. As a result, the designated component of executive ownership (wealth share plan: 
WSP) is utilised as a dependent variable in this equation. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) propose that companies with higher growth opportunities are 
more attractive to both executives and investors, likely to be more profitable and more 
likely to offer share based compensation packages. This leads to the research expectation 
that executive ownership is positively related to corporate change in total assets (CTASS). It 
has been suggested that when executives hold shares for long periods this might mitigate 
the conflicts of interest and result in more appropriate corporate policies in line with the 
expectations of the wider shareholder body, particularly in large-sized companies (Ang et 
al., 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004; etc.) and this leads to the tentative belief that executive 
ownership is positively associated with corporate size (TASS). Another point of interest is 
the possibility of a link between executive ownership and mechanisms of corporate 
governance. This study expects executive ownership to be positively related to the number 
of independent directors (ID) and the existence of audit (AC), remuneration (RC), and 
nomination (NC) committees, but to be negatively associated with the duality role (DR). 
Finally, there is an expectation that executive ownership holding proportions will vary 
across financial and non-financial companies (Dreg), and years (Dt). Consequently the 
fourth simultaneous equation includes nine exogenous variables and is specified as follows:  
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DAi,t= β0 +β1 TREMi,t + β2 BSi,t + β3 NXDi,t + β4 WSPi,t + β5 TQi,t 
+ ∑βjExogenousi,t + vi,t                                                                                             (7) 
 
  5 
 j=1 
TQi,t= β0 +β1 TREMi,t + β2 BSi,t + β3 NXDi,t + β4 WSPi,t + β5 DAi,t 
+ ∑βjControlsi,t + vi,t                                                                                                  (8) 
 
 10 
 j=1 
Fifth, the benefit of using greater debt in mitigating agency costs might mean that leverage 
is regarded as positively associated with corporate governance, consistent with Jensen 
(1986). According to prior literature (such as Harris and Raviv, 1979; Conyon et al., 2009, 
etc.), risk-averse executives might seek to trade off company risk for higher compensation 
packages. Therefore, the company debt-to-assets (DA) ratio is utilised as a dependent 
variable in the fifth simultaneous equation.  
Previous research suggests that leverage is positively related to corporate size (TASS) as 
large-sized companies are more exposed to agency problems in terms of higher costs of 
managerial monitoring (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). However, Jensen (1986) notes that 
increasing corporate debt levels will in turn lead to outside constraints which will 
eventually limit the company’s capacity to grow. The hypothesis then is that leverage is 
negatively associated with corporate change in total assets (CTASS). The literature 
identifies that debt leverage indicators are significant in both operating and financing 
processes in terms of their interaction with the long term solvency of the firm (Fabozzi and 
Peterson, 2003). The hypothesis then is that there are preferences as to the type of debt 
financing (DE) as the former perform as an alternative to the latter, but obviously 
associations between them and governance measures are not clear in the literature. The 
final hypothesis, again based on previous literature, is that leverage varies across financial 
and non-financial companies (Dreg), and years (Dt). This leads to specification of the fifth 
simultaneous equation which includes five exogenous variables as follows:  
 
 
 
The final, and sixth, simultaneous equation brings into play Tobin’s Q (TQ) and ROA 
separately as dependent variables but with the same set of control variables as in equation 
(2) to examine the relationships between executive compensation and firm performance 
within a package of corporate governance mechanisms. It is specified as follows: 
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4.3.2 Research Data Collection and Preparation 
In this section, the second stage of the research empirical examination process is discussed, 
and the sources and processes of collecting and preparing the data sample are highlighted.  
The data sample is drawn from the constituent companies of the FTSE 35050 index over the 
period 1999-2008. The preliminary sample of panel data51 has the potential of comprising 
about 3,500 observations which are constituents of the companies of FTSE 350 index for 
ten years. However, the unavailability of a number of remuneration and/or governance 
variables for some companies restricts the sample to a panel of 2,726 firm-years over the 
period 1999-2008. In this case, the sample size is still considerably larger than those 
utilised in previous UK studies (such as Conyon et al., 1995; Main et al., 1996; Cosh and 
Hugh, 1997; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; etc) which reported the pay-performance results 
based typically on only few hundred companies or even less. 
The FTSE 350 companies comprise those found in both financial and non-financial sectors 
in 10 different UK industries52. The industrial, customer services, and financial sectors 
represent the highest volume of companies in the index and in which the corporate 
observations in the sample number 633, 619, and 539, respectively, whilst the sectors of 
telecommunication and health care represent the lowest numbers, 69 and 87, respectively. 
In order to generalise the findings to all sectors and indices within the UK, all the FTSE 
350 companies are included. In much of the prior literature (such as Khatri et al., 2002; 
Adams and Mehran, 2005; Spong and Sullivan, 2007) it is suggested that there are gains 
from excluding both the financial and utility sectors. However although the arguments for 
doing this were noted and considered, the decision was made to seek to add generality to 
the results by the inclusion of the relevant 643 observations in the index for the period 
under examination. It is also true that there is literature which argues for the inclusion of as 
wider sample as possible and seeking to discriminate if appropriate by means of the use of 
dummy or control variables (Koh and Liu, 2012) – and this has been the approach adopted 
                                                          
50The largest institutions constitute the FTSE 100; the FTSE 250 comprises the largest companies from 101 to 
350. 
51The panel data are largely adopted in order to identify and measure effects that are not detectable with other 
data structures, such as pure cross-section or pure time-series data. 
52UK industries are Oil and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care, Customer 
Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials, and Technology. The sample represents the 10 
industrial sectors based on the FTSE Global Industry Classification System. 
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in this study, although as documented below the research does also include separate 
industry sector analysis. Table 3 shows the sample size for each sector over the period 
under investigation. 
The reason behind choosing the FTSE 350 index is that the registered companies in this 
represent the widely top-listed UK companies in the stock exchange based on their market 
capitalisation. As Polo (2007) reported, the major indexes of worldwide companies within 
diverse sectors are those which are among the most significant sources of organisational 
financing and external governance. The FTSE 350 index comprises a long history of these 
sectors in the provision of financial information, in addition to the data consistency in the 
manner of well-preparation and accounting systems.53 The FTSE 350 is thus regarded as a 
significant super-sector index providing a comprehensive view of one of the global capital 
markets. 
A significant reason underlying the choice of the 10-year period beginning in 1999 and 
ending in 2008 is that it enables an examination period of executive compensation after a 
period in which, as noted above, the UK corporate governance system was reformed 
through a series of mandatory and quasi-mandatory regulations which led to a much more 
uniform system of governance, and before the effect of the recent financial crisis was 
revealed. A separate period analysis is also included to capture the reflections of these 
series of regulations over the period 1999-2008. In particular in this period of time 
virtually all of the companies under examination had adopted the use of remuneration 
committees and very much enhanced disclosure as to compensation as compared with 
previous periods. It is contended that this does provide a good basis for a longitudinal 
study both in terms of the empirical results set out in the following chapter and also the 
single company case study which is explored in Chapter Six. 
                                                          
53See: http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK_Indices/index.jsp 
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Table 3: Summary of Sample Size for Each Sector by Year 
 
Sector 
Code 
YEARS 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total  
 
Financial 
and non-
Financial 
Sectors 
Initial Sample (FTSE 
350) 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 3500 
Missing Data on 
Remuneration, 
Corporate 
Governance, and/or 
Performance 
151 111 79 70 61 56 50 54 67 75 774 
1 Oil and Gas 3 4 6 8 8 10 13 16 16 18 102 
2083 
2 Basic Materials 8 8 10 11 12 11 13 10 12 15 110 
3 Industrials 50 53 65 68 68 64 65 67 68 65 633 
4 Consumer Goods 27 26 35 32 35 37 35 32 27 26 312 
5 Health Care 7 11 11 12 10 7 7 9 6 7 87 
6 Customer Services 47 53 63 65 69 71 63 66 62 60 619 
7 Telecommunications 3 9 6 8 8 8 9 7 6 5 69 
8 Utilities 7 9 8 10 11 12 14 13 11 9 104 
643 
 
9 Financials 31 39 50 54 55 62 66 65 63 54 539 
10 Technology 16 27 17 12 13 12 15 11 12 16 151  
 Total 199 239 271 280 289 294 300 296 283 275 
2726 
 Sub Periods 989 883 854 
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Because of the diversity of data employed (including executive directors’ remuneration, 
corporate governance, company performance, and other related indicators), necessarily a 
variety of different sources need to be utilised to collect this data. Data for boardroom pay 
packages, corporate governance and ownership indicators, and board member characteristics 
have been taken from the BoardEx database.1 Data relating to company performance and 
specific firm characteristics has been collected from the DataStream and Thomson-One-
Banker databases.  
Because of the range and variety of the data employed it has been necessary to take care with 
respect to a whole collection of data related aspects, for example missing values, value 
appearance and measurement, outliers, and lags - all of which have the capability to distort the 
results and the interpretation thereof. In this respect a number of points are noted. 
First, the panel data utilised in the study contains a relatively low number of missing values, 
especially for executive directors’ compensation and company performance. Where data was 
missing on the original trawl other sources, in particular directors’ remuneration reports and 
annual reviews, were explored so as to fill gaps and provide the information necessary for the 
analytical program used (Stata2) to run appropriately.  
Second, a logarithm function is utilised where the distribution of the underlying variables is 
such that it is likely to cause issues relating to the conventional regression assumptions. 
Consequently logarithmic transformations were used in respect to executive pay, company 
performance as measured by profitability, as well as corporate size and growth in terms of 
their magnitudes to more closely meet the necessary assumptions suitable for statistical 
inference.  
However even after the employment of logarithmic transformation there is still the possibility 
of the results being affected or distorted by extreme observations and outliers. Here to avoid 
the possibility of high levels of residuals which might result in biased estimates of parameters, 
                                                          
1The BoardEx database is a new business development tool and a source for academic research concerning on 
corporate governance and boardroom processes, containing a good package of information on company boards 
and individual directors. 
2Stata is normally the core statistical software package used by academics and researchers to store, manage, 
manipulate, and analyse the numeric data, especially in the fields of sociology. 
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a 98%3 winsorisation technique has been applied to the corporate performance and leverage 
data so as to exclude outliers which could disproportionately affect the statistical measurement 
and inference. The winsorisation technique is normally regarded as the most robust technique 
for transforming outliers (Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2009; etc.). 
Finally, the issues relating to lags have been carefully considered because of the importance to 
the research design of the need to consider the effect of data moving forward. To achieve the 
relevant research objective, this study aims to set the lags for the indicators of company 
performance to one year before and one year after. In the interests of efficiency and accuracy, 
company performance measures were collected directly from the databases rather than using 
an automatic machine generated process. 
4.1 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the research methodology and outlined the first part of the 
examination process. The research methodology set out links underlying theory with the 
empirical analysis. As has been noted, the main research purpose of the current study is to 
examine the executive directors’ remuneration in FTSE 350 companies by providing a 
quantitative investigation on the interrelationships between executive pay and company 
performance, and a qualitative case study on the mechanisms and structures that determine 
executive compensation. Again as has been noted before the study adopts a mixed 
methodology to conduct its research endeavour (i.e. the abductive approach) based on an 
objectivist methodological position of philosophical assumptions following the realist 
ontological and the positivist epistemological positions. 
In line with the focus of the empirical research strategy a deductive approach has been 
considered the appropriate examination structure to adopt in this study in order to address the 
main research question: i.e. whether managerial compensation is the greater influence on firm 
performance or whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on the former? The 
detailed discussion set out above has considered the appropriate variables to utilise for this 
investigation, i.e. CEO/executive compensation, company performance, corporate governance 
                                                          
3The set of firm performance indicators which are below 1% are set to the 1% level and those above 99% fit to 
the 99% level. 
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and ownership mechanisms, boardroom members’ features, and firm characteristics. Drawing 
from this discussion a number of hypotheses have been developed which seek to investigate 
this question and its linked aspects. Using quantitative methods the research aims to gather 
and structure the underlying data based on a longitudinal time horizon by adopting two 
different, but complementary, quantitative empirical research analyses (i.e. fixed-effect and 
simultaneous equations). The fixed-effect regression modelling is used to examine separately 
the association between the key components and measures of CEO/executive compensation 
and company performance. The simultaneous regression modelling is utilised to investigate 
further and in more depth the interrelationships between CEO/executive pay and firm 
performance with a view to unpacking, if it is possible to do so, how those relationships work 
and are constructed. 
The following chapter sets out more specifically the research methodology adopted and the 
sequential process by which the quantitative analysis has been conducted. It reports the 
empirics relating to the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, and then proceeds to 
detail the results from the main empirical approach (i.e. fixed-effect and simultaneous 
equations modelling) conducted in order to examine the interrelationships between executive 
compensation and company performance. 
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Chapter Five 
Relationships between Executive Compensation and 
Company Performance – Analyses, Results, and Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has outlined the research methodology, considered the relevant 
philosophical assumptions, and constructed an appropriate process for the purpose of the 
empirical examination discussed in this chapter. Accordingly this chapter proceeds to present 
both the empirical steps taken and the relevant analyses and findings. As discussed in Chapter 
Three the underlying theoretical approach has been linked into the pervasive but conflicting 
notions of pure agency, managerial hegemony, stewardship, and tournament play. This is the 
underpinning for the key research objective of the study which is to examine the 
interrelationships between executive directors’ remuneration packages and corporate 
performance in FTSE 350 companies. Here the significant innovation of this study is the focus 
on the question as to whether managerial compensation is the greater influence on firm 
performance or whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on the former? 
Previous literature has addressed the pay-performance framework in terms of the sensitivity of 
pay to performance and perhaps directed less attention to the performance-pay framework 
pertaining to the sensitivity of pay-related performance. To test the structure of the 
interrelationships between compensation and performance, the empirical section of this study 
employs two modelling plans to explore and reflect the research findings in alignment with the 
adopted theoretical perspectives. First, a fixed-effect analysis framework is utilised employing 
two separate multiple regression equations incorporating a set of appropriate categories of 
control variables relating to pay and performance. These include: corporate governance 
mechanisms designed to enhance internal monitoring, ownership determinants which are 
relevant to wider stakeholder issues, leverage ratios which may reflect companies’ excessive 
risk-taking behaviour, as well as corporate characteristics and expertise indicators. Second, a 
set of simultaneous or structural equation modelling is developed for the purpose of 
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identifying insights into the question of the relative influence of executive pay or company 
performance and their linkages with aspects of corporate governance. 
This chapter is then organised as follows. After this short introduction, the second section 
introduces the process of examination and analysis by reference to the descriptive statistics 
examining the nature of CEO/executive pay measures (i.e. cash, non-cash, and total 
remuneration), the trends of CEO/executive pay, and finally the wider consideration of the 
variables of interest throughout the period under examination (1999-2008). The third section 
looks at a number of different sets of correlation analyses in order to examine the value and 
direction of the relationships between the variables, detect any autocorrelations between the 
variables utilised, and confirm the validity of the framework for the analyses. By applying the 
two adopted regression frameworks, the fourth section details the discussions of the fixed-
effect analyses to test the developed hypotheses separately to investigate the relationships 
between executive compensation and company performance throughout the three sub-sections 
(pay-performance analyses, performance-pay analyses, and reflections on pay-performance 
and performance-pay results). The fifth section highlights the discussion of the simultaneous 
modelling analysis to examine the interrelations between pay and performance. The final 
section provides an overall conclusion regarding the statistics and analyses. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Gujarati (2004) and Wooldridge (2005) note that frequency distribution tests are the key initial 
step for indicating the number of values’ occurrences within a particular group of variables or 
interval. These tests can be structured to assess differences and similarities between frequency 
distributions via demonstrating the measures of central tendency (such as the mean and 
median) and the measures of variability (e.g. the standard deviation). In this section, the 
descriptive statistics of the components and measures of CEO/executive directors’ 
remuneration, as well as the features of company performance and the underlying control 
variables for the period of examination, are highlighted. 
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5.2.1 Measures of Executive Directors’ Remuneration  
The mean of CEOs and boardroom executive pay accounting for the difference between years 
(i.e. year-to-year descriptive statistics) is mainly utilised as a measure of central tendency to 
examine the evolution and direction of CEO/executive pay measures during the period under 
examination. It is usually used in conjunction with the median. In the statistics under 
examination in this study the values of means and medians in this study are relatively close to 
each other. Table 4 shows the fundamental explanatory statistics for the three measures of 
CEO and boardroom executive directors’ remuneration (i.e. cash, non-cash, and total 
remuneration) for the FTSE 350 companies each year over the period 1999-2008. Panel A 
reports statistics relating to the total CEO pay, whilst Panel B presents similar figures for 
boardroom executive members. 
The table demonstrates that cash pay for CEOs and board executives increased considerably 
over the first nine years but decreased in 2008 (a decrease likely to be attributable to the global 
financial and economic crises commencing at the end of 2007) reaching a peak of £1.29m and 
£3.18m for CEOs and executives, respectively, in 2007. There was more variability in the non-
cash packages for both CEOs and boardroom executives varied during the period which 
although increasing substantially over the period – peaking at £1.59m and £3.53m respectively 
in 2007 did in fact decline three times in 2002, 2006 and 2008. Overall the findings show that 
the mean of CEOs’ total reimbursement increased by about 89.5%, from £1.26m in 1999 to 
£2.38m in 2008, suggesting an approximate annual growth rate of 10.5%. This result supports 
the widely held perspective that the growth in CEO compensation has significantly outstripped 
average UK pay growth4.  
Equity-based remuneration forms in general, the larger part of the CEO pay package compared 
with cash-based compensation, which supports the theoretical perspective of pure agency, by 
which the CEO interests are aligned with those of shareholders through providing a sufficient 
level and structure of managerial incentives.   
                                                          
4The 10.5% growth rate is significantly higher than the increase in the average annual UK Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). To facilitate comparison, the annual CPI values published by the International Monetary Fund in their 
annual World Economic Outlook for the UK are 2.3%, 2.1%, 2.1%, 2.2%, 1.4%, 1.3%, 2.0%, 2.3%, 2.3%, and 
3.6% for the ten consecutive years between 1999 and 2008, with a ten-year average of 2.16%. 
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Table 4: Basic Descriptive Statistics of CEO and board executive pay measures in FTSE 350 
companies, 1999-2008 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
Panel A: Pay Indicators - CEO 
Total Cash Remuneration of CEOs (£000s) 
Mean 560.407 634.6653 721.203 797.8179 838.5675 928.3878 978.83 1085.608 1292.576 1209.313 926.2112 
Median 479 516 567 627 720 756 785.5 870 1011 931 889.75 
  S. D. 341.7622 443.4728 598.9345 540.6074 595.5877 635.1504 655.2923 739.0146 1050.503 957.5901 265.284 
  Min 40 38 15 135 30 12 38 0 187 0 464.7 
  Max 2060 2665 6100 3254 4239 4561 3856 6039 10177 7197 2801 
  Obs. 199 239 271 280 289 294 300 296 283 275 300 
Total Non-cash Remuneration of CEOs (£000s) 
Mean 697.8894 704.0962 743.1513 727.5036 846.481 1072.969 1329.417 1154.99 1591.816 1175.233 1072.384 
Median 116 209 252 256.5 349 450 519.5 622.5 742 483 816.2 
  S. D. 4045.196 1622.33 1933.128 1927.427 1779.918 2447.161 5297.416 1845.5 3327.361 2074.505 1059.992 
  Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Max 55386 15504 20774 18622 16173 25153 87901 17962 42406 17967 9180.7 
  Obs. 199 239 271 280 289 294 300 296 283 275 300 
Total Remuneration of CEOs (£000s) 
Mean 1258.296 1338.762 1464.354 1525.321 1685.048 2001.357 2308.247 2240.598 2884.392 2384.545 1998.596 
Median 671 802 908 911 1099 1164.5 1350.5 1517 1760 1495 1739.6 
  S. D. 4167.222 1804.414 2350.225 2214.96 2144.535 2807.877 5526.934 2357.21 3742.413 2720.606 1198.316 
  Min 40 38 25 135 60 15 75 200 239 95 675 
  Max 57034 17046 24283 20688 18247 27893 90223 22056 43282 22718 10111.67 
  Obs. 199 239 271 280 289 294 300 296 283 275 300 
Panel B: Pay Indicators - Boardroom Executives 
Total Cash Remuneration of All Executives (£000s) 
Mean 1948.472 2031.368 2241.089 2353.246 2413.394 2543.867 2638.59 2886.611 3184.516 2836.582 2525.347 
Median 1450 1613 1662 1783 1866 2001 2071.5 2204 2372 2163 2415.23 
  S. D. 1727.388 1665.5 1837.757 1741.95 1814.795 1923.503 1965.916 2528.865 2896.976 2253.603 760.2351 
  Min 170 90 15 373 209 140 137 0 289 95 906.333 
  Max 15118 10292 13454 12639 11557 13288 12328 20948 23155 16446 5494.2 
  Obs. 199 239 271 280 289 294 300 296 283 275 300 
Total Non-cash Remuneration of All Executives (£000s) 
Mean 1549.633 1992.169 1879.399 1774.169 1972.91 2323.19 2861.871 2524.424 3536.06 2299.588 2376.555 
Median 376 509 704 683.5 946 1081 1040.5 1276.5 1503 983 1913.4 
  S. D. 5399.42 4161.319 3938.448 3717.19 3372.232 4188.338 10093.86 3709.802 10863.19 3877.785 2089.469 
  Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 269.25 
  Max 65387 32833 28400 34784 36545 39629 164814 21560 174176 38822 20112.5 
  Obs. 199 239 271 280 289 294 300 296 283 275 300 
Total Remuneration of All Executives (£000s) 
Mean 3498.106 4023.538 4120.487 4127.416 4386.304 4867.058 5500.461 5411.036 6720.576 5136.169 4901.902 
Median 1921 2317 2597 2454.5 2926 3191 3327.5 3496 4189 3300 4429.95 
  S. D. 6009.756 4903.879 5245.963 4913.848 4489.752 5409.37 10749.23 5532.172 11653.95 5450.657 2465.523 
  Min 170 117 200 377 209 140 211 303 298 95 1536 
  Max 68061 36487 41205 41722 41241 41136 170208 42465 177584 50989 23677.2 
  Obs. 199 239 271 280 289 294 300 296 283 275 300 
 
Notes: The descriptive statistics for both cash and non-cash components of the total CEO and executive pay are based on the 
FTSE 350 registered corporations between 1999 and 2008 (British pounds), according to the availability of executive 
directors’ remuneration packages for those corporations. All pay components are rounded to the nearest thousand. The 
average pay components are derived from the total cash and equity compensation packages, consistent with the factor of 
time. Total basic compensation consists of a base salary, a performance bonus, a pension contribution, and other 
elements. Total remuneration includes cash, as basic compensation, and non-cash/equity pay, which represents the value 
of granted shares, exercised options, and any other long-term incentive plans (LTIPs).  
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However, the differences are not that great with on average cash components during the period 
representing just over 46% and non-cash components just under 54% respectively of the 
average total CEO remuneration. For boardroom executives other than CEOs direct cash 
components have formed slightly more than half of total compensation during the whole 
period under examination – but as with CEOs this has masked some variability in particular 
the quite sharp decline in non- cash compensation in 2008. These trends are discussed further 
in the next section. 
5.2.2 Trends of Executive Directors’ Remuneration Packages 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 indicate the trends in CEO and board executive directors’ remuneration in 
FTSE 350 companies throughout the period 1999-2008, demonstrating the average and 
median of CEO/executive remuneration indicators by time (Figure 6) and industry (Figure 7), 
as well as the average of CEO/executive pay components (Figure 8).  
Figure 6 shows that the average of total CEO remuneration in FTSE 350 companies more than 
doubled, from about £1,258,300 in 1999 to £2,884,390 in 2007, before falling to £2,384,550 in 
2008. As a result, the level of pay for CEOs in large-sized UK firms rose considerably over 
the past decade, driven by a significant growth in LTIPs. The average value of LTIPs rose 
from £0.67m in 1999 to over £1.54m in 2007 before falling to £1.16m in 2008. In contrast 
pure options and equities comprise a very small component of non-cash compensation.5 Here 
there may be some questions as to how successfully the BoardEx data base captures the use 
extent and value of option and equity packages. The total remuneration of boardroom 
executives also increased, but it is not by the same proportion as that of CEOs (from £3.5m in 
1999 to £6.72m in 2007, falling to £5.14m in 2008); although again the increase in LTIPs was 
a significant driver of this increase. There is, as would be expected, evidence of positive 
skewness with the means exceeding the medians for all the remuneration indicators for CEOs 
and board executives. There is also some evidence that this skewness has increased over the 
period under examination.6  
                                                          
5The difference between the LTIPs’ value in 2007 (i.e. £1.54m) and the £1.59m of equity-based compensation for 
the same year comprises awarded options and equities. 
6 The higher values lie to the right of the distribution by 2007 and 2008, while the left tail is longer with low 
values relating to 1999 and 2000. 
121 
 
Figure 6: CEO and Board Executive Remuneration Packages in FTSE 350 Companies by 
Average of Pay Indicators, 1999-2008 
 
 
Notes: The sample is based on CEOs and board executives included in the FTSE 350 companies between 1999 
and 2008, using the numeric data from BoardEx. The cash pay of CEOs and other corporate executives 
includes salary, bonus, pensions, and other elements, while their equity pay comprises value of equity 
awarded, value of LTIP awarded, intrinsic value of options awarded, and estimated value of options 
awarded. The total pay of CEOs and board executives represents both cash and non-cash remunerations.   
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Figure 6: CEO and Board Executive Remuneration Packages in FTSE 350 Companies by 
Median of Pay Indicators, 1999-2008 (Cont.) 
 
 
Notes: The sample is based on CEOs and board executives included in the FTSE 350 companies between 1999 
and 2008, using the numeric data from BoardEx. The cash pay of CEOs and other corporate executives 
includes salary, bonus, pensions, and other elements, while their equity pay comprises value of equity 
awarded, value of LTIP awarded, intrinsic value of options awarded, and estimated value of options 
awarded. The total pay of CEOs and board executives represents both cash and non-cash remunerations.  
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Figure 7 shows both the average and median of remuneration indicators for both CEOs and 
board executive in various FTSE 350 industries during the same interval period (1999-2008). 
According to the average pay indicators of CEOs, the sector “Financials” has the highest 
average cash remuneration (£1.14m), whilst “Oil and Gas” offers the highest average equity-
based and total remuneration, £2.22m and £3.25m, respectively. On the other hand, 
“Technology” has the lowest average cash remuneration for CEOs (£0.66m), while “Utilities” 
provides the lowest average equity-based and total remuneration, £0.54m and £1.2m, 
respectively. According to the average compensation measures for board executive, 
“Financials” still offers the highest average cash remuneration (£3.55m), whereas “Oil and 
Gas” also has the highest average equity-based (£6.1m) and total remuneration (£8.91m). By 
contrast, “Technology” provides executives the lowest average cash remuneration (£1.76m), 
and “Industrials” has the lowest average equity-based and total remuneration, £1.43m and 
£3.37m, respectively. The median values of pay measures for CEOs and board executives in 
FTSE 350 industries are again lower than their corresponding means, which outlines a position 
of resisting extreme values of executive remuneration via showing the middle values within 
each sector or industry.  
Figure 8 shows the level and composition of the remuneration package of FTSE 350 CEOs 
and board executives from 1999 to 2008. In 1999 the base salaries of CEOs and board 
executive accounted, on average, for 28% and 34% of the total compensation, £0.35m and 
£1.18m, respectively, whilst LTIPs accounted for 53% and 41% for both CEOs and board 
executives, respectively. It is observable that the CEO/executive pay package increased each 
year from 1999 to 2005, fell slightly in 2006 before rising again to a high point in 2007 over 
time, at which the average base salary of CEOs and board executives accounted for only 18% 
and 20% of the total compensation (£2.9m and £6.7m, respectively), while the amount of 
LTIPs accounted for more than half of their overall pay package. In 2008 the average total 
remuneration for both CEOs and board executives fell, to £2.4m and £5.1m driven by a 
decrease in LTIPs which decreased to comprise nearly half of the CEO remuneration package 
and 43% of overall boardroom executive members’ packages. In consequence as a proportion 
of total remuneration base salary rose to 23% and 26% in that year.  
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Figure 7: Average of Cash, Non-cash, and Total Remuneration for CEOs and Board 
Executives in FTSE 350 Companies by Sector, 1999-2008 
 
 
Notes: The sample is based on CEOs and board executives included in the FTSE 350 between 1999 and 2008, using 
the numeric data from BoardEx. The FTSE 350 index consists of 10 key sectors, which are oil and gas, basic 
materials, industrials, consumer goods, health care, customer services, telecommunications, utilities, financials, 
and technology.  
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Figure 7: Median of Cash, Non-cash, and Total Remuneration for CEOs and Board 
Executives in FTSE 350 Companies by Sector, 1999-2008 (Cont.) 
 
 
Notes: The sample is based on CEOs and board executives included in the FTSE 350 between 1999 and 2008, 
using the numeric data from BoardEx. The FTSE 350 index consists of 10 key sectors, which are oil and 
gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, health care, customer services, telecommunications, 
utilities, financials, and technology. 
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Figure 8: CEO and Board Executive Remuneration Packages in FTSE 350 Companies by 
Average Pay Components, 1999-2008  
 
 
Notes: The sample is based on CEOs and board executives included in the FTSE 350 between 1999 and 2008, 
using the numeric data from BoardEx. The component “OTHER” comprises pensions, other monetary 
compensation, and value of equity awarded.  
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5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics for all the Variables Utilised 
Table 5 summarises the overall descriptive statistics for all adopted variables.7 CEOs and 
board executives members received the prime cash compensation component (i.e. base salary), 
which is, on average, £453,185 and £1,291,839, respectively, whilst the amount of LITPs (the 
key non-cash remuneration component) offered is £1,219,658 and £2,473,317, respectively. 
On the other hand, the value of pensions and the awarded equity with options are the lowest of 
the cash and non-cash pay components provided to both CEOs and board executives. Overall, 
the average CEO’s total remuneration is £1,943,000 with a median of £1,160,500, whilst the 
average total compensation for board executives is £4,840,000 with a median of £3,012,000. 
For the accounting-based indicators of company performance, Tobin’s Q ratio at the current 
period (t) has a mean of 1.49 with a median of 0.82, while ROA has a mean of 6.9 with a 
median of 6.6, implying that the mean and median values of ROA are closer to each other 
rather than to their Q ratio counterparts. It has been clearly seen that ROE has the maximum 
central location (18.47%, 18.1%, and 15.25%) for prior (t-1), current (t), and following (t+1) 
periods, respectively. Also ROE data are spread out over a large range of values (58.8%, 
55.4%, and 53.5%, respectively) which refers to the highest volatility in the whole time period 
compared with other indicators of performance, while EPS has the minimum average (0.26%, 
0.25%, and 0.22%) and standard deviation (0.46%, 0.52%, and 0.62%) for the same time 
intervals (i.e. 1998-2007, 1999-2008, and 2000-2009, respectively), which shows that the EPS 
data tend to be very close to the mean.  
                                                          
7Variables’ names, codes, and definitions used in the empirical analyses are summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 5: Summary of Basic Explanatory Statistics for Pooled Sample of FTSE 350 
Companies within the 10-year Period  
 
 
CEOs Remuneration 
Package (£000s) 
 
 
Salary 
 
Bonus 
 
Pension 
 
Other 
 
Total Cash Compensation 
 
Equity Awarded 
 
LTIP Awarded 
 
Intrinsic Options Awarded 
 
Estimated Options Aw. 
 
Total Equity Compensation 
 
Total Remuneration  
 
Variables 
Mean 
(Median) 
S.D. 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Skewness Kurtosis Obs. 
CEOSLR 
 
CEOBNS 
 
CEOPNS 
 
CEOOTHR 
 
CEOTCC 
 
CEOEQAW 
 
CEOLTIPAW 
 
CEOIOPAW 
 
CEOEOPAW 
 
CEOTEC 
 
CEOTREM 
 
453.1845 
(405) 
355.2903 
(205) 
107.9598 
(69) 
64.33068 
(24) 
921.0132 
(726) 
223.6364 
(8) 
1219.658 
(545.5) 
126.6919 
(4) 
281.3563 
(6) 
1022.273 
(376.5) 
1943.286 
(1160.5) 
225.8776 
 
554.6461 
 
120.2201 
 
172.8305 
 
730.4951 
 
632.6823 
 
3093.758 
 
443.9063 
 
936.4889 
 
2873.97 
 
3213.549 
 
0 
(1842) 
0 
(10000) 
1 
(1240) 
0 
(5040) 
0 
(10177) 
0 
(3391) 
0 
(87901) 
0 
(3686) 
0 
(7771) 
0 
(87901) 
15 
(90223) 
1.179328 
 
5.730375 
 
3.010277 
 
15.6086 
 
3.250275 
 
4.186556 
 
15.40052 
 
5.362479 
 
5.001303 
 
15.36015 
 
12.02023 
 
5.410492 
 
62.40436 
 
18.02046 
 
378.4968 
 
23.78593 
 
20.65254 
 
357.9143 
 
35.64563 
 
30.74006 
 
378.0501 
 
259.888 
 
2726 
 
2725 
 
1270 
 
2643 
 
2726 
 
33 
 
2114 
 
396 
 
536 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
Executives’ 
Remuneration Package 
(£000s) 
Salary 
 
Bonus 
 
Pension 
 
Other 
 
Total Cash Comp. 
 
Equity Awarded 
 
LTIP Awarded 
 
Intrinsic Options Aw. 
 
Estimated Options Aw. 
 
Total Equity Comp. 
 
 
Total Remuneration 
ALLSLR 
 
ALLBNS 
 
ALLPNS 
 
ALLOTHR 
 
ALLTCC 
 
ALLEQAW 
 
ALLLTIPAW 
 
ALLIOPAW 
 
ALLEOPAW 
 
ALLTEC 
 
ALLTREM 
1291.839 
(1093.5) 
941.9567 
(550) 
121.2422 
(50) 
181.2437 
(83) 
2535.637 
(1949) 
538.0222 
(86) 
2473.317 
(1116) 
182.9782 
(5) 
376.7159 
(8) 
2304.718 
(927) 
4840.355 
783.9226 
 
1457.36 
 
209.155 
 
390.1589 
 
2115.275 
 
1844.611 
 
6201.482 
 
798.4492 
 
1634.636 
 
6030.734 
 
7000.651 
0 
(5937) 
0 
(21362) 
0 
(4338) 
0 
(11170) 
0 
(23155) 
3 
(12373) 
1 
(174176) 
0 
(13155) 
1 
(21354) 
0 
(174176) 
95 
1.768509 
 
5.428805 
 
6.111394 
 
12.70653 
 
3.023221 
 
6.06362 
 
18.10161 
 
8.397355 
 
8.107727 
 
17.13332 
 
11.88003 
7.465688 
 
50.7622 
 
84.69192 
 
278.874 
 
18.09779 
 
39.39389 
 
463.7954 
 
105.1995 
 
84.21943 
 
444.3864 
 
257.8444 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2713 
 
2725 
 
2726 
 
45 
 
2319 
 
780 
 
1009 
 
2726 
 
2726 
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  (3012)  (177584)    
Corporate Performance 
Indicators (year t / 1999-
2008) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Earnings Per Share 
 
Return on Equity 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Total Assets Turnover 
 
TQ 
 
EPS 
 
ROE 
 
ROA 
 
TASST 
 
1.495056 
(.82296) 
0.254556 
(.19) 
18.10398 
(15.54) 
6.891233 
(6.595) 
0.860708 
(.73) 
2.570347 
 
0.521872 
 
55.38736 
 
8.617823 
 
0.699398 
 
0.04 
 (19.77) 
-2.18 
(2.47) 
-216.8 
(369.77) 
-29.61 
 (35.53) 
0.02 
(3.23) 
2.94244 
 
-35.46855 
 
4.112887 
 
-2.405512 
 
1.957937 
 
104.629 
 
1288.369 
 
360.8905 
 
29.29984 
 
12.80725 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
Corporate Performance 
Indicators (year t+1 / 
2000-2009) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Earnings Per Share 
 
Return on Equity 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Total Assets Turnover 
 
TQNY 
 
TQNY 
 
ROENY 
 
ROANY 
 
TASSTNY 
 
1.3505 
(.79917) 
0.219134 
(.18) 
15.25826 
(14.43) 
6.053441 
(6.09) 
0.847018 
(.71) 
2.175284 
 
0.621436 
 
53.53992 
 
9.469233 
 
0.68852 
 
0.0333 
 (17.755) 
-3.47 
 (2.33) 
-239.7 
 (315.21) 
-37.96 
 (36.57) 
0.02 
(3.16) 
4.32665 
 
-50.05939 
 
-7.276308 
 
-3.256137 
 
0.3351991 
 
204.359 
 
2562.118 
 
485.7623 
 
37.79661 
 
31.77821 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
Corporate Performance 
Indicators (year t-1 / 
1998-2007) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Earnings Per Share 
 
Return on Equity 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Total Assets Turnover 
 
TQPY 
 
EPSPY 
 
ROEPY 
 
ROAPY 
 
TASSTPY 
 
2.063538 
(.902818) 
0.256768 
(.18) 
18.47047 
(15.835) 
7.202927 
(6.795) 
0.878239 
(.76) 
4.895862 
 
0.457063 
 
58.84553 
 
8.389889 
 
0.707225 
 
0.05 
(40.53) 
-1.44 
(2.49) 
-268.3 
(371.05) 
-27.64 
(37.26) 
0.02 
(3.25) 
2.56877 
 
-46.13098 
 
-16.82467 
 
-13.40965 
 
1.83122 
 
72.6547 
 
2315.643 
 
498.4936 
 
421.1106 
 
11.7659 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
Duality Role 
 
Board Size 
 
Non-executive Directors 
 
Independent Directors 
 
Audit Committee 
 
Remuneration Committee 
 
Nomination Committee 
 
DR 
 
BS 
 
NXD 
 
ID 
 
AC 
 
RC 
 
NC 
 
0.070066 
(0) 
9.761189 
(9) 
5.655906 
(5) 
4.694424 
(4) 
0.997432 
(1) 
0.987528 
(1) 
0.928834 
(1) 
0.255305 
 
2.825931 
 
2.165047 
 
1.910517 
 
0.050618 
 
0.111002 
 
0.25715 
 
0 
(1) 
2 
(23) 
0 
(17) 
0 
(14) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(1) 
3.368619 
 
0.999472 
 
1.035916 
 
0.7806028 
 
-19.65785 
 
-8.785733 
 
-3.335891 
 
12.3476 
 
4.655388 
 
4.879106 
 
4.66628 
 
387.4311 
 
78.1891 
 
12.12817 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
CEOs Ownership 
Package 
 
 
 
Wealth Share Plans 
 
Wealth Options (Ex.) 
CEOWSP 
 
CEOEWO 
440.8319 
(95.3295) 
249.7959 
1175.607 
 
843.6385 
0 
(16200) 
0 
6.839663 
 
11.08642 
64.92073 
 
188.127 
2726 
 
2725 
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Executives’ Ownership 
Package 
 
Wealth Options (Un-ex.) 
 
Wealth Equity (Ex.) 
 
Wealth Equity (Un-ex.) 
 
Wealth Share Plans 
 
Wealth Options (Ex.) 
 
Wealth Options (Un-ex.) 
 
Wealth Equity (Ex.) 
 
Wealth Equity (Un-ex.) 
 
 
CEOUWO 
 
CEOEWE 
 
CEOUWE 
 
ALLWSP 
 
ALLEWO 
 
ALLUWO 
 
ALLEWE 
 
ALLUWE 
 
(0) 
428.7447 
(38.82) 
219.3799 
(0) 
70.41367 
(0) 
1133.890 
(296.886) 
621.7715 
(54) 
1114.758 
(270) 
564.8072 
(0) 
196.764 
(5.668) 
 
964.2135 
 
1379.423 
 
750.8222 
 
2287.448 
 
1485.751 
 
2379.748 
 
3455.681 
 
2071.887 
 
(17000) 
0 
(20300) 
0 
(35700) 
0 
(26400) 
0 
(22500) 
0 
(19300) 
0 
(30400) 
0 
(91500) 
0 
(78700) 
 
6.349162 
 
16.9155 
 
26.67385 
 
4.959132 
 
5.97223 
 
5.062487 
 
17.37081 
 
29.16084 
 
 
84.93934 
 
355.7279 
 
825.0201 
 
34.37278 
 
55.08865 
 
41.31047 
 
387.0734 
 
978.1106 
 
 
2726 
 
2725 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2724 
 
2723 
 
2722 
 
2724 
 
Board member Features CEOs Age 
 
CEOs Tenure 
 
CEOs Gender  
 
Executives’  Age (Average) 
 
Executives’  Tenure 
(Average) 
 
Executives’  Gender 
(Average) 
CEOAGE 
 
CEOTIR 
 
CEOGNDR 
 
AVAGE 
 
AVTIR 
 
AVGNDR 
 
51.62326 
(52) 
5.010492 
(3.4) 
0.017975 
(0) 
47.62326 
(48) 
7.010492 
(5.4) 
0 
(0) 
6.599697 
 
5.405783 
 
0.132885 
 
6.599697 
 
5.405783 
 
0 
 
31 
(82) 
0 
(38.9) 
0 
(1) 
27 
(78) 
2 
(40.9) 
0 
(0) 
-0.159443 
 
2.35859 
 
7.256098 
 
-0.159443 
 
2.35859 
 
. 
3.095337 
 
10.01314 
 
53.65096 
 
3.095337 
 
10.01314 
 
. 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
Firm Characteristics Corporate Size (£000s) 
 
Corporate Growth (£000s) 
 
Debt to Common Equity  
 
Debt to Total Assets  
 
TASS 
 
CTASS 
 
DE 
 
DA 
 
19081.07 
(1371.895) 
3047.712 
(985.16) 
77.07438 
(57.59) 
26.27821 
(24.68) 
107706 
 
33038.77  
 
1598.328 
 
21.08369 
 
0.52 
(2394570)  
-60150.9 
(1026299)  
-76200 
(10080) 
-42.1 
(311.2) 
12.83816 
 
21.39149 
 
-39.95472 
 
2.750798 
 
214.9648 
 
552.2716 
 
1907.8 
 
28.91868 
 
2726 
 
2637 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
Dummy Effects Regulation Dummy 
 
Time Dummy 
 
DREG 
 
DT 
 
0.765224 
(1)  
5.283199 
(5) 
0.423937 
  
2.766734 
 
0 
(1) 
1 
(10) 
-1.251472 
 
0.0749377 
 
2.566182 
 
1.852473 
 
2726 
 
2726 
 
 
Notes: The descriptive statistics of all the diverse variables are based on the FTSE 350 registered companies between 1999 and 
2008) according to the availability of executive directors’ remuneration packages for those corporations. Table 1 fully 
defines all the variables used. Identical data sources have been used for all the FTSE 350 companies in the sample. 
Executives’ pay and ownership packages are presented in £000s, while corporate size is presented in millions. A 98% 
winsorising technique has been applied to set all corporate performance and leverage outliers (i.e. extreme values) which 
can disproportionately affect the statistical distribution and measurement. The lags for company performance measures 
have also been manually collected and adopted for one-year before and one-year after, besides the current interval.  
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In terms of governance related variables, average the board size for FTSE 350 corporations 
has a mean of just under 10 members and a median of 9. This is lower than the corresponding 
number of 12 members noted by Yermack (1996) and the 13 reported by Core et al. (1999) for 
their samples of US corporations. A number of FTSE 350 companies, however, have more 
than 20 members in their boardrooms (as many as 23 members, as in the case of HSBC 
Holdings in 2001). The statistical results also show that the number of managerial members on 
the boardroom is ranging from 2 to 23, which is consistent with Ozkan (2007) who reported 
the range of 4 to 21 for UK firms’ board size. The findings indicate that 5 to 6 members 
(median=5, and mean=5.66) are non-executive directors, and 4 to 5 (median=4, and 
mean=4.69) are independent directors in FTSE 350 companies. This illustrates a relatively 
high degree of compliance with the Higgs Report (2003) and the UK Combined Code’s (2008) 
requirement that at least 50% of the board room members, excluding the chairman, should be 
non-executive directors who are determined by the board to be independent. 
As would be expected following the requirements/expectations of the Combined Code the 
presence of audit committees (99.7%) and remuneration committees (98.8%) are all but 
universal and 92.9% of the sample have nomination committees. Not surprisingly the presence 
of remuneration committees is much higher than the figure of 30% reported by Main and 
Johnston (1993) for a sample of British companies, and perhaps more surprisingly than the 
66% reported by Brown and Caylor (2009) for a sample of 2,363 US firms in 2003 derived 
from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) database. However 7% of the sample did 
have a combined role of CEO and Chairman which was specifically discouraged in the 
Combined Code8 (although this figure is lower than the 18% found by Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) for a sample of UK companies). 
The ownership package variable shows on average relatively small proportions of boardroom 
share ownership. The ownership that is there is largely derived from share plans obtained as 
part of compensation packages, with an average £440,832 and £1,133,890 provided to CEOs 
and board executives, respectively; while little is derived from exercised options and 
unexercised equities. 
                                                          
8This finding demonstrates a high level of compliance with the recommendations of governance reform (FRC, 
2008), which emphasise the importance of two individuals occupying the positions of corporate Chairman and 
CEO to prevent any one individual having dominant or even unfettered power in the boardroom. 
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Characteristics of board members show a median age for CEOs of 52. There is however quite 
a wide range of age and experience the youngest CEOs in the sample being just 319 years old 
whereas the oldest is 8210. The median tenure of CEOs is just three and a half years. 
Obviously many companies have fresh start CEOs but the longest in post in the sample had 
been CEO for 38.9 years. Again not unexpectedly CEOs are almost overwhelmingly male. In 
fact only 1.7% of FTSE 350 companies have a female CEO perhaps an even lower percentage 
than a priori expectations suggested. Similarly boardrooms were also male dominated – 
although not to quite such a striking extent as for CEOs.  
Corporate characteristics were measured by a number of variables. Time spent in the FTSE 
350 was measured by means of a dummy variable – the average length of time for a company 
to be in the index as a separate identity being between five and six years. The regulation 
dummy, as suggested by Koh and Liu (2012), acts to distinguish between financial and the 
non-financial companies and reflected the composition of the sample as containing 23% 
financial companies and 77% non-financial.  According to the firm characteristics, corporate 
assets leverage (DA) ranges from -42.1 to 311.2, with an average of 26.3%, whilst the ratio of 
debt to equity (DE) ranges from -76,200 to 10,080, with an average of 77.1%. Here there are 
clearly a number of extreme outliers which would be removed by the winsorisation process. 
Over the period the average individual firm total asset is about £19.1 billion, whereas the 
overall growth of FTSE 350 corporations is approximately £3.05 billion on average. 
Again as in line with expectations tests for skewness and kurtosis indicate that the majority of 
the variables utilised are positively or right skewed and therefore non-normally distributed, as 
the data does not fall within the ranges ±1.96 and ±3 for the standard skewness and kurtosis 
statistics, respectively (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). As a result, the estimated standard errors 
and the results of test statistics are more likely to be biased and inconsistent. According to 
Dinga (2011), the problem of non-normality can be solved or at least mitigated by using either 
data transformation or by means of running regression equations with robustness of standard 
errors (Wooldridge, 2002, 2005). The former option involves logarithmic transformations in 
order to artificially ensure that the data are normally distributed. This is consistent with much 
                                                          
9Adam Kaye – the CEO of ASK CENTRAL PLC. 
10Jacques Gaston Murray – the Chairman and CEO of London Security PLC. 
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prior literature in executive remuneration (for example Core et al., 1999; Sapp, 2008; Conyon 
et al., 2009). The latter option employs robust estimation analysis of standard errors within the 
multiple regression analyses, allowing the management of the variables’ non-normality and 
the identification of the consistency of the findings. In the current study, these two alternative 
statistical approaches are adopted by means of using natural logarithmic transformations for 
all compensation components, corporate performance measures, corporate size, and growth 
opportunities, as well as utilising the multiple regression modelling incorporating robust 
standard errors. 
5.3 Correlation Analyses 
This section discusses the correlation analysis results as they relate to significant 
interrelationships among the adopted variables in the categories of executive remuneration, 
firm performance, corporate governance, and other underlying control indicators in an attempt 
to confirm the construct validity of the analysis. In addition the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) test is utilised to check for multicollinearity issues and concerns.  
Table 6 shows the degree of coefficient relationships between CEO/executive pay and 
corporate performance for two different time intervals (t+1 and t-1), whilst the structure of 
significance levels in the data set is shown in tables 7 and 8, consistent with Gujarati (2004) 
and Wooldridge (2002, 2005). In addition Table 9 shows the results of the relevant VIF test. 
5.3.1 Correlation Matrix - Pay and Performance 
Table 6 shows the degrees of association between the components and measures of pay for 
CEOs and boardroom executives and the accounting-based indicators of company 
performance by adopting two interval periods (one-year forward and one-year backward) in an 
attempt to identify the extent to which the underlying variables are interrelated within different 
time periods.  
The findings indicate the existence of high levels of interrelation between and within the 
remuneration packages for CEOs and board executive directors and the indicators of corporate 
performance. The results show, perhaps surprisingly, that CEOs’ salaries are negatively 
related to pensions and other monetary compensation, but, not surprisingly (because bonus 
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amounts are often directly linked as multiples of base salary), they are positively associated 
with bonuses and all non-cash components. CEOs’ bonus, pension, and other pay components 
are negatively related with non-cash remuneration packages. Interestingly there are differences 
when one looks at correlations relating to executive directors compensation (including CEOs).  
The components of executive directors’ remuneration are almost entirely positively correlated 
with each other with the exception of the relationships between awarded options and cash pay 
which are negatively correlated and the relationships between LTIPs and the components of 
bonus and pensions which are also negatively correlated. 
It can be observed from the correlation analysis that the accounting-based measures of 
company performance at the remuneration at two interval periods are highly linked with the 
majority of CEO remuneration indicators – which is again what might be expected. They are 
however rather less closely associated with the indicators as they relate to board executive 
pay. It can also be seen that the compensation components of CEOs and board executives, 
especially the equity-based pay components, are strongly associated with both periods of firm 
performance measures, but the previous-year levels of performance are relatively more closely 
associated which might perhaps be more consistent with a pure agency perspective. There are 
some significant differences, for example, CEOs’ LTIPs are associated with the following 
year’s Tobin’s Q at a level just above 68% - but the association with prior-year’s Tobin’s Q is 
actually over 98%. However rather surprisingly Tobin’s Q, ROE, and ROA are in fact 
negatively correlated with the majority of cash compensation components for board executives 
(i.e. the whole set of board executives), whilst EPS and TASST have a positive link with the 
remuneration package of boardroom members. 
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix - FTSE 350 CEOs’ Compensation and Firm Performance at 2-interval Levels 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
                      (1) Salary 1 
                    
(2) Bonus 0.1069 1 
                   
(3) Pensions -0.9233 0.2831 1 
                  
(4) Other Pay -0.941 0.2358 0.9988 1 
                 
(5) Total Cash 0.8072 0.6733 -0.5185 -0.5598 1 
                
(6) Equity 0.4802 -0.8208 -0.7803 -0.7487 -0.1302 1 
               
(7) LTIPs 0.9353 -0.2519 -0.9995 -0.9999 0.546 0.7596 1 
              
(8) Options-11 0.9915 -0.023 -0.9653 -0.977 0.7237 0.59 0.9733 1 
             
(9) Options-22 0.9618 -0.1692 -0.9932 -0.9977 0.6148 0.7019 0.9964 0.9892 1 
            
(10) T. Non-Cash  0.9464 -0.22 -0.9979 -0.9999 0.5732 0.7378 0.9995 0.9803 0.9987 1 
           
(11) Total Pay 0.9888 -0.0429 -0.9704 -0.981 0.7098 0.606 0.9777 0.9998 0.9919 0.984 1 
          
(12) TQ - NY 0.3812 -0.8784 -0.7071 -0.6716 -0.238 0.994 0.6838 0.498 0.6197 0.6594 0.5152 1 
         
(13) EPS - NY 0.5685 0.8788 -0.2089 -0.2566 0.9445 -0.4486 0.2405 0.4569 0.3217 0.2723 0.4391 -0.5438 1 
        
(14) ROE - NY 0.9955 0.0123 -0.9555 -0.9688 0.7476 0.5612 0.9646 0.9994 0.9834 0.9727 0.9985 0.4671 0.488 1 
       
(15) ROA - NY 0.8994 -0.3386 -0.9983 -0.9942 0.4678 0.8154 0.9959 0.9485 0.9847 0.9924 0.9546 0.7471 0.1516 0.9367 1 
      
(16) TASST - NY 0.7263 -0.6057 -0.9346 -0.9161 0.1805 0.9517 0.9226 0.8094 0.8867 0.9094 0.8209 0.9123 -0.1525 0.7882 0.9538 1 
     
(17) TQ - PY 0.8631 -0.4098 -0.9909 -0.9831 0.3986 0.8574 0.986 0.9214 0.9684 0.98 0.9289 0.7959 0.0753 0.9071 0.997 0.974 1 
    
(18) EPS - PY 0.2656 0.987 0.125 0.0763 0.7835 -0.7181 -0.0928 0.1382 -0.0084 -0.0601 0.1185 -0.79 0.9441 0.1731 -0.1827 -0.4697 -0.2576 1 
   
(19) ROE - PY 0.2551 0.9887 0.1359 0.0872 0.7767 -0.7257 -0.1037 0.1274 -0.0193 -0.071 0.1076 -0.7967 0.9405 0.1623 -0.1934 -0.4794 -0.2681 0.9999 1 
  
(20) ROA - PY 0.985 -0.0663 -0.9757 -0.9853 0.6932 0.6244 0.9823 0.9991 0.9946 0.9879 0.9997 0.5351 0.418 0.9969 0.9613 0.8341 0.9373 0.0952 0.0844 1 
 
(21) TASST - PY 0.7541 -0.5724 -0.9485 -0.9318 0.2209 0.9382 0.9377 0.8329 0.905 0.9258 0.8438 0.8947 -0.1116 0.8129 0.9653 0.9991 0.9825 -0.4329 -0.4427 0.8561 1 
 
Notes: The correlation degrees of association for the variables of CEOs’ pay and firm performance are based on the FTSE 350 registered corporations between 
1999 and 2008. The table shows the correlation coefficients. 
 
  
                                                          
1 CEO intrinsic options awarded. 
2 CEO estimated options awarded. 
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix (Cont.) - FTSE 350 Board Executive Compensation and Firm Performance at 2-interval Levels 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
                      
(1) Salary 1                     
(2) Bonus 0.8076 1                    
(3) Pensions 0.2531 0.6127 1                   
(4) Other Pay 0.9155 0.7894 0.1635 1                  
(5) Total Cash 0.9662 0.9294 0.4382 0.9108 1                 
(6) Equity 0.2535 0.1404 -0.1315 0.2475 0.2338 1                
(7) LTIPs 0.2348 -0.0768 -0.0103 0.164 0.1264 0.2008 1               
(8) Options-13 -0.155 -0.5297 -0.2598 -0.4386 -0.328 -0.0089 0.2794 1              
(9) Options-24 -0.0998 -0.3994 -0.1159 -0.3341 -0.2298 0.0983 0.3151 0.915 1             
(10) T. Non-Cash  0.2061 -0.1416 -0.0093 0.0559 0.0828 0.3342 0.9531 0.4903 0.5281 1            
(11) Total Pay 0.8045 0.5463 0.3677 0.6118 0.7468 0.386 0.5841 0.2529 0.3679 0.6569 1           
(12) TQ - NY -0.5091 -0.4807 0.0008 -0.6164 -0.5041 0.4126 0.2104 0.3722 0.4775 0.3741 -0.0519 1          
(13) EPS - NY 0.4418 0.3208 0.0063 0.3889 0.4064 0.2929 -0.2317 0.262 0.4321 -0.0924 0.4155 -0.2082 1         
(14) ROE - NY -0.3219 -0.358 -0.0831 -0.4223 -0.3595 -0.1925 0.0513 0.6327 0.7749 0.1839 0.0208 0.2464 0.3998 1        
(15) ROA - NY -0.2073 -0.2815 0.0385 -0.4155 -0.2457 0.2326 0.1933 0.6961 0.8841 0.4095 0.2647 0.6977 0.3702 0.7686 1       
(16) TASST - NY 0.6253 0.438 -0.0568 0.5484 0.5784 0.5703 0.3415 0.0348 0.2364 0.3978 0.66 0.1204 0.3755 0.0701 0.3506 1      
(17) TQ - PY -0.502 -0.511 -0.1074 -0.7176 -0.5294 0.253 0.1717 0.5907 0.6067 0.3706 -0.0505 0.8633 -0.1688 0.4899 0.7801 0.1517 1     
(18) EPS - PY 0.7178 0.4257 -0.2448 0.6635 0.6221 0.5957 -0.0532 -0.029 -0.0583 0.0115 0.4698 -0.2509 0.5288 -0.418 -0.153 0.5481 -0.303 1    
(19) ROE - PY 0.0573 0.3065 -0.0843 0.0723 0.1371 0.1196 -0.2954 -0.1936 -0.0675 -0.2913 -0.1046 -0.1291 0.3495 0.3435 0.2015 0.36 0.116 0.0623 1   
(20) ROA - PY -0.1006 0.019 -0.1434 -0.2655 -0.0777 0.2876 -0.1444 0.0898 0.1161 -0.0469 -0.0858 0.4699 -0.042 0.1033 0.4328 0.4345 0.6304 0.128 0.5984 1  
(21) TASST - PY 0.5919 0.4444 -0.1759 0.5291 0.5447 0.5837 0.3229 -0.0344 0.1085 0.3425 0.5437 0.0072 0.377 0.0176 0.2422 0.8983 0.0924 0.5904 0.5815 0.5387 1 
 
Notes: The correlation degrees of association for the variables of board executive pay and firm performance are based on the FTSE 350 registered corporations 
between 1999 and 2008. The table shows the correlation coefficients. 
                                                          
3 Boardroom executives’ intrinsic options awarded. 
4 Boardroom executives’ estimated options awarded. 
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To recap, the findings from this preliminary analysis of correlation are that there are high 
positive relationships between the measures of corporate performance and CEOs’ salaries, 
LTIPs, and options. As discussed before, the underlying theoretical perspectives considered and 
reference to the relevant institutional and regulatory aspects suggest the likelihood of the 
possibility of such relationships between executive pay and company performance within the 
overall environment of corporate governance as operationalised under the Combined Code and 
related regulatory measures. 
5.1.1 Pairwise Correlation Matrix - Pay, Performance, and Control Variables  
Tables (7 and 8) show the levels of significance between the pay components and indicators, as 
they relate to CEOs and board executives, and the measures of firm performance for two-interval 
periods (next-year and previous-year). They also show relationships between the underlying set 
of control variables focusing on aspects of corporate governance and ownership, and 
characteristics attributable to both companies and boardroom members. The correlation 
coefficients reported here are considered for the purpose of examining whether as significance 
levels increase then the potential collinearity introduces instability into the regression model. 
Wooldridge (2002) and Gujarati (2004) suggest that multicollinearity might threaten the 
coherence of the regression analyses if the degree of correlation exceeds 80%; therefore this 
proportion is adopted as a starting-point for further investigation and consideration. 
The correlation analysis clearly shows that the cash pay components for CEOs and board 
executives are not only highly significantly related internally but also are strongly associated 
with the indicators of company performance, especially Tobin’s Q and EPS. The analysis also 
shows that bonus payments have a more than modest degree of correlation with almost with all 
performance measures. However, the equity based compensation measures for both CEOs and 
board executives do vary both directionally and in terms of significance with the majority of 
corporate performance indicators. 
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Table 7: Pairwise Correlation Matrix - FTSE 350 CEOs’ Compensation and Firm Performance at 2-interval Levels 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
                      (1) Salary 1                     
(2) Bonus 0.5167*** 1                    
(3) Pensions 0.5523*** 0.3041*** 1                   
(4) Other Pay 0.3817*** 0.241***   0.2385*** 1                  
(5) Total Cash 0.7863*** 0.876***    0.5561***   0.4328*** 1                 
(6) Equity 0.5992*** 0.5558***       0.3263 0.4346** 0.6394*** 1                
(7) LTIPs 0.5006*** 0.6018***    0.2688***   0.2607*** 0.6044*** 0.6377*** 1               
(8) Options-11     0.0844 0.181***       -0.1235         0.0465 0.1607***        0.0806   0.2252*** 1              
(9) Options-22 0.1103** 0.1567***       -0.0946 0.121***     0.145***       -0.0914 0.247***  0.9355*** 1             
(10) T. Non-Cash  0.4589*** 0.5525***    0.2247***   0.2393*** 0.5516*** 0.715***   0.9826***  0.4204*** 0.399*** 1            
(11) Total Pay 0.6814*** 0.7496***    0.4403*** 0.358*** 0.8388***   0.8146***   0.8969***  0.4528***   0.4139***    0.8635*** 1           
(12) TQ - NY -0.2251*** -0.0846***      -0.2153***   -0.0901*** -0.1955***       -0.0475      -0.027  0.2777***   0.1922*** -0.0356*    -0.168*** 1          
(13) EPS - NY 0.0987*** 0.1371***        0.053*         0.0276 0.1271*** 0.3673**    0.1186***       0.0317       -0.0033     0.1022***     0.126***  -0.0418** 1         
(14) ROE - NY      0.0171 0.1132***        0.0078         -0.009 0.0956***        -0.1597    0.0661***       -0.0009       -0.0591        0.0289      0.076***   0.0134  0.3373*** 1        
(15) ROA - NY      0.0223 0.0739***        -0.0003         -0.0174 0.0779***        -0.2816       0.0347         0.0106       -0.0538        0.0125      0.053***   0.091***  0.5503*** 0.5215*** 1       
(16) TASST - NY      0.016 -0.0934***    -0.0565**         0.0131      -0.057***       -0.0133   -0.0833***        0.0379        0.0023      -0.0851***       -0.0649**  0.11*** 0.0406** 0.1312*** 0.242*** 1      
(17) TQ - PY -0.3145***     -0.152***       0.2711**       -0.1235*** -0.271***        0.002      -0.0358* 0.139***     0.1235***     -0.0638***       -0.2243**   0.697***  -0.096*** -0.0465** -0.0507*** 0.0225 1     
(18) EPS - PY 0.1607*** 0.1424***    0.127***      0.0626***   0.1511***        0.2217    0.1013***        -0.0349       -0.028     0.0868***     0.129***   -0.121***  0.3033*** 0.0529*** 0.0826*** -0.0358* -0.1188*** 1    
(19) ROE - PY     0.0088 0.0734***        0.0138         -0.008   0.0725***        -0.1307  0.0137         -0.0654   -0.1037**       -0.0082      0.0477**  -0.0324* 0.097*** 0.3517*** 0.1452*** 0.0564*** -0.032* 0.2139*** 1   
(20) ROA - PY    -0.0056      0.0422**       -0.0242     -0.0604***       0.0269 -0.3178*       0.004          0.0428       -0.0049        0.0034 0.0153   0.073***  0.1593*** 0.1597*** 0.4279*** 0.1927*** 0.0497*** 0.4192*** 0.3962*** 1  
(21) TASST - PY    -0.0008 -0.0907***    -0.0688**         0.0036 -0.0587***        0.0026   -0.0692***         0.0577       -0.001      -0.0681***       -0.0614**   0.108***  0.0558*** 0.1505*** 0.2681*** 0.9131*** 0.0988*** -0.0036 0.1055*** 0.2751*** 1 
 
Notes: The correlation levels of significance for the variables of CEOs’ pay and firm performance are based on the FTSE 350 registered corporations between 
1999 and 2008. The table shows the significant values. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no 
sign, no significant correlation was found. 
  
                                                          
1 CEO intrinsic options awarded. 
2 CEO estimated options awarded. 
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Table 7: Pairwise Correlation Matrix (Cont.) - FTSE 350 CEOs’ Compensation Indicators with Control Variables   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
                      
                     
(1) Total Cash 1 
                    
(2) T. Non-Cash     0.552*** 1 
                   
(3) Total Pay     0.838*** 0.863*** 1 
                  
(4) Duality Role      -0.119*** -0.062***   -0.157*** 1 
                 
(5) Board Size      0.366*** 0.260***  0.352***  -0.065*** 1 
                
(6) Nonexecutives     0.454*** 0.386***  0.462***  -0.143***       0.796*** 1 
               
(7) Independents      0.436*** 0.394***  0.468***  -0.143***       0.651***  0.806*** 1 
              
(8) Audit Comm.      0.0101        0.0412*        0.0301  -0.071***       0.047**  0.062*** 0.075*** 1 
             
(9) Rem. Comm.      -0.0018       -0.0203        -0.0152         -0.0209        -0.0036       0.0188         0.0149 0.321*** 1 
            
(10) Nom. Comm.       0.191***  0.144***   0.202***   -0.080***        0.113***  0.143*** 0.167*** 0.099***   0.111*** 1 
           
(11) Age      0.109***        -0.0265       0.0238 0.243***         0.109***  0.076***         0.07***       0.0081        -0.027          0.0303 1 
          
(12) Gender      0.069*** 0.0413*  0.073***        -0.0263        -0.0257       -0.0015          0.0216       0.0069    -0.233***          -0.0055 -0.051*** 1 
         
(13) Time-in-role      0.0196   -0.058***   -0.0434** 0.244***        -0.0276  -0.114***  -0.128***  -0.066***       -0.0076   -0.067*** 0.335*** -0.0333* 1 
        
(14) Share Plans3      0.315***   0.380***   0.403***        -0.045**         0.120***  0.208*** 0.211***      0.019         0.0131  0.072***      0.0341*    0.0409**   0.114*** 1 
       
(15) Ex. Options4      0.111***   0.094***   0.116***        -0.0344*         0.0154        0.0323* 0.058***      0.0108         0.0159           0.0207       -0.0043 -0.0178        0.035* 0.071*** 1 
      
(16) Un-Ex. Op.5      0.164***   0.142***   0.207*** -0.052***        0.026   0.052*** 0.079***      0.0037         0.0194 0.0333*       -0.0085   -0.043**   -0.042** 0.057*** 0.246*** 1 
     
(17) Ex. Equity      0.093***   0.147***   0.156***        -0.0038         0.09***   0.111*** 0.114***      -0.0214 -0.0013          0.0038       -0.0039            -0.012        0.003 0.260***      -0.0038        0.0124 1 
    
(18) Un-Ex. Eq.      0.057***   0.114***   0.119***        -0.0147         0.054***   0.086*** 0.113***      0.0046 0.0083          0.0071       -0.0192 0.0297        -0.0282 0.227***      -0.0095        0.0042   0.568*** 1 
   
(19) Debt-Asset      0.0158         0.0091        0.0148         -0.005         0.031        0.0259          0.0228       0.0015 0.0012          -0.0034       -0.007  -0.0023        -0.0071        -0.0049       -0.0031       -0.0041        -0.0026 -0.0044 1 
  
(20) Debt-Equity      0.008         -0.036*       0.0104         -0.0337*         0.0066 0.0352*         0.0246       0.045** 0.0068 -0.0112  -0.0397**  -0.0314  -0.0326*        -0.076***      -0.0003   -0.0484** -0.0325* -0.0153 0.0474** 1 
 
(21) Total Assets      0.517***    0.402*** 0.519*** -0.099***        0.572***   0.609*** 0.649***      0.05*** -0.0036   0.141***     0.098***  -0.0206     -0.151***  0.205*** 0.0337*    0.064***    0.107***     0.073*** 0.080***      0.094*** 1 
 
 
Notes: The correlation levels of significance for the variables of CEOs’ pay and control variables are based on the FTSE 350 registered corporations between 
1999 and 2008. The table shows the significant values. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is 
no sign, no significant correlation was found. 
  
                                                          
3 CEO wealth share plans awarded. 
4 CEO exercised options awarded. 
5 CEO unexercised options awarded. 
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Table 8: Pairwise Correlation Matrix - FTSE 350 Executive Compensation and Firm Performance at 2-interval Levels 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
                      (1) Salary 1 
                    
(2) Bonus 0.5701*** 1 
                   
(3) Pensions 0.5013*** 0.3258*** 1 
                  
(4) Other Pay 0.5544*** 0.3408***  0.2723*** 1 
                 
(5) Total Cash 0.8558*** 0.8481***  0.5105***      0.5736*** 1 
                
(6) Equity          0.2666*         0.2809*       0.1721 0.2786*      0.2995** 1 
               
(7) LTIPs  0.4482***         0.457***  0.2538***    0.2797*** 0.5024***     0.4417*** 1 
              
(8) Options-16  0.0975*** 0.1437***      0.0404            0.0213 0.1372***             0.1167 0.1356*** 1 
             
(9) Options-27 0.093*** 0.1076***      0.0097 0.0547* 0.1001***             0.2798       0.135***     0.8733*** 1 
            
(10) T. Non-Cash   0.4371*** 0.4406***      0.244***      0.2616*** 0.4864***    0.598*** 0.9689***     0.3533***  0.3252*** 1 
           
(11) Total Pay  0.7523*** 0.7467***  0.4563***      0.4833*** 0.8646***    0.537*** 0.7885***     0.3502*** 0.294***    0.7897*** 1 
          
(12) TQ - NY   -0.2324***  -0.0997*** -0.161***     -0.124*** -0.195***              0.0596      -0.0409**       0.1921*** 0.197***       -0.049**    -0.166*** 1 
         
(13) EPS - NY  0.1115*** 0.1731***       0.052**      0.0614*** 0.1388***    0.388***  0.0972***              0.0193       0.018  0.091***    0.135***  -0.0418** 1 
        
(14) ROE - NY          0.0169 0.1171***       -0.0197             -0.0148 0.0729***             0.0436  0.0579***              -0.0044       -0.0381        0.0344*    0.068***        0.0134   0.337*** 1 
       
(15) ROA - NY          -0.0056 0.0841***       -0.0125    -0.0458**      0.0455**             -0.0978       0.0126             -0.0071       -0.0308        -0.0028 0.0319*  0.091*** 0.55*** 0.522*** 1 
      
(16) TASST - NY          -0.0002 -0.1125*** -0.051**            -0.0051      -0.069***              0.104 -0.088***              0.0262       -0.0284   -0.092***  -0.078***       0.11***        0.041** 0.131***        0.242*** 1 
     
(17) TQ - PY   -0.3094***       -0.152***        -0.198***     -0.1469***      -0.265***              0.0593 -0.056***     0.1983***   0.2032***  -0.056***  -0.204***  0.697***  -0.096*** -0.046** -0.0507**        0.0225 1 
    
(18) EPS - PY   0.1941*** 0.1578***    0.1553***      0.1095***       0.187***             0.0808 0.108***    -0.0766**      -0.0379   0.103***  0.158***  -0.121***  0.303*** 0.053*** 0.0826***         -0.0358*      -0.119*** 1 
   
(19) ROE - PY          0.044** 0.0664***       0.0174             0.0047       0.075*** -0.0742        0.0241  -0.0679*       -0.068**        0.0101  0.059***       -0.032* 0.097*** 0.352*** 0.1452*** 0.0564***     -0.032*    0.214*** 1 
  
(20) ROA - PY          -0.0268        0.0046        -0.0087       -0.0858***      -0.0017 -0.2351       -0.037*             0.0102       0.0144         -0.023       -0.0047  0.073*** 0.159***      0.16*** 0.4279*** 0.1927***     0.05***     0.419*** 0.396*** 1 
 
(21) TASST - PY          -0.0225 -0.1116***  -0.0619** -0.0114 -0.079***              0.1145  -0.084***             0.0571       -0.0037   -0.07***  -0.079*** 0.109*** 0.056*** 0.151*** 0.2681*** 0.9131***     0.099*** -0.0036 0.106***   0.275*** 1 
 
Notes: The correlation levels of significance for the variables of board executive pay and firm performance are based on the FTSE 350 registered corporations 
between 1999 and 2008. The table shows the significant values. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If 
there is no sign, no significant correlation was found. 
  
                                                          
6 Boardroom executives’ intrinsic options awarded. 
7 Boardroom executives’ estimated options awarded. 
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Table 8: Pairwise Correlation Matrix (Cont.) - FTSE 350 Executive Compensation Indicators with Control Variables   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
                     
                    
(1) Total Cash 1 
                   
(2) T. Non-Cash 0.486*** 1 
                  
(3) Total Pay 0.865*** 0.789*** 1 
                 
(4) Duality Role -0.061*** -0.063***  -0.093*** 1 
                
(5) Board Size 0.605*** 0.333***  0.555***   -0.065*** 1 
               
(6) Nonexecutives 0.431***          0.35***  0.455***   -0.143***        0.795*** 1 
              
(7) Independents 0.432*** 0.352***  0.468***   -0.143***        0.651***  0.806*** 1 
             
(8) Audit Comm.             0.0119 0.0432**          0.031   -0.071***        0.047**  0.062*** 0.075*** 1 
            
(9) Rem. Comm.            -0.0015          -0.0221         -0.0159         -0.0209        -0.0036        0.0188          0.0149  0.321*** 1 
           
(10) Nom. Comm.  0.162*** 0.13*** 0.173***   -0.080***        0.113***  0.143*** 0.167***  0.098***   0.11*** 1 
          
(11) Age 0.123***           -0.0301         0.049**  0.243***        0.109***  0.076*** 0.071***        0.0081         -0.027          0.0303 1 
         
(12) Time-in-role             0.0273  -0.043**         -0.017  0.243***        -0.0276 - 0.113*** -0.128*** -0.066*** -0.0076  -0.067***   0.334*** 1 
        
(13) Share Plans8 0.318***  0.331***  0.419***   -0.0423** 0.209***  0.248*** 0.284***        0.0229 0.0092 0.084***       0.0123    0.067*** 1 
       
(14) Ex. Options9             0.17***  0.103***  0.158***          -0.0215 0.099*** 0.048** 0.085***        0.0054 0.0052 0.0415**       0.0123 -0.0062 0.122*** 1 
      
(15) Un-Ex. Op.10 0.186***  0.155***  0.223***          -0.0029 0.092***  0.0386** 0.083***        0.0036 0.0214 0.0445**       -0.0072   -0.045** 0.142***   0.351*** 1 
     
(16) Ex. Equity 0.084*** 0.139***  0.153***          0.0191 0.135***  0.115*** 0.115***        -0.0186         0.001          0.0143        -0.0223 -0.0099 0.275***       -0.0242      -0.0108 1 
    
(17) Un-Ex. Eq.             0.042** 0.086***  0.094***         -0.0077 0.059***  0.071*** 0.099***        0.0045 0.0078          0.0098        -0.0201 -0.0234 0.247***       -0.0207      -0.0082  0.309*** 1 
   
(18) Debt-Asset             0.0292          0.0136          0.0257         -0.005          0.031        0.0259          0.0228        0.0015 0.0012          -0.0034        -0.007 -0.0071        0.0037        0.0009      -0.0037         -0.0025 -0.0035 1 
  
(19) Debt-Equity             0.0013         -0.0228         -0.0017        -0.0337*          0.0066 0.0352*          0.0246  0.0451** 0.0068          -0.0112  -0.039**    -0.0326*  -0.076***       -0.0029 -0.039**   -0.049*** -0.0213    0.0474** 1 
 
(20) Total Assets 0.578*** 0.396*** 0.572*** -0.098*** 0.572***   0.609*** 0.649***  0.051***  -0.0036 0.141***   0.098***    0.151***  0.272***   0.070***  0.071***   0.120***    0.069***    0.081***     0.094*** 1 
 
Notes: The correlation levels of significance for the variables of board executive pay and control variables are based on the FTSE 350 registered corporations 
between 1999 and 2008. The table shows the significant values. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there 
is no sign, no significant correlation was found. 
                                                          
8 Boardroom executives’ wealth share plans awarded. 
9 Boardroom executives’ exercised options awarded. 
10 Boardroom executives’ unexercised options awarded. 
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Because of the manner in which the compensation of both CEOs and boardroom members is 
influenced by both direct bonus payments and the awardance of LTIPs then it is of interest in 
the manner in which these variable pay components are positively and significantly correlated 
with corporate performance indicators (other than Q ratio and TASST) and also other 
components of compensation. This would lead to the possible naïve, hypothesis that higher the 
amounts of bonuses and LTIPs (as variable pay components) offered to CEOs and board 
executive members will be associated with better the levels of corporate performance. 
As would be expected the performance indicators are quite highly intercorrelated; for 
example, ROA is associated with EPS and ROE by 55% and 52%, respectively, and TQ and 
TASST are even more highly correlated with their counterparts in different periods (70% and 
91%, respectively). Within the corporate governance variables again as is to be expected board 
size is found to be positively and significantly correlated with the number of non-executive 
and independent directors (79.5% and 65%), respectively. Again not unsurprisingly the 
highest positive correlation identified – approximately 80 % – was between the number of 
non-executives and independent director. Corporate size is positively and significantly 
correlated with board size, non-executives, and independent directors (57%, 61%, and 65%, 
respectively), which demonstrates that larger-sized companies have larger boardrooms 
comprised largely of non-executives and independent directors. Although the pairwise 
correlation analyses show that all, but one, correlation coefficients are less than 80%,1 there 
may nevertheless still be a multicollinearity issue between the regressors (Gujarati, 2004). In 
order to provide further confidence in the robustness of the models adopted a VIF test is used 
to check for the possibility of multicollinearity in the regression models. 
5.1.1 Multicollinearity Tests 
Multicollinearity refers to the presence of a linear association between two or more 
independent variables, making it difficult to differentiate between the individual effects of the 
explanatory variables and regression estimators (Wooldridge, 2002; and O’Brien, 2007). As a 
result, it is impossible to determine the true relationship between the dependent variable and 
                                                          
1Based on Gujarati (2004), it is proposed that multicollinearity may perhaps statistically threaten or violate the 
sensitivity analyses if the correlation level exceeds 80%. 
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the explanatory variables as the coefficient estimates may change erratically in response to 
small changes in the modelling. 
Based on the correlation analyses incorporating all underlying variables, there may be a degree 
of multicollinearity (0.806) between the number of non-executive and independent directors, 
as well as the relationship between board size and non-executives (0.795) (see Tables 7 and 8). 
These findings are largely expected within corporate governance variables, consistent with 
prior literatures (such as Gubitta and Gianecchini, 2002) which show the difficulty of 
differentiating between non-executive and independent directors within the corporate board of 
directors. These levels of multicollinearity are close to the conventional optimal limit (i.e. 
80%). Consequently the effects of incorporating both these variables within the same model 
will be discussed further. 
The potential presence of multicollinearity is examined by the use of variance inflation factor 
(VIF). According to Wooldridge (2002) and O’Brien (2007), multicollinearity issues are likely 
to be relatively unimportant if the value of VIF is less than 10 and the tolerance factor (1/VIF) 
is greater than 0.10. Table 9 shows the findings of the VIF and tolerance coefficients of each 
explanatory variable within both pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks. For the 
pay-performance framework, the results indicate that the highest VIF is 4.89 and the mean 
VIF is 1.95 for variables relating to CEOs, whilst the highest and average VIFs are 4.91 and 
2.01, respectively, for board executives. The inversion shows the lowest and average tolerance 
factors (1/VIF) for CEO related variables to be 0.2043 and 0.513 (1/1.95), and 0.2037 and 
0.498 (1/2.01) respectively for board executives. For the performance-pay framework, the 
findings demonstrate that the highest VIF is 5.58 and the mean 2.28 for CEO related variables 
and the highest and average VIFs are 5.29 and 2.22, respectively for board executives. The 
lowest and overall tolerance factors (1/VIF) for CEO related variables are 0.179 and 0.439 
(1/2.28), and 0.189 and 0.45 (1/2.22) respectively for board executives. These outcomes 
suggest that VIFs and tolerance coefficients are within acceptable levels and give confidence 
in the likely limited impact of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables within the 
adopted regression models. 
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Table 9: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of the Pay-Performance Framework 
 
Variables 
CEOs  
Variables 
Board Executives 
VIF Tolerance 1/VIF 
 VIF Tolerance 1/VIF 
Non-executive 
Directors 4.89 0.204355 
 Non-executive 
Directors 4.91 0.203755 
Total Assets-log 3.82 0.262056  Total Assets-log 3.87 0.258717 
ROA PY-log 3.55 0.282011  ROA PY-log 3.54 0.282301 
Independent 
Directors 3.38 0.296147 
 Independent 
Directors 3.38 0.295606 
Board Size 3.06 0.327218  Board Size 3.08 0.324271 
Tobin’s Q PY-log 2.83 0.353097  Tobin’s Q PY-log 2.85 0.350522 
EPS PY-log 1.94 0.516417  EPS PY-log 2.04 0.48962 
ROE PY-log 1.89 0.528063  ROE PY-log 1.89 0.528954 
TASST PY-log 1.63 0.61298  TASST PY-log 1.63 0.615382 
Time in Role 1.35 0.739162  Time in Role 1.33 0.753227 
Age 1.25 0.801072  Age 1.25 0.799802 
Remuneration 
Committee 1.21 0.826138 
 Un-exercised 
Wealth Options 1.24 0.809431 
Wealth Share 
Plans 1.17 0.853475 
 Exercised Wealth 
Options 1.21 0.826168 
Duality Role 1.16 0.859009  Wealth Share Plans 1.21 0.826266 
Audit Committee 1.16 0.860202  Duality Role 1.16 0.862555 
Un-exercised 
Wealth Options 1.13 0.88505 
 
Audit Committee 1.16 0.864688 
Exercised Wealth 
Equity 1.13 0.887032 
 Exercised Wealth 
Equity 1.14 0.8746 
Gender 1.1 0.907857 
 Remuneration 
Committee 1.14 0.876532 
Un-exercised 
Wealth Equity 1.1 0.90896 
 Nomination 
Committee 1.08 0.921966 
Exercised Wealth 
Options 1.09 0.916214 
 Un-exercised 
Wealth Equity 1.05 0.955788 
Nomination 
Committee 1.08 0.92195 
    
Mean VIF 1.95  Mean VIF 2.01 
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Table 9: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of the Performance-Pay Framework (Cont.) 
 
Variables 
CEOs  
Variables 
Board Executives 
VIF Tolerance 1/VIF 
 VIF Tolerance 1/VIF 
Non-executive 
Directors 5.58 0.179073 
 Non-executive 
Directors 5.29 0.189183 
Total Assets-log 5.42 0.184583  Total Assets-log 5.19 0.192539 
Independent 
Directors 4.28 0.233462 
 Independent 
Directors 4.1 0.244189 
Board Size 3.84 0.260679  Board Size 3.72 0.268871 
Growth 
Opportunity-log 3.71 0.269792 
 Growth 
Opportunity-log 3.62 0.276366 
Bonus-log 2.09 0.478279  Bonus-log 1.79 0.558406 
LTIPs-log 2.06 0.485615  LTIPs-log 1.5 0.664786 
Wealth Share 
Plans 1.35 0.742801 
 Wealth Share 
Plans 1.26 0.794351 
Remuneration 
Committee 1.28 0.783599 
 Remuneration 
Committee 1.22 0.821032 
Time in Role 1.23 0.810892  Age 1.22 0.822519 
Age 1.21 0.828878  Time in Role 1.13 0.881602 
Gender 1.2 0.833878  Duality Role 1.11 0.898514 
Duality Role 1.12 0.892221 
 Nomination 
Committee 1.11 0.90253 
Debt to Equity 1.11 0.89774  Debt to Equity 1.09 0.921412 
Debt to Assets 1.1 0.909505  Debt to Assets 1.08 0.923037 
Nomination 
Committee 1.09 0.917997 
 
Audit Committee 1.06 0.944597 
Audit Committee 1.09 0.918254     
Mean VIF 2.28  Mean VIF 2.22 
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5.2 Fixed-Effect Equations Modelling 
In this section, the two-way relationships between the remuneration components and measures 
for CEOs and board executives and company performance are investigated over the period of 
examination by utilising fixed-effect equations modelling. According to this modelling, the 
typical value of the dependent variable changes when any one of the main independent 
variables changes, while the other control variables are held fixed under the following 
headings: pay-performance analysis, performance-pay analysis, and reflections on pay-
performance and performance-pay results. The analytical findings of the multivariate 
regression analyses are expected to show a high level of consistency similar to the univariate 
descriptive analyses and the bivariate correlation analyses discussed above. The findings are 
discussed and compared with prior literature with a particular focus on relevant UK empirical 
studies. 
5.2.1 Analyses of Pay-Performance Framework 
The first trend of two-way relationships is tested in this section, in which the impact of 
previous year accounting-based indicators of corporate performance on both the prime pay 
components (i.e. salary, bonus, and LTIPs) and the compensation measures (i.e. cash, non-
cash, and total remuneration) for CEOs and board executives are examined separately. The 
pay-performance analyses for the three sub-time periods referred to above and sub-sector 
dichotomy between financial and non-financial companies are also reported. 
5.4.1.1 Remuneration Components of CEOs and Board Executives  
In this section - the significance of base salary, bonus, and LTIPs as the core compensation 
components for CEOs and board executives in FTSE 350 companies over the period 1999-
2008 are investigated under the following three discussion headings: pay-performance results, 
results relevant to the control variables, and endogenous estimations.   
5.4.1.1.1 Discussion of Pay-Performance Results  
Table 10 shows the results of fixed-effect regressions with robust standard errors of 
remuneration components (i.e. salary, bonus, and LTIPs) with the previous-period indicators of 
corporate performance (as proxied by Tobin’s Q, EPS, ROE, ROA, and TASST) for both 
corporate CEOs and board executives incorporating a number of related control variables.  
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Table 10: Fixed-Effects Regressions - Salary, Bonus, and LTIPs as Functions of Corporate 
Performance at Previous Interval (t-1) 
 
CEOs Board Executives 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Salary Bonus LTIPs Salary Bonus LTIPs 
Constant 4.2120906*** 
(18.18) 
2.913881*** 
(3.29) 
3.1763669*** 
(4.4) 
4.5658078*** 
(23.53) 
2.533585*** 
(2.73) 
3.6459815*** 
(3.84) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log .02279962*  
(1.92) 
.14362425*** 
(4.61) 
.3056681*** 
(8.06) 
.02583095** 
(2.57) 
.18012652*** 
(5.68) 
.32502072*** 
(6.86) 
EPS PY-log .02326518**  
(2.41) 
-0.00260204  
(-0.11) 
.03724061*  
(1.69) 
.02093347** 
(2.51) 
0.00727145  
(0.28) 
.05707655*  
(1.71) 
ROE PY-log -.02062927**  
(-2.01) 
.08268128*** 
(3.21) 
.04100779*  
(1.76) 
-.0216008**  
(-2.51) 
.09672122*** 
(3.68) 
.05913649*  
(1.88) 
ROA PY-log .02281504*  
(1.76) 
-0.01848607  
(-0.46) 
0.01505427  
(0.32) 
.03457427***  
(2.64) 
-0.06140126  
(-1.52) 
-0.00882083  
(-0.15) 
TASST PY-log .06090098*** 
(5.9) 
.05108104*  
(1.91) 
-0.03887797  
(-1.23) 
.06026576*** 
(6.92) 
.04933045*  
(1.81) 
-0.09924834 
(-1.53) 
Duality Role -0.00573106  
(-0.18) 
-0.0428842  
(-0.5) 
0.08971772  
(0.79) 
0.0258179  
(0.99) 
-0.13253099  
(-1.62) 
0.00646531  
(0.05) 
Board Size -0.0060255  
(-1.26) 
0.00394095  
(0.32) 
-.05425376***  
(-3.7) 
.16948291*** 
(41.81) 
.15244016*** 
(12.13) 
.05894225*** 
(3.29) 
Non-executive Directors .022064***  
(2.9) 
.11057682*** 
(5.78) 
.07523806*** 
(3.31) 
-.15850167***  
(-24.66) 
-.06949022***  
(-3.51) 
.01960111*  
(1.69) 
Independent Directors .01418475**  
(1.99) 
-.05565646***  
(-3.13) 
.03898421*  
(1.83) 
.00895682*  
(1.7) 
-.0514097***  
(-2.8) 
.0056536*  
(1.81) 
Audit Committee -0.0960273  
(-0.37) 
-0.40548756  
(-0.67) 
0.16367111  
(0.25) 
-0.17837405  
(-0.82) 
-0.87567178  
(-1.37) 
-0.43845581 
(-0.5) 
Remuneration Committee 0.07467662  
(0.98) 
-0.17157974  
(-0.85) 
-.42485193*  
(-1.85) 
0.0622315  
(1) 
-0.32397492 
(-1.64) 
-0.44424575  
(-1.58) 
Nomination Committee .1081304***  
(3.53) 
.10044976*  
(1.73) 
.14740425*  
(1.87) 
0.0283112  
(1.09) 
.05555836*  
(1.68) 
0.17961611  
(1.41) 
Age  .00590792*** 
(4.71) 
-0.00106646  
(-0.33) 
-.01067889***  
(-2.8) 
.00399759*** 
(3.79) 
-0.00105072  
(-0.32) 
-.01592241***  
(-3.38) 
Gender .17821289***  
(3.02) 
.47137391*** 
(3.07) 
0.07249123  
(0.43) 
- - - 
Time in Role .01114884*** 
(7.2) 
.01543114*** 
(3.81) 
-0.00232158  
(-0.46) 
.00615394*** 
(4.77) 
.01198202*** 
(2.99) 
0.00371614  
(0.63) 
Wealth Share Plans 2.203e-08*** 
(3.18) 
1.310e-07*** 
(7.29) 
2.887e-07*** 
(13.95) 
9.237e-09*** 
(2.9) 
6.978e-08*** 
(7.01) 
1.120e-07*** 
(7.99) 
Exercised Wealth Options 2.777e-08*** 
(2.77) 
4.537e-08*  
(1.82) 
5.646e-08*  
(1.92) 
1.785e-08***  
(3.53) 
3.138e-08** 
(2.05) 
2.19e-08*  
(1.71) 
Un-exercised Wealth 
Options 
6.602e-08*** 
(7.68) 
1.148e-07*** 
(4.65) 
1.487e-07*** 
(6.44) 
2.294e-08*** 
(7.33) 
0.000000009934 
(1.05) 
7.599e-08*** 
(5.9) 
Exercised Wealth Equity -0.000000004344 
(-0.32) 
6.752e-08**  
(2.02) 
0.00000002429  
(0.61) 
-0.000000001796 
(-0.43) 
0.000000001921 
(0.15) 
-0.00000001096  
(-0.62) 
Un-exercised Wealth 
Equity 
8.172e-08** 
(2.57) 
.0000001249* 
(1.69) 
-0.00000004839  
(-0.5) 
.00000001496* 
(1.69) 
0.00000001725 
(0.63) 
-0.00000002834  
(-0.72) 
Total Assets-log .19157808*** 
(23.25) 
.20717629*** 
(9.88) 
.35477431*** 
(14.67) 
.192112***  
(27.5) 
.24949598*** 
(11.6) 
.39859678*** 
(12.9) 
Regulation dummy .25024823*** (9.93) 
-.25921756***  
(-4.01) 
.2266663*** 
(2.98) 
.16290656*** 
(7.66) 
-.31179649***  
(-4.76) 
.41791753*** 
(4.45) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2355 2032 1841 2347 2143 2015 
F-value 90.82*** 40.63*** 48.52*** 199.5*** 47.3*** 34.21*** 
Adjusted R2 0.5498 0.3844 0.4447 0.724 0.4012 0.4631 
 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equation (1) by using Stata. The model is estimated using 
firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of firm performance indicators on both CEO and board executive pay 
components controlling for separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and year; regression model 
include variables of duality role, board size, non-executive directors, independent directors, audit committee, 
remuneration committee, nomination committee, age, gender, time-in-role, wealth share plans, exercised and 
unexercised wealth options and equity, and total assets-log. Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard 
errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation 
was found. Because of the construction of the Gender variable for board executives it is omitted to avoid collinearity. 
148 
 
Columns 1 to 3 present results relating to CEO compensation variables, whereas columns 4 to 
6 report similar estimates for board executives. The regression model reports good results, 
especially for base salary, as the constant coefficients are positively significant (at the 1% 
level), and the t-statistics2 are large. The explanatory power of applied regression for salary 
(i.e. goodness-of-fit measure: adjusted R2) is higher than that for other pay components (e.g. 
bonus and LTIPs). However, even despite this, the specification and fit of all the regression 
equations as at least comparable, if not better than that found in prior empirical studies (e.g. 
Conyon and Peck, 1998; McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Conyon and Sadler, 2001). The 
proportion of change occurring in board executives’ pay components as a result of the change 
in company performance indicators is therefore quite marked. By locating the associated p-
values of t-statistics under the normal distribution with a significance level at least 10%, the 
outcomes indicate that there is common robustness in the significance levels and 
overwhelmingly direct associations between the remuneration components and the 
accounting-based measures of firm performance, especially Tobin’s Q and ROE, at least at the 
10% level of significance, for both panels (i.e. CEOs and board executives).  
In general, the signs on the coefficients of past performance measures and their sizes of t-
statistics vary. It has been noted that CEO salary is positively related at various levels of 
significance to the majority of past performance indicators, except ROE, with 1% significance 
for TASST, 5% for EPS and ROE, and 10% for Tobin’s Q and ROA. Board executives’ 
salaries are positively and robustly significant with TASST and ROA, positively linked with a 
moderate level of significance to Tobin’s Q and EPS, and negatively again with ROE. The 
lack of any positive link between ROE and salary is perhaps surprising and might be 
explicable along the lines, suggested by Palepu et al. (2004), regarding the possibility of large-
sized companies to expose more to invested-asset financing rather than equity. CEO bonus 
payments and LTIPs are positively significant with Tobin’s Q and ROE, and there are positive 
significant relationships (at the 10% level) between CEO bonus payments and TASST and 
LTIPs with EPS, consistent with the findings of Sapp (2008). 
                                                          
2T-statistics for the intercept, which tests whether the average sums of the mean-paying are equal to zero, is 
completely nonnegative; located generally over the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values of 2.58, 1.96, and 1.64, 
respectively. 
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The coefficients across the relationships with Tobin’s Q vary in size, ranging, for instance, 
from 0.023 and 0.026 for CEO and board executive salary, respectively, to 0.14 and 0.18 for 
CEO and board executive bonus, and 0.305 and 0.325 for CEO and board executive LTIPs. 
These results suggest some significant economic variance in the relationships with the pay 
component. On average, salary, based on the previous example, will be higher by 2.3% for 
CEOs and 2.6% for board executives when the company’s Tobin’s Q is 100%, whereas 
bonuses will on average be 14% and 18% respectively higher for CEOs and board executives 
when Tobin’s Q is 100% higher. The difference is even more pronounced for LTIPs where 
there is a respective average increase of 30.5% for CEOs and 32.5% for board executives 
when Tobin’s Q is 100% higher.  
Therefore it would appear the link between bonus and LTIPs (as variable compensation 
components for prior achieved performance), and the overall firm performance is stronger 
than the component ‘salary’ as paid for future unachieved performance. This finding is 
perhaps to be expected as the non-direct cash compensation components are more likely to 
closely relate to the indicators of company performance than salaries as cash pay, which are 
most often predetermined (Murphy, 1999). Although the absolute level of bonuses is lower 
than that of salary (see Table 5), bonus has a stronger relationship with company performance 
than there is for salary. The results suggest that insights connecting the compensation of CEOs 
and board executives with measures of firm performance might be better focused toward 
compensation composition than necessarily absolute amount of compensation.   
Overall, the results strongly indicate a positive flow of influence from the accounting-based 
indicators of the FTSE 350 corporate performance to the level and structure of CEO and board 
executive remuneration. Therefore these findings can be interpreted as lending support to H1a 
(the agent-principal hypothesis), as CEOs and board executives are compensated for their 
intention to act in the best interests of the owners based on prior levels of corporate 
performance. 
5.4.1.1.2 Discussion of Results Relevant to the Control Variables  
Table 10 sets out the results relating to the control variables as pertaining to corporate 
governance and ownership and the board member and corporate characteristics. These results 
150 
 
and their relevance to pay components for CEOs and board executives within the pay-
performance framework are discussed below.  
First, the results are interesting in part for where there is an absence of significance. The 
relationships between CEO duality and the remuneration components of CEOs and board 
executives are not significant and if anything negative in their direction. This finding is 
consistent with the results of Benito and Conyon (1999), but contradictory to those of Core et 
al. (1999) and Sapp (2008). Of course here the sample numbers are low3 in that few of the 
FTSE 350 do have such duality and when they do, as for example in the case of Marks and 
Spencer for some of the period under examination, there are specific reasons therefore.  
Second, there is a significant negative link between board size and CEOs’ LTIPs. This is again 
a little surprising and is possibly at variance with the findings of Ozkan (2011) where the 
results show board size to be positively and significantly associated with total CEO 
compensation in the UK context. Ozkan interpreted her finding on the basis of the larger the 
number of board members the less effective are the monitoring roles they can exercise and 
there is greater influence and authority of the chief executive. The negative relationship 
indicated by this study is more consistent with the earlier, US based, results of Yermack 
(1996) which suggests that CEOs receive higher compensation incentives in companies with 
smaller boards. However, there are positive relationships at a high level of significance 
between the number of board members and all the pay components of board executives. In that 
company size is controlled for separately this positive relationship could be interpreted in a 
number of ways - perhaps in terms of a lower level of domination by the CEO, perhaps in 
terms of personal relationships within corporate board of directors the mutuality of which 
impacts the level and structure of their compensation package.  
Third, the number of non-executive directors is positively and significantly associated with the 
remuneration components of chief executives. This might perhaps be interpreted as indicating 
a weakness of non-executives’ monitoring process of CEOs’ pay – perhaps driven by the 
presence of personal contacts between the CEOs and the non-executives in the board. 
However, it could also be interpreted in terms of the role of non-executive directors in the 
                                                          
3The low figure of FTSE 350 duality roles (7%) is highlighted above in Table 5. 
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provision of appropriate incentive packages for CEOs as a motivation for sustaining corporate 
performance – an interpretation consistent with the theorising of Fama and Jensen (1983) and 
the empirical findings of Ozkan (2007). There are however negative and significant 
associations between the number of non-executive directors and the salaries and bonuses of 
board executives, which might suggest that non-executive directors approach setting the 
compensation components of board executives in a manner different than they do in respect to 
the compensation of CEOs. 
Fourth, the results indicate that the number of independent directors is positively related, albeit 
at differing levels of significance, with the salaries and LTIPs of both CEOs and board 
executives (consistent with Core et al. (1999)), but it is negatively and significantly associated 
with their bonus levels. In general, these findings support the study expectation that 
independent directors do have an influence in the determination of both CEO and board 
executive compensation packages - but the manner in which this influence is exercised is 
mixed. 
Fifth, and interestingly, the study finds little in terms of significant relationships between the 
presence of board committees, especially audit and remuneration committees, in terms of their 
associations with CEO/executive compensation. This finding is consistent with Conyon and 
Peck (1998), and indicates that such committees appeared to play little role in shaping 
managerial compensation. However of course in interpreting this result it has to be noted that 
the sample size of firms without these committees is very low indeed so considerable caution 
should be exercised in any such interpretation. However, in previous studies where there has 
been much greater dispersion amongst sample firms in relation to the existence or otherwise of 
such committees there have been similar results. In the UK, Main and Johnston (1993) found 
that the presence of a remuneration committee had no influence on the structure of pay, 
measured by the percentage of options awarded of total pay. In another UK study, Benito and 
Conyon (1999) found that there was no evidence that the adoption of either a remuneration or 
nomination committees had an effect upon executive pay awards for a sample of 1093 quoted 
UK companies over the period 1985-1994. However, the results of the present study do show 
a varied but generally positive significant effect between the existence of nomination 
committees and the components of CEO pay (and here there is a slightly greater disparity in 
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the existence or otherwise of such a committee). This in turn might be reflective of either a 
direct or indirect influence of CEOs on nomination committees which in turn might give rise 
to focus and outcomes in relation to CEO compensation packages. 
Relationships between levels of ownership and CEO and board executive remuneration show 
that wealth share plans and both exercised and un-exercised options are positively associated 
with high degrees of significance with the pay components of CEOs and board executives. 
This finding might be interpreted as chief-officers and board executives are exercising more 
control and power to benefit from the use of corporate resources, consistent with Holderness 
and Sheehan (1988) and Ozkan (2007). Also this result indicates that the interests of both 
executive members and corporate stockholders are more likely to be aligned, consistent with 
the pure agency perspective, in attempt to improve corporate performance (Watts, 1977; 
Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Ang et al., 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004). On the other hand, 
exercised and un-exercised equity are found to have negative relationships (albeit with only 
partial significance) with CEO salary and board executive bonuses and LTIPs, which might 
perhaps suggest that higher equity ownership would act to reduce the reliance of executive 
directors on fixed components of remuneration to achieve their rewards.  
Findings in respect to CEO and board executive members’ characteristics (for example age, 
sexual category, tenure) and their relationships to remuneration components also show mixed 
results. In accordance with the expectation of age, the longer the time that a CEO or board 
executive member has served, the higher the salary, a result consistent with Hogan and 
McPheters (1980) and Devers et al. (2007). However, there are no apparent significant 
relationships between the age of CEOs and board executives and their bonuses, consistent with 
Deckop (1988). This finding might be interpreted as bonuses are provided normally according 
to the actual individual performance rather than how old the CEO or board executive is. 
Interestingly, there is a significant negative link between the age of CEOs and board 
executives and their LTIPs. This might just be a statistical artefact but could perhaps be 
interpreted in terms that these incentive schemes are more likely to be awarded to younger 
executive members with the perspective that they will be more ambitious to seek to realise the 
corporate objectives based on the prospect performance levels. 
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Gender is found to be positively and significantly related with the level of CEO salary and 
bonuses, but insignificantly with CEO LTIPs. Clearly detailed investigation of gender 
relationships and issues are beyond the scope of this study but this finding is not entirely out 
of line with the perception that females are paid less than males globally because men 
normally spend more time in work compared with women as the latter still retain primary 
responsibility for housework and child care in their families, which in turn influences their 
progress in the field of work, consistent with the findings of Blau and Kahn (2000). Therefore 
the sexual factor (being male or female) has a direct impact on CEO salary and bonus. Again it 
can be conjectured that the positive (but not significant) relationship with LTIPs might 
possibly reflect actual, or perceived, outcomes rather than societal and institutional factors. 
However, the average effect of gender on the compensation components of boardroom 
executive is omitted as the corporate board normally consists largely of male rather than 
female directors. 
Results also suggest that the longer the tenure of CEOs and board executives, the higher the 
amount of their salaries and bonuses. This again is not unexpected and is consistent with the 
results reported in McKnight and Tomkins (2004) - and perhaps with the suggestion in Hill 
and Phan (1991) that the longer the tenure of CEO and board executive roles in the company, 
the more control and power they are able to exercise over the remuneration setting process. 
However there is no significant association between the time-in-role of CEOs and board 
executives and LTIPs compensation, which again suggests that the mechanism underlying the 
award and achievement of LTIPs might be subject to different influences than those relating to 
salary and bonuses – and might perhaps be better modelled separately. 
As expected, and as in almost every empirical study related to companies, firm size is a 
significant variable. It is positively and very significantly associated with the remuneration 
components of CEOs and board executives – perhaps most strikingly in respect to the variable 
pay components: bonus and LTIPs. This finding is entirely in line with that in previous 
literature (for example Conyon, 1997; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; John et al., 2010, etc.) 
which identifies corporate size as a key determinant of executive compensation. Large-sized 
companies are more complex in structure, requiring higher qualified and talented members to 
make crucial decisions regarding their running (Core et al., 1999; Zhou, 2000, etc.). 
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Consequently competitive remuneration packages are considered essential to attract talented 
executives who are rare and highly mobile (Murphy, 1999; and Sapp, 2008). 
Finally, the regulation dummy is very significant and positive in relation to the salary and 
LTIP pay components of CEOs and board executives of non-financial companies – but is 
significantly and negatively associated with bonuses. Interpretation of this finding is not that 
straightforward, but it is perhaps in line with the widespread perception that bonus linked 
rewards are more dominant in the financial and banking service sector – and possibly that 
these bonuses are not linked in to a perspective of longer term performance and outcomes. The 
coefficients for the year dummy are not reported in the tables, as they are not of direct interest 
for the study. Generally, the results indicate positive and very significant associations within 
the remuneration components for both CEOs and board executive directors across the majority 
of the period under examination. 
5.4.1.1.3 Discussion of Endogenous Estimations 
Here a further set of estimations is undertaken adopting the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS)4 
to extend the regression analyses of pay-performance framework with a view to investigating 
the presence of endogeneity links between the identical package of executive compensation 
and other instruments of corporate performance within the same set of control variables. This 
examination is consistent with Loderer and Martin (1997) and Black et al. (2006) in the line 
with do firms with higher performance levels provide sufficient amounts and appropriate 
structure of executive compensation?, therefore the examination here runs from the dependent 
variable (executive compensation) to corporate performance – but it does not move forward 
with more specific consideration of the causation of this relationship. 
Table 11 examines the effect of 2-year lags of the prior year indicators of corporate 
performance on current year pay components (i.e. salary, bonus, and LTIPs) for CEOs and 
                                                          
4Two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) is a technique of extending regression to cover models which violate 
the repetitive assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, especially models where the researcher 
assumes that one or more predictors is correlated with the disturbance term of the dependent variable. 2SLS is 
an alternative method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) in estimating the path parameters of non-
recursive models with correlated error among the endogenous variables in structural equation modelling (SEM). 
2SLS can also be used to test the selection bias in quasi-experimental studies by involving a treatment group 
and a comparison group. 
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board executives. This assumes that two lags of performance indicators are appropriate 
variables, consistent with prior econometric literatures (such as Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 
2005) which recommend the lag approach especially when it is difficult to find variables that 
can serve as valid instruments. 2SLS is applied with robust standard errors. More than one 
instrument has been used to avoid over-identification; in addition, the Sargan statistic test5 has 
been reported to indicate the degree of insignificance of the 2SLS model.  
Statistically, the results indicate significant coefficients in the first stage residual as the 
majority of the coefficients of the instrumented performance indicators are positively related 
and highly significant with one-year lag – but vary in significance and sign with two-year lag 
for all pay components. These results therefore show the existence of endogeneity 
relationships between pay and performance. It surmised that these issues of endogeneity links 
are more likely to arise with variables derived from and proxying the discipline and manner of 
corporate governance (consistent with the majority of the literature and theoretical structures 
(including Murphy, 1999; Black et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2012; etc.)). The findings of the 
second stage show that all performance indicators (except ROE) are positively (except ROA) 
associated with varied significance levels with salaries of CEOs and board executives. Tobin’s 
Q, ROE, and ROA are also positively (except ROA) and significantly related to CEO and 
board executive bonuses. Finally, ROE and TASST are positively and significantly linked to 
LTIPs of CEOs and board executives while ROA is negatively and significantly associated 
with LTIPs of board executives. 
  
                                                          
5The Sargan statistic (or Hansen J) test have to be more than 0.05 and less than 1 for insignificance. 
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Table 11: Estimations via 2SLS - Salary as a Function of Corporate Performance at 
Previous Interval (t-1) 
       CEOs 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Salary 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
.14480563*  
(1.72) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.32655616***  
(3.43) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
0.10071486  
(0.8) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-.44420267** 
(-2.05) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
.35150015**  
(2.01) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4064149*** (12.29)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0045876 (-0.14)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2708307*** (4.49)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.066186* (1.71)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2768015*** (4.23)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1068357* (1.83)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2379646*** (3.59)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1440941** (-2.28)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3098162*** (8.12)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0661886* (-1.72)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 
F-value 26.21*** 13.29*** 10.73*** 15.2*** 15.21*** 2.71 
Centered R2 0.2098 0.1187 0.0981 0.1335 0.1333  
Sargan Statistic      0.1027 
 
           Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Salary 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
.06315682*  
(1.75) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.29674012***  
(4.78) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
0.08810109  
(1.05) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-.4014462***  
(-2.8) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
.37301785***  
(3.25) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4038979*** (12.23)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0034581 (-0.11)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2684402*** (4.43)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.0676211* (1.73)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2662598*** (4.07)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.0979682* (1.68)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.234033*** (3.52)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1459215** (-2.3)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3124715*** (8.16)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.068018* (-1.77)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 
F-value 25.49*** 12.44*** 9.7 13.87*** 12.7*** 5.08*** 
Centered R2 0.2062 0.1126 0.09 0.1239 0.1146  
Sargan Statistic      0.0552 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) corporate performance indicators at previous interval 
on (Log) Salary based on Two-Stage Least Squares regression estimation. The test has been estimated by 
using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). Table 1 fully 
defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. Three, two, and one asterisks denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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Table 11: Estimations via 2SLS (Cont.) - Bonus as a Function of Corporate Performance at 
previous interval (t-1) 
          CEOs 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Bonus 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
.56045523*  
(1.81) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
0.19399378  
(0.91) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
.56174733*  
(1.83) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-1.2988448**  
(-2.39) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
0.66569092 
(1.62) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4395693*** (12.15)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) 0.0281173 (0.77)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2960712*** (4.61)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.1021155* (1.76)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2346833*** (3.32)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.170119*** (2.59)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2144406*** (2.92)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.2136644*** (-2.82)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.319517*** (7.64)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0842281** (-2)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
F-value 23.57*** 11.06*** 7.25 10.54*** 10.56*** 1.17 
Centered R2 0.2195 0.1166 0.0797 0.1118 0.112  
Sargan Statistic      0.0636 
 
            Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Bonus 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
.38947038 *  
(1.88) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
-0.09527586  
(-0.42) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
.42380037*  
(1.71) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-1.0828709**  
(-2.17) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
0.3372776  
(0.83) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4020054*** (11.41)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) 0.0021657  (0.06)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2770154*** (4.39)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.0845137* (1.68)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2334553*** (3.34)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1182378* (1.87)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2604968*** (3.73)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.2024251*** (-2.96)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3180558*** (7.8)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.080707* (-1.96)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 
F-value 21.34*** 10.97*** 7.28 11.88*** 11.99*** 2.91 
Centered R2 0.1943 0.1103 0.076 0.1184 0.1193  
Sargan Statistic      0.1563 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) corporate performance indicators at previous interval 
on (Log) Bonus based on Two-Stage Least Squares regression estimation. The test has been estimated by 
using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). Table 1 fully 
defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. Three, two, and one asterisks denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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Table 11: Estimations via 2SLS (Cont.) - LTIPs as a Function of Corporate Performance at 
previous interval (t-1) 
          CEOs 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log LTIPs 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
-0.16440703  
(-0.48) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
-0.00286345  
(-0.01) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
.20417945*  
(1.68) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-0.34175576  
(-0.64) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
.32040708*  
(1.72) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.3868075*** (10.79)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0020568  (-0.06)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2647548*** (4.14)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.076028  (1.28)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.1942118*** (2.69)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1365785** (2.11)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2600019*** (3.52)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.2097833*** (-2.83)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3088859*** (7.3)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0940617** (-2.21)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1066 1066 1066 1066 1066 1066 
F-value 22.29*** 11.02*** 7.34 12.24*** 9.91 1.09 
Centered R2 0.2156 0.1196 0.083 0.1311 0.1089  
Sargan Statistic      0.0556 
 
            Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log LTIPs 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
0.3136668  
(0.61) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
0.6224695  
(1.61) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
.6967699*  
(1.73) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-1.992216** 
(-2.38) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
1.422992**  
(2.07) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.3927246*** (11.51)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0055661  (-0.17)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2499944*** (4.03)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.0834406 (1.46)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2335047*** (3.44)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1189806* (1.96)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2323629*** (3.3)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1853414*** (-2.73)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.318513*** (7.9)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0753336* (-1.88)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 
F-value 23.49*** 10.83*** 7.82 11.79*** 10.78*** 2.11 
Centered R2 0.2103 0.1094 0.0814 0.1179 0.1089  
Sargan Statistic      0.2153 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) corporate performance indicators at previous interval 
on (Log) LTIPs based on Two-Stage Least Squares regression estimation. The test has been estimated by 
using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). Table 1 fully 
defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. Three, two, and one asterisks denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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5.4.1.2 CEO and Board Executive Remuneration Measures 
In this section, the significance of cash-based, equity-based, and total remuneration are 
explored further - the majority of previous studies having focused on overall pay. The analysis 
is reported under three headings: pay-performance results, results relevant to the control 
variables, and endogenous estimations. 
5.4.1.2.1 Discussion of Pay-Performance Results  
Table 12 shows the findings of fixed-effect regression equations with robust standard errors of 
remuneration measures (i.e. cash, non-cash, and total pay) for both CEOs and board 
executives with the previous-period indicators of firm performance, consistent with the similar 
set of control variables. Outcomes regarding the CEO remuneration measures are presented in 
columns 1 to 3, while analogous indicators for board executives are presented in columns 4 to 
6. 
Both the coefficients and t-statistics for the constants of cash and total remuneration suggest 
convergence at a 1% level of significance, whereas the findings relating to non-cash 
compensation are mixed in that they show positive significance for CEOs and negative 
significance for board executives. Again interpretation of this result is not that straightforward. 
Relatively equity-based compensation does form a larger part of CEO compensation, but the 
current study shows the difference is not that marked nor within CEOs compensation packages 
are there very large difference between cash and non-cash compensation (see Table 4). The 
higher percentage of board executive compensation represented by cash payments may be 
causal in terms of the negative relationship (see Figure 6). The statistical measures suggest 
that the modelling is quite robust - the goodness-of-fit measure for cash and total remuneration 
indicators stands up well as compared with prior studies (e.g. Main et al., 1996; Matolcsy, 
2000; Conyon and Sadler, 2001) - which provides some reassurance that the model results are 
worthy of consideration and may represent real underlying economic factors. By locating the 
associated p-values of t-statistics under the normal distribution with a significance level at 
least 10%, the findings indicate that there is robustness in the significance levels and positive 
relationships between the remuneration measures and the indicators of firm performance, 
especially Tobin’s Q and TASST, for both panels (i.e. CEOs and board executives).   
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Table 12: Fixed-Effects Regressions - Cash, Equity-based, and Total Remuneration as 
Functions of Corporate Performance at Previous Interval (t-1) 
 
CEOs Board Executives 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash Equity-based Total Rem. Cash Equity-based Total Rem. 
Constant 4.1318139*** 
(12.83) 
2.9728581*** 
(3.53) 
4.1813778*** 
(10.56) 
4.4830685*** 
(15.68) 
-0.73862321  
(-0.53) 
4.3161275*** 
(12.14) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log .06781359*** 
(4.1) 
.35358073*** 
(8.36) 
.13135168*** 
(6.46) 
.07130237*** 
(4.82) 
.36156548*** 
(7.38) 
.156967*** 
(8.53) 
EPS PY-log 0.01427815 
(1.07) 
.02655927*  
(1.8) 
.02410775*  
(1.86) 
.02159521*  
(1.76) 
0.0140334  
(0.35) 
.02449403*  
(1.71) 
ROE PY-log .02841289** 
 (2) 
0.0132444  
(0.39) 
.03098867*  
(1.77) 
.01466093*  
(1.86) 
.03795067* 
(1.95) 
.02542431*  
(1.81) 
ROA PY-log -0.0098365  
(-0.45) 
0.02611587  
(0.5) 
0.02001726  
(0.75) 
0.00913255  
(0.47) 
0.02350898  
(0.38) 
0.02612206  
(1.09) 
TASST PY-log .06775544*** 
(4.72) 
-0.04597493  
(-1.27) 
.04633526*** 
(2.63) 
.0741291*** 
(5.78) 
-.11107723***  
(-2.68) 
.03882536**  
(2.43) 
Duality Role -0.06825378  
(-1.58) 
0.05357018  
(0.43) 
-0.13053174  
(-1.46) 
-0.02684207  
(-0. 7) 
-0.02935265  
(-0.22) 
-0.05254362  
(-1.1) 
Board Size .01314931**  
(1.98) 
-.0537252***  
(-3.27) 
0.00145651  
(0.18) 
.17424545*** 
(29.17) 
.08033092*** 
(4.22) 
.15165326*** 
(20.42) 
Non-executive Directors .0507808***  
(4.8) 
.08049844*** 
(3.11) 
.04436255*** 
(3.41) 
-.12332101***  
(-13.02) 
-0.02827743  
(-0.93) 
-.1057122***  
(-8.97) 
Independent Directors -.03251024***  
(-3.29) 
.03578261*  
(1.71) 
-0.00209707  
(-0.17) 
-.03024278***  
(-3.43) 
0.01303574  
(0.47) 
-0.01490498  
(-1.36) 
Audit Committee -0.11964474  
(-0.33) 
0.02455587  
(0.03) 
-0.0821484  
(-0.19) 
-0.34156876  
(-1.07) 
-0.5341745  
(-0.56) 
-0.32193217  
(-0.81) 
Remuneration Committee -0.04417191  
(-0.42) 
-0.43291746  
(-1.64) 
-.25950648**  
(-1.99) 
-0.02529624  
(-0.28) 
-0.45740097  
(-1.53) 
-.21153517*  
(-1.86) 
Nomination Committee .14604831*** 
(3.43) 
.49231763*** 
(4.19) 
.27057986*** 
(5.16) 
.04119965*  
(1.78) 
.46295847*** 
(3.56) 
.13822149*** 
(2.91) 
Age  .00461136*** 
(2.65) 
-.01765558***  
(-4.03) 
-.00418662*  
(-1.95) 
.00264483*  
(1.7) 
-.02185484***  
(-4.35) 
-.00398701**  
(-2.06) 
Gender .28318216***  
(3.45) 
-0.03250463  
(-0.17) 
.25538932**  
(2.53) 
- - - 
Time in Role .01030815*** 
(4.79) 
-0.00354343  
(-0.62) 
.00551129** 
(2.08) 
.00690485*** 
(3.63) 
0.00572305  
(0.91) 
.00571145**  
(2.42) 
Wealth Share Plans 7.264e-08*** 
(7.56) 
2.879e-07*** 
(11.97) 
1.635e-07*** 
(13.83) 
3.339e-08*** 
(7.12) 
1.173e-07*** 
(7.7) 
7.628e-08*** 
(13.09) 
Exercised Wealth Options 3.857e-08*** 
(2.77) 
7.021e-08**  
(2.04) 
5.141e-08***  
(3) 
2.650e-08*** 
(3.55) 
0.00000001984  
(0.84) 
2.063e-08**  
(2.22) 
Un-exercised Wealth 
Options 
8.362e-08*** 
(7) 
1.234e-07*** 
(4.62) 
1.353e-07*** 
(9.2) 
2.667e-08*** 
(5.78) 
6.442e-08*** 
(4.6) 
4.733e-08*** 
(8.25) 
Exercised Wealth Equity 3.395e-08*  
(1.8) 
0.000000001757 
(0.04) 
4.774e-08**  
(2.06) 
0.000000002543 
(0.41) 
0.000000002675 
(0.14) 
0.00000001034  
(1.34) 
Un-exercised Wealth 
Equity 
8.158e-08*  
(1.84) 
2.765e-07***  
(2.82) 
2.318e-07*** 
(4.26) 
0.00000001693 
(1.25) 
9.711e-08** 
(2.33) 
5.207e-08*** 
(3.08) 
Total Assets-log .19221235*** 
(16.78) 
.39277556*** 
(14.22) 
.26454093*** 
(18.79) 
.20097899*** 
(19.52) 
.44739725*** 
(13.65) 
.27378418*** 
(21.38) 
Regulation dummy -0.0110227  (-0.31) 
.24681177***  
(2.81) 
0.06488288  
(1.51) 
-.10353228***  
(-3.3) 
.46378363***  
(4.64) 
0.00516622  
(0.13) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2355 1918 2356 2347 2107 2347 
F-value 69.64*** 44.16*** 86.04*** 119.34*** 34.87*** 115.35*** 
Adjusted R2 0.4827 0.4111 0.5361 0.61 0.3327 0.6017 
 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equation (1) by using Stata. The model is estimated using 
firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of firm performance indicators on both CEO and board executive pay 
measures controlling for separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and year; regression model include 
variables of duality role, board size, non-executive directors, independent directors, audit committee, remuneration 
committee, nomination committee, age, gender, time-in-role, wealth share plans, exercised and unexercised wealth 
options and equity, and total assets-log. Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by 
clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found. Because of the 
construction of the Gender variable for board executives it is omitted to avoid collinearity.  
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In general, the signs on the coefficients of past performance indicators are positive, but the 
size of their t-statistics varies. The results demonstrate that there are positive relationships with 
varied levels of significance between the remuneration measures and the indicators of 
company performance (especially Tobin’s Q at 1% significance level) for CEOs and board 
executives on the overall selected data. EPS is associated positively at 10% significance with 
CEOs equity-based and total compensation, as well as board executive cash-based and total 
pay. ROE also has a positive significant link with cash based and total remuneration for both 
CEOs and board executives, in addition to non-cash remuneration for boardroom members. 
Surprisingly, ROA has no significant relationship with the remuneration measures of both 
CEOs and board executives. Finally, TASST is very significantly and positively associated 
with cash and total remuneration of CEOs and board executives.  
In accordance with the findings of previous studies (e.g. Conyon, 1997; Ozkan, 2011), the 
coefficients across the relationships with Tobin’s Q are large-sized, ranging, for example, 
from 0.068 and 0.071 for CEO and board executive cash pay, respectively, to nearly 0.35 and 
0.36 for CEO and board executive non-cash pay, and 0.13 and 0.16 for CEO and board 
executive total remuneration. These results suggest some significant economic variance in the 
relationships with the pay measures. On average CEO cash, equity, and total compensation 
would be higher by approximately 6.8%, 35%, and 13%, respectively, when the company’s 
Tobin’s Q is higher by100%. For board executives the corresponding figures are 7.1%, 36%, 
and 16%, respectively.  
This would suggest that the link with equity-based compensation is noticeably stronger as a 
pay indicator for prior achieved firm performance than cash-based compensation as paid for 
future unachieved performance, consistent with (Murphy, 1999), and similar to the results of 
variable pay components. This finding supports the results of prior literature (for instance, 
Main et al., 1996; Conyon and Murphy, 2000) which reported a lower association between 
firm performance and CEO cash remuneration than that with equity based pay.  
Overall, these outcomes imply the importance of pay composition in linking the remuneration 
of CEOs and board executives to company performance indicators. These therefore tend to 
lend support to H1a (the agent-principal hypothesis) whereby CEOs and board executives are 
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compensated for their intention to act in the best interests of the owners based on the prior 
levels of corporate performance. 
5.4.1.2.2 Discussion of Results Relevant to the Control Variables  
Table 12 sets out also the outcomes relating to the control variables (mechanisms pertaining to 
corporate governance and ownership, and the board member and corporate characteristics). 
These findings and their significance to remuneration measures for CEOs and board 
executives within the pay-performance framework are outlined below.  
In terms of CEO duality there is a negative association, albeit with no significance, between 
duality role of CEO and chairman and the remuneration measures of CEOs and board 
executives. This outcome implies that the chairman/CEO duality position does not affect the 
volume and structure of CEO/board executive compensation package, and is consistent with 
the findings of Benito and Conyon (1999) and with the results reported above, in Table 10, 
relating to the pay components.   
The results also show that board size is positively and significantly related to CEOs cash 
remuneration, whilst it is negatively and very significantly associated with CEOs non-cash 
compensation. This finding is consistent with that of Yermack (1996). It is also consistent with 
the results noted above, in Table 10, in respect to the relationship between board size and 
CEOs’ LTIPs. This suggests that the more members on the corporate board there are, the 
higher the level of CEO cash pay and the lower the level of CEO equity pay. However, there 
does not seem to be a level of influence with CEOs total remuneration. This finding may 
provide evidence of greater pressure on the levels and structures of equity compensation 
package for CEOs when their boards are augmented with new members. Board size is 
positively and very significantly linked to all compensation measures of board executives. 
Given the control for company size this finding might perhaps be interpreted in terms of a 
lower level of domination by the CEO, or even in terms of personal relationships within 
corporate board of directors. 
There is again a very significant positive link between the number of non-executive directors 
and the remuneration measures of CEOs, whilst the number of non-executive directors is 
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negatively and very significantly associated with the cash-based and total remuneration of 
board executives – again similar to the findings reported in Table 10. The positive association 
in relation to CEOs may perhaps indicate the ambition of non-executives directors to motivate 
CEOs with appropriate incentive packages for the purpose of enhancing firm performance 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; and Ozkan, 2007), or possibly even the weakness of non-executives’ 
monitoring process of CEOs’ pay, or perhaps reflecting the likelihood of personal contacts 
between the CEOs and the non-executives in the board. The negative association with the 
compensation package for boardroom executives may also be reflective of the nature of 
interpersonal dynamics and relative power/control characteristics.  
The results also show that the number of independent directors is negatively and very 
significantly related with the cash-based compensation of CEOs and board executives a result 
driven by the negative association with the amount of cash based bonuses. However, there are 
positive and significant links with the equity-based compensation of CEOs and board 
executives consistent with the LTIP findings reported above. In consequence overall there is 
no significant association between the number of independent directors and the total 
remuneration of CEOs and board executives. The mixed findings in terms of the relationships 
between the number of the independent directors and remuneration package of CEOs and 
board executives might possibly be interpreted as consistent with lending support to the study 
expectation that independent directors will act to moderate the pay ambitions of CEOs and 
board executives.  
Again the results confirm those reported earlier, i.e. that the presence or otherwise of an audit 
committee has little if any association with either CEO or board executives remuneration – but 
again with the caveat that very few firms in the sample did not have an audit committee. 
However there are some more significant interactions between the existence of a remuneration 
committee and total compensation measure. These are perhaps a little surprising in that the 
existence of remuneration committee is negatively associated with overall compensation 
packages for both CEOs and board executives. This result could suggest the presence of other 
institutional and regulatory factors contributing to determining the level and structure of CEO 
and board executive remuneration. One possible mediating factor might be the positive and 
strong significant link between the existence or otherwise of a nomination committee on both 
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CEO and board executive pay which may in turn suggest a rather more complex and subtle 
relationship than the more conventional perspective that remuneration committees act to 
enhance rather than moderate board compensation. 
The associations between the levels of ownership and pay measures of CEOs and board 
executives shows that wealth share plans and options’ ownership are positively and 
significantly associated with the compensation measures of CEOs and board executives – 
again this is a finding similar to that reported earlier in Table 10. However, the variables of 
equity ownership are mixed in terms of their levels of significance. Again these results may be 
capable of differing interpretations. They may suggest that professional managers with large-
sized holdings are exercising their power in designing their pay package, consistent with 
(Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; and Ozkan, 2007); or alternatively that the agents’ interests 
are aligned with the interests of the principals in terms of increasing corporate progress and 
efficiency, a view consistent with prior literature (for example, Watts, 1977; Craswell and 
Taylor, 1992; Ang et al., 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004; etc.). 
Associations between CEO and board executive members’ characteristics and their 
remuneration indicators again do not throw up clearly definitive outcomes – although possibly 
not ones out of line with expectations. Age and tenure are positively and directly associated 
with cash based pay for both CEOs and board executives. This finding is consistent with 
Hogan and McPheters (1980) and Devers et al. (2007) - and also similar to the results 
presented in Table 10. However, negative significant relationships are reported between the 
age of CEOs and board executives and their equity-based and total compensation. This might 
be explicable in that the nature of equity-based compensation (which as reported above 
constitutes a large part of total remuneration) is likely to be related to actual performance 
rather than predetermined base levels in terms of age and experience. 
CEO gender (male) is positively and significantly related to cash-based and total remuneration 
variables. This finding is completely consistent with a nature of career culture in which 
women are paid less than men (Blau and Kahn, 2000). However, and again interestingly, CEO 
gender is found to be insignificantly associated with their equity-based compensation. There 
might again be the possibility that more determinable performance outcomes are not related to 
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gender – which might underline this finding. Results of the effect of gender on the 
remuneration measures of board executives are omitted because boardroom seats are 
exclusively occupied by men. 
To look more specifically at tenure, again not contrary to expectations, the results show that 
the length of working time for boardroom members still holding the same roles is positively 
and significantly associated with the cash compensation of CEOs and board executives and is 
also somewhat significant in terms of the relationship with the total remuneration of CEOs and 
board executives. This finding is consistent with that of Hill and Phan (1991) and McKnight 
and Tomkins (2004), and also to those reported for salary and bonus in Table 10. However, 
tenure is found to be not significantly related to the non-cash compensation of CEOs and 
board executives – which again might be in line with surmise as to the nature of compensation 
relating to actual performance rather than period in office.  
Findings in respect to corporate size not unexpectedly show relationships with remuneration 
measures in accordance with prior empirical literature (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; John et al., 
2010). Company size is found to be positively and significantly related to the remuneration 
measures of CEOs and board executives, especially as applicable to equity-based 
compensation packages. This finding would support the perspective that larger companies 
seek to hire talented board executives and for that endeavour provide appropriate incentive 
packages (Gregg et al., 1993; Murphy, 1999; Sapp, 2008). 
In respect to the final to the dummy variables, the regulation (financial/non-financial) dummy 
is positively and significantly linked to the equity-base pay of CEOs and board executives of 
non-financial institutions (as consistent with the results reported in Table 10). It is negatively 
associated with the cash-based compensation of CEOs and board executives - which might 
relate to the perspective that bonus based compensation is a very important part of 
compensation packages in the financial sector. The coefficients of year dummy are not directly 
reported - but the outcomes do indicate positive and significant associations between the pay 
measures and the 10-year time dummy with a 2008 peak compensation for both CEOs and 
board executives displaying the largest positive coefficients.  
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5.4.1.2.3 Discussion of Endogenous Estimations 
As an extension of the regression analyses of pay-performance framework, the 2SLS 
estimations with robust standard errors were undertaken for the purpose of determining 
whether there is an existence of endogeneity links between the measures of executive 
compensation and other instruments of corporate performance within the same set of control 
variables. 
In this context, Table 13 reports the results of the effect of 2-year lags of the prior year 
indicators of corporate performance on current year remuneration measures (i.e. cash pay, 
non-cash pay, and total remuneration) of CEOs and board executives. The two lags of 
performance indicators were considered to be appropriate variables, consistent with Gujarati 
(2004) and Wooldridge (2005). The Sargan test statistic has been reported to verify the 
significance or otherwise of the 2SLS model.  
The findings also show positive and very significant statistical associations between the pay 
measures and the first lag instrument of performance in the first stage residual – but they do 
vary in significance and sign with two-year lag for all remuneration measures. These results 
continue to indicate the presence of endogeneity links between pay and performance. This 
finding is likely to be explicable within a framework where endogenous links are likely to 
arise within the discipline of corporate governance (Murphy, 1999; Black et al., 2006; Coles et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, this finding indicates the possibility of the dependence of CEO and 
board executive compensation measures not only on the last year of company performance, 
but also on prior previous periods of corporate achievement. The second stage analysis shows 
that the cash-based pay of CEOs and board executives varies in significance and sign with 
performance indicators, positively with Tobin’s Q and EPS, and negatively with ROA. Again 
there is a distinction between the results relating to CEOs and board executives. Tobin’s Q and 
TASST are positively and significantly associated with CEOs equity-based and total pay; 
whereas EPS, ROE, and TASST are positively related and ROA is negatively linked to both 
the equity-based and total compensation of board executives.   
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Table 13: Estimations via 2SLS - Cash Remuneration as a Function of Corporate 
Performance at Previous Interval (t-1) 
         CEOs 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Cash Rem. 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
.13587204*  
(1.86) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.21426324*  
(1.85) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
0.17159275  
(1.12) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-.54011571**  
(-2.05) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
0.22608695  
(1.07) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4064149*** (12.29)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0045876 (-0.14)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2708307*** (4.49)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.066186 (1.21)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2768015*** (4.23)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1068357* (1.83)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2379646*** (3.59)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1440941** (-2.28)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3098162*** (8.12)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0661886* (-1.72)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 
F-value 26.21*** 13.29*** 10.73*** 15.2*** 12.67*** 1.44 
Centered R2 0.2098 0.1187 0.0981 0.1335 0.1138  
Sargan Statistic      0.0745 
  
          Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Cash Rem. 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
.1118929*  
(1.92) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.19227808**  
(2.15) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
0.18978008  
(1.57) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-.52926729**  
(-2.56) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
.30326742*  
(1.84) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4038979*** (12.23)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0034581 (-0.11)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2684402*** (4.43)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.0676211 (1.23)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2662598*** (4.07)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.0979682* (1.68)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.234033*** (3.52)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1459215** (-2.3)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3124715*** (8.16)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.068018* (-1.77)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 
F-value 25.49*** 12.44*** 9.7 13.87*** 12.7*** 2.05 
Centered R2 0.2062 0.1126 0.09 0.1239 0.1146  
Sargan Statistic      0.0665 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) corporate performance indicators at previous interval 
on (Log) Cash Remuneration based on Two Stage Least Squares regression estimation. The test has been 
estimated by using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). 
Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 
companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. Three, two, and one asterisks denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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Table 13: Estimations via 2SLS (Cont.) - Equity-based Remuneration as a Function of 
Corporate Performance at Previous Interval (t-1) 
         CEOs 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Equity-based Remuneration 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
-0.17886108  
(-0.43) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.27441983*  
(1.86) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
0.2619809  
(0.6) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-0.76785448  
(-1.16) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
.87673438*  
(1.67) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.3930446*** (11.05)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0071916 (-0.21)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2669677*** (4.24)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.0727556 (1.24)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2118857*** (2.99)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1210658* (1.9)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2700433*** (3.71)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1974988*** (-2.7)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3110212*** (7.55)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0948268** (-2.29)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 
F-value 23.08*** 11.46*** 8.12 13.05*** 10.36*** 2.05 
Centered R2 0.2143 0.1193 0.0876 0.1337 0.1091  
Sargan Statistic      0.1169 
 
        Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Equity-based Remuneration 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
0.33949352  
(0.6) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.7768055*  
(1.84) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
1.0347508*  
(1.84) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-2.6625762***  
(-2.88) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
2.0184372***  
(2.7) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.3965895*** (11.69)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0170129 (-0.52)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2519272*** (4.13)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.0808884 (1.44)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2511963*** (3.77)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1122437* (1.88)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2450457*** (3.54)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1780875*** (-2.66)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.322903*** (8.17)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0699207* (-1.78)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 
F-value 24.01*** 11.37*** 8.69 12.68*** 11.61*** 3.38 
Centered R2 0.2081 0.1106 0.0868 0.1218 0.1127  
Sargan Statistic      0.2175 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) corporate performance indicators at previous interval on 
(Log) Equity-based Remuneration based on Two Stage Least Squares regression estimation. The test has been 
estimated by using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). Table 1 
fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics 
are presented in parentheses. Three, two, and one asterisks denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found. 
169 
 
Table 13: Estimations via 2SLS (Cont.) - Total Remuneration as a Function of Corporate 
Performance at Previous Interval (t-1) 
         CEOs 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Total Rem. 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
-0.00120209  
(-0.01) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.19865808*  
(1.76) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
0.1516648  
(0.78) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-0.48780609  
(-1.46) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
.29825937*  
(1.81) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4064149*** (12.29)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0045876 (-0.14)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2708307*** (4.49)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.066186 (1.21)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2768015*** (4.23)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.1068357* (1.83)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.2379646*** (3.59)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1440941** (-2.28)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3098162*** (8.12)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.0661886* (-1.72)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 1266 
F-value 26.21*** 13.29*** 10.73*** 15.2*** 12.67*** 1.45 
Centered R2 0.2098 0.1187 0.0981 0.1335 0.1138  
Sargan Statistic      0.0823 
 
        Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Tobin’s Q PY-log EPS PY-log ROE PY-log ROA PY-log TASST PY-log Total Rem. 
Fitted Value from Tobin’s Q PY-
log Equation      
0.08264295  
(0.45) 
Fitted Value from EPS PY-log 
Equation      
.27941921**  
(2.08) 
Fitted Value from ROE PY-log 
Equation      
0.26633153  
(1.47) 
Fitted Value from ROA PY-log 
Equation     
 
 
-.77183087**  
(-2.49) 
Fitted Value from TASST PY-
log Equation      
.59663668**  
(2.4) 
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged1) 0.4038979*** (12.23)      
Tobin’s Q PY-log (Lagged2) -0.0034581 (-0.11)      
EPS PY-log (Lagged1)  0.2684402*** (4.43)     
EPS PY-log (Lagged2)  0.0676211 (1.23)     
ROE PY-log (Lagged1)   0.2662598*** (4.07)    
ROE PY-log (Lagged2)   0.0979682* (1.68)    
ROA PY-log (Lagged1)    0.234033*** (3.52)   
ROA PY-log (Lagged2)    -0.1459215** (-2.3)   
TASST PY-log (Lagged1)     0.3124715*** (8.16)  
TASST PY-log (Lagged2)     -0.068018* (-1.77)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 
F-value 25.49*** 12.44*** 9.7 13.87*** 12.7*** 2.76 
Centered R2 0.2062 0.1126 0.09 0.1239 0.1146  
Sargan Statistic      0.0916 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) corporate performance indicators at previous interval 
on (Log) Total Remuneration based on Two Stage Least Squares regression estimation. The test has been 
estimated by using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). 
Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 
companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. Three, two, and one asterisks denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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5.4.1.3 Sub-Time Periods and Sub-Sector Analyses 
Table 14 shows the outcomes of fixed-effect regressions with robust standard error of 
previous-year indicators of firm performance on a number of key pay variables of CEO and 
board executive (i.e. salary, LTIPs, and total remuneration) over three sub-periods of the data 
sample: fiscal years 1999 to 2002, 2003 to 2005, and 2006 to 2008. The reason for the division 
of the analysis into sub-time periods is to reflect the impact of the major institutional changes 
in the framework of the UK corporate governance arrangements (including the 1992 Cadbury 
Report, the 1995 Greenbury Report, and the 1998 Hampel Report) which occurred before the 
first year of study period. And beyond that further governance regulations (including the 2002 
UK Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, the 2003 Higgs Report, and the 2006 
Companies Act) which occurred during the period under examination are considered in the 
context of the second and third time panels within the pay-performance framework.  
The findings show the adjusted R2 for the model to be respectably high especially for salary 
and total compensation (relative to previous studies (such as Smith, 2008)) – and this provides 
a degree of confidence in the results of the sub-analysis. The sub-analysis shows that there are 
significant levels of time variation re the coefficients of performance indicators. Interestingly 
the results indicate that none of the corporate performance indicators has an overwhelming 
high significant effect in their impact or association with the compensation of CEOs and 
boardroom members throughout the period under examination. There is, however, some 
degree of significant association with Tobin’s Q during the three sub-time periods, particularly 
for the pay variables: LTIPs and total remuneration. ROE and TASST are also significant over 
the 1999-2002 interval, while EPS and ROA are significant over the last interval of 2006-
2008. Tobin’s Q - which does appear to be an interesting performance variable to consider - 
has an increasing-order positive impact on the salary of both CEOs and board executives over 
the time period with particular significance in relation to interval 2006-2008. But the results 
are not uniform - whilst Tobin’s Q is related to increases in terms of LTIPs for CEOs and 
board executives during the intervals1999-2002 and 2003-2005, there are decreases in 2006-
2008. In fact in overall terms, Tobin’s Q has a declining positive impact on CEO total 
remuneration from the first interval to second interval, but it does then increase in the last 
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interval – however, again and slightly difficult to interpret, there is a similar reversal trend in 
the total remuneration of board executives. 
The endogenous estimations using the 2SLS approach in the manner similar to that described 
above show a number of significant results – indeed for the majority of the instrumented 
coefficients of performance indicators – which indicates again the presence of endogenous 
links between the performance measures adopted and the pay variables. Again the results of 
second-stage approach for the three panels demonstrate that Tobin’s Q is positively and 
significantly associated with pay variables for both CEOs and board executives over the sub-
time period panels – as noted before, and in accordance with the results from the endogenous 
estimations – associations with other performance indicators are mixed and varied. 
Beyond the sub-time period analyses additional sub-sector analyses were undertaken to 
consider separately the effects of company performance on executive compensation within 
both financial and non-financial sectors (as in previous literature; Khatri et al., 2002; Adams 
and Mehran, 2005; Spong and Sullivan, 2007) which suggested the exclusion of both financial 
and utilities sectors because of the specific nature of these businesses and the particular 
regulatory and financial reporting regimes under which they work. Table 15 shows the results 
of the fixed-effect regressions with robust standard error of the identical previous-year 
indicators of firm performance on the same compensation variables over the two sub-sector 
panels (i.e. financial and non-financial).  
The overall associative power of the performance indicators, represented by adjusted R2, 
suggests strong levels for all pay variables. Comparison of the outcomes for performance 
indicators in both panels in terms of their direction and significance indicates that the 
relationships between remuneration measures and corporate performance are more significant 
in the non-financial sector. Re financial-sector companies the results suggest that Tobin’s Q is 
positively and significant associated with salary of CEOs and board executives. ROE is 
positively associated with LTIPs and TASST with total remuneration for both CEOs and 
board executives. For non-financial companies Tobin’s Q, EPS, and ROE are positively and 
quite significantly associated with the pay variables of CEOs and board executives - but ROA 
has negative influence on compensation, again a result that is rather difficult to explain. 
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Table 14: Sub-Time Period Analyses - Salary, LTIPs, and Total Remuneration as Prime 
Remuneration Functions of Corporate Performance at Previous Interval (t-1) 
 Panel A: 1999 to 2002 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Salary LTIPs Total Pay Salary LTIPs Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log 0.01352751 (0.41) 
.01751633** 
(2.11) 
.07423296* 
(1.7) 
-0.00338219 
(-0.14) 
.1184277* 
(1.68) 
.08663846* 
(1.69) 
EPS PY-log 0.00679086 (0.16) 
-0.25954099 
(-1.43) 
-.1806985** 
(-2.29) 
0.00513592 
(0.16) 
-0.27490494 
(-1.33) 
-.18657841*** 
(-2.88) 
ROE PY-log .03925497* 
(1.83) 
.31136416** 
(2.15) 
.22059742*** 
(3.42) 
-0.01180835 
(-0.46) 
.45754448*** 
(2.85) 
.1628124*** 
(3.07) 
ROA PY-log -0.05343034 
(-1.1) 
-0.05324637 
(-0.27) 
-0.09658441 
(-1.07) 
-0.01119378 
(-0.31) 
-0.17864687 
(-0.79) 
-0.02321592 
(-0.31) 
TASST PY-log .02027319* 
(1.66) 
-0.28252421 
(-1.11) 
-.19663433* 
(-1.88) 
.02734933* 
(1.65) 
-.53425356* 
(-1.82) 
-.15574507* 
(-1.8) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 847 577 847 844 669 844 
Adjusted R2 0.7466 0.5179 0.6829 0.9 0.4552 0.7961 
 Panel B: 2003 to 2005 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Salary LTIPs Total Pay Salary LTIPs Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log 0.07276762 
(1.22) 
.07591603* 
(1.72) 
.04593487* 
(1.69) 
0.01334781 
(0.36) 
.55009183** 
(2.29) 
.21446262*** 
(2.88) 
EPS PY-log -0.0032769 (-0.05) 
-0.04278322 
(-0.26) 
0.06931958 
(0.8) 
-0.00977136 
(-0.24) 
0.08270293 
(0.31) 
-0.02906352 
(-0.35) 
ROE PY-log -.11582457* (-1.93) 
-0.05134625 
(-0.35) 
-0.08647163 
(-1.11) 
.01353093* 
(1.67) 
0.04494209 
(0.19) 
-0.0035886 
(-0.05) 
ROA PY-log .10966422* 
(1.69) 
0.1086357 
(0.54) 
-0.01851292 
(-0.15) 
-0.02434769 
(-0.43) 
-0.06800585 
(-0.2) 
-0.02647027 
(-0.23) 
TASST PY-log -0.0001612 
(0.01) 
-0.2367909 
(-1.2) 
.06340028* 
(1.75) 
0.01121249 
(0.21) 
-0.12801014 
(-0.38) 
.07059757* 
(1.67) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 724 592 724 720 640 720 
Adjusted R2 0.7048 0.7442 0.8111 0.8865 0.4878 0.8179 
 Panel C: 2006 to 2008 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Salary LTIPs Total Pay Salary LTIPs Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log .08613753** 
(2.15) 
-0.0332026 
(-0.23) 
.14657242* 
(1.79) 
.03649917* 
(1.67) 
-0.08561178 
(-0.4) 
.07170223** 
(1.96) 
EPS PY-log .02242791* 
(1.67) 
.21513955* 
(1.76) 
.17216893** 
(2.54) 
-0.00062584 
(-0.02) 
.23060147* 
(1.65) 
.1287597** 
(2.1) 
ROE PY-log 0.02732005 (0.83) 
.16700127* 
(1.68) 
-0.01515379 
(-0.23) 
0.01755446 
(0.65) 
.35877716** 
(2.14) 
.10564818* 
(1.74) 
ROA PY-log -.07242558* (-1.8) 
-.37080823** 
(-2.58) 
-.14040878* 
(-1.71) 
-0.03183157 
(-0.96) 
-.64281805*** 
(-2.94) 
-.22130269*** 
(-2.97) 
TASST PY-log -0.04522664 
(-0.93) 
.37649061** 
(2.31) 
0.0174563 
(0.18) 
-.07311487* 
(-1.82) 
.56530947** 
(2.28) 
0.08311697 
(0.92) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 784 672 785 783 706 783 
Adjusted R2 0.8298 0.6848 0.7394 0.9069 0.5277 0.7844 
 
Notes: This table presents the sub-time period results based on the effect of a number of (Log) firm performance indicators (t-1) on 
(Log) Salary, LTIPs, and Total Remuneration as executive pay functions by using Stata. The model is primary estimated using 
firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of performance indicators on executive pay with controlling for separation between 
financial and nonfinancial companies and year; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). Table 1 
fully defines all the variables used. Panel A presents the results for the fiscal years 1999 to 2002; Panel B shows 2003 to 2005; 
and Panel C shows 2006 to 2008. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no 
significant correlation was found. 
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Table 14: Sub-Time Period Analyses (Cont.) - Estimations via 2SLS for Salary, LTIPs, and 
Total Remuneration as Prime Remuneration Functions of Corporate Performance (t-1) 
 Panel A: 1999 to 2002 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log 0.229705 (0.75) 
-0.142967 
(-0.19) 
.1579782* 
(1.82) 
0.007447 
(0.04) 
1.635523* 
(1.71) 
.04186* 
(1.71) 
EPS PY-log .1347697* (1.69) 
-0.9840956 
(-1.03) 
0.3873035 
(0.71) 
.313285* 
(1.76) 
-1.51846 
(-0.69) 
0.000739 
(0.01) 
ROE PY-log -0.0788556 
(-0.26) 
.7108238* 
(1.7) 
-0.8222568 
(-1.18) 
-0.13577 
(-0.64) 
0.269893 
(0.11) 
-0.40897 
(-0.95) 
ROA PY-log -0.3907337 
(-0.93) 
-0.2017798 
(-0.18) 
1.012099 
(1.47) 
-0.25884 
(-0.97) 
2.105844 
(0.81) 
.88472* 
(1.79) 
TASST PY-log .1033251* (1.75) 
0.9251262 
(0.98) 
.8898113** 
(1.99) 
.29044* 
(1.71) 
-1.32222 
(-0.52) 
-0.63646 
(-1.04) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 238 164 238 234 194 234 
Sargan Statistic .8037 .7862 .4295 .1514 .6116 .7198 
 Panel B: 2003 to 2005 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log 0.18546327  
(1.21) 
1.05784691*  
(1.73) 
.31452697*  
(1.92) 
.05478326*  
(1.82) 
1.8452617*  
(1.82) 
.074586423** 
(2.24) 
EPS PY-log 0.1978562  
(1.42) 
0.3258746 
(0.84) 
0.4259813  
(0.86) 
0.178569  
(1.24) 
0.08745216  
(0.13) 
0.004589 
(0.32) 
ROE PY-log -0.07128936  (-0.29) 
-0.158932476  
(-0.64) 
-0.07569413 
(-0.51) 
-0.1258963  
(-0.59) 
0.38745621  
(0.25) 
0.12478563 
(0.29) 
ROA PY-log -0.3458129  (-0.81) 
0.298415637  
(0.83) 
1.2158437*  
(1.66) 
-0.198741256  
(-1) 
1.9542681 
(0.92) 
0.6312457 
(0.58) 
TASST PY-log .18923745*  
(1.93) 
-0.35478967  
(-0.33) 
.98725463*  
(1.87) 
.35471829*  
(1.66) 
-0.98475321  
(-0.57) 
.5214793* 
(1.72) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 198 175 211 191 186 207 
Sargan Statistic .7412 .7412 .3911 .1397 .5531 .6812 
 Panel C: 2006 to 2008 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log .125478693*  (1.84) 
0.84753246*  
(1.67) 
.48759612**  
(2.32) 
.09854163*  
(1.65) 
2.1564893**  
(1.97) 
.0675429*  
(1.77) 
EPS PY-log .269845711*  (1.68) 
.84532199* 
(1.73) 
.4578621*  
(1.76) 
.48752136*  
(1.71) 
.54782163* 
(1.66) 
0.11578232 
(0.75) 
ROE PY-log -0.06547133  
(-0.34) 
0.36841576  
(0.78) 
0.12478536 
(0.27) 
-0.09874512  
(-0.57) 
0.75126984  
(1.52) 
0.254789163 
(0.61) 
ROA PY-log -0.24589617 
 (-0.77) 
-0.15476385  
(-0.26) 
-0.12478563  
(-0.86) 
-0.1416302  
(-1.11) 
1.4568129 
(1.03) 
-0.2578615  
(-0.27) 
TASST PY-log .2478563**  (2.27) 
-0.8415968  
(-0.16) 
0.78695142  
(1.27) 
.42589651** 
(1.99) 
-0.4581267  
(-0.74) 
.45896732* 
(1.68) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 209 203 223 200 221 219 
Sargan Statistic .7131 .7131 .3576 .1313 .5241 .632 
Notes: This table presents the sub-time period results based on the effect of a number of (Log) firm performance indicators (t-1) on 
(Log) Salary, LTIPs, and Total Remuneration as executive pay measures by using Stata. The model is estimated using 2SLS 
regression estimation (first stage results are not presented); regression model include all control variables utilised under 
equation (1). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Panel A presents results for the fiscal years 1999 to 2002; Panel B 
shows 2003 to 2005; and Panel C shows 2006 to 2008. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. If 
there is no sign, no significant correlation was found. 
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Table 15: Sub-Sector Analyses - Salary, LTIPs, and Total Remuneration as Prime 
Remuneration Functions of Corporate Performance at Previous Interval (t-1) 
 Panel A: Financial Sector 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Salary LTIPs Total Pay Salary LTIPs Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log .02788197* 
(1.65) 
-0.07743238 
(-0.58) 
-0.07658653 
(-0.73) 
.02276153* 
(1.68) 
-0.0572635 
(-0.31) 
-0.05876602 
(-1.02) 
EPS PY-log -0.00195475 
(-0.05) 
-0.0409885 
(-0.31) 
0.06988963 
(1.07) 
-0.02020037 
(-0.63) 
-0.16541358 
(-0.9) 
0.04799844 
(0.87) 
ROE PY-log 0.01116424 (0.31) 
.10041138* 
(1.91) 
0.0197702 
(0.35) 
0.02536213 
(0.92) 
.39377674*** 
(2.66) 
0.04508596 
(0.94) 
ROA PY-log -0.06711524 (-1.47) 
-0.02455554 
(-0.18) 
-.11979747* 
(-1.67) 
-0.0257918 
(-0.73) 
-0.2193942 
(-1.13) 
-.10861183* 
(-1.79) 
TASST PY-log 0.02152286 
(0.45) 
0.07683518 
(0.54) 
.13274507* 
(1.78) 
.0603008* 
(1.65) 
0.00543188 
(0.03) 
.11990742* 
(1.9) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 572 452 572 569 493 569 
Adjusted R2 0.7451 0.6207 0.7492 0.8843 0.518 0.8266 
 
 
Panel B: Non-financial Sector 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Salary LTIPs Total Pay Salary LTIPs Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log .02632476* (1.67) 
.11403144* 
(1.7) 
.0982747*** 
(2.97) 
.02773018** 
(2.08) 
.15474441* 
(1.74) 
.14977148*** 
(5.15) 
EPS PY-log .06113071*** 
(2.75) 
.05473352* 
(1.76) 
0.03640305 
(0.95) 
.07328759*** 
(4.75) 
.10842406* 
(1.71) 
0.00994267 
(0.3) 
ROE PY-log 0.01577825 
(0.75) 
0.01080096 
(0.16) 
.0698327* 
(1.93) 
0.02069137 
(1.43) 
.23149427** 
(2.55) 
.08008231** 
(2.53) 
ROA PY-log -.09036856*** (-2.75) 
-0.01762601 
(-0.17) 
-.10529762* 
(-1.86) 
-.11078342*** 
(-4.88) 
-.36186569** 
(-2.55) 
-.10760779** 
(-2.17) 
TASST PY-log 0.04217192 (1.2) 
0.00051672 
(0.01) 
0.00504737 
(0.08) 
-0.00972299 
(-0.4) 
0.04420431 
(0.29) 
0.05301794 
(1) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1783 1389 1784 1778 1522 1778 
Adjusted R2 0.7245 0.603 0.7246 0.8794 0.4334 0.7656 
 
Notes: This table presents the sub-sector results based on the effect of a number of (Log) firm performance 
indicators (t-1) on (Log) Salary, LTIPs, and Total Remuneration as executive pay functions by using Stata. 
The model is primary estimated using firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of performance indicators 
on executive pay with controlling for year; regression model include all control variables utilised under 
equation (1). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Panel A presents results for the financial sector 
(represented by Utilities and Financial Industries); and Panel B for the non-financial sector (represented by 
the rest of the 10 industries). Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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Table 15: Sub-Sector Analyses (Cont.) - Estimations via 2SLS for Salary, LTIPs, and Total 
Remuneration as Prime Remuneration Functions of Corporate Performance (t-1) 
 Panel A: Financial Sector 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY -log 0.088172 
(0.41) 
-0.5702606 
(-1.09) 
-0.081393 
(-0.32) 
-0.0955 
(-0.97) 
-0.7257 
(-1.14) 
-0.09352 
(-0.49) 
EPS PY-log 0.166827 
(0.86) 
-0.9586077 
(-1.41) 
-0.2409217 
(-0.59) 
0.000241 
(0.01) 
-0.00052 
(-0.01) 
-0.10852 
(-0.3) 
ROE PY-log -0.2129297 (-0.85) 
.6438769* 
(1.77) 
0.3544989 
(0.81) 
-0.12898 
(-0.59) 
.26291* 
(1.74) 
0.124831 
(0.37) 
ROA PY-log 0.1517395 (0.57) 
0.6351785 
(1.36) 
0.0629652 
(0.29) 
.212627* 
(1.87) 
0.525519 
(0.77) 
0.002646 
(0.01) 
TASST PY-log .1519767* 
(1.68) 
-0.1975833 
(-0.66) 
.0706571* 
(1.74) 
0.00365 
(0.05) 
-0.01603 
(-0.03) 
.021999* 
(1.67) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 330 285 330 328 307 328 
Sargan Statistic .1307 .4431 .5472 .0732 .2897 .335 
 
 
Panel B: Non-financial Sector 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
2SLS  
Salary 
2SLS  
LTIPs 
2SLS  
Total Pay 
Tobin’s Q PY –log -0.1160331 (-0.92) 
.1599422* 
(1.71) 
-0.1122189 
(-0.51) 
-0.05322 
(-0.61) 
.809503* 
(1.87) 
0.113803 
(0.47) 
EPS PY-log .1580943* (1.83) 
.7905419** 
(1.95) 
-.6126223* 
(-1.67) 
.126538** 
(1.98) 
-0.66823 
(-0.48) 
-0.24346 
(-0.8) 
ROE PY-log -0.1045921 
(-0.9) 
0.0447004 
(0.12) 
0.0254885 
(0.11) 
0.043777 
(0.61) 
.360273* 
(1.71) 
0.080631 
(0.39) 
ROA PY-log 0.0803749 
(0.38) 
0.0366237 
(0.06) 
0.3616694 
(0.81) 
-0.14793 
(-0.96) 
-1.54637 
(-1.21) 
-0.18302 
(-0.43) 
TASST PY-log .2843856* (1.67) 
0.3450018 
(0.34) 
.0811981* 
(1.88) 
0.006736 
(0.04) 
1.25914 
(0.69) 
.640601** 
(2.05) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 936 781 936 931 841 931 
Sargan Statistic .6358 .4072 .4365 .2037 .9187 .5023 
 
Notes: This table presents the sub-sector results based on the effect of a number of (Log) firm performance 
indicators (t-1) on (Log) Salary, LTIPs, and Total Remuneration as executive pay measures by using Stata. 
The model is estimated using 2SLS regression estimation (first stage results are not presented); regression 
model include all control variables utilised under equation (1). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
Panel A presents results for the financial sector (represented by Utilities and Financial Industries); and Panel 
B for the non-financial sector (represented by the rest of the 10 industries). Standard errors are adjusted by 
clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant 
correlation was found. 
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The endogenous estimations show that significance are reported for the majority of the 
instrumented coefficients of performance indicators, which indicates again the presence of 
endogenous links between the performance measures adopted and the pay variables. The 
second-stage findings for the two sector-panels show that TASST is positively and 
significantly associated with total pay of CEOs and board executives in both the financial and 
non-financial panels. ROE is positively significant with LTIPs for CEOs, whilst Tobin’s Q is 
positively related with the LTIPs for board executives. TASST and ROA are positively and 
significantly associated with the salary of CEOs and board executives in the financial sector, 
while EPS is significantly and positively associated with the salary of both CEOs and board 
executives in the non-financial sector. These results again demonstrate the complexity of the 
underlying relationships but are not out of line with the interpretation suggested above 
(Sections 5.4.1.1.3 and 5.4.1.2.3). 
5.2.2 Analyses of Performance-Pay Framework 
Here the results of the second directional nature of the two-way relationships are reported. The 
effects of variable compensation components (i.e. bonus and LTIPs) of CEOs and board 
executives on the forward-year indicators of corporate performance are investigated 
separately. These variable pay components clearly have a forward looking perspective (and 
are of course in tune with the tenor of the 2013 proposed draft of executive directors’ 
remuneration policy and reports as discussed in Chapter Two). Again analyses of the sub-time 
periods and the sub-sector dichotomy between financial and non-financial companies are also 
presented.  
5.2.2.1 Primary Indicators of Company Performance 
The relevance of Tobin’s Q (as a market valuation measure of performance) and ROA (as an 
operational and effectiveness indicator of performance) has been extensively discussed in 
academic literature (for example Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Bhagat and Black, 1999; Core and Larcker, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Habib and 
Ljungqvist, 2005; Belkhir, 2009; Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Coles et al., 2012). It is therefore 
considered to be appropriate to focus on these two measures of company performance within 
the examination of the performance-pay framework for FTSE 350 companies over the period 
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1999-2008, but under the aegis of the following three discussion headings: performance-pay 
results, results relevant to the control variables, and endogenous estimations. 
5.4.2.1.1 Discussion of Performance-Pay Results  
Table 16 reports the results of the fixed-effect regressions with robust standard errors of next 
interval Tobin’s Q and ROA as they relate to the variable remuneration components of both 
CEOs and boardroom executives – subject to a set of control variables including those 
referring to corporate governance, ownership and other firm-specific, including boardroom, 
characteristics in FTSE 350 companies over the period 1999-2008. The pay-related 
performance findings associated with the CEO compensation variables are presented in 
columns 1 and 2 (Panel I). Columns 3 and 4 present the equivalent estimates for all board 
executives (Panel II). There are contrasts in explanatory power – that for Tobin’s Q (59%) in 
terms of measuring proportion variations between company performance and the remuneration 
components package is very much higher than that for ROA (33%), however the specification 
and fit of the regression equations does appear to be better than that found in prior empirical 
studies (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; and Smith, 2008). 
The signs in respect to the coefficients of variable compensation awarded and the level of 
significance in terms of the t-statistics vary. They do however suggest that Tobin’s Q is 
positively and strongly significant linked to bonus and LTIP for both CEOs and board 
executives, while ROA has the same positive sign with relatively low significance effects. It 
might be conjectured that, within a tournament theory perspective (Main et al., 1993; Lazear, 
1998; Conyon et al., 2001), boards of executive directors make greater efforts to achieve 
institutional goals and objectives, if they have been awarded sufficient incentives in terms of 
bonus and LTIP, or perhaps if they have been promised to perceive a realistic chance of 
replacing more senior executives. However, an alternative perspective might posit that FTSE 
350 companies operating within a competitive environment take seriously the need to satisfy 
human capital aspects in terms of necessary knowledge and skills, qualifications and 
experience and therefore reimburse board executives by means of sufficient incentives to 
enhance their overall performance (as consistent with the stewardship perspective; Barney, 
1991; Castanias and Helfat, 1991; Hendry and Kiel, 2004).  
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Table 16: Fixed-Effects Regressions - Tobin’s Q and ROA at next interval (t+1) as Functions of 
CEOs and Board Executive Remuneration Variables  
 CEOs Board Executives 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tobin’s Q NY ROA NY Tobin’s Q NY ROA NY 
Constant 0.27064739  
(0.51) 
1.4175427** 
(2.03) 
0.4990348  
(0.96) 
1.5443426** 
(2.33) 
Bonus-log .05621747** 
(2.27) 
.07576245** 
(2.27) 
.10390466*** 
(5.01) 
.1241619***  
  (4.56) 
LTIPs-log .16686231*** 
(7.97) 
.05377011* 
(1.89) 
.0959864*** 
(6.79) 
.03530452* 
(1.9) 
Duality Role 0.12745171  
(1.22) 
0.12080419 
(0.86) 
0.05999306  
(0.73) 
0.07269955  
(0.68) 
Board Size .04101*** 
(3.23) 
.04301855** 
(2.52) 
-0.00556979  
(-0.48) 
0.00135552  
(0.09) 
Non-executive Directors 0.01103878  
(0.57) 
-0.03231676 
(-1.23) 
.05445439***  
(3.09) 
0.00519649 
(0.22) 
Independent Directors .05710558*** 
(3) 
0.03717543 
(1.43) 
.0635767*** 
(3.57) 
.04087284*  
(1.74) 
Audit Committee 0.53465045  
(1.1) 
-0.06327969 
(-0.1) 
0.61540117 
(1.28) 
0.09190875 
(0.15) 
Remuneration Committee -0.2104068  
(-0.89) 
.73937406** 
(2.33) 
-0.28823752  
(-1.5) 
.46867022*  
(1.79) 
Nomination Committee 0.00502533 
(0.05) 
0.01839963  
(0.14) 
0.00314017 
(0.04) 
0.00471137 
(0.04) 
Age  0.00420672  
(1.32) 
0.00502839 
(1.17) 
0.00365465 
(1.25) 
0.00499731 
(1.31) 
Gender 0.23684596  
(1.42) 
.41079037* 
(1.83) 
- - 
Time in Role 0.00025023  
(0.06) 
0.00312055 
(054) 
-0.00423908  
(-1.16) 
0.00110611 
(0.23) 
Wealth Share Plans -0.000000022 
(-1.15) 
0.0000000054 
(0.22) 
0.0000000071  
(0.81) 
0.0000000061 
(0.54) 
Total Assets-log -.41125176*** 
(-17.84) 
-.30677956*** 
(-9.68) 
-.41325437*** 
(-19.25) 
-.31113925*** 
(-10.88) 
Growth Opportunity-log -.04315978**  
(-2.56) 
0.00938482 
(0.41) 
-.04192527***  
(-2.66) 
0.0024653 
(0.12) 
Debt to Equity -.00011006*** 
(-3.62) 
-.00014048*** 
(-3.55) 
-.00011439*** 
(-3.78) 
-.00014278*** 
(-3.74) 
Debt to Assets -0.0015942  
(-1.59) 
.00739074*** 
(5.52) 
-.00203027** 
(-2.16) 
.00688868*** 
(5.65) 
Regulation dummy .54374156*** (11.54) 
.55803162*** 
(8.7) 
.56093393*** 
(12.8) 
.5449515*** 
(9.43) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1366 1276 1537 1436 
F-value 75*** 23.98*** 84.9*** 29.18*** 
Adjusted R2 0.5941 0.3273 0.5868 0.338 
 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equation (2) through using Stata. The model is estimated 
using firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of executive pay on performance indicators with controlling for 
separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and year; regression model include variables of duality 
role, board size, non-executive directors, independent directors, audit committee, remuneration committee, 
nomination committee, age, gender, time-in-role, wealth share plans, total assets-log, growth opportunities-log, 
debt to equity, and debt to assets. Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by 
clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no sign, there will be no significant correlation was 
found. Because of the construction of the Gender variable for board executives it is omitted to avoid collinearity. 
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There is again considerable statistical variance in terms of the relationships. For example with 
respect to bonuses and LTIPs of CEOs and board executives’ coefficients, bonuses are ranging 
from 0.056 to 0.104 for Tobin’s Q and from 0.076 and 0.124 for ROA. For LTIPs, they range 
from 0.167 and 0.096 for Tobin’s Q and from 0.054 and 0.135 for ROA. These outcomes 
suggest genuine underlying economic relationships in that for a 100% difference in Tobin’s Q, 
bonuses of CEOs and board executives are higher by 5.6% and 10.4%, respectively. For 
LTIPs, the difference is 16.7% and 9.6%, respectively, for CEOs and board executives. For 
bonuses of CEOs and board executives, the 100% relationship with ROA is 7.6% and 12.4%, 
respectively; and for LTIPs is raised by 5.4% for CEOs and 13.5% for board executives. Of 
course the issues of causation are paramount – but the statistical testing has been designed to 
seek out the notion that it is the incentives offered to lead executives which drives the 
improvement in company performance. 
Taking the results at face value they do suggest that bonuses and LTIPs represent essential 
variable reward components for enhancing the prospective company performance. This of 
course can be interpreted within the range of theoretical perspectives considered earlier. 
Perhaps the clearest link is with tournament theory – but there may be implications in respect 
to stewardship theory. It is however suggested here that the findings do lend support to 
Hypothesis 2 (reflecting tournament and/or stewardship), as CEOs and boardroom executives 
will perform better going forward when variable compensation packages are appropriately 
structured in terms of their amount and nature. 
5.4.2.1.2 Discussion of Results Relevant to the Control Variables  
Table 16 also sets out the findings relating to the control variables as pertaining to corporate 
governance attributes, ownership, board member and corporate characteristics. These findings 
and their relevance to the indicators of company performance within the performance-pay 
framework for the panels of CEOs and boardroom executives are discussed below. 
Although CEO duality is positively associated with the corporate performance measures: 
Tobin’s Q and ROA, there is no clear significance attached to the finding. This is in line with 
the results of Lee et al. (2008) in terms of the absence of significance effects – it is also in 
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accordance with the results obtained from the modelling within the pay-performance 
framework6. 
However, contrary to the findings within the pay-performance framework (Section 5.4.1), the 
results suggest that board size is positively and significantly linked to corporate performance 
in respect to CEO compensation, but that there is no significant association in respect to the 
compensation of boardroom executives. This outcome is distinctive from that reported in 
previous literature (including Jensen, 1993; Pound, 1995; Yermack, 1996; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2000; and Raheja, 2005). Again explication is not easy. One suggestion is that 
organisation and control becomes more efficient as boards increase in size (Adams and 
Mehran, 2005). Another might be that the increased board size encourages lower-level 
executive members, who consider themselves to have a realistic prospect of advancement on 
the career ladder, and therefore compete to move up – in line with the precepts of tournament 
theory (Rosen, 1986).  
The number of non-executive directors is positively associated, albeit with no real levels of 
significance effect, with the majority of corporate performance measures – with the one 
exception that there is significance with Tobin’s Q regarding the pay panel of boardroom 
executives. This result is consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
and Mura (2007). Again explication is problematic – it might relate to a closer perception by 
non-executives of the need for a link between appropriate incentives for executive directors to 
maximise their efforts to ensure the effective and profitable running of the firm.  
The number of independent directors is positively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q, but it 
has a relatively low significant association with ROA for the pay panels of CEOs and 
boardroom members. This finding may suggest that large-sized boards of independent 
members are situated to use their best judgment for the company’s interests in terms of 
improving market value rather than outcomes which might be conditional upon accounting 
convention and possibly even manipulation. This result is consistent with the findings of (Core 
et al., 1999; Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; and Abdullah and Page, 2009), but contrary to 
those of Bhagat and Black (1999).  
                                                          
6See Tables 10 and 12. 
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There are positive – but with no real significance – relationships between the presences of 
board committees, especially audit and nomination committees, in terms of their associations 
with company performance. Interestingly, the results do find positive and relatively high 
significant relationships between the existence of remuneration committees and ROA, whilst 
there is no significant association at all Tobin’s Q. Possible reasons for this outcome in terms 
of the manner in which remuneration committees approach their perspective on compensation 
packages are discussed in the case study in the following chapter. The significant and positive 
relationship does imply that remuneration committees are indeed important – but possibly do 
not necessarily operate to enhance firm performance/shareholder value entirely in accordance 
with the principle of aligning the interests of agents and principals according to the pure 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Braiotta and Sommer, 1987). This is 
consistent also with the rationale explanation of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) in terms of 
which board committees could be expanded for political reasons (such as customer 
representatives or environmental activists) and therefore they might not essentially aim to 
improve corporate performance. 
Although the relationships with wealth share plans are in general positively related to Tobin’s 
Q and ROA, there was no real evidence of a significant association. This finding is 
contradictory with Core and Larcker (2002) who reported that the adoption of incentive plans 
for top executives was significantly correlated with corporate performance in the US context. 
This outcome might be related to a different historical and cultural background whereby levels 
of managerial share plans have not been seen as appropriate measures to encourage 
professional managers to mediate/mitigate their conflicts of interest to interact more directly 
with the expectations of the wider shareholder body and thereby to enhance company 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leftwich et al., 1981). 
Outcomes re CEO and board executive members’ characteristics (for example age, sexual 
category, tenure) and their associations with company performance show also mixed results in 
terms of the direction – and again with an absence of many significant associations. Age and 
tenure is positively associated with performance but with no real significance. CEO gender 
(male) is found to be positively related with some firm performance indicators and 
significantly at the 10% level with ROA. This finding has some connotations with prior 
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literature (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2004) who suggest that better corporate performance is 
achieved when fewer women are on the board – but could well be explicable in a number of 
other ways.  
Findings in respect to corporate characteristics (firm size, growth, and leverage) and their 
relationships to firm performance indicate, in general, negative and significant outcomes. 
Again it is not entirely clear why firm size should be negatively and significantly associated 
with the adopted performance indicators: Tobin’s Q and ROA, although a number of 
explanations are possible. This finding is however consistent with the results of Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), and Loderer and Martin (1997) who also report an inverse association 
between company size and performance. This negative relationship might be interpreted as 
corporate size could be a proxy for agency problems between shareholders and managers. 
There is also a negative and significant relationship between change in total assets7 (as an 
indicator reflecting the growth opportunities) and Tobin’s Q, whereas the association with 
ROA is positive (although not significant). It is possible that this negative finding might be in 
line with the suggestion of Smith and Watts (1992) who argue that when quoted companies 
have an opportunity for short term rapid growth their risk exposure is increased leading to 
greater caution on the part of professional managers. Professional managers might therefore 
seek to approach the opportunity of growth more slowly, consistent with the general 
perspective that steady and sustainable corporate growth opportunities form a significant part 
of a firm’s stock market value.  
In accordance with expectations of leverage, debt to equity and debt to assets are negatively 
and significantly related to Tobin’s Q. There is however a significant positive association 
between debt-to-asset and ROA for board executive compensation. It may be that these 
slightly conflicting are in line with the suggestion (Audia and Greve, 2006) that there is a 
dichotomy in terms of the manner in which boardroom executive members perceive possible 
negative performance caused by risk-taking as a reparable gap or as a threat to firm survival. 
The findings are also consistent with (Jensen, 1986; and Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009) - which 
discuss in detail the manner in which risky behaviour undertaken by boards of executive 
                                                          
7Change in total assets implies the extant value of the opportunities that the organization provides for making 
additional investments in real corporate assets. 
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directors, based on equity or asset financing, impacts corporate portfolios. This in turn might 
relate to the responses of institutional shareholders whose concern about the suitability of 
investment decisions may lead to a decrease in market based corporate value (consistent with 
Audia and Greve (2006)). Alternatively it might be explicable in terms of differing accounting 
treatment allowed with GAAP. 
Finally, the regulation dummy is positive and significant in relation to the performance of non-
financial companies. The year dummy results indicate the presence of both negative and 
positive associations with moderately-significant differences in Tobin’s Q and ROA, 
respectively. Consequently there is no clear trend or pattern to be observed – but it is noted 
that there was a peak performance link with compensation of both CEOs and board executives 
in 2005 – in particular in respect to ROA.  
5.4.2.1.3 Discussion of Endogenous Estimations  
This further set of estimations is undertaken adopting the 2SLS approach to extend the 
previous regression analyses of performance-pay framework with an intention to examine the 
potential existence of endogeneity between the indicators of company performance and other 
instruments representing executive remuneration within the same set of control variables. This 
is consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Loderer and Martin (1997), and Black et al. 
(2006) in terms of posing the question - do firms with sufficient amounts and appropriate 
structure of executive compensation realise higher performance levels? Therefore the 
examination here runs from the dependent variable (corporate performance) to executive 
remuneration – however it does not move forward with more specific consideration of the 
causation of this association. 
Table 17 reports the outcomes relating to CEO/executive pay instruments, using three different 
indicators (one-year lag of executive pay, wealth options, and equity) by reference to on both 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. This presumes the suitability of a one period lag of executive compensation 
(consistent with Gujarati (2004), Wooldridge (2005)), and that the managerial ownership 
indicators are appropriate variables for remuneration. 2SLS is applied with robust standard 
errors. More than one instrument is used to avoid over-identification. The Sargan statistic test 
has been reported to indicate the degree of significance or otherwise of the 2SLS model.   
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Table 17: Estimations via 2SLS - Tobin’s Q and ROA at next interval (t+1) as a Function of 
Remuneration Components and Measures 
                               Tobin’s Q 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Bonus-log LTIPs-log Tobin’s Q NY Bonus-log LTIPs-log Tobin’s Q NY 
Fitted Value from Bonus-log 
Equation   
-.0672506 
 (-0.52)   
.0061515  
(0.05) 
Fitted Value from LTIPs-log 
Equation   
.2331691  
(1.07)   
.119775 
(0.99) 
Bonus-log (Lagged) .3231694***  
(9.07)   
.2282132***  
(6.57)   
LTIPs-log (Lagged) 
 
.0180054  
(0.53)   
-.002969  
(-0.08)  
Un-exercised Wealth Options 5.53e-09  
(0.21) 
9.01e-08*** 
 (2.85)  
-2.62e-08**  
(-2.23) 
5.06e-08**  
(2.39)  
Un-exercised Wealth Equity 2.01e-07* 
(1.78) 
-1.94e-07 
 (-1.42)  
2.43e-08  
(0.90) 
-3.14e-08 
(-0.65)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 908 908 908 1064 1064 1064 
F-value 31.5*** 7.59*** 2.68*** 15.68*** 4.49*** 2.74*** 
Centered R2 0.1585 0.0434  0.0727 0.022  
Sargan Statistic   0.3944   0.4631 
 
                          ROA 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Bonus-log LTIPs-log ROA NY Bonus-log LTIPs-log ROA NY 
Fitted Value from Bonus-log 
Equation   
.5249431* 
(1.70)   
.474207***  
(2.64) 
Fitted Value from LTIPs-log 
Equation   
-.9245735**  
(-1.97)   
-.229551  
(-1.29) 
Bonus-log (Lagged) .3330705***  
(9.08)   
.2100969***  
(5.85)   
LTIPs-log (Lagged) 
 
.0277617  
(0.77)   
-.0102243   
(-0.28)  
Un-exercised Wealth Options 2.64e-09 
(0.10) 
7.99e-08** 
 (2.51)  
-3.23e-08***  
(-2.68) 
5.32e-08**  
(2.42)  
Un-exercised Wealth Equity 2.18e-07* 
(1.93) 
-1.24e-07 
 (-0.91)  
2.65e-08 
(0.99) 
-3.03e-08 
(-0.62)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 837 837 837 984 984 984 
F-value 31.60*** 9.47*** 2.89*** 13.56*** 4.13*** 3.42*** 
Centered R2 0.1716 0.0585  0.0691 0.0221  
Sargan Statistic   0.6429   0.8962 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) executive pay components and measures on (Log) 
Tobin’s Q and ROA at next interval, separately, based on Two Stage Least Squares regression estimation. 
The test has been estimated by using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised 
under equation (2). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the 
FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. Three, two and one asterisks denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, correspondingly. If there is no sign, there will be no significant 
correlation was found. 
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Statistically, the findings respecting the first stage residual indicate significant links as the 
majority of the coefficients of the instrumented compensation indicators are positively related 
and highly significant with a one-year lag of bonuses – but vary in significance and sign with 
wealth options and equity for Tobin’s Q and ROA. These results do suggest the presence of 
endogeneity linkages between performance and remuneration. However it is also possible that 
these outcomes could be interpreted in terms of endogenous links being more likely to arise 
with variables derived from and proxying the discipline and manner of corporate governance. 
The findings in the second stage show that bonuses and LTIPs are not significant with Tobin’s 
Q, while the former is positively related and the latter is negatively associated with varied 
significance levels with ROA. 
5.4.2.2 Alternative Indicators of Company Performance 
Further sensitivity analyses re the performance-pay framework is provided by re-running 
equation (2) utilising EPS, ROE, and total assets turnover (TASST) as substitute measures of 
accounting-based performance (an approach in line with much previous academic literature – 
for example, Dalton et al. (2003) and Gregg et al. (2011) for EPS; Donaldson and Davis 
(1991), Berger et al. (2005), and Sigler (2011) for ROE; and Bhagat and Black (1999) for 
TASST). Table 18 shows a series of supplementary findings for equation (2) using a fixed-
effects model with robust standard errors based on EPS, ROE, and TASST, while Table 19 
shows the endogenous estimations using the 2SLS approach. 
Overall, although findings in respect to the size of the coefficients of compensation variables 
indicate that there are positive and significant sensitivities between variable executive 
remuneration and forthcoming performance targets, the number and level of significant 
outcomes are clearly lower than those in relation to their counterparts (shown in Table 16) for 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. The results might also be interpreted as implying that boardroom 
members are more focused on reaching the planned performance targets when there is higher 
proportion of short-term incentives in terms of bonuses. These results may be seen as lending 
further support to H2 (the hypothesis directed toward either tournament and/or stewardship), 
as enhanced forward performance by CEOs and board executives is influenced by the prior 
level and structure of their compensation packages.   
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Table 18: Fixed-Effects Regressions - EPS, ROE, and TASST at next interval (t+1) as Functions 
of CEOs and Board Executive Remuneration Variables 
 CEOs Board Executives     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EPS NY  ROE NY TASST NY EPS NY  ROE NY TASST NY 
Constant -3.555066***  
(-4.4) 
2.1227642*** 
(2.83) 
-1.9495216*** 
(-3.27) 
-3.6882683*** 
(-4.73) 
1.9524997*** 
(2.72) 
-1.7153294*** 
(-2.94) 
Bonus-log 0.05636823  
(1.42) 
.12468052*** 
(3.41) 
.08730945*** 
(3.15) 
.14606442*** 
(4.45) 
.1946783*** 
(6.46) 
.0853092*** 
(3.67) 
LTIPs-log .08392051** 
(2.53) 
0.03724768 
(1.21) 
-.04142885 
(-1.57) 
0.00776548 
(0.35) 
0.00064079 
(0.03) 
-0.01906648 
(-1.2) 
Duality Role -0.0497805  
(-0.3) 
-0.13814228 
(-0.91) 
-0.17118584 
(-1.46) 
-0.0607502 
(-0.47) 
0.04710943 
(0.4) 
0.01181567 
(0.13) 
Board Size 0.02891989  
(1.44) 
.03563714* 
(1.91) 
.04747834*** 
(3.35) 
0.00296368 
(0.16) 
0.01406679 
(0.84) 
.03681858*** 
(2.83) 
Non-executive Directors -0.01535486 
(-0.5) 
-0.01192513 
(-0.42) 
-.14107025*** 
(-6.55) 
-0.00266021 
(-0.1) 
0.03127143 
(1.22) 
-.10917465*** 
(-5.53) 
Independent Directors -0.01975393 
(-0.65) 
0.01020759 
(0.36) 
.04955043** 
(2.33) 
-0.01004475 
(-0.36) 
0.00197821 
(0.08) 
.04797807** 
(2.41) 
Audit Committee -0.64707889 
(-0.88) 
-0.71224891 
(-1.05) 
-0.57403104 
(-1.05) 
-0.32574345 
(-0.46) 
-0.29941471 
(-0.46) 
-0.15973545 
(-0.3) 
Remuneration Committee .70203908*  
(1.77) 
1.2087327*** 
(3.29) 
.89527767*** 
(3.39) 
0.28982876 
(0.9) 
.75548766** 
(2.55) 
.37528711* 
(1.75) 
Nomination Committee -0.02780647  
(-0.18) 
-0.10040129 
(-0.7) 
.21204** 
(2) 
-0.0108946 
(-0.09) 
-0.07018901 
(-0.6) 
.17951397** 
(2) 
Age  .01300079** 
(2.55) 
-0.001656 
(-0.35) 
.00811544** 
(2.28) 
.01020535** 
(2.22) 
-0.00116339 
(-0.28) 
.00791705** 
(2.42) 
Gender .57462092** 
(2.06) 
0.37468956 
(1.45) 
.5220429*** 
(2.8) 
- - - 
Time in Role 0.00065751 
(0.1) 
-.0181267*** 
(-2.87) 
-.03760935*** 
(-7.74) 
0.00420092 
(0.75) 
-.01820403*** 
(-3.51) 
-.03041041*** 
(-7.42) 
Wealth Share Plans -1.647e-07*** 
(-5.64) 
-1.05E-08 
(-0.39) 
7.074e-08*** 
(3.32) 
-1.001e-07*** 
(-7.49) 
-7.51E-09 
(-0.61) 
3.490e-08*** 
(3.53) 
Total Assets-log 0.04788371 
(1.26) 
-.13220453*** 
(-3.75) 
-.04878496* 
(-1.9) 
.09735022*** 
(2.81) 
-.15183722*** 
(-4.74) 
-.0799847*** 
(-3.32) 
Growth Opportunity-log 3.68E-02 
(1.35) 
0.01619223 
(0.64) 
-.06269606*** 
(-3.34) 
2.63E-02 
(1.04) 
0.01131892 
(0.49) 
-.06675454*** 
(-3.77) 
Debt to Equity 0.00004078 
(0.82) 
.00011599** 
(2.51) 
-0.00004734 
(-1.39) 
0.00003683 
(0.75) 
.00013471*** 
(2.98) 
-0.00004563 
(-1.35) 
Debt to Assets .00313931** 
(1.99) 
.00312271** 
(1.98) 
-.00459783*** 
(-4.11) 
0.00213992 
(1.46) 
.00292697** 
(2.03) 
-.0047288*** 
(-4.49) 
Regulation dummy -.14643079  (-1.62) 
.20869847*** 
(2.96) 
1.6896169*** 
(32.11) 
-0.03748301  
(-0.54) 
.23800102*** 
(3.71) 
1.6363982*** 
(33.31) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1216 1209 1366 1374 1366 1537 
F-value 7 4.9 77.12*** 9 7.66 85.98*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1176 0.1007 0.6009 0.1316 0.1231 0.5899 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equation (2) through using Stata. The model is estimated 
using firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of executive pay on performance indicators with controlling for 
separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and year; regression model include variables of duality 
role, board size, non-executive directors, independent directors, audit committee, remuneration committee, 
nomination committee, age, gender, time-in-role, wealth share plans, total assets-log, growth opportunities-log, 
debt to equity, and debt to assets. Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by 
clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no sign, there will be no significant correlation was 
found. Because of the construction of the Gender variable for board executives it is omitted to avoid collinearity. 
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Table 19: Estimations via 2SLS – EPS, ROE and TASST at next interval (t+1) as a 
Function of Remuneration Components and Measures 
   EPS 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Bonus-log LTIPs-log EPS NY Bonus-log LTIPs-log EPS NY 
Fitted Value from Bonus-log 
Equation   
.4218409  
(1.64)   
.3052879** 
(1.95) 
Fitted Value from LTIPs-log 
Equation   
-.1205627  
(-0.31)   
.2274864  
(1.64) 
Bonus-log (Lagged) .3174308*** (8.53)   .2205943*** (5.63)   
LTIPs-log (Lagged)  .0369961 (0.99)   .0023981 (0.06)  
Un-exercised Wealth Options 1.94e-09 (0.07) 6.19e-08* (1.68)  -4.91e-08*** (-3.34) 8.06e-08*** (2.95)  
Un-exercised Wealth Equity 2.30e-07** (2.06) -1.31e-07 (-0.95)  2.64e-08 (1.00) -3.08e-08 (-0.63)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 793 793 793 932 932 932 
F-value 30.30*** 8.52*** 4.39*** 13.95*** 5.09*** 4.68*** 
Centered R2 0.1743 0.0560  0.0749 0.0287  
Sargan Statistic   0.0902   0.7909 
 
                                 ROE 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Bonus-log LTIPs-log ROE NY Bonus-log LTIPs-log ROE NY 
Fitted Value from Bonus-log 
Equation   
.3370012  
(1.14)   
.299578* 
 (1.71) 
Fitted Value from LTIPs-log 
Equation   
-.3402951  
(-0.75)   
.1060991   
(0.59) 
Bonus-log (Lagged)  .3247147*** (8.67)   .231135*** (5.9)   
LTIPs-log (Lagged)  .0320721 (0.85)   .0047007 (0.12)  
Un-exercised Wealth Options 2.04e-09 (0.07) 5.73e-08 (1.57)  -3.84e-08*** (-2.85) 5.29e-08** (2.12)  
Un-exercised Wealth Equity 2.22e-07** (1.96) -1.28e-07  (-0.93)  3.21e-08 (1.2) -3.00e-08 (-0.61)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 791 791 791 930 930 930 
F-value 30.99*** 8.72*** 2.83*** 14.48*** 5.92*** 2.79*** 
Centered R2 0.1781 0.0575  0.0778 0.0223  
Sargan Statistic   0.8989   0.8716 
 
                                TASST 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 First Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Bonus-log LTIPs-log TASST NY Bonus-log LTIPs-log TASST NY 
Fitted Value from Bonus-log 
Equation   
.0330876 
 (0.44)   
.1118083  
(1.61) 
Fitted Value from LTIPs-log 
Equation   
.1368269  
(1.09)   
.0954781 
(1.32) 
Bonus-log (Lagged) .3231694***  (9.07)   
.2282132***  
(6.57)   
LTIPs-log (Lagged) 
 
.0180054  
(0.53)   
-.002969  
(-0.08)  
Un-exercised Wealth Options 5.53e-09 (0.21) 9.01e-08*** (2.85)  -2.62e-08** (-2.23) 5.06e-08** (2.39)  
Un-exercised Wealth Equity 2.01e-07* (1.78) -1.94e-07 (-1.42)  2.43e-08 (0.90) -3.14e-08 (-0.65)  
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 908 908 908 1064 1064 1064 
F-value 31.5*** 7.59*** 2.77*** 15.68*** 4.49*** 2.40*** 
Centered R2 0.1585 0.0434  0.0727 0.022  
Sargan Statistic   0.3439   0.4053 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effect of (Log) executive pay components and measures on (Log) EPS, 
ROE and TASST at next interval based, separately, on Two Stage Least Squares regression estimation. The test 
has been estimated by using panel OLS; regression model include all control variables utilised under equation 
(2). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 
companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. Three, two and one asterisks denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels, correspondingly. If there is no sign, there will be no significant correlation was found. 
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The signs and significance levels of the coefficients of control variables as they pertain to 
features of corporate governance, ownership and the board member and corporate 
characteristics remain similar, albeit with some exceptions, to the findings reported in Table 
16. They are discussed in more detail below. 
CEO duality is found to be negatively linked but without any real degree of significance, to 
EPS, ROE and TASST (the findings for Tobin’s Q and ROA are positive but again without 
significance). This finding is consistent with the findings of Lee et al. (2008) in terms of both 
direction and significance, which indicated that in the absence of the duality of CEO and 
chairman roles the higher the firm performance would be. The number of non-executive board 
members is negatively associated but without significance for most performance measures 
with the exception of TASST where it is negative and significant. It is possible to interpret this 
finding in the context of non-executives being more focused on due process and compliance 
with regulatory guidance (in accordance the Higgs Report (2003)), rather than on enhancing 
the levels of corporate performance. The number of independent directors is positively related 
to most performance indicators with the exception of TASST where it is positive and 
significant. This result may suggest that the larger the size of independent members in the 
board, the higher the levels of firm performance. The presence of board committees shows 
little in the way of significant associations with the exception of the existence of a 
remuneration committee which has a positive and significant relationship with all corporate 
performance measures, and the presence of nomination committee which has also positive and 
significant association with TASST.  
The results relating to board members’ characteristics show positive and significant 
relationships between age and gender (male) and all performance indicators. However tenure 
is negatively and very significantly related to ROE and TASST. This latter negative finding 
may be consistent with that of Hill and Phan (1991) who suggested that the longer the tenure 
of CEOs and board executives in the company the greater the likelihood that they would be 
able to exercise more control over the remuneration setting process in harmony with their 
preferences – and this in turn might influence forthcoming performance levels. Findings in 
respect to corporate characteristics indicate negative and significant associations with firm 
performance - again similar to the findings reported for Tobin’s Q and ROA. For example, 
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firm size found to be negatively and significantly related to ROE and TASST. Corporate 
growth and leverage indicators are also negative and significant with TASST.  
In terms of the findings of the endogenous estimations following the same approach and steps 
adopted with the primary indicators of company performance, the statistical results indicate a 
number of significant levels in the first stage, especially for the one-year lag of bonus, which 
implies the likelihood of the presence of endogeneity linkage between performance and 
remuneration. Findings based on second stage residuals show, in general, positive 
relationships – but with an absence of real significance – between performance indicators and 
variable compensation awarded. 
5.4.2.3 Sub-Time Periods and Sub-Sector Analyses 
Table 20 reports the findings of fixed-effect regressions with robust standard error of variable 
compensation components for both CEO and board executives on two prime indicators of firm 
performance (i.e. Tobin’s Q and ROA) at forthcoming year over three sub-periods of the data 
sample: fiscal years 1999 to 2002, 2003 to 2005, and 2006 to 2008. Table 20 comprises also 
the results of endogenous estimations via 2SLS. The reason behind adopting Tobin’s Q and 
ROA is their overwhelming impact as accounting-based indicators of performance on the 
majority of compensation variables for CEOs and board executives (as consistent with prior 
literature (for example, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Core and 
Larcker, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Ozkan, 2007, 2011)). Again this division of the 
analysis into sub-time periods aims to reflect the impact of the major UK governance 
arrangements and regulations which occurred before and during the period under 
investigation.  
The findings indicate the explanatory power for Tobin’s Q is higher than that for ROA, the 
specification and fit of all the regression equations is at least better for Tobin’s Q than that 
found in prior empirical studies (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Smith, 2008; Conyon and Sadler, 2001). 
The results of sub-analysis show that there are significant levels of time variations regarding 
the valuation of compensation indicators. Variable compensation components (i.e. bonuses 
and LTIPs) are found clearly to be positively and significantly associated with performance 
indicators, particularly in the middle sub-time period 2003-2005. Bonuses for CEOs and board 
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executives have increasing effect on Tobin’s Q from 1999-2002 to 2003-2005, before 
decreasing in the period 2006-2008. CEO bonuses have a decreasing impact on ROA over the 
10-year period, while the trend for bonuses of board executives with ROA is similar to that for 
Tobin’s Q. For LTIPs, there is a decreasing effect on Tobin’s Q from first to second sub-time 
periods, before increasing in the last period – whereas there is an increasing impact on ROA 
over time. 
The endogenous estimations utilising the 2SLS approach in the manner similar to that 
described above indicate a number of significant findings in the first stage for the instrumented 
coefficients of remuneration. This finding in turn shows the existence of endogenous links 
between the compensation variables adopted and the performance measures. Re the second-
stage results for the three panels, there is an absence of significant levels between 
remuneration and performance variables for both CEOs and board executives over the sub-
time period panels. 
Additional sub-sector analyses were undertaken to examine the effects of variable executive 
compensation on firm performance within both financial and non-financial sectors. Table 21 
shows the findings of fixed-effect regressions with robust standard error of the same 
CEO/executive compensation variables on Tobin’s Q and ROA at the forthcoming year over 
the two sub-sector panels (i.e. financial and non-financial). 
The power of pay variables has good fit levels, which suggest strong levels for all performance 
measures. By comparing the findings of CEO and board executive compensation in both 
financial and non-financial panels, it is seen that the associations between variable 
remuneration components and company performance are more significant in the non-financial 
sector. For financial-sector companies, the outcomes suggest that bonuses of CEOs and board 
executives are positively and very significantly related to Tobin’s Q. This result might support 
the perspective that bonus is a very important part of compensation packages in the financial 
sector. Re non-financial companies, bonuses and LTIPs are positively and significantly 
associated with both Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
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Table 20: Sub-Time Period Analyses - Tobin’s Q and ROA at next interval (t+1) as Prime 
Performance Functions of Variable Remuneration and Estimations via 2SLS 
  
Panel A: 1999 to 2002 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS 
Bonus-log .07768143** 
(2.1) 
-.1299279 
(-0.57) 
.11132966** 
(2.22) 
.1685153 
(0.44) 
.08230942*** 
(2.89) 
.3517876 
(0.77) 
.128237*** 
(3.4) 
.2423407 
(0.62) 
LTIPs-log .16159098***  
(5.58) 
.0493241 
(0.60) 
-0.03062725 
(-0.75) 
-.171283 
(-0.95) 
.1233226*** 
(6.37) 
-.1340726 
(-1.35) 
0.0055018 
(0.21) 
-.0763907 
(-0.6) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 554 206 487 177 692 307 599 248 
F-value 36.84*** 3.26*** 11.18*** 2.48*** 46.6*** 3.84*** 14.31*** 2.2*** 
Adjusted R2 0.5518  0.2846  0.5429  0.286  
Sargan Statistic  0.1314  0.5588  0.5831  0.3670 
 
 
Panel B: 2003 to 2005 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS 
Bonus-log .12519274*** 
(3.2) 
.0014885  
(0.01) 
.0966828* 
(1.74) 
-.4163508 
(-0.84) 
.10541868*** 
(3.49) 
-.0867064  
(-0.51) 
.1659216*** 
(3.77) 
-.3657337  
(-0.66) 
LTIPs-log .10793505*** 
(3.2) 
.0412711 
(0.57) 
.1330887*** 
(2.79) 
-.2303271 
(-0.96) 
.06182514*** 
(2.88) 
-.0393311 
(-0.77) 
.05057196* 
(1.65) 
-.2310727  
(-1.41) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 644 278 608 262 721 336 679 318 
F-value 45.39*** 3.16*** 10.65*** 2.82*** 52.15*** 3.37*** 12.01*** 2.96*** 
Adjusted R2 0.5399  0.2128  0.532  0.2062  
Sargan Statistic  0.8669  0.9663  0.7642  0.5708 
 
 
Panel C: 2006 to 2008 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS 
Bonus-log .07510636* 
(1.84) 
-.3912706 
(-1.28) 
0.07646156 
(1.45) 
.6904652 
(1.43) 
.0980243*** 
(2.75) 
-.2134987 
(-1.3) 
.1034178** 
(2.27) 
.8768646** 
(2.22) 
LTIPs-log .26601635*** 
(7.48) 
-.0611979 
(-0.48) 
.2312992*** 
(5.11) 
.2726317 
(1.15) 
.15462057*** 
(6.11) 
-.0846514 
(-1.31) 
.1468963*** 
(4.75) 
.2339108 
(1.29) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 659 260 588 208 711 298 635 238 
F-value 45.76*** 3.90*** 15.74*** 3.10*** 51.52*** 4.30*** 17.53*** 3.83*** 
Adjusted R2 0.5363  0.2992  0.5324  0.2943  
Sargan Statistic  0.5257  0.1340  0.9953  0.5315 
 
Notes: This table presents the sub-time period results based on the effect of (Log) variable executive pay components on 
(Log) Tobin’s Q and ROA as firm performance indicators (t+1) through using Stata. The model in odd columns is 
primary estimated using firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of variable executive pay on performance indicators 
with controlling for separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and year, and the model in binary 
columns is estimated using 2SLS regression estimation (first stage results are not presented); regression model include 
all control variables utilised under equation (2). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Panel A presents results 
for the fiscal year 1999 to 2002; Panel B 2003 to 2005; and Panel C 2006 to 2008. Standard errors are adjusted by 
clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no sign, there will be no significant correlation was found.  
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Table 21: Sub-Sector Analyses - Tobin’s Q and ROA at next interval (t+1) as Prime Performance 
Functions of Variable Remuneration and Estimations via 2SLS  
  
Panel A: Financial Sector 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS 
Bonus-log 
.08921424** 
(2.06) 
-.2073867 
(-0.87) 
0.02266755 
(0.33) 
.7731072 
(0.95) 
.08349396** 
(2.48) 
-.1047478 
(-0.51) 
0.08146127 
(1.49) 
.457934 
(1.24) 
LTIPs-log 
0.01087594 
(0.29) 
-.1074115 
(-0.29) 
0.0304799 
(0.5) 
-1.172986 
(-1.13) 
0.03744456 
(1.51) 
.0295548  
(0.19) 
0.03346435 
(0.85) 
.0784692 
(0.24) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 471 356 420 310 525 401 466 352 
F-value 39.03*** 2.67*** 12.28*** 2.61*** 44.2*** 2.15*** 14.94*** 1.92*** 
Adjusted R2 0.6601  0.3925  0.6643  0.4081  
Sargan Statistic  0.1241  0.7081  0.5131  0.9865 
 
 
Panel B: Non-financial Sector 
 CEOs Board Executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS Tobin’s Q NY 2SLS ROA NY 2SLS 
Bonus-log 
.09882127*** 
(4.04) 
.1057381  
(0.59) 
.1234016*** 
(3.91) 
.3733858 
(1.07) 
.11281072*** 
(5.69) 
-.0710133 
(-0.37) 
.1600647*** 
(6.28) 
.6432958* 
(1.9) 
LTIPs-log 
.1662778*** 
(8.17) 
.280178 
(0.93) 
.04628179* 
(1.74) 
-.5201787  
(-0.83) 
.09286522*** 
(6.83) 
.2168746 
(1.25) 
0.02063233 
(1.19) 
-.3649809  
(-1.32) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1386 864 1263 782 1599 1085 1447 977 
F-value 31.67*** 2.78*** 8.78*** 2.61*** 38.01*** 2.89*** 10.39*** 2.78*** 
Adjusted R2 0.3563  0.1697  0.3573  0.1821  
Sargan Statistic  0.0758  0.0898  0.0697  0.1529 
 
Notes: This table presents the sub-sector results based on the effect of (Log) variable executive pay components on 
(Log) Tobin’s Q and ROA as firm performance indicators (t+1) through using Stata. The model in odd columns is 
primary estimated using firm-fixed effects by showing the impact of variable executive pay on performance 
indicators with controlling for year, and the model in binary columns is estimated using 2SLS regression 
estimation (first stage results are not presented); regression model include all control variables utilised under 
equation (2). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Panel A presents results for financial sector (represented 
by Utilities and Financial Industries); and Panel B for non-financial sector (represented by the rest of the 10 
industries). Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. If there is no 
sign, there will be no significant correlation was found.  
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The endogenous estimations in the first stage show that varied levels of significance are 
reported for the instrumented coefficients of compensation, which indicates again the presence 
of endogenous links between the compensation variables adopted and the performance 
measures. For the second-stage findings for two sub-sector panels, there is again no significant 
effects between remuneration and performance variables for both CEOs and board executives 
with the exception of the association between bonus and ROA within the non-financial sector 
where it is positive and significant at 10% level. 
5.4.3 Reflections on Pay-Performance and Performance-Pay Results 
Comparison of the findings of the pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks using 
the fixed-effect regression approach as described in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 shows that both 
support the existence of the dual relationships between the nature and composition of 
executive compensation packages and the majority of indicators of firm performance – having 
controlled for a range of possible mediating factors including mechanisms of governance and 
ownership, and characteristics of company and board members. 
The pay-performance framework findings may be seen as lending support to the agent-
principal theoretical perspective. The sensitivity of CEO/executive pay components 
(comprising salary, bonus, and LTIP) ranges positively and significantly with Tobin’s Q as 
does the measures of compensation (including cash based, equity based, and total 
remuneration) of CEOs and board executives.8 The performance-pay framework approach 
within the fixed-effect model is coherent in the manner in which they interrelate with the 
findings for the pay-performance structure. Sensitivity to Tobin’s Q provides robust degrees of 
relationships with variable compensation awarded (bonuses and LTIPs) for both CEO and 
boardroom executives.9 The results may therefore provide support to the stewardship and/or 
tournament perspectives, by which executive directors’ remuneration is seen to be an incentive 
for better action rewarding managerial talents or inspiring the lower-level executive directors 
to work harder to achieve the entity goals and objectives which they might perceive to be 
realistic in the future. 
                                                          
8See Tables 10 and 12. 
9See Table 16. 
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There are still significant econometric issues in interpreting the results of the empirical study 
conducted and also in attaching connections with the various theoretical perspectives 
discussed. The fixed effect approach cannot on its own establish a clear viewpoint on the key 
empirical question of the current research, ‘whether managerial compensation is the greater 
influence on firm performance or whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on the 
former?’, which is essentially the nature of the third hypothesis (see Chapter Four). 
Prior literature has tending to focus on examining the relationships between executive 
compensation and company performance using the single equation modelling as specified, for 
instance, in equations (1) and (2), without necessarily fully taking into consideration potential 
simultaneities among the estimated variables which might lead either to endogenous links or 
misleading coefficients (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). In order to overcome possible 
modelling deficiencies, it is appropriate to take a simultaneous equations approach which may 
reveal additional insights into the true nature of the underlying relationships. This is done in 
the context of adopting a number of control/dependent governance variables to assist in the 
examination of the influence of executive pay and company performance on each other. 
5.5 Simultaneous Equations Modelling 
In this section investigation of the relationships between the total compensation of CEOs and 
boardroom executives and company performance (performance being represented by Tobin’s 
Q (Table 22) and ROA (Table 23)) is extended further by developing a system of six 
simultaneous equations. The intention is to allow for simultaneous interdependencies between 
executive pay and company performance by employing data available on four control 
variables (i.e. board size, non-executive directors, asset leverage, and boardroom ownership) 
using 3SLS, following Ntim et al. (2011). The 3SLS estimation technique is applied to 
estimate the coefficients’ robustness with a system of equations that are endogenous by 
controlling for cross-equation correlation among the errors to reach efficiency (Baltagi, 2008; 
Brooks, 2008). This technique permits not only executive pay and company performance to 
simultaneously affect each other and the mechanism of four control variables, but also allows 
these control variables to influence each other as well as executive compensation and firm 
performance, consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). The result outcomes do in fact 
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demonstrate, in general, a high level of consistency with the univariate analyses (see Section 
5.3) previously discussed. They will now be considered further within a theoretical context 
and also juxtaposed with previous empirical literature in particular that relating to the UK. 
Table 22 shows the results of equations (3) to (8) as a system of simultaneous equations that 
allows for possible simultaneous separate interrelationships between the total remuneration of 
CEOs and boardroom executives with that of Tobin’s Q and four corporate governance 
indicators, compatible with a number of related control variables. Overall, the signs on the 
coefficients in equations (3) to (8) and the significance of their t-statistics vary for both CEOs 
and board executives - however, the results related to total CEO pay show more significant 
links compared with their counterparts for the total compensation of boardroom executives. 
Perhaps a more important finding is that that the findings respecting the relationships between 
total pay for both CEOs and board executives and Tobin’s Q in equations 3 and 8 show that 
the total remuneration for CEOs and boardroom members has more influence on firm 
performance than company performance has over the total pay of CEOs and board executives. 
Statistically these results might be interpreted as implying that corporate performance will rise 
by 76.8% or 125% as a result of an increase of 100% in the total pay of CEOs or executives, 
respectively, whilst the total remuneration of CEOs and boardroom executives will increase by 
55.8% and 62.3%, respectively, in response to a 100% increase in company performance. 
Interpreting these statistical outcomes they do suggest that the compensation of CEOs and 
executives seems to be more influential for firm performance than the framework of 
performance-related pay. This lends support to the third hypothesis (H3) which is presented 
within the stewardship and/or tournament theories as they refer to how incentive packages are 
used to reward boardroom executives for better performance.   
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Table 22: Simultaneous Regressions – 3SLS Estimations of Equations (3) to (8) for Total 
CEO Remuneration and Tobin’s Q 
 
Dependent Variables 
Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5) Equation (6) Equation (7) Equation (8) 
Total Pay Board Size Non-executives Ownership Leverage Tobin’s Q 
Constant 12.250645*** (4.76) 
1.7824608*** 
(2.68) 
-1.1638896***  
 (-3.74) 
18.445336*** 
(7.19) 
-16.341911  
(-0.37) 
.71116112**  
(2.14) 
Total Pay-log -- -- 
-.75950325*** 
 (-2.85) 
.69940551** 
(2.35) 
-.79543695**  
(-2.27) 
-7.4444291*  
(-1.85) 
.76774664*  
(1.9) 
Board Size -.63470576***  (-4.25) 
-- 
-- 
.98278548*** 
(20.56) 
-1.1420345***  
(-8.83) 
3.6393111 
(1.26) 
1.0895199***  
(5.03) 
Non-executive 
Directors 
.57055107*  
(1.88) 
.93162352** 
(2.42) 
-- 
-- 
1.1118564** 
(2.49) 
-4.3243254 
(-1.42) 
-1.2016289* 
(-1.87) 
CEO Ownership  -.33603161*  (-1.71) 
-.82781697***  
(-8.3) 
.86494332*** 
(5.16) 
-- 
-- 
6.8351745* 
(1.92) 
.85863687***  
(2.91) 
Debt to Assets -.06601321***  (-5.63) 
-0.01604312  
(-1.12) 
.02202858* 
(1.79) 
-0.02040068  
(-1.26) 
-- 
-- 
-0.00132328 
(-1.37) 
Tobin’s Q log .55836276**  (2.52) 
.85375871***  
(6.4) 
-.57015871***  
(-3.04) 
.86480878***  
(4.72) 
-1.9312069 
(-0.62) 
-- 
-- 
Duality Role 0.44337736  
(1.27) 
0.50743953  
(1.09) 
-.6048851**  
(-2.11) 
0.63687468  
(1.3) 
-- 
-- 
-0.5942182 
 (-1.01) 
Independent 
Directors 
0.01748198  
(0.08) 
0.04526176 
(0.14) 
-- 
-- 
0.01945451 
(0.06) 
-- 
-- 
0.11567469 
(0.26) 
Audit Committee 2.1821484*  (1.77) 
15.727521*** 
(8.11) 
-16.463842*** 
(-10.14) 
1.92365478* 
(1.66) 
-- 
-- 
-15.690572*** 
(-3.89) 
Remuneration 
Committee 
-0.83651905  
(-1.31) 
-0.9832008 
(-1.18) 
1.0998969*  
(1.73) 
-1.1749231  
(-1.32) 
-- 
-- 
1.06083 
(1.22) 
Nomination 
Committee 
-0.43423169  
(-1.51) 
-0.5148428  
(-1.37) 
-.56399131**  
(-2.01) 
-0.62765186 
(-1.61) 
-- 
-- 
0.48309838  
(1.28) 
Total Assets-log .66498251*** (4.81) 
.84644901*** 
(7.35) 
.72624784*** 
(6.19) 
.91816862*** 
(5.95) 
-0.23666249  
(-0.1) 
-.88980967*** 
(-6.59) 
Growth Opportunity-
log 
0.02755935  
(0.59) 
0.02232045  
(0.41) 
-0.01725574  
(-0.42) 
0.02236196  
(-0.39) 
0.1976726 
(0.38) 
-0.01982065 
(-0.35) 
Debt to Equity .00031207***  (5.14) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.00602592***  
(5.56) 
0.00009323  
(1.15) 
Regulation dummy 0.05937073  (0.27) 
-0.14336819  
(-0.66) 
-0.0407105  
(-0.21) 
-0.0952829  
(-0.41) 
2.8745629  
(1.06) 
0.26316502 
(1.21) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231 
Adjusted R2 0.5729 0.6215 0.4123 0.3145 0.2441 0.4286 
 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equations (3) to (8) by using Stata. The model is 
estimated using simultaneous modelling by showing the joint relationships between CEO total pay and 
Tobin’s Q with controlling for separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and year; 
regression model include variables of duality role, independent directors, audit committee, remuneration 
committee, nomination committee, total assets-log, growth opportunities-log, and debt to equity. Table 1 
fully defines all the variables used, and Table 2 summarises the variables employed by simultaneous 
equations modelling. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. Z-values are 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 
respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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Table 22: Simultaneous Regressions (Cont.) – 3SLS Estimations of Equations (3) to (8) for 
Total Boardroom Executive Remuneration and Tobin’s Q 
 
Dependent Variables 
Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5) Equation (6) Equation (7) Equation (8) 
Total Pay Board Size Non-executives Ownership Leverage Tobin’s Q 
Constant 15.5487961*** (5.27) 
9.7824608** 
(2.18) 
-21.116634***  
 (-6.92) 
24.789654*** 
(8.16) 
-16.696884  
(-0.31) 
0.5214649  
(1.16) 
Total Pay-log  -- -- 
-0.73047659 
 (-1.29) 
-0.14916952  
(-0.29) 
0.17047338 
(0.56) 
-7.1040466*  
(-1.68) 
1.2504267*** 
(3.54) 
Board Size -0.22169134  (-1.27) 
-- 
-- 
.90662857*** 
(13.06) 
-.5263708*** 
(-7.33) 
3.0315929 
(1.21) 
0.15945863 
(1.14) 
Non-executive 
Directors 
0.42644652  
(1.08) 
1.4721016*** 
(2.68) 
-- 
-- 
.54829404*** 
(2.6) 
-4.3095496 
(-1.54) 
0.75970217  
(1.26) 
Board Ownership  0.07782672  (0.24) 
-1.1866861***  
(-4.8) 
1.6274765*** 
(8.85) 
-- 
-- 
6.3617941 
(1.44) 
-.56870917**  
(-1.98) 
Debt to Assets -.07104468***  (-5.83) 
-0.02293907  
(-1.04) 
0.02803965 
(1.51) 
-0.01659667  
(-1.45) 
-- 
-- 
0.0011876 
(1.12) 
Tobin’s Q log   .62267499*** (2.67) 
.77637316**  
(2.22) 
0.02356144  
(0.07) 
-0.04070189 
(-0.2) 
1.570236 
(0.51) 
-- 
-- 
Duality Role   0.30558328 
(0.96) 
0.50412277  
(0.88) 
-0.11571762  
(-0.36) 
0.03282953  
(0.14) 
-- 
-- 
-0.59439336 
 (-1.29) 
Independent 
Directors 
-0.26951228 
(-0.91) 
-0.40662274  
(-0.86) 
-- 
-- 
0.03397419  
(0.22) 
-- 
-- 
0.62654659 
(1.29) 
Audit Committee 6.3372474 (1.49) 
20.000141*** 
(4.83) 
-17.236589*** 
(-8.45) 
12.53206*** 
(5.73) 
-- 
-- 
-18.145698*** 
(-4.98) 
Remuneration 
Committee 
-0.17149229  
(-0.35) 
-0.30045334  
(-0.3) 
0.04817609  
(0.06) 
-0.02127711  
(-0.04) 
-- 
-- 
0.4221367 
(0.84) 
Nomination 
Committee 
-0.14732886  
(-0.55) 
-0.64507927  
(-1.25) 
.96202258**  
(2.56) 
-.60502484***  
(-2.6) 
-- 
-- 
-0.39463361  
(-1.22) 
Total Assets-log .5446425*** (3.75) 
.86952886*** 
(4.01) 
-.48883476**  
(-2.31) 
.25833807*  
(1.9) 
1.4840319 
(0.68) 
-.53296794***  
(-5.45) 
Growth Opportunity-
log 
0.01735378  
(0.38) 
0.03213671  
(0.43) 
-0.03131975  
(-0.55) 
0.01835277  
(0.52) 
0.0662947 
(0.13) 
0.00059758  
(0.01) 
Debt to Equity .00042797***  (5.62) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.00673146***  
(6.3) 
-0.00002971  
(-0.5) 
Regulation dummy -0.07877665  (-0.35) 
-0.04376599  
(-0.13) 
-0.34754396  
(-1.19) 
0.23089296  
(1.31) 
0.83272429 
(0.32) 
.48863366*** 
(3.8) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1308 1308 1308 1308 1308 1308 
Adjusted R2 0.5125 0.4437 0.326 0.2871 0.2691 0.5741 
 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equations (3) to (8) by using Stata. The model is 
estimated using simultaneous modelling by showing the joint relationships between total pay of board 
executives and Tobin’s Q with controlling for separation between financial and nonfinancial companies 
and year; regression model include variables of duality role, independent directors, audit committee, 
remuneration committee, nomination committee, total assets-log, growth opportunities-log, and debt to 
equity. Table 1 fully defines all the variables used, and Table 2 summarises the variables employed by 
simultaneous equations modelling. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. Z-
values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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It is observable that the associations between Tobin’s Q and the total remuneration of CEOs 
and boardroom members are much higher for the simultaneous equation modelling reported in 
Table 22 (0.56 and 0.62, respectively) than for the single fixed-effect equation modelling 
reported in Table 12 (0.13 and 0.16, respectively). The difference is substantial compared with 
the findings reported in prior literature (for example, Conyon, 1997; Conyon and Peck, 1998; 
Conyon and Sadler, 2001). The outcomes suggest that bringing into the modelling the 
existence of possible simultaneous interdependencies among the adopted variables (i.e. total 
compensation, Tobin’s Q, and the mechanisms of corporate governance) gives rise to a 
stronger statistical association between the sensitivity analysis of executive remuneration and 
firm performance. They also indicate significant interdependencies between total 
compensation, firm performance, and the mechanisms of corporate governance and thus 
provide support for the modelling approach employed. It may also provide an indication as to 
the need for future studies to utilise a comprehensive set of governance mechanisms within a 
simultaneous equation structure in order to examine in depth the relationships between 
executive compensation and company performance. 
The findings reported for equations (3) and (4) suggest overall negative relationships between 
board size and the total compensation of CEOs and board executives. This result is consistent 
with Yermack (1996) but contrary to the finding of Ozkan (2011) and is capable of alternative 
interpretations in terms of issues of coordination and communication within the boardroom. 
The outcomes for equations (3) and (5) show that there is a positive association between the 
number of non-executives and CEO compensation. Again this could be interpreted in terms of 
the larger number of non-executive directors improving board independence and monitoring 
functions and leading to enhanced performance related remuneration decisions (consistent 
with Franks et al. (2001), Ozkan (2007), and John et al. (2010)). Outcomes from equations (3) 
and (6) indicate a negative link between total CEO compensation and their ownership wealth 
but there is a positive relationship with board executive wealth holdings. Again despite the 
statistical significance it is difficult to hypothesise strongly as to the nature of these results. 
However, the negative relationship suggests that higher CEOs’ ownership might act to reduce 
their reliance on remuneration, while the positive link implies that either executive directors 
with large-sized ownerships exercised their power in designing their pay package (as 
consistent with (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; and Ozkan, 2007)); or the agents’ interests are 
199 
 
possibly aligned with the interests of the principals (Watts, 1977; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; 
Ang et al., 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004). The results for equations (3) and (7) show a 
significant relationship between leverage and lower total compensation for CEOs and board 
executives. This may be seen as consistent with previous literature (John et al., 2010) which 
suggests that greater debt usage leads to additional managerial monitoring by internal and 
external stakeholders, as well as reducing the agency problem of ‘free cash flows’ requisition 
by opportunistic officers (Jensen, 1986). 
The findings for equation (8) show that board size and ownership are positively and 
significantly related to firm performance as proxied by Tobin’s Q, whereas non-executive 
directors and leverage are negatively related to firm performance. Issues as to benefits of 
larger boards have been referred to before one aspect is that they may seek to enhance 
corporate performance by attracting sufficient financial resources (Adams and Mehran, 2005). 
Another explication might be that the increased board size encourages lower-level executive 
members to move up – in line with the precepts of tournament theory (Rosen, 1986). The 
conventional agency-theory perspective is that larger CEO ownership might improve firm 
performance - the interests of chief executives and institutional shareholders being better 
aligned by reduction in corporate conflicts of interest and the costs of managerial monitoring 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The presence of non-executive directors perhaps puts more 
focus on improving board independence and monitoring the determination of CEO 
compensation, according to the UK institutional and regulatory aspects (Greenbury, 1995, and 
Higgs Report, 2003), rather than enhancing corporate performance. The negative, but 
insignificant, link between Tobin’s Q and debt usage cannot be interpreted very strongly but 
might be in line with the notion that greater corporate leverage maximises financial pressure 
and minimises institutional capability to benefit from growth opportunities (as consistent with 
Jensen (1986), and Bebchuk and Spamann (2009)). 
The governance relationships as set out in the outcomes of equation (5) (again reported in 
Table 22) and the interaction with the total remuneration of CEOs and board executives show 
that the number of non-executive directors is significantly and positively linked to board size, 
ownership, and leverage. These results emphasise further the need to consider the wider range 
of integral simultaneous associations. Again explication is capable of multiple interpretations - 
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larger boards would be expected to lead to an increase in the number of non-executives, the 
positive relationship between leverage and ownership is interesting and perhaps not entirely 
expected. It might reflect differing risk taking profiles of managers and shareholders. The 
negative association between board size and ownership is expected in line with classic theory 
(Berle and Means, 1932).  
The majority of the coefficients of the exogenous variables show the expected signs in terms 
to their associations with both CEOs and board executives in Table 22. For example, the 
presence of audit committees and firm size are positively linked to total compensation (as 
consistent with Hossain et al. (1994), and McDaniel et al. (2002) for audit committee’s 
existence, and Conyon (1997), Conyon and Murphy (2000), and John et al. (2010) for 
corporate size) and negatively associated with Tobin’s Q (as consistent with Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) for board committees, and Loderer and Martin (1997) for firm size). Findings 
in relation to other features of corporate governance (i.e. CEO duality role, the number of 
independent directors, and the presence of remuneration and nomination committees) and their 
direction and insignificant associations with total remuneration and Tobin’s Q are not 
unexpected being consistent with the results that reported above (see Tables 12 and 16).  
The presence of remuneration committees is negatively related, with an absence of 
significance effect, to total compensation of CEOs and board executives and the majority of 
other attributes of corporate governance. This in turn suggests the presence of other 
institutional and regulatory factors contributing to determining the level and structure of CEO 
and board executive remuneration. Another interpretation might perhaps be in the line with the 
suggestions of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) that political and institutional factors relating 
perhaps to the existence of wider stakeholders (such as customer representatives or 
environmental activists) might also act to influence or indeed control the manner in which 
board committees work and the manner in which they determine the structure of executive 
compensation. This finding therefore is discussed in further in the line with the manner in 
which remuneration committees approach their perspective in determining the type and extent 
of executive pay packages in the following chapter.  
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To further determine the sensitivity of the findings revealed in relation to Tobin’s Q, equations 
(3) to (8) are re-run utilising return-on-assets (ROA) as an accounting-based alternative 
performance indicator whose implications in academic literatures are widely acknowledged, 
especially within the executive pay studies (for instance Mehran 1995; Bhagat and Black, 
1999; Core and Larcker, 2002; Dalton et al., 2003; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Sapp 2008; 
Belkhir, 2009; Gregg et al., 2011; Coles et al., 2012). Table 23 shows the findings for 
equations (3) to (8) based on a system of simultaneous equation evaluation with ROA as the 
dependent variable. 
Even though a number of minor differences are observed regarding the magnitude of some of 
the coefficients, the outcomes are virtually the same as their counterparts in Table 22 for 
Tobin’s Q. This could be seen as confirming the robustness of the findings. The associations 
between total remuneration for both CEOs and board executives and ROA in equations 3 and 
8 show that firm performance is found to have risen by 125% or 108% as a result of a 100% 
increase in total compensation of CEOs and board executives, respectively, while the total pay 
of CEOs and boardroom executives will increase by 78% and 69%, respectively, in response 
to a 100% increase in ROA. These results are capable of multiple interpretations but may be 
seen as lending support to the alternate third hypothesis (H3) as they refer to how the level and 
structure of executive compensation are utilised to reward the levels of company performance, 
consistent with the stewardship and tournament perspectives. 
The relationships between ROA and the total compensation of CEOs and boardroom 
executives within the simultaneous equation modelling also show more significant statistical 
relationships as compared with the fixed-effect equation modelling. Within the fixed equation 
framework there was no significant association between ROA and total CEO and executive 
boardroom in Table 12 - but that was not the case under the simultaneous modelling 
framework where as described in Table 23 very significant associations were reported. These 
statistical outcomes again provide further support for the adoption of simultaneous modelling 
rather than the fixed-effects regression modelling.   
202 
 
Table 23: Simultaneous Regressions – 3SLS Estimations of Equations (3) to (8) for Total 
CEO Remuneration and ROA 
 
Dependent Variables 
Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5) Equation (6) Equation (7) Equation (8) 
Total Pay Board Size Non-executives Ownership Leverage ROA 
Constant 18.601823*** (3.24) 
17.158802*** 
(6.99) 
-1.254786*** 
(-2.78) 
16.147397*** 
(6.7) 
32.7935652  
(0.06) 
0.6547745** 
(2.31) 
Total Pay-log  -- -- 
-.58580125* 
 (-1.8) 
0.55686753 
(1.62) 
-.55640269*  
(-1.78) 
-4.1782628  
(-1.02) 
1.2573473*** 
(5.43) 
Board Size -.90493795***  (-3.21) 
-- 
-- 
.91221547*** 
(20.24) 
-.94014791***  
(-13.25) 
1.9434985 
(0.73) 
1.1466268***  
(3.14) 
Non-executive 
Directors 
1.3458558  
(1.6) 
1.3381759* 
(1.89) 
-- 
-- 
1.3280183** 
(2.11) 
-2.9952792 
(-0.99) 
-1.7297963  
(-1.58) 
CEO Ownership  -.83063984**  (-2.22) 
-1.0662052***  
(-12.64) 
.91553171*** 
(4.41) 
-- 
-- 
3.621412 
(1.01) 
1.0568909** 
(2.22) 
Debt to Assets -.1122001***  (-3.12) 
-0.02384005  
(-1.18) 
.02833558** 
(2.01) 
-0.02274609  
(-1.25) 
-- 
-- 
.13999787*** 
(2.94) 
ROA log   .77950497***  (3.32) 
0.69255645  
(1.59) 
-0.20977013  
(-0.55) 
.65219723*  
(1.65) 
-0.0300453 
(-0.01) 
-- 
-- 
Duality Role   1.1182192  
(1.51) 
0.93995563  
(1.41) 
-.71830641**  
(-2.46) 
0.92930294  
(1.59) 
-- 
-- 
-1.4286468 
 (-1.49) 
Independent 
Directors 
-0.38866868  
(-0.62) 
-0.22355623  
(-0.37) 
-- 
-- 
-0.27135319  
(-0.51) 
-- 
-- 
0.51277197 
(0.64) 
Audit Committee 2.2145896 (1.59) 
11.256984*** 
(5.23) 
-16.645273*** 
(-9.3) 
1.8521463 
(1.54) 
-- 
-- 
-23.469669*** 
(-3.14) 
Remuneration 
Committee 
-1.6977526  
(-1.59) 
-1.5347931  
(-1.49) 
1.3198698**  
(1.99) 
-1.4626883 
 (-1.61) 
-- 
-- 
2.1528856 
(1.58) 
Nomination 
Committee 
-0.63277709  
(-1.26) 
-0.55220229  
(-1.21) 
0.44315418  
(1.5) 
-0.53498324  
(-1.34) 
-- 
-- 
0.80553517  
(1.25) 
Total Assets-log .76376247*** (4.18) 
.64930786*** 
(3.37) 
-.50088183*** 
(-3.28) 
.60171595***  
(3.45) 
0.90009199 
(0.42) 
-.96472817***  
(-4.13) 
Growth Opportunity-
log 
0.00299393  
(0.04) 
0.00101572  
(0.01) 
-0.01985465  
(-0.43) 
0.00068835  
(0.01) 
0.04775218 
(0.09) 
-0.00298095 
(-0.03) 
Debt to Equity .00053743***  (3.06) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.00621411***  
(5.28) 
-.00066899***  
(-2.9) 
Regulation dummy 0.04098072  (0.17) 
-0.01482704  
(-0.04) 
-0.23959952  
(-0.92) 
-0.01614239  
(-0.05) 
0.96724093  
(0.28) 
-0.04085214  
(-0.14) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 
Adjusted R2 0.5817 0.5281 0.4423 0.2995 0.2174 0.4552 
 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equations (3) to (8) by using Stata. The model is 
estimated using simultaneous modelling by showing the joint relationships between CEO total pay and 
ROA with controlling for separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and year; regression 
model include variables of duality role, independent directors, audit committee, remuneration committee, 
nomination committee, total assets-log, growth opportunities-log, and debt to equity. Table 1 fully defines 
all the variables used, and Table 2 summarises the variables employed by simultaneous equations 
modelling. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. Z-values are presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. If 
there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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Table 23: Simultaneous Regressions (Cont.) – 3SLS Estimations of Equations (3) to (8) for 
Total Boardroom Executive Remuneration and ROA 
 
Dependent Variables 
Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5) Equation (6) Equation (7) Equation (8) 
Total Pay Board Size Non-executives Ownership Leverage ROA 
Constant 17.233566*** (4.37) 
24.655894*** 
(6.34) 
-16.254416***  
 (-3.26) 
13.674612*** 
(5.82) 
33.517064  
(0.06) 
0.3514892  
(0.13) 
Total Pay-log  -- -- 
-0.21064455 
(-0.38) 
-0.0536675  
(-0.1) 
-0.04093698  
(-0.13) 
-6.5108543  
(-1.46) 
1.0791636*** 
(4.14) 
Board Size -0.13802108  (-0.69) 
-- 
-- 
.87025829*** 
(17.15) 
-.56019226***  
(-11.99) 
0.63595228  
(0.26) 
0.11930109 
(0.63) 
Non-executive 
Directors 
1.0324231*  
(1.73) 
1.6183646*** 
(6.07) 
-- 
-- 
.86700431*** 
(3.81) 
-1.3288611 
(-0.47) 
-1.4231208*  
(-1.91) 
Board Ownership  -0.10853554  (-0.29) 
-1.7564425***  
(-11.75) 
1.5504623*** 
(9.09) 
-- 
-- 
2.1973701 
(0.49) 
0.08385071 
(0.22) 
Debt to Assets -.0696259***  (-4.71) 
-.03792593*  
(-1.76) 
.03268542* 
(1.79) 
-.02049761*  
(-1.71) 
-- 
-- 
.05246179*** 
(2.73) 
ROA   .69496579***  (3.29) 
0.09309358  
(0.16) 
0.23435461  
(0.45) 
0.01685072  
(0.05) 
0.5622117 
(0.13) 
-- 
-- 
Duality Role   0.55164535  
(1.43) 
0.47292897  
(1.12) 
-0.1797651  
(-0.56) 
0.24376396  
(0.99) 
-- 
-- 
-0.77575888 
 (-1.55) 
Independent 
Directors 
-.78279293*  
(-1.77) 
-.40578612*  
(-1.89) 
-- 
-- 
-0.19594974  
(-1.08) 
-- 
-- 
1.1340134** 
(1.96) 
Audit Committee 6.7349405  (1.34) 
18.216552** 
(2.44) 
-21.398491*** 
(-7.08) 
8.268206** 
(2.36) 
-- 
-- 
-5.4275599 
(-1.09) 
Remuneration 
Committee 
-0.17841431 
(-0.35) 
-0.03885134  
(-0.04) 
-0.06162798  
(-0.08) 
-0.03174907  
(-0.06) 
-- 
-- 
0.29532585 
(0.46) 
Nomination 
Committee 
-0.25013659  
(-0.94) 
-.85572359**  
(-1.96) 
.68299179*  
(1.88) 
-.4919629**  
(-2.09) 
-- 
-- 
0.30759463  
(0.92) 
Total Assets-log .41033918*** (2.96) 
.50363053** 
(2.01) 
-0.35232561  
(-1.58) 
.26378511*  
(1.88) 
2.1649664 
(1.13) 
-.43939144*** 
(-3.31) 
Growth Opportunity-
log 
-0.00814754  
(-0.16) 
0.07774774  
(1.08) 
-0.07755604  
(-1.29) 
0.0434816  
(1.12) 
-0.05694715 
(-0.1) 
0.0206179  
(0.4) 
Debt to Equity .00037488***  (4.34) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.00613093***  
(5.59) 
-.00027876*** 
(-3.17) 
Regulation dummy -0.04271486  (-0.21) 
0.42312898  
(1.09) 
-0.48727033  
(-1.44) 
0.24006382  
(1.1) 
1.7924054 
(0.59) 
0.2128602  
(1.2) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 
Adjusted R2 0.4537 0.3419 0.421 0.3589 0.258 0.5221 
 
Notes: This table presents the results based on the estimation of equations (3) to (8) by using Stata. The model is 
estimated using simultaneous modelling by showing the joint relationships between total pay of board 
executives and ROA with controlling for separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and 
year; regression model include variables of duality role, independent directors, audit committee, 
remuneration committee, nomination committee, total assets-log, growth opportunities-log, and debt to 
equity. Table 1 fully defines all the variables used, and Table 2 summarises the variables employed by 
simultaneous equations modelling. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering the FTSE 350 companies. Z-
values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. If there is no sign, no significant correlation was found.  
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Comparisons between the findings of Tobin’s Q and ROA within the simultaneous framework 
suggest that the coefficients of associations between total pay and ROA are slightly higher 
than those reported with Tobin’s Q. This result may imply that accounting-based performance 
is more directly linked to executive compensation than market-based performance. The signs 
and significance levels of the coefficients of governance mechanisms and exogenous variables 
reported in Table 23 remain virtually identical to those reported in Table 22. For example, 
board size and ownership are significantly and negatively related to CEO pay, while they are 
linked positively to corporate performance. The number of non-executives has no significant 
association with total CEO compensation - nor is it significantly associated with firm 
performance. Leverage does have significant associations with total remuneration and firm 
performance compared with the number of non-executive directors. In respect to the 
exogenous variables, corporate size and debt-to-equity remain significantly and positively 
associated with executive compensation, whilst they are negatively related to firm 
performance. The presence of an audit committee has the same direction as corporate size 
without a real significant effect. Again the existence of remuneration committee is negatively 
related but with no real significance to total compensation of CEOs and board executives and 
the majority of other attributes of corporate governance.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a discussion of the findings of the empirical work aimed at quantitatively 
examining the interrelationships between executive directors’ remuneration and company 
performance. A variety of statistical tests and analytical estimations (comprising descriptive 
statistics, correlation analyses, in addition to fixed-effect and simultaneous analyses) were 
adopted in order to examine the extent and trend in executive directors’ remuneration, and to 
investigate the relationships between pay and performance to identify whether managerial 
compensation is the greater influence on firm performance or whether it is the latter which has 
the greater influence on the former, while controlling for corporate governance mechanisms 
and ownership, as well as the characteristics of companies and board room members. Overall 
the findings are discussed in terms of the theoretical perspectives adopted and conclusions are 
outlined based on the statistical results. 
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Descriptive statistics showed that on average CEOs’ total reimbursement increased by about 
90% over the period under examination, which suggests an approximate annual growth rate of 
10%. This growth rate implies that CEOs in FTSE 350 companies have received increases in 
their compensation packages at a rate five times higher than the average UK growth rate in 
pay. As noted equity or equity-based pay forms the greater part of CEOs’ compensation 
package – 54% over the period (1999-2008) – while for board room executives cash-based 
remuneration is the greater percentage 52% over the same time period. Industry analysis 
suggests that the financial sector offers the highest average cash remuneration, whilst the oil 
and gas sector provides the highest average equity-based and total remuneration for both 
CEOs and board executives.  
Over the period under examination, salary, bonus, and LTIPs are as expected the key pay 
components in terms of the amounts provided. The descriptive statistics as they relate to 
corporate governance variables are mixed but might be seen as in line with the corporate 
governance arrangements and regulations in the UK (such as the 1992 Cadbury Report, the 
1995 Greenbury Report, the 1998 Hampel Report, the 2002 UK Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Regulations, the 2003 Higgs Report, and the 2006 Companies Acts).  
Findings in respect to the associations between the variables of CEO/executive compensation 
and company performance suggest significant links within both the fixed-effects and 
simultaneous analyses. The results of fixed-effect equation modelling overall reinforce the 
agent-principal perspective that CEOs and boardroom executives are compensated for their 
intention to act in the best interests of the owners based on their prior levels of corporate 
performance within the pay-performance framework. However, the findings relating to the 
performance-pay framework again within the fixed effects framework provide some support to 
the tournament and/or stewardship perspective that CEOs and board executive directors will 
provide enhanced future performance when rewarded in accordance with prior amounts and 
structure of their compensation packages. 
The analytical estimations using the 2SLS methodology imply the presence of endogeneity 
links for both the pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks when utilising different 
instruments for executive compensation and company performance. It is possible to surmise 
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that these endogenous linkages are more likely to arise when associated with variables derived 
from and proxying the discipline and manner of corporate governance (as consistent with 
Murphy (1999), Black et al. (2006), and Coles et al. (2012)). 
Further analysis of sub-time periods and sub-sectors provide a deeper insight into the different 
time periods and industry dimensions within the frameworks of pay-performance and 
performance-pay. Here again the results are mixed. Through the period under examination, the 
sub-time period findings suggest that none of the corporate performance indicators has a 
markedly significant effect on setting the pay packages of CEOs and boardroom members for 
the pay-performance framework – but they do indicate that variable compensation awarded 
(e.g. bonuses and LTIPs) for both CEOs and board executives are positively and strongly 
significant in enhancing company performance over time. Interestingly the sub-sector findings 
demonstrate that there are lower levels of significant variation in the financial sector compared 
with the non-financial sector for both pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks.  
Relating to the simultaneous equation modelling, the results did provide a possible answer to 
the key empirical research question by showing that the total compensation of CEOs and 
boardroom executives seems to be more influential for firm performance than the framework 
of performance-related pay. This finding may also be interpreted as lending support to the 
stewardship and/or tournament theories in terms of how they refer to the use of incentive 
packages to reward CEOs and other boardroom executives based on their knowledge and 
skills, and/or their ambition to win a career title for better performance. 
Finding in relation to the presence of remuneration committees in FTSE 350 companies in 
terms of their associations with executive compensation and company performance are 
perhaps a little out of line with general perceptions and might perhaps suggest a deeper 
investigation of how remuneration committees approach their perspective on compensation 
packages. This final insight links into the next chapter which is devoted to qualitatively 
investigating the role of compensation committees at a major large UK company (BP) and the 
manner in which they have approached setting the type and extent of executive pay packages 
over the approximately the same time period as that of the empirical analysis presented in this 
chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
BP Boardroom Compensation 2001 - 2010 –  
A Case Study10 
6.1 Introduction 
The quite extensive academic literature, aspects of which are reviewed briefly below, has been 
dominated by studies which have sought to identify associations, causal or otherwise, between 
amount and nature of executive compensation and the performance of an entity - performance 
normally measured in terms of profitability and return but sometimes inclusive of wider 
stakeholder goals and objectives. With relatively few exceptions (as for example three 
interview based studies of remuneration in the UK, the first at two utility companies (Bender, 
2003), the second at twelve companies which had consummated significant changes to their 
board compensation over a period of years (Bender, 2007), the third a wider based study 
focusing on 35 companies (Main et al., 2008)), there has been far less focus on case study 
analysis of actual remuneration within specific companies. The empirical study reported above 
suggests perhaps slightly unexpected results in terms of the presence of compensation 
committees in FTSE 350 companies and their relationship with executive directors’ 
remuneration and company performance. This result therefore suggests that there is need for 
further investigation to explore the actual role of remuneration committees in FTSE 350 
companies to determine the type and extent of executive pay packages (as consistent with 
previous literature (including Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bender, 2003, 2004, and 2007)). This 
previous literature suggests that the relationships between pay and performance might perhaps 
be influenced by a number of behavioural and institutional factors. 
British Petroleum (BP) is an interesting research site for a number of reasons: (i) the 
fluctuating levels of executive director compensation over the period under review, (ii) the 
                                                          
10According to prior literature (such as: Scapens, 1990; Collis and Hussey, 2003; and Yin, 2009), the form of archival-
based case study illustrates as an extensive inquiry via examining a single case within its particular context so as to 
understand the present BP dynamics, as a unit of analysis, in setting directors’ remuneration packages. As a research 
strategy, this case will comprise a logical plan for covering an appropriate structure as well as data collection and 
analysis by gathering a detailed information about BP over a long period of time with a view to obtain in-depth 
knowledge. 
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boardroom tensions regarding the retirement timing of a dominant chief executive, namely 
Lord (Edmund John) Browne who in 2007 resigned at 59 years old after being CEO for 12 
years and the ambitions of younger directors to replace him. Anthony (Tony) Bryan Hayward 
became the BP CEO in 2007 and remained in place until 2011, (iii) the international nature of 
its operations and the presence of both UK and US directors on the board, and (iv) the role of 
longstanding and powerful non-executive directors. In addition to all of the above there is also 
evidence of the periodic disquiet of shareholders as to the level of executives’ pay which 
culminated in 38% of the shareholders voting against the remuneration committee’s report at 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM) held in April 2010.11  
The purpose of the archival-based case study is to draw out relevant insights and observations 
from the underlying data by reference to executive compensation reports at BP - one of the 
largest UK quoted companies within FTSE 350 index - in the years between 2001 and 2010. 
Clearly the climacteric final incident at the very end of the period was the blow out on the 
Deepwater Horizon rig in April 2010 and the ensuing massive oil-spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
This pushed BP headlong into the forefront of media and political attention in the UK, USA 
and worldwide – but it was not actually the first time that BP had experienced turbulence both 
in respect to its safety and environmental profile, its relationships with its investors, and the 
composition of its senior management team. 
This case study is organised as follows. After this short introduction the second section 
introduces the strategy of the case study including the research objective, proposition, and 
examination plan – as well as the underlying source of documents for data collection and 
enquiry. The third section goes over the ground previously covered in part in Chapter Three 
and highlights a number of related theoretical perspectives underlying the question of how 
                                                          
11In the same direction, early of year 2011, it has been observed that shareholders started to extent more their 
overwhelm rejection on the pay rises compared with the levels of company performance. For example, AVIVA 
boss - Andrew Moss - was called for step down after about 59 per cent vote against the executive pay report 
(see: the Telegraph report: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/insurance/9248435/Aviva-investors-call-
for-CEO-Andrew-Moss-to-be-replaced.html, and the Guardian report: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/may/03/aviva-shareholder-rebellion-executive-pay) under the new 
strikingly trend of investor uprisings: so-called "shareholder spring" (see: the Bloomberg report: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-21/welcome-shareholder-spring-that-holds-bosses-to-account.html, 
and the Guardian report: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/may/17/shareholder-spring-investor-revolt-
pay). 
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boardroom and senior executive remuneration are or perhaps ‘should be’ set, together with a 
review of the academic literature thereon referred to above. The fourth section refers to the 
two main research approaches. First, the archival-base case study is undertaken to review the 
nature of remuneration practice at BP with a particular focus on the years 2001-2010 although 
at times there is reference to earlier developments. This section also details changes in the 
amount and nature of remuneration packages over the years under examination and explores 
the role of the remuneration committee in effectively determining the type and extent of those 
packages. Second, content analysis is adopted to provide a more specific empirical analysis of 
the Directors Remuneration Reports utilising NVivo: Qualitative Analysis Software12. The 
final section provides an overall conclusion regarding the BP boardroom compensation. 
6.2 Research Strategy - Exploratory Structure 
In Chapter Four the research methodology, by which the researcher follows the functionalism 
paradigm via considering and adopting notions of objectivist ontology and positivist 
epistemology, has discussed in general the research platform in relation to the extant archival 
case study. This of course purely inductive to study the mechanisms and structures which 
determine executive pay in a very large-sized UK company by providing an overall review on 
what it is possible to learn from the information contained in the directors’ remuneration 
reports. This case study therefore might be seen as an exploratory study in an attempt to 
provide further richness and insights in terms of the aspiration of identifying the presence of 
behavioural and institutional factors concerning the manner and process of the setting process 
of executive directors’ remuneration. It is also supplemented by a modicum of the use of 
content analysis.  
                                                          
12NVivo is a powerful data analysis program produced by QSR International which guides the researcher from 
questions to answers throughout organising and analysing the information, and exploring and visualising the 
outcomes (http://www.qsrinternational.com).Over the period under examination, NVivo is utilised to identify 
and gather the selected terms (i.e. nodes), code terms of interest, and examine coded terms by using a set of 
analytical techniques. 
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In accordance with the constructed examination process13, the structure here is continued 
within the framework of the three key sections of the overall enquiry (i.e. research question, 
research proposition, and research examination plan). 
6.2.1 Research Question 
The current case study research is aiming to investigate the manner in which remuneration 
committees approach their perspective, role and contribution in determining the type and 
extent of executive compensation in BP during the time period from 2001 till 2010. Therefore 
this case study makes an attempt to answer the following broad inquiries or questions: How 
boardroom and senior executive remuneration are or perhaps ‘should be’ set based on a 
number of the theoretical perspectives? Does the BP case support the alignment between 
principals and agents according to interpreted theoretical perspectives? How were board 
remuneration packages determined at BP over the 2001-2010 period and how were issues as to 
the extent and nature of disclosure resolved? This brings into play the role of the BP 
remuneration committee in the manner in which it effectively determines the type and extent 
of those packages – if indeed it does so? What might be the reasons behind why 38% of BP 
shareholder body chose not to support the remuneration committee’s report at the AGM held 
in April 2010?  
Answering these questions will provide indicative perspectives toward understanding the 
answer to the second key research question: i.e. do behavioural and institutional factors, in 
particular those relating to the remuneration committee, play a significant role in determining 
the composition and size of executive compensation?  
6.2.2 Research Proposition 
The current case study attempts to shed some light on how the BP executive directors’ 
remuneration packages are actually determined (consistent with the scope of the work of Tosi 
and Gomez-Mejía (1989) by looking inside the black box of the executive compensation 
process). This investigation puts a focus on the behavioural and institutional factors in relation 
to the remuneration committee rather than directly relies on the explanations and 
                                                          
13See Figure Three. 
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interpretations of empirical findings. Accordingly, the main case study proposition that can be 
structured as follows14: 
(H4): Behavioural and institutional factors in relation to the remuneration 
committee play a key role in determining the composition and size of 
executive directors’ remuneration packages. 
The null proposition (H0) here points out that there is no behavioural and institutional aspects, 
in particular those relating to the remuneration committee, which might have an influence on 
executive compensation packages, and as a result adequate and apparent compensation records 
will enhance and empower the levels of corporate performance. On the other hand, the 
alternate proposition (H4) shows that behavioural and institutional drivers in relation to the 
remuneration committee might play a significant role in determining the volume and structure 
of executives’ pay packages. 
6.2.3 Research Examination Plan and Data Collection 
The research proposition is examined by adopting two research methods. The first research 
method is that of archival case study analysis, which aims to review the nature of 
remuneration practice for the period under examination, with a reference to the previously 
discussed of theoretical perspectives underlying the research questions and the role of the 
remuneration committee in setting the type and extent of executive pay packages. 
The within-case examination along with literature review assists the assurance of internal and 
external validity. Analysis should seek to build up separate case descriptions, views, and 
trends by which research outlines or patterns can be identified (Yin, 2009). As Collis and 
Hussey (2003, p.163) stated that, “qualitative data in business research provides a more ‘real’ 
basis for analysis and interpretation”. The main research examination plan which is applied 
here is to investigate the qualitative information provided by BP as to the nature of 
remuneration and compensations for its senior executives. It is recognised that an archival-
based case study cannot necessarily establish definitively the suitability or ranking of any one 
                                                          
14According to Ryan, et al. (2002), Collis and Hussey (2003), and Yin (2009), the case study hypothesis has to 
provide reliable explanation to the research concern, it should be able to be tested, and it is supposed to be 
reasonable based on research inquiries. 
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particular theory as to the manner in which executive director remuneration is established. It is 
however contended that such a study can offer a range of insights into the process whereby it 
is established, extend experience, or add strength to what is already known through previous 
research, as well as into the factors and competing pressures which underlie the process and 
drive therefore the outcomes (again consistent with the explanation of Yin (2009)). 
The second research method is that of practical content analysis15 - as a supplement 
examination to the archival content analysis - by which two key procedures are applied with 
the ambition to explore the empirical inferences about the messages within the texts (Collis 
and Hussey, 2003; and Yin, 2009). First, the BP directors’ remuneration reports are imported 
into manageable categories on a variety of levels (e.g. word, phrase, or sentence) as a 
preliminary preparation for coding them in themes afterward. Second, the material contained 
within BP directors’ remuneration reports (i.e. documents, reports, and accounts) are 
examined via applying two types of basic methods of content analysis (i.e. conceptual analysis 
and relational analysis16) via utilising NVivo: Data Analysis Software. 
The basic documents under examination in relation to BP are the Directors Remuneration 
Reports (DRRs) over the period 2001-2010. These are of course encompassed within 
company’s data and records, annual reports and accounts, and published statistics. The main 
source of this documentation is the BP company website17. This documentation is in part 
qualitative (essentially based on textual material) – but there is also a significant contribution 
                                                          
15Content analysis - a qualitative data analysis approach (Collis and Hussey, 2003) - has been applied in a number 
of previous studies in the accounting literature for the examination of management representations (Aerts, 
1994), accounting standards (Bennett et al., 2006), and exposure drafts’ submission (Yen et al., 2007); however 
the content of directors’ remuneration reports has not been analysed. This examination is used to extract sense 
and meaning from textual materials so as to determine the presence of common concepts, themes, phrases, and 
numbers in an objective manner (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Over the period under examination, NVivo 
software is utilised with the ambition to identify and gather the selected terms (i.e. nodes), code terms of 
interest, and examine coded terms by using a set of analytical techniques (Yin, 2009). These techniques provide 
support in establishing the presence and frequency of concepts in a text (conceptual ‘thematic’ analysis), and 
examining and mapping the relationships among these concepts (relational ‘network’ analysis). Subject to the 
research questions, these techniques are used to identify whether particular coded terms in BP directors’ 
remuneration reports are more prevalent and whether the prevalence of coded terms changes over time. 
16Conceptual and relational frameworks are considered the two major approaches in content analysis research. In 
conceptual ‘thematic’ approach, a term or unit is identified and coded clearly for examination in order to 
establish the existence and frequency of concepts in a text; while the relational ‘network’ analysis is aiming to 
examine and map the relationships between concepts and references as it builds on conceptual analysis findings 
(Yin, 2009). 
17BP Annual Reports over the period 2001-2010 available at: 
http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9039692&contentId=7072683 
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from quantitative data relating, inter alia, to the actual directors’ remuneration numbers, 
aspects of corporate governance, and also those in relation to company performance. 
6.3 Theoretical Perspectives – Implications on BP Case Study 
There are a myriad of theories which have been developed - either as normative models of 
how executive pay should be determined or as explanatory models of how executive 
compensation is actually determined - although frequently the distinction between the 
normative and the descriptive is blurred. Rather than seek to rehearse this very extensive 
literature again in detail18, the researcher highlights here two aspects of theory which may be 
seen as in part at least competing (i.e. agency theory and managerial hegemony theory) before 
making brief reference to other behavioural strands of ‘theory’ which may be powerful in 
explaining the actuality of practice. 
The traditional perspective on the nature of commercial enterprise was that it was organised on 
the basis of individuals, or groups of individuals acting together, who provided the capital, 
undertook the risk and managed the day to day operation of the business. Successful enterprise 
and management might result in the accumulation of enormous wealth,19 unsuccessful 
enterprise and management could lead to the debtors prison or, in fiction at least, death on the 
tracks at Tenway Junction.20 Inevitably this is a partial perspective as in the real world the 
achievement or grant of monopoly rights, political patronage etc were frequently drivers of the 
rewards achieved - and also even the early joint stock companies would have managers, or 
their equivalent, who would work together with those responsible for the provision of capital 
to oversee the running of the business (Scott, 1910).  
However it was not until the twentieth century that there was recognition of the significant 
incremental change that had taken place in the arrangements between owners and professional 
managers, recognition most famously illustrated in Berle and Means’ book published in 1932. 
Since that date the relevance and importance of a managerial class, with incentives not 
                                                          
18See Chapter Three for more details. 
19As for example in the case of John Gladstone, father of the future Prime Minister, the second of sixteen children 
who coming from a relatively modest Scottish background accumulated a very substantial fortune from trading 
in corn, cotton and sugar  with the Americas and his plantation interests in the West Indies.. 
20For example: the fate of Ferdinand Lopez in Anthony Trollope’s novel of the period ‘The Prime Minister’. 
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necessarily derived from the ownership of a significant equity stake in the enterprise for which 
they work, has come to dominate much of the organisational and management literature. 
Within this literature an important theme has been the appropriate means to remunerate this 
managerial elite for the purpose of aligning their interests with those of the owners of the 
equity capital wherein interests normally seen in terms of maximising financial returns to the 
shareholders. In this context the ‘agency theory’ paradigm as formalised in a number of papers 
from the 1970s onwards, perhaps most notably that of Jensen and Meckling study in 1976, has 
been highly influential. In its simplest form agency theory provides a framework to examine 
the manner in which ‘principals’ (the equity shareholders) might seek to control and 
incentivise ‘agents’ (the managers) to work in their best interests in circumstances where the 
managers have information available to them, for example as to actual or likely outcomes of 
investment choice, information which is not so easily available to the shareholders. At a risk 
of oversimplification, agency theory perspectives suggest that principals have the ability to 
achieve appropriate incentivisation by means of suitably drawn contracts, contracts which are 
likely to include a mixture of direct and contingent compensation (contingent either upon the 
achievement of targets or share price behaviour) and are accompanied by monitoring 
procedures as to the fulfilment of those contracts, for example audit or direct or indirect board 
representation. One strand of agency theory suggests that in a rational expectations type world 
‘good’ managers will in fact voluntarily sign up to such forms of monitoring so as to 
demonstrate their bona fides vis-à-vis ‘bad’ managers. Even though generalisations across a 
wide field are fraught with difficulty, it is probably fair to characterise the majority of agency 
theorists as being supportive of the power of the markets and in the context of executive 
remuneration antithetical to intervention which might affect and distort the market process - 
although this perspective has given rise to those more critical of the paradigm (e.g. Tinker, 
1988) suggesting that agency theory is in essence little more than a Panglossian apologia for 
the status quo. 
However a separate strand of theory/explication suggests that in a real world of uncertainty 
and highly imperfect information, and one which is not necessarily characterised by a myriad 
of individual agents operating within a rational expectations framework, the institutional and 
organisational structures are such that managers have the ability to dominate and control the 
operations of the entity that they manage and, as an adjunct to this, largely determine their 
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own remuneration contracts (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004b; etc). Principals 
of inefficient companies may have residual powers in terms of an ability to sell their holdings 
to other companies - in which case the incumbent management is unlikely to remain in situ - 
but this is a blunt and uncertain power and frequently managerial contracts are written to 
ensure significant compensation in the event of loss of office. 
More recently the research focus has shifted - or perhaps come back in a circle - toward an 
emphasis on personal contact and relationships within organisations, a perspective which is 
seen as derived from the institutional theory as discussed above in Chapter Three. The last few 
years has seen an explosion in what is related to the network form of governance21 as 
introduced by Jones et al. (1997) which focuses directly on these contact relationships and 
enables companies to utilise social mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding exchanges 
which perhaps might be seen here relating to the behaviour of boardroom members. Although 
the case study research is not structured specifically in terms of governance networking view, 
a number of links and connections which might be seen as relevant in the context of the 
material under examination are highlighted, as well as references to the wider behavioural 
literature which focuses on the importance of structure, personal and psychological 
relationships and at times economic irrationality in determining behaviour and outcomes 
within organisations are provided. 
6.4 Research Discussion 
The discussion of BP case study is divided into two main sections. The first section is the 
archival-based case study which deals with reporting the analysis of the BP case study through 
viewing reports’ disclosure, board structure, directors’ remuneration packages, and the role of 
the remuneration committee in BP. The second section is more empirical in its focus seeking 
to investigate aspects of the manner in the frequency of concepts reported in BP 
documentation, as well as examining the relationships among these concepts. 
 
                                                          
21The network form of governance has received very extensive coverage in recent years as for example in the 
work of Clarke, 2004; Huse, 2005; Kirchmaeir and Stath, 2008 (see also Managerial Power Perspective in 
Bebchuk and Cohen 2003, and Bebchuk and Fried 2003). 
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6.4.1 Archival-base Case Study 
6.4.1.1 BP Case Study 
BP began life in 1909 as the Anglo-Persian oil company after a near ten years search for oil in 
Persia (modern day ‘Iran’) largely at the instigation of a wealthy UK private individual (who 
had received a sixty year concession over oil rights in Persia from the then Shah).22 After early 
difficulties it began to prosper in World War 1 (with injections of capital from the British 
government to support its contract to fuel the Royal Navy) and acquired the UK assets of 
‘British Petroleum’ - a German company which used the name for distribution purposes in the 
UK and whose UK assets were expropriated during the war. The company continued to 
flourish during the inter war years as the use of motor vehicles became more widespread. It 
discovered a major oil field in Iraq (in Kirkuk) in 1927 and in 1933 reached a compromise 
agreement with the government of Persia over the renegotiation of the original concession - 
albeit one which was still highly advantageous to the company ahead of a change of name to 
Anglo-Iranian in 1936. World War 2 - and quasi nationalisation of oil supply and distribution 
in the UK - was less kind to the company but post war recovery brought growth and expansion 
overseas although in 1951 a significant setback occurred with the nationalisation of its Iranian 
oil operations. Although a CIA inspired coup returned a significant stake to the company the 
writing was on the wall with regard to its Middle East interests as over the next twenty years 
the rise of Arab nationalism resulted in a rapid fall in the proportion of the newly renamed 
British Petroleum’s revenues deriving from the region.  
Without its ready made supply of easy to drill Arabian oil (although Abu Dhabi continued to 
be a significant source) BP23 was forced to look elsewhere and in the 1960s the company 
spread its exploration activities successfully around the world, for example in Nigeria, the 
North Sea and in Alaska where, in 1968, after a decade of drilling dry wells along the North 
Slope, BP was on the verge of abandoning its search before, as in Persia sixty years earlier, a 
last chance drilling operation was successful. By the end of the century BP had further 
                                                          
22History of BP at: http://www.bp.com/multipleimagesection.do?categoryId=2010123&contentId=7059226 
23The British Petroleum Company used the title BP in much of its marketing and other literature until the formal 
change of name to BP Amoco in 1999 and then to BP in 2001.  
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developed its access to oil undertaking major joint venture projects in Russia and former 
Russian states, as well as successfully prospecting offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Meantime to assist its distribution of Alaskan oil in the US BP acquired 25% of Standard Oil 
of Ohio (SOHIO) and in 1987 purchased the company outright. This was followed by the key 
note ‘merger’ in 1998 with AMOCO (a former competitor in Iran) and a further significant 
‘merger’ with ARCO another US producer together with a number of other smaller deals. The 
driving force behind the acquisition strategy of the late 1990s was John Browne (Lord 
Browne) - a lifelong BP employee - appointed CEO in 1995 and who remained in that position 
until his resignation in 2007. Lord Browne was also credited with building on the work of his 
two immediate predecessors, Bob Horton and David Simon (Lord Simon) in streamlining 
BP’s work force and introducing much greater performance accountability throughout the 
company (Roberts, 2005).24 Throughout much of its corporate life – and for the entirety of the 
period under review - the main source of profitability for BP has been what it terms its 
upstream operations - essentially exploration and production - with much smaller 
contributions coming from refining and distribution and typically still less from the variety of 
non-core businesses including chemicals and more recently alternative energy.  
Over time the ownership of BP changed significantly - the early shareholdings reflected the 
initial proprietorial interest together with support from the older established Burmah Oil25. 
However in 1914 the UK government took a controlling stake in BP (and which at times 
exceeded 50%) – which it did not finally relinquish until the privatisations of 1979 and 1987. 
Today BP, and throughout the period under examination, has a mixture of institutional and 
private shareholders – including a very significant proportion of overseas investors, many of 
them US investors acquired at the time of the ‘mergers’ with AMOCO and ARCO at the end 
of the twentieth century.26 In recent years BP has been noted both for its strong cash flow and 
                                                          
24See: “Organising for performance: How BP did it”, John Roberts 2004 Stanford Business Magazine (February, 
2005) available at: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/bmag/sbsm0502/feature_bp.shtml 
25In 2000, BP - by then much the bigger of the two - reversed the roles by taking over Burmah Castrol.  
26Further details to the early history of BP can be found in The history of the British Petroleum Company: 
– Vol. I: R. W. Ferrier, The Developing Years 1901-1932, Cambridge University Press, 1982.  
– Vol. II: James H. Bamberg, The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928-1954, Cambridge University Press, 1994  
– Vol. III: James H. Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1951-1975: The Challenge of 
Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, 2000  
 For the early history of BP in Iran and Iraq, See: 
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high dividend yield although, as discussed further below, even ahead of Deepwater Horizon its 
shares had for many years failed to outperform the main UK market indices.27 
6.4.1.1.1 Reports’ Disclosure 
Throughout the period under review, the BP annual report28 contained specific information as 
to both corporate governance (from 2004 the ‘Governance: board performance report’ and 
later in 2007 just the ‘BP board performance report’) and executive directors’ remuneration 
(from 2002 the ‘Directors’ remuneration report’). The basic material for much of this case 
study is derived from these reports - in particular the Directors’ Remuneration Reports (DRRs) 
- although other information contained in the annual reports is also reviewed and referred to 
where appropriate together with information obtained from the internet or other sources.29  
6.4.1.1.2 Board Structure 
In the period covered by this study, although the size of the board of directors remained 
reasonably stable, there were significant changes in the personnel comprising that board. At 
end 200130 there were eighteen directors, six executive and twelve non-executive; whereas at 
end 2010 there were fifteen directors, three executive and twelve non-executive. However 
only one executive director (Byron Grote who had been appointed in August 2000) and two 
non-executives (Peter Sutherland the chairman from 1997 who stood down at the end of 2009, 
and Ian Prosser who had been deputy chairman from 1999 and retired in April 2010) were in 
situ throughout.31 Perhaps the most significant change had been the retirement, after a widely 
reported boardroom battle and hastened by publicity associated with his personal life, of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Karl E. Meyer and Shareen B. Brysac, Kingmakers: the Invention of the Modern Middle East, W.W. 
Norton, 2008. ISBN 978-0-393-06199-4  
A brief abstract available at: http://www.wwnorton.co.uk/book.html?id=1787 
27BP share price which was 555p at the start of 2001 had in fact fallen to 475p by end 2010. Check: 
http://production.investis.com/bp2/download/uk/  
Over this period the FTSE 100 decreased from 6198.1 to 5899.9. Check: 
http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=%5EFTSE#symbol=^ftse;range=20001127,20120218;compare=;indicat
or=volume;charttype=area;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined 
28See http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9039692&contentId=7072683 
29The length of the Annual Report grew from 38 pages in 2001 to 251 pages in 2010. The Directors’ 
Remuneration Report, or equivalent, expanded from 5 pages in 2001 to 12 pages in 2010. 
30The BP Annual Report is normally published in February of the year following the calendar year to which it 
relates. In this paper, year references are to the year covered by the report not its date of publication. 
31Sutherland would presumably not have participated directly in the board meetings immediately ahead of the 
2009 Annual Report and Annual General Meeting. 
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CEO Lord Browne in 2007 and his replacement as CEO by his erstwhile protégé Tony 
Hayward who had joined the Board in 2003. 
6.4.1.1.3 Executive Directors’ Remuneration Packages 
Throughout the period under examination the composition of the remuneration packages 
available to executive directors remained broadly similar comprising: a basic salary, an annual 
performance bonus payable in cash, fully paid shares under longer term incentive plans 
‘performance shares’, and for part of the period ‘share options’ dependent upon the 
achievement of performance targets - a pattern which, with variations thereon, is common 
across the great majority of large UK quoted companies. In addition over the period all 
executive directors participated in pension schemes - some received resettlement or 
accommodation allowances and there were occasional (but not insignificant) one-off payments 
to directors under the heading ‘retention allowances’. The determination of the criteria under 
these headings to be used in assessing the amount of remuneration to be received by individual 
directors, throughout the period, was the responsibility of the ‘remuneration committee’, a 
board committee consisting entirely of non-executive directors - whose recommendations are 
subject to the approval by the full board and ultimately by the shareholder body. As noted 
above - and below - there has been quite extensive criticism in some years of these 
recommendations, but in no year under consideration did the shareholders not approve the 
proposals put before them. 
In Table 24 Panel A shows the disclosed remuneration of the BP executive directors 
(including the CEO) in post at the end of each calendar year between 2001 and 2010 under the 
headings of annual salary, bonus, pension, other cash payments and the grant of fully paid 
performance related shares as well as share options at market price. Panel B (also in Table 24) 
presents the disclosed remuneration of the CEO under the same headings. The figures are 
derived from BoardEx data base and it is not that easy to reconcile these numbers with those 
contained within the company annual reports32 - particularly those in respect to the Long Term 
Incentive Plan, as shown below during the discussion. They do however contain valuations of 
                                                          
32Data bases are occasionally criticised about the values of components included, especially for those which are 
not easy to extract from the companies’ annual reports and accounts (such as LTIPs, options, etc), which they 
are more likely to be subjected to the individual diligence. 
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the options which are not easy to obtain from the annual reports, although values were 
calculated by BP based on a Black and Scholes model for the purpose of relating the 
proportion of pay which was directly linked to performance. The figures are heavily 
influenced by the changing pattern of board composition as new directors came onto the 
board, for instance the replacement in the early years of the decade of Ford (retired in 2002), 
Buchanan (2002), Chase (2003), Olver (2004) and finally in 2007 Lord Browne, by the 
younger generation of Grote (appointed in 2000), Allen, Hayward, Manzoni (all appointed in 
2003), Conn (2004), and Inglis33 (2007, who resigned in 2010 as well as Hayward) which 
initially resulted in lower basic salary payments for the incoming directors. They also show 
the domination in terms of relative remuneration by Lord Browne over the period 2001-2006 
and the significant increases in terms of both salary and bonus achieved in 2007 by the other 
directors following Lord Browne’s departure in that year - most notably by the new CEO 
Tony Hayward - and which together with the one-off retention awards of £1.5m shares made 
to both Conn and Inglis in February 2008 compensated for the non-award of any performance 
shares in this year. 
These increases accelerated in 2008 together with the return of performance share awards, 
albeit at modest levels relative to those in previous years, and continued propelled by 
enhanced bonus and performance share awards in 2009 - and in this year for the first time, the 
compensation package of Tony Hayward in respect to salary and bonus matched that of Lord 
Browne in the earlier part of the decade - although it still lagged significantly behind in terms 
of performance shares and share options. In 2010 - consequent to Deepwater Horizon - there 
were, with minor exceptions, no rises in salary or bonuses for the executive directors. There 
were also significant boardroom changes with both Hayward and Inglis leaving the board and 
the appointment of Dudley as CEO. 
                                                          
33Manzoni - who had been seen as a contender for the position of CEO left the board in 2007, and Allen – a close 
associate of Lord Browne left in 2008. The only other change in the executive directors in the period under 
examination occurred in 2009 when Robert Dudley, who had previously been the managing director of the joint 
venture with TNK, joined the board. In 2010, following the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and its aftermath, 
Andy Hayward stepped down and was replaced by Dudley and not long after Inglis head of exploration and 
production left the board. 
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Table 24: BP Executive Directors’ and CEO’s Compensation Packages with Descriptive Statistics 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Median SD Min. Max. 
Panel A: Executive Directors’ Compensation Packages from 2001 till 2010 (£,000) 
Salary 3,702 2,743 3,421 3,248 3,699 3,879 3,104 3,197 3,751 2,343 3,309 488.894 2,343 3,879 
Bonus 5,159 3,437 4,582 5,079 4,217 2,168 4,078 4,657 6,494 238 4,011 1,744.1 238 6,494 
DC Pensions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 695 302 262 217 206 216 265 277 479 405 332 154.41 206 695 
Value of Equity Awarded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Value of LTIP Awarded 13,748 9,350 15,599 14,484 26,317 21,515 15,447 16,391 4,278 1,552 13,868 7,376.9 1,552 26,317 
Intrinsic Value of Options Awarded 0 0 1,858 2,426 3 2 0 0 0 0 429 912.755 0 2,426 
Estimated Value of Options 
Awarded 
6,499 3,417 5,474 6,274 5 7 0 2 2 0 2,168 2,910.49 0 6,499 
Total Remuneration during the 
Period 
29,108 18,947 29,076 29,085 34,238 27,569 22,629 24,247 14,525 4,538 23,396 8,740.98 4,538 34,238 
Number of Executives 6 4 6 6 6 6 5 4 5 3 5 1.1005 3 6 
Average Pay               
Panel B: CEO’s Compensation Packages from 2001 till 2010 (£,000)  
Salary 1,193 1,203 1,316 1,382 1,451 1,531 877 998 1,045 760 1,176 252.99 760 1,531 
Bonus 1,772 1,588 1,882 2,280 1,750 900 1,262 1,496 2,090 0 1,502 659.4 0 2,280 
DC Pensions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 55 49 79 82 90 95 14 15 23 365 87 102.48 14 365 
Value of Equity Awarded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Value of LTIP Awarded 4,457 3,947 5,699 6,509 12,472 10,066 4,344 4,444 1,183 376 5,350 3,668.67 376 12,472 
Intrinsic Value of Options Awarded 0 0 847 1,365 0 0 0 0 0 0 221 482.05 0 1,365 
Estimated Value of Options 
Awarded 3,256 2,220 2,662 3,523 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
1,166 1,543.08 0 3,523 
Total Remuneration during the 
Period 10,678 8,958 11,559 13,694 15,673 12,497 6,483 6,938 4,318 
1,501 
9,230 4,426.84 1,501 15,673 
 
Notes: This table recaps a number of descriptive statistics for BP executives’ and CEO’s remuneration components from 2001 until 2010, amounts are presented 
through British Pounds. All pay components are rounded to the nearest thousand. Panel A reports statistics relating to BP board executives, while Panel B 
presents similar figures for BP CEO pay. The average pay components are derived from the total remuneration during the period over the number of 
executives. 
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The following sub-sections detail the nature of executive compensation components and the 
developments of achievements’ criteria for these pay components over the period under the 
respective headings of: base salary, annual bonus, long term incentives, performance shares, 
share options, pensions, other remuneration, as well as non-executive directorship. 
6.1.1.1.1.1 Base Salary 
Salaries for executive directors were significantly increased in 2001: 
‘Taking into account this advice and the fact that base salaries had not previously been 
increased since October 1999, the committee decided to increase Lord Browne’s salary 
by 47% and the other executive directors’ salaries by an average of 15% for 2001.’1 
Changes in future years reflected both the generational shift in the composition of the board 
and also changes in job description – but on an individual basis saw significant increases across 
the period under examination. The only executive director in post throughout (Grote) saw his 
base salary more than double from $665,000 in 2001 to $1,380,000 in 2009 and 2010 too. In 
2003 Allen, Hayward and Manzoni all received a base salary of £367,000. By 2006 - the year 
before the board room changes of 2007 - their salaries had risen to £463,000 for each 
individual. Conn who received £400,000 pro rata in 2004 saw his basic salary rise to £690,000 
in 2009 and 2010 too. In 2009, Hayward’s salary had risen to £1,045,000, although he had of 
course stepped up to be the CEO in 2007 (and in fact his basic salary was still below the 
£1,531,000 received by Lord Browne in 2006 – in 2007, Lord Browne also received an ex 
gratia payment equivalent to one year’s salary of £1,575,000). In 2010 Hayward’s salary 
received £958,000 as a last fixed sum before leaving the board, as well as Dudley’s salary rose 
to $1,175,000 compared with his start in 2009 by $750,000 due to his role as group chief 
executive at the end of the year. However Dudley’s salary had been reported as $1,000,000 in 
2009 and $1,700,000 in 2010 by adding the amount of non-cash benefits and other 
emoluments.2 
These increases in salaries were well in excess of any form of match with UK inflation or 
earnings indices for the relevant period - and ahead, albeit by rather less, of average increases 
                                                          
1Annual Report, (2001), p.36 
2Annual Report, (2009), p.84; and Annual Report, (2010), p.114 
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in remuneration of the BP work force.3 Furthermore they are important in that they form the 
baseline for the annual cash bonus payable subject to the achievement of the targets - and as 
these targets were routinely achieved - then the increasing level of base salary effectively acted 
as a multiplier to the annual bonus received. They also form the base for the calculation of the 
number of performance shares that might be awarded - as is discussed further below. 
6.1.1.1.1.2 Annual Bonus 
The nature of bonuses - which in general more than doubled the basic salary payments in every 
year - are investigated by taking the nature of these bonuses into consideration, and also the 
manner in which the criteria for the bonuses has been set as discussed in increasing detail in the 
respective executive directors’ remuneration reports.  
Salient features of change over the period were an increase in the percentage of base salary 
which could be awarded - in 2001 it was 100% (110% for the CEO) going up to 150% in 
exceptional circumstances, in 2005 it rose to 120% (130% for the CEO), and remained at that 
level thereafter although the 150% ceiling remained (except it had risen to 165% for the CEO). 
Throughout the remuneration committee discretion has been claimed to award higher or lower 
bonuses than those achieved according to the targets. The extent to which this discretion was 
exercised in any year is not that clear, although it would appear that normally it moved the 
numbers up with the salient exception of 2006, the only year for which the bonus in aggregate 
did not match base salary, where there was a significant reduction: 
‘While the quantitative assessment generated a near-target score, the remuneration 
committee also considered broader qualitative factors. These included the findings of 
internal and external reports on operational and safety issues in the US business. On 
balance, the committee judged that bonus levels should be reduced by 50% from the level 
they would otherwise have been.’4 
In addition the annual bonus amounted to only just over 50%. However this was very much a 
one-off and by 2009 bonuses amounted to approximately 170% (and 200% for the CEO) well 
above the specified normal maximum.  
                                                          
3Calculation of the increase in pay for BP employees is complicated because the numbers are reported in dollars and 
affected by exchange rate movements and also the significant shrinkage and change in composition of the work 
force over the period.  
4Annual Report, (2006), p.69 
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The proposed targets themselves also changed across the individual years although maintaining 
a mix of financial and non-financial targets throughout - and the amount of detail given as to 
the nature of the targets and feedback on their achievement increased significantly and all (but 
monotonically) over the period under review. In respect to targets for 2002, there is just 
reference to ‘a mix of financial targets and leadership objectives’ without providing any such 
information related to these types of objectives. For 2003, slightly more detail as to the aspects 
of corporate performance in general was provided: 
‘Executive directors’ annual bonus awards for 2003 will again be based on a mix of 
demanding financial targets and other leadership objectives, established at the beginning 
of the year. In addition to business performance, they cover areas such as people, safety, 
environment and organization.’5  
In 2004, there was no significant change – but rather more detail was provided as to what 
constituted good performance:  
‘Executive directors’ annual bonus awards for 2004 will be based on a mix of demanding 
financial targets relating to the company’s annual plan and leadership objectives 
established at the beginning of the year. In addition to stretching milestones and long-run 
metrics to track the enactment of strategy, they include areas such as people, safety, 
environment and organization.’6  
For 2005, more information was provided as to the breakdown of the targets (i.e. the 
achievement criteria) in to financial, strategic, and individual performance factors by 50, 30, and 
20 percents, respectively: 
‘Executive directors’ annual bonus awards for 2005 will be based on a mix of 
demanding financial targets, based on the company’s annual plan and leadership 
objectives established at the beginning of the year, in accordance with the following 
weightings: 
• 50% financial measures from the annual plan principally on cash flow. 
• 30% annual strategic metrics and milestones taken from the five-year group business 
plan. There is a wide range of measures, including those relating to people, safety, 
environment, technology and organization, as well as operational actions and 
business development. 
                                                          
5Annual Report, (2002), p.34 
6Annual Report, (2003), p.109 
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• 20% individual performance against leadership objectives and living the values of the 
group which incorporates BP’s code of conduct.’7 
Although the breakdown between financial and non-financial remained the same for 2006 in 
levels of proportions, there was a significant shift away from cash flow toward the accounting 
data in terms of the financial metrics: 
‘Executive directors’ annual bonus awards for 2006 will be based on a mix of 
demanding financial targets, based on the company’s annual plan and leadership 
objectives established at the beginning of the year, in accordance with the following 
weightings: 
• 50% financial and operational metrics from the annual plan, principally earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) and return on average 
capital employed (ROACE).  
• 30% annual strategic milestones taken from the five-year group business plan, 
including those relating to technology, operational actions and business development.   
• 20% individual performance against leadership objectives and living the values of the 
group, which incorporates BP’s code of conduct.’8 
There was no significant change for 2007 (although ‘cash costs’ were reinstated together with 
EBITDA and ROACE as an identified financial metric), or for 2008 other than slight reductions 
in the weighting for financial data and individual performance: 
‘Bonus for 2008 will reflect the business priorities of safety, people and performance as 
articulated by Dr Hayward. Of the 120% ‘on-target’ bonus, 50 will be measured on 
financial results, principally earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), return on average capital employed and cash flow; 25 will be based on safety 
as assessed by the safety, ethics and environment assurance committee (SEEAC); 25 on 
people, behaviour and values; and 20 on individual performance, which will primarily 
reflect relevant operating results and leadership.’9 
For 2009, there was further individualization: 
‘The group chief executive’s and group chief financial officer’s bonuses will be based 70% 
on group performance against key metrics in the annual plan, 15% on safety performance 
and 15% on people. The chief executives of Exploration and Production and Refining and 
                                                          
7Annual Report, (2004), p.120 
8Annual Report, (2005), p.165 
9Annual Report, (2007), p.64 
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Marketing will have 50% of their bonuses determined on the above basis and 50% on the 
performance of their respective businesses.’10 
For 2010, more radical changes were proposed with an increase in the proposed uplift levels 
(150% on target and maximum of 225% of salary)11 - but with one third payable in deferred 
shares and subject to assessment of safety and environmental performance over the three year 
period.12  
For 2011, information was unchanged other than focusing more on a number of corporate 
performance metrics - particularly in both short and long terms: 
‘The approach for 2011 aligns closely with the group template for reinforcing safety 
and risk management, rebuilding trust and reinforcing value creation. There is a 
balance of long-term and near-term objectives weighted towards the top priorities of 
risk identification and management, safety and compliance, and talent and capability 
development. Group measures for executive directors will focus on: 
• Safety and operational risk metrics – including full implementation of the S&OR 
functional model. 
• Short-term performance – including key financial and operating metrics. 
• Long-term performance – including progress on key projects and reserves 
replacement. 
• People – including a new performance and reward framework.’13 
Progressively over the period more details were given as to the proposed targets and also as to 
the outcomes relating to those targets. Space does not permit a full rehearsal/narrative of these 
disclosures, but there is a clear contrast, for instance, between the bonus in years 2001 and 2009. 
In 2001, bonus entirety consisted of: 
‘Executive directors’ annual bonus awards for 2001 were based on a mix of financial 
targets and leadership objectives established at the beginning of the year. Assessment of 
all the targets showed that, compared with a target performance of 100 points, 135 points 
were achieved, resulting in bonus awards as shown in the summary of remuneration on 
page 32.’14 
                                                          
10Annual Report, (2008), p.79 
11Annual Report, (2009), p.85 
12Together with an option to defer a further third 
13Annual Report, (2010), p.114 
14Annual Report, (2001), p.36 
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However, in 2009, bonus’ proposed targets and related outcomes are discussed in details as 
follows:  
‘The annual bonus awards for 2009 reflect the excellent performance achieved across the 
business and are set out in the table on page 83.  
Performance measures and targets were set at the beginning of the year based on the 
group’s annual plan. Group results formed the basis for Dr Hayward’s, Mr Dudley’s and 
Dr Grote’s annual bonus and were weighted 70% on financial and operating results 
(including profit, cash flow, cash costs, production, reserves replacement, Refining and 
Marketing profitability, refining availability, and installed wind capacity), 15% on safety 
(both metrics and progress on plans), and 15% on people (including organizational 
changes and employee attitudes). Mr Conn’s and Mr Inglis’s annual bonuses were based 
50% on the group results as above, and 50% on their respective business unit results 
(also a mix of financial, operating, safety and people measures). The target level of bonus 
for executive directors was 120% of salary with committee judgement to award up to 
150% for exceeding targets and above that level to recognize exceptional performance.  
Targets were exceeded on virtually all key measures during 2009, a number by a 
substantial margin and resulting in bonuses averaging 170% of salary.  
All key safety and operating metrics (including days away from work case frequency 
(DAFWCF), recordable injury frequency (RIF), oil spills, loss of primary containment, 
and process safety high potential incidents) showed good results and significant 
improvements in all cases from 2008. Implementation of the operating management 
system (OMS) progressed ahead of plan and is now successfully installed at 70 operating 
entities including all major downstream sites. People metrics were also exceeded. Major 
organizational restructuring was completed including reducing the number of group 
leaders and senior level leaders in excess of plan. The employee survey results showed 
significant improvement in key aspects such as safety and compliance and performance 
culture, as well as overall employee satisfaction.  
Exceptional results were achieved on financial and operating measures. Replacement 
cost profit was some $5billion above plan after adjusting for the oil price and other 
environmental factors. Cash costs were reduced substantially. Production increased by 
more than 4% while unit production costs reduced by 12%.The reserves replacement 
ratio was 129%, continuing an industry-leading performance. Refining and Marketing 
cash costs were reduced by 15%, and refining availability increased to 94%. Refining 
and Marketing profitability exceeded plan after adjusting for a dramatically weaker 
industry environment. Exploration and Production achieved major project start-ups in 
the Gulf of Mexico, Indonesia and Trinidad & Tobago. Exploration successes included 
the Tiber discovery in the Gulf of Mexico and new access for future growth was secured 
in Iraq, Indonesia and Jordan as well as new acreage in the Gulf of Mexico.  
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The excellent results achieved during 2009 reflect the strong leadership of the executive 
team and their continuing focus on safety, people and performance.’15 
 
In addition, this is illustrated further in the 2010 report where separate disclosures as to the 
annual and deferred bonuses included the following:  
‘Annual bonus 
The 2010 annual bonus results were dramatically affected by the Gulf of Mexico accident. 
In the judgement of the committee and the group chief executive this overrode the normal 
metrics for bonus outcomes. As indicated in the table on page 112, no bonus was paid to 
Mr Dudley, Dr Hayward or Mr Inglis for 2010. Mr Conn and Dr Grote similarly received 
no bonus for their group portion and were limited to an ‘on-target’ level for their 
segment/functional portion (accounting for 30% of their overall bonus opportunity). Both 
of these met or exceeded targets and made important contributions to the stabilization of 
the business following the accident. 
The total bonus to Mr Conn was £310,500 and to Dr Grote $621,000. Of the total for each, 
one-third is paid in cash, one-third is deferred on a mandatory basis and one-third is paid 
either in cash or voluntarily deferred at the individual’s discretion. These amounts are 
shown in the table on page 112. 
 
Deferred bonus 
One-third of the bonus awarded to Dr Grote and Mr Conn is deferred into shares on a 
mandatory basis under the terms of the deferred bonus element. Their deferred shares are 
matched on a one-for-one basis and will vest in three years contingent on an assessment of 
safety and environmental sustainability over the three-year deferral period. 
Both individuals may elect to defer an additional third into shares on the same basis as the 
mandatory deferral. 
All deferred bonuses are converted to shares based on an average price of BP shares over 
the three days following the company’s announcement of 2010 results (£4.84/share, 
$46.68/ADS).’16 
6.1.1.1.1.3 Long Term Incentives 
Throughout the period under examination the base salary and annual bonus were paid wholly in 
cash. However, as noted above, there were longer term share based incentive plans in operation 
throughout. The Executive Directors’ Long Term Incentive Plan (EDLTIP),17 which was 
approved by shareholders in April 2000, included the potential for the award of fully paid 
                                                          
15Annual Report, (2009), p.84 
16Annual Report, (2010), p.114 
17The acronym was later shortened to EDIP. 
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shares, share options, or cash. Through until 2010 the main component has been the award of 
fully paid shares based on the achievement of performance targets over a three-year rolling 
period, ending at the close of the relevant year. These shares would not vest for another three 
years but - although there were provisions for discretion to be exercised in the vesting, no 
subsequent performance targets were set.18  In 2001 through to 2004 share options granted at 
market price were also important and nearly 10m options were granted - but in 2004 the 
remuneration committee stated that they did not intend to use the grant of share options in 
future periods - and with the exception of small numbers flowing through from previous 
schemes, none have been awarded since. Nor have there been any direct cash awards. 
‘The share element of the EDIP will provide the long-term performance-based 
component of the executive directors’ remuneration package. There is no current 
intention to make further share options grants.’19 
Successful performance against the targets set gave rise to the potential for very significant 
rewards beyond the annual salary and bonus. In 2001 awards of £10.8m were made20.21 In 2002 
they were £3.2m, in 2003 £3.5m, in 2004 £4.7m, in 2005 £8.0m, and in 2006 £4.9m. However 
in 2007 there was only an award of £0.4m to a director who had left during the year (Lord 
Browne)22 and - although the awards were on an upward trajectory in 2008 £1.4m and 2009 
£2.5m, they were still well below the levels achieved in the first half of the decade. Nor there 
have been any EDIP awards in 2010. 
In terms of share options, approximately 2.2m were granted in 2001 (more than half of them to 
Lord Browne), 2.1m in 2002 (more than 60% to Lord Browne), 2.7m in 2003 (all but 50% to 
Lord Browne), 2.7m in 2004 (more than 50% to Lord Browne), after which - as noted above - 
the use of share options within the reward package was discontinued and has not been 
reinstated. 
 
                                                          
18There is no evidence of any awards once made been subsequently reduced. 
19 Annual Report, (2004), p.119 
20In 2001 only the number of shares awarded to each individual director was disclosed, but the comparative value 
figures were disclosed in 2002. 
21The value calculations are based upon straight multiplication of the number of shares and their then market value - 
no adjustment appears to have been made in respect to the three-year vesting period. 
22This was based on the wind down of a previous incentive plan. 
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6.1.1.1.1.4 Performance Shares 
Within the LTIP framework, performance shares were - and are - intended to provide the 
opportunity for executive directors to obtain very significant additional remuneration for strong 
performance. The potential number of shares to be awarded has throughout been based on 
multipliers of salary. No specific detail as to these multipliers was provided in 2001, 2002 and 
2003 - in 2001 there was disclosure of the maximum number of shares per director that could 
be awarded under the commencing plan (2002-2004), but the equivalent information was not 
provided in 2002 or 2003. It was not until the 2004 Annual Report that full detail regarding the 
maximum (subject to the exercise of discretion by the remuneration committee) future awards 
available under the 2005-2007 scheme was provided. 
‘The maximum number of performance shares that may be awarded to an executive 
director in any one year will be determined at the discretion of the remuneration 
committee and will not normally exceed 5.5 x base salary and, in the case of the group 
chief executive, 7.5 x base salary’23 
The same formula was used in 2005, 2006 and presumably in 2007 - although it is not 
specifically referred to. In 2008, there is reference to a maximum of 5.5 of the base salary for any 
executive director without any special reference to the CEO - but it is clear from the change in 
2009 (to reflect the greater weight being given to the annual bonus) that his differential had been 
maintained: 
‘The share element of the EDIP has been a feature of the plan, with some modifications, 
since its inception in 2000. To reflect the introduction of the deferred matching element, 
the maximum number of shares that can be awarded will be reduced from 7.5 times salary 
to 5.5 times salary for the group chief executive and from 5.5 times salary to 4.75 times 
salary for the chief executive of Exploration and Production, and to four times salary for 
the other executive directors.’24 
In 2010, no significant change provided other than the maximum number of shares awarded to 
the chief executive of Exploration and Production was unmentioned.  
Over the period, targets set for the award of performance shares focused largely - but not entirely 
- on comparisons with other oil and gas companies based on three performance measures (i.e. 
                                                          
23Annual Report, (2004), p.120 
24Annual Report, (2009), p.85 
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SHRAM, ROACE, and EPS growth). In 2001 reporting on the outcome of the 1998-2000 plan, it 
was noted:  
‘The share element compares BP’s performance against oil majors over three years, on a 
rolling basis. This has been assessed in terms of a three-year shareholder return against 
the market (SHRAM), return on average capital employed (ROACE) and earnings per 
share (EPS) growth.’25 
For the 1998-2000 plan, the award for which was made in 2001 - the comparators were Chevron, 
Texaco, ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalFinaElf - and this was the case for the 1999-2001 plan as 
well for which an award was recommended in 2001. For the 2000-2002 and 2003 plan, the 
comparator group was ExxonMobil, Shell, TotalFinaElf, ChevronTexaco, ENI and Repsol-YPF. 
But in 2001, it was decided to change the comparator base for 2002-2004 plan to the FTSE All 
World Oil and Gas index: 
‘The comparator group of companies used for the SHRAM performance condition in the 
share element has been reduced so much by industry consolidation that the committee 
has decided for the 2002-2004 Plan to change to the FTSE All World Oil and Gas Index 
weighted by market capitalization. The committee is satisfied that this change does not 
make the performance targets of the Plan less demanding.’26 
The 2004 Report provided further detail as to the relevant criteria for the awards running through 
to 2006 by specifying the four key comparators (i.e. ExxonMobil, Shell, Total, and 
ChevronTexaco): 
‘The primary measure is BP’s shareholder return against the market (SHRAM), which 
accounts for nearly two thirds of the potential total award, the remainder being assessed 
on BP’s relative return on average capital employed (ROACE) and earnings per share 
growth (EPS).  
BP’s SHRAM is measured against the companies in the FTSE All World Oil & Gas 
Index. Companies within the index are weighted according to their market capitalization 
at the beginning of each three-year period in order to give greatest emphasis to oil 
majors. BP’s ROACE and EPS growth are measured against ExxonMobil, Shell, Total 
and ChevronTexaco.’27 
                                                          
25Annual Report, (2001), p.34 
26Ref o/s - Annual Review, (2001), p.34 
27Annual Report, (2004), p.121 
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But significantly, the basis had been changed for awards after that date based on TSR as a 
financial performance indicator to be 100%, 70% and 35% for achieving first, second or third 
position correspondingly: 
‘For share element awards in 2005, the performance condition will relate to BP’s total 
shareholder return (TSR) performance against the other oil majors (ExxonMobil, Shell, 
Total and ChevronTexaco) over a three-year period. TSR is calculated by taking the 
share price performance of a company over the period, assuming dividends to be 
reinvested in the company’s shares. All share prices will be averaged over the three 
months before the beginning and end of the performance period and will be measured in 
US dollars. At the end of the performance period, the TSR performance of each of the 
companies will be ranked to establish the relative total return to shareholders over the 
period. Shares under the award will vest as to 100%, 70% and 35% if BP achieves first, 
second or third place respectively; no shares will vest if BP achieves fourth or fifth 
place.’28 
This base was maintained in 2006 and 2007, but revised again in 2008 by including 
‘ConocoPhillips’ to the previous four comparators, and the balanced scorecard for non-financial 
performance measures to the TSR based on the same weighting: 
‘Performance conditions for the 2009-11 share element will be somewhat modified from 
previous years. First, the peer group of oil majors against which we compare will be 
increased to include ConocoPhillips as well as ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Chevron as 
previously. This change reflects ConocoPhillips’ significant growth over the last few 
years, providing it with similar scale and global reach to the other oil majors.  
Second, vesting of the shares will be based 50% on total shareholder return (TSR) versus 
the competitor group and 50% on a balanced scorecard of underlying performance 
versus the same competitors. The underlying performance will be assessed on three 
measures reflecting key priorities in BP’s strategy – in Exploration and Production, 
hydrocarbon production growth, in Refining and Marketing, improvement in earnings 
per barrel, and group increase in underlying net income. Both Exploration and 
Production growth and Refining and Marketing earnings improvement are key strategic 
objectives for the group and this inclusion aligns key measures with both executive 
director priorities as well as key drivers of value for shareholders. Group increase in 
underlying net income acts as a holistic measure of success reflecting revenues, costs and 
complexity as well as safe and reliable operations. 
                                                          
28Ref o/s - Annual Review, (2004), p.121 
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All the above measures will be compared with the five other oil majors to determine the 
overall vesting result. The methodology used will rank each of the five other majors on 
each of the measures. BP’s performance will then be compared on an interpolated basis 
relative to the performance of the other five. For performance between second and third 
or first and second, the result will be interpolated based on BP’s performance relative to 
the company ranked directly above and below it. As in previous years, performance 
shares will vest at 100%, 70% and 35% for performance equivalent to first, second and 
third rank respectively and none for fourth or fifth place. The three underlying measures 
will be averaged to form the balanced scorecard component.  
The committee considers that this combination of measures provides a good balance of 
external as well as internal metrics reflecting both shareholder value and operating 
priorities. As in previous years, the committee will exercise its discretion, in a reasonable 
and informed manner to adjust vesting levels upwards or downwards if it concludes the 
above quantitative approach does not reflect the true underlying health and performance 
of BP’s business relative to its peers. It will explain any adjustments in the next directors’ 
remuneration report following the vesting, in line with its commitment to transparency.’29 
This structure was maintained in 2009, but the weighting given to non-financial measures 
increased from half to two-thirds: 
‘Performance conditions for the 2010-12 share element will continue the structure used in 
the 2009-2011 plan.  
Vesting of shares will be based, as to one-third, on BP’s TSR compared with other oil 
majors over a three-year period and as to two-thirds, on a balanced scorecard of 
underlying performance. BP’s TSR performance will be compared with the other oil 
majors–ExxonMobil, Shell, Total, ConocoPhillips and Chevron.’30 
In 2010, the weighting of performance shares returned back to half for financial measures and 
the other half will be based on value creation, reinforcing safety and risk management, and 
rebuilding trust rather than balanced scorecard standard. 
‘Performance conditions for the 2011-2013 share element will be aligned with the 
strategic agenda that has evolved in response to last year’s events. This focuses on value 
creation, reinforcing safety and risk management, and rebuilding trust. 
Vesting of shares will be based 50% on BP’s total shareholder return (TSR) compared to 
the other oil majors, reflecting the central importance of restoring the value of the 
company. A further 20% will be based on the reserves replacement ratio, also relative to 
                                                          
29Annual Report, (2008), p.82-83 
30Annual Report, (2009), p.86 
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the other oil majors, reflecting a central element of value creation. The final 30% will be 
based on a set of strategic imperatives for rebuilding trust; in particular, reinforcing safety 
and risk management culture, rebuilding BP’s external reputation, and reinforcing staff 
alignment and morale.’31 
As the overall figures above suggest initially the outcomes under the plan were very 
encouraging, for example: 
‘For the 1998-2000 LTPP BP’s performance was assessed in terms of three-year 
shareholder return against the market (SHRAM) in relation to the following companies: 
Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and Texaco. BP came first in the 1998-2000 Plan, and the 
Remuneration Committee made the maximum award of shares to executive directors in 
2001. 
For the 1999-2001 Plan BP’s SHRAM again exceeded ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil and 
TotalFinaElf, but came second to Shell.  
The Remuneration Committee has also considered profitability and growth targets for the 
1999-2001 Plan, i.e. return on average capital employed (ROACE) and earnings per 
share (EPS) growth. On both measures BP came first in assessing performance against 
the same oil companies.  
Based on an initial performance assessment of 175 points out of 200, the committee 
expects to make an award of shares to executive directors…’32 
But relative performance began to decline particularly in respect to comparison of shareholder 
return. In 2002: ‘BP’s SHRAM came in at sixth place among the comparator group, fourth 
place on EPS growth and first place on ROACE’33 - which gave rise to a performance 
assessment of 80 points out of 200. An identical performance sixth, fourth and first was 
achieved in 2003 - but in that year the performance assessment was increased to 85 points. 
Things did not improve in 2004 - the first year of the use of the FTSE All World Oil & Gas 
index which saw a performance assessment of ‘75 points out of 200 (0 for SHRAM, 50 for 
ROACE and 25 for EPS growth)’34 -  a performance and assessment which was exactly 
                                                          
31Annual Report, (2010), p.115 
32Annual Report, (2001), p.35 
33Annual Report, (2002), p.38 
34Annual Report, (2004), p.125 
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repeated in 2005. In 2006, matters were still worse with a performance assessment of ‘60 points 
out of 200 (0 for SHRAM, 50 for ROACE and 10 for EPS growth)’35. 
In 2007, a nadir was reached with - for the first time in the period under consideration - no shares 
being awarded based on the overall assessment of compensation committee - although a number 
of good performing areas were achieved: 
‘Performance for the 2005-2007 share element was assessed relative to the TSR of the 
company compared with the other oil majors–ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Chevron. BP’s 
TSR result, reflecting past operating problems, was last relative to the other majors. The 
committee also reviewed the underlying business performance relative to competitors, 
including financial (ROACE, EPS, cash flow etc.) and non-financial (HSE etc.) indicators. 
While this showed some areas of strong performance, the committee’s overall assessment, 
considering both the TSR result and the underlying performance, was that performance 
failed to meet satisfactory levels and consequently no shares will vest in the Plan for 2005-
2007.’36 
In 2008 operating under the new criteria based on TSR comparison with other oil majors, the 
company again signally failed to meet the targets set – however the remuneration committee 
decided to use its discretion to make awards amounting to £1.4m. It justified this accordingly: 
‘Performance for the share element is assessed relative to the TSR of the company 
compared with the other oil majors – ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Chevron. Recognizing 
the inherent imperfections in a TSR ranking, the EDIP rules give the committee power to 
adjust (upwards or downwards) the vesting level derived from the TSR ranking if it 
considers that the ranking does not fairly reflect BP’s underlying business performance 
relative to the comparators. This is designed to enable a more comprehensive review of 
BP’s long-term performance, with the aims of tempering anomalies created by relying 
solely on a formula-based approach. 
For the 2006-2008 plan, BP was fifth relative to the other majors in terms of TSR when 
calculated on a common currency (US dollar) basis as originally anticipated. However, 
unusually large currency movements at the end of this period were an extraneous influence 
on this result. On a local currency basis, the TSRs of BP, Shell and Total were tightly 
bunched together. The committee also reviewed BP’s underlying business performance 
relative to the comparator companies over the full three-year period. This review included 
financial measures (earning per share growth, ROACE, free cash flow, net income), 
operating measures (production, reserves replacement and Refining and Marketing 
                                                          
35Annual Report, (2006), p.69 
36Annual Report, (2007), p.66 
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profitability), and nonfinancial measures (health, safety and environmental and 
reputation). Again, the performance of the European comparators was quite similar: BP 
led the group on some measures (notably free cash flow and reserves replacement) but 
lagged on Refining and Marketing profitability.  
The committee concluded that the TSR result, by itself, was not a fair reflection of BP’s 
relative underlying performance over the period. After thorough consideration, the 
committee determined that 15% of the shares under the 2006-08 award should vest – this 
being a fair reflection of the overall results achieved and consistent with its approach to 
the clustering of results, as anticipated in the EDIP rules approved by shareholders in 
2005. 
… 
Lord Browne also held an award under the 2006-08 share element related to long-term 
leadership measures. These focused on sustaining BP’s financial, strategic and 
organizational health. Performance relative to the award was assessed by the chairman’s 
committee and, based on this assessment, no shares were vested.’37 
In 2009, a rather similar story unfolded: 
‘This momentum of improvement is also apparent over the three-year performance period 
covered by the 2007-2009 share element under the EDIP. Performance for the share 
element is assessed relative to the other oil majors –ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and 
Chevron. The committee follows the assessment process approved by shareholders in 
determining the vesting of shares that had been awarded at the start of2007. It first 
compares the total shareholder return (TSR) of each of the majors and then reviews 
underlying performance metrics across the same group. Given the small peer group, 
similarity of their businesses, and general imperfections in measurement, there will be 
occasions when results of some or all of the companies are tightly clustered. In such 
circumstances, a small difference in TSR performance or calculation methodology could 
produce a large, and inappropriate, difference in vesting level. To counter this the 
committee has the obligation to review both relative TSR and underlying performance to 
ensure a balanced judgement is made. Such was the case with regard to the 2007-2009 
metrics.  
The TSR result was tightly clustered for 2007-2009 with BP coming fourth based on our 
established methodology but very close to third place. As required by the plan, the 
committee reviewed a number of financial and operating metrics to assess relative 
underlying performance. These included the average change over the three years of EPS, 
ROACE, free cash flow, net income, production growth and Refining and Marketing 
profitability. The review of underlying performance showed BP in a strong relative 
                                                          
37Annual Report, (2008), p.81 
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position. BP came first on change in EPS growth, ROACE, free cash flow and production, 
on adjusted net income BP ranked second and on Refining and Marketing profitability it 
came third. Based on the full review and combining both the TSR and underlying analysis, 
the committee judged BP to be tied for third place and thus shared the vesting outcome for 
third and fourth place (35% and 0%respectively) as set out in the plan rules. The resulting 
17.5% vesting for eligible participants is also shown in the table ...’38 
This decision resulted in £2.5m being awarded to the four executive directors (i.e. Conn, Dudley, 
Grote, and Inglis), although BP came fourth in terms of TSR comparison with its comparators. In 
2010, another nadir was reached with no shares being awarded - for the second time in the period 
under consideration - due to the massive oil-spill accident in the Mexican Gulf. 
‘Results for the 2008-2010 share element were also strongly affected by the Gulf of Mexico 
accident. BP‘s Total Shareholder Return (TSR) for the three-year period was lowest 
among the peer group of oil majors. The company‘s underlying performance relative to the 
peer group actually remained quite strong on the metrics historically used to test the 
fairness of the TSR result. The committee felt, however, that because of the seriousness of 
the Gulf of Mexico accident, the TSR ranking was an appropriate result. No shares, 
therefore, vested under the plan for any executive director.’39 
6.1.1.1.1.5 Share Options 
Although the LTIP framework still enables the use of share options effectively these options 
have not been awarded since 2004 - however they were quite a significant part of the 
remuneration package in the early years of the period under examination. The criteria for the 
award of option shares in the years 2001-2004 was based on comparative returns, but in this 
case the comparison was with a wider group of companies - as noted in the 2001 Annual 
Report: 
‘The share option element reflects BP’s performance relative to a wider selection of 
global companies. The committee will take into account BP’s total shareholder return 
(TSR) compared with the TSR for the FTSE Global 100 group of companies over the 
three years preceding the grant.’40 
Options vested in equal proportions over the three years subsequent to the grant and had a life 
of seven years - and the same basis was used for 2002, 2003 and 2004. In terms of how these 
                                                          
38Annual Report, (2009), p.84 
39Annual Report, (2010), p.114 
40Annual Report, (2001), p.34 
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options were allocated (and over the period more than half of them went to Lord Browne), very 
little information is provided other than the statement in 2003 that: 
‘In accordance with the framework approved by shareholders in 2000, it is the 
committee’s policy to continue to exercise its judgement in 2004 to decide the number of 
options to be granted to each executive director.’41  
Nor is any information as to valuation provided - although Black and Scholes in 1972 type 
valuations were calculated by the company for the purposes of estimation of the proportion of 
executive director remuneration which was performance based. 
6.1.1.1.1.6 Pensions 
Until quite recently, the very significant sums provided to directors and senior executives in 
terms of pension contributions made on their behalf have received relatively little attention. 
This has to an extent changed consequent to the introduction of further requirements for 
disclosure - and also the impact of revelations as to particular cause celebres e.g. that of the 
chief executive of RBS referred to above. The basic construction of the BP scheme as it applied 
to UK based directors42 was set out in the 2001 Annual Report as follows: 
‘Scheme members’ core benefits are non-contributory. They include a pension accrual 
of 1/60th of basic salary for each year of service, subject to a maximum of two-thirds of 
final basic salary; a lump-sum death-in-service benefit of three times salary; and a 
dependant’s benefit of two-thirds of the member’s pension. The Scheme pension is not 
integrated with state pension benefits.  
Normal retirement age is 60, but Scheme members who have 30 or more years’ 
pensionable service at age 55 can elect to retire early without an actuarial reduction 
being applied to their pension.  
Pensions payable from the Fund are guaranteed to be increased annually in line with 
changes to the Retail Prices Index, up to a maximum of 5% a year. 
Directors accrue pension on a non-contributory basis at the enhanced rate of 2/60ths of 
their final salary for each year of service as executive directors (up to the same two-
thirds limit). None of the directors is affected by the pensionable earnings cap.’43 
                                                          
41Annual Report, (2003), p.110 
42There is also significant detail provided as to the separate schemes relevant to US based directors – but space does 
not permit detailed exposition of these. 
43Annual Report, (2001), p.37 
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More information on the eligibility of executives for pension payments was added to the BP 
pension scheme as it applied to UK based directors in the 2002 Annual Report as follows: 
‘In accordance with the company’s long-standing practice for executive directors who 
retire from BP on or after age 55 having accrued at least 30 years’ service, Mr Chase 
will receive an ex-gratia lump sum as a superannuation payment from the company equal 
to one year’s base salary following his retirement. Lord Browne will remain eligible for 
consideration for such a payment. In the case of these individuals, all matters relating to 
such superannuation payments will be considered by the remuneration committee. Any 
such payments would be in addition to their pension entitlements referred to above. None 
of the other executive directors is eligible for consideration for a superannuation 
payment - as the remuneration committee decided in 1996 that appointees to the board 
after that time should cease to be eligible for consideration for such a payment.’44 
No significant change occurred in 2003. In 2004, the UK government had announced important 
proposals on pensions, the impact of which was to be reviewed by the committee in 2005 in 
conjunction with BP studies into the wider effects of the new legislation for employees.45 In 
2005, no change happened. Further information on the amendments of BP pension scheme in 
terms of the executive retirement age and setting of new pension allowance was added in the 
2006 Annual Report as follows: 
‘The rules of the BP Pension Scheme have recently been amended such that the normal 
retirement age is 65. Scheme members can retire on or after age 60 without reduction. 
Special early retirement terms apply to pre-1 December 2006 service for members with 
long service as at 1 December 2006.  
In April 2006, the UK government made important changes to the operation and taxation 
of pensions. The remuneration committee decided to deliver pension benefits in excess of 
the new lifetime allowance of £1.5 million set by the legislation via an unapproved and 
unfunded pension arrangement paid by the company direct.’46 
No change occurred in 2007. More information was provided in 2008, 2009 and 2010 Annual 
Reports related to Mr Inglis participation - as a member in the BP Pension Scheme - gave rise 
to a US federal tax liability as he was based in Houston - the amounts mentioned later on in 
                                                          
44Annual Report, (2002), p.39 
45Annual Report, (2004), p.122 
46Annual Report, (2006), p.71 
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section: Other Remuneration. Therefore the committee approved to discharge this US tax 
liability under a tax equalization arrangement in respect of each year.47 
Indicative figures show the speed at which the value of the benefit accruing to the executive 
directors rose. At end 2001, Lord Browne had accrued $16.3m dollars in terms of transferable 
value48, five years later at end 2006 this had raised to £21.7m. For Hayward, the increase was 
even more dramatic - at end 2002, his transferable value was £1.3m, seven years later it had 
risen to £10.8m. For Grote, over the same period the increase was from $3.5m to $12m. 
Furthermore, the rules of the scheme appear to have been generous in the instance of early 
retirement. For example, the 2007 Annual Report notes that: 
‘Dr Allen is due to retire on 31 March 2008 and will be entitled to take an immediate 
unreduced pension. The figures in the table relate to 2007 and so do not include 
anticipated incremental cost of the unreduced pension (£1.36 million).’49 
6.1.1.1.1.7 Other Remuneration 
Beyond these basic constituents of compensation, there were also a variety of additional 
benefits covering travel provision, relocation and accommodation allowances, disclosure of 
consultancy contracts with former directors etc. Perhaps the most striking individual 
components of these non-standard aspects of compensation were the £1.575m ex gratia lump 
sum payment to Lord Browne following his resignation in 2007, and the one-off retention 
awards of £1.5m shares made to both Conn and Inglis in February 2008. The following sets out 
some details of the disclosures relating to the period 2001-2010.50 
In 2001, resettlement allowances for Mr Ford and Dr Grote were $440,000 and $300,000 
respectively51, while in 2002 these allowances were $300,000 for Dr Grote, and $110,000 for 
Mr Ford52.  
Resettlement allowance for Dr Grote was $175,000 in 2003. Besides this Mr Chase was 
engaged as a consultant to BP in relation to the TNK-BP transaction, following his retirement 
                                                          
47Annual Reports for period 2008/09/10 in pages 83/86/116 respectively. 
48These figures were not disclosed until 2002 – the 2001 figure is a comparative. 
49Annual Report, (2007), p.68 
50Through the period, there were payments relating to the cessation of contract for directors. 
51Annual Report, (2001), p.34 
52Annual Report, (2002), p.36 
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in May 2003. He received $50,000 gross per month plus expenses throughout the consultancy 
agreement which ended in May 2004. In July 2003, Mr Chase was also appointed as a BP 
nominated director of TNK-BP Limited53. He received emoluments of $120,000 from TNK-BP 
Limited during 2003.54 
Compensation for Mr Manzoni amounting to £50,000 paid relating to expatriate costs prior to 
his appointment as an executive director in 2004. Moreover, Mr Olver was appointed on 1 July 
2004 as a consultant to BP in relation to its activities in Russia following his retirement from 
BP p.l.c., and he had previously been appointed as a BP nominated director of TNK-BP 
Limited effectively on 20 April 2004. He received £150,000 in fees in 2004 and - as a director, 
deputy chairman and chairman of the audit committee of the joint-venture company - he 
received $90,000 in fees from TNK-BP Limited throughout the consultancy agreement. 
Furthermore, Mr Chase continued as a consultant to BP in relation to the TNK-BP transaction 
ended in May 2004 and he left the board of TNK-BP Limited in March 2004. He received 
$250,000 in 2004 and - as a director, deputy chairman and chairman of the audit committee of 
TNK-BP Limited - he received $30,000 in fees from that company throughout the consultancy 
agreement.55 
In 2005, Mr Olver continued as a consultant to BP in relation to its activities in Russia and 
served as a BP-nominated director of TNK-BP Limited. He received £300,000 in fees in 2005 
in addition to reimbursement of costs and support for his role throughout the consultancy 
agreement. In addition, he is entitled to retain fees paid to him by TNK-BP up to a maximum of 
$120,000 a year for his role as a director, deputy chairman and chairman of the audit committee 
of TNK-BP Limited.56 
Mr Olver still continued as a consultant to BP in relation to its activities in Russia and served as 
a BP-nominated director of TNK-BP Limited until 30 September 2006. He received £225,000 
in fees in 2006 as well as reimbursement of costs and support for his role throughout the 
consultancy agreement. Additionally, he was entitled to retain fees paid to him by TNK-BP up 
to a maximum of $120,000 a year for his role as a director, deputy chairman and chairman of 
                                                          
53A joint-venture company owned 50% by BP 
54Annual Report, (2003), p.112-113 
55Annual Report, (2004), p.123and126 
56Annual Report, (2005), p.171 
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the audit committee of TNK-BP Limited. On the other hand, Mr Miles57 received £150,000 per 
annum since he was appointed as a director and non-executive chairman of BP Pension 
Trustees Limited in October 2006 for a term of three years.58 
Lord Browne resigned from the BP board on 1 May 2007, and he was awarded a lump sum ex 
gratia superannuation payment of one year’s salary worth £1,575,000 in addition to the his pay 
package. On the other hand, Mr Manzoni resigned from the board as well on 31 August 2007, 
and he was awarded compensation for loss of office equal to one year’s salary worth £485,000 
besides his remuneration parcel. Additionally, he received £30,000 regarding statutory rights and 
retained his company car.59 
In 2008, a non-cash benefits amount of £212,000 includes costs of London accommodation 
provided to Mr Inglis. In addition, BP discharged Mr Inglis a US tax liability arising on his 
participation in the UK pension scheme amounting to $553,175 throughout a tax equalization 
arrangement. On the other hand, Dr Allen left the company at the end of March 2008. He was 
entitled to one year’s salary worth £510,000 as compensation for loss of office in accordance 
with his contractual entitlement, as well as a pro rata bonus for 2008 and continued full 
participation in the 2006-08 and 2007-09 share elements, according to the normal rules of the 
plan. Additionally, he received £30,000 in respect of statutory rights and retained his company 
car. In February 2008 it was considered appropriate to strengthen the retention element of 
remuneration for two executive directors (namely: Mr Conn and Mr Inglis) as restricted shares 
amounting to £1.5m.60 
Disclosures in 2009 reflect Mr Dudley’s remuneration package since his appointment as 
executive director on 6 April 2009. A non-cash benefits amounting to $304,000 includes costs 
of London accommodation and any tax liability thereon provided to Mr Dudley. In addition, BP 
discharged Mr Inglis a US tax liability arising from his participation in the UK pension scheme 
amounting to $90,314.61 
                                                          
57Non-executive director of BP until April 2006 
58Annual Report, (2006), p.73 
59Annual Report, (2007), p.65 
60Annual Report, (2008), p.80and84 
61Annual Report, (2009), p.83 
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During 2010, a non-cash benefits amount of $564,000 provided to Mr Dudley includes costs 
of London accommodation and any tax liability thereon. On 30 November 2010, Dr Hayward 
left the board, and awarded compensation for office loss equal to his salary for entire one year 
- worth £1,045,000 - besides his remuneration package, as well as £30,000 regarding statutory 
rights. On 31 October 2010, Mr Inglis left also the board, and awarded compensation for 
office loss equal to one year’s salary - worth £690,000 - besides his pay package. In addition, 
he received a further £200,000 for costs related to both repatriation and relocation consistent 
with his international assignment arrangements. Furthermore, BP discharged Mr Inglis a US 
tax liability arising from his participation in the UK pension scheme amounting to 
$1,260,000.62 
6.1.1.1.1.8 Non-executive Directorships 
Over the period under examination, BP board executive directors held a number of non-
executive directorship positions in other companies. Chronologically - in 2001 - Browne was a 
non-executive director of Goldman Sachs Inc63 as well as Intel Corporation, Buchanan was a 
non-executive director of Boots (where Ian Prosser had been a non- executive director from 
1984 till 1996 and the chairman until 1999), Chase was a non- executive director of Computer 
Sciences Corp and Diageo, Ford was a non-executive director of USG Corp and Olver of 
Reuters Group.64  
In 2002, Chase added Tesco to his list of non-executive directorships and Hayward who 
appointed as executive director of BP in February 2003 became a non-executive director of 
Corus Group.65 Buchanan, Chase, Olver and Ford had all given up their executive directorships 
by the end of 2003. In 2004, Conn became a non-executive director of Rolls-Royce (from 
January 2005) and Manzoni a non-executive director of SABMiller.66 It is interesting to note 
that at that time BP did not comply with the provisions of the (then) Combined Code in terms 
of disclosing the fees received by executives for outside services – stating in the annual report: 
                                                          
62Annual Report, (2010), p.112 
63See: http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/compensation/employment/2289.html 
64Annual Report, (2001), p.39 
65Annual Report, (2002), p.43 
66Annual Report, (2004), p.128 
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‘The amount of fees received by executive directors in respect of their service on 
outside boards is not disclosed since this information is not considered relevant to 
BP.’67 
In 2006, Browne stood down as a non-executive director at Intel and Grote became a non-
executive director at Unilever NV and Unilever plc.68 In 2007, Browne left the company and 
there was more detailed disclosure as to the policy re non-executive directorships and for the first 
time disclosure of the extent of fees received: 
‘The board encourages executive directors to broaden their knowledge and experience 
by taking up appointments outside the company. Each executive director is permitted to 
accept one non-executive appointment, from which they may retain any fee. External 
appointments are subject to agreement by the chairman and must not conflict with a 
director’s duties and commitments to BP. During the year, the fees received by 
executive directors for external appointments were as follows: Tony Hayward Corus 
£62,250 and Tata Steel £177, Iain Conn Rolls Royce £57,166, Byron Grote Unilever 
PLC £31,000 and Unilever NV €45,000, and Andy Inglis BAE Systems £39,661’69 
In 2008, Hayward stood down as a non-executive director of Corus but became a non-executive 
director and senior independent director of Tata Steel and Inglis became a non-executive director 
of BAE Systems.70 
‘During the year, the fees received by executive directors for external appointments 
were as follows: Tony Hayward Tata Steel £83,000, Iain Conn Rolls Royce £65,000, 
Byron Grote Unilever PLC £33,500 and Unilever NV €48,625, and Andy Inglis BAE 
Systems £86,754’71 
In 2009, Hayward stood down as a NED at Tata Steel and the relevant disclosure details were as 
follows:72 
‘During the year, the fees received by executive directors for external appointments 
were as follows: Tony Hayward Tata Steel £29,000, Iain Conn Rolls Royce £65,000, 
Byron Grote Unilever PLC £36,000 and Unilever NV €52,250, and Andy Inglis BAE 
Systems £90,000’73 
                                                          
67Annual Report, (2004), p.117 
68Annual Report, (2006), p.65-66  
69Annual Report, (2007), p.71  
70Annual Report, (2008), p.68-69 
71Annual Report, (2008), p.86 
72Annual Report, (2009), p.67 
73Annual Report, (2009), p.90  
246 
 
In 2010, Hayward and Inglis left the company and the relevant disclosure note was as follows:74 
‘During the year, the fees received by executive directors for external appointments 
were as follows: Iain Conn Rolls Royce £65,000, Byron Grote Unilever PLC £33,000 
and Unilever NV €47,500, and Andy Inglis BAE Systems £49,280’75 
6.1.1.1.2 The Remuneration Committee 
The remuneration committee at BP is a long standing one. At the start of investigation period it 
was chaired by Robin Nicholson - who in a varied career had been an academic scientist, 
managing director of the European subsidiary of a Canadian nickel mining company, as well as 
a civil servant (as Chief Scientific Officer, Cabinet Office, 1983-1985) before taking up an 
executive directorship at Pilkington in 1986 and a non-executive directorship at Rolls Royce in 
1986. He joined the BP board in 1987. He remained a board member of BP until the 2005 
AGM when he retired at the age of 70. His replacement as chair of the remuneration committee 
was Dr DeAnne Julius - an American economist living in England76 who had worked with the 
World Bank, British Airways and Shell before a four year spell (1997-2001) on the Monetary 
Policy committee of the Bank of England. She became a non-executive director of BP in 2001, 
as well as a non-executive director on a number of other boards – including Lloyds TSB from 
2001-2007 where she was a member of the remuneration committee, and she is currently on the 
remuneration committee of Serco and Jones, and Lang Lasalle. Each member of the 
remuneration committee was (and is) subject to re-election every three years77 – but Julius and 
Prosser (BP’s deputy chairman, previously CEO of Bass and until 2003 Intercontinental 
hotels78) were members of the committee throughout the period under review and Davis, 
                                                          
74Annual Report, (2010), p.84  
75Annual Report, (2010), p.118  
76Although her first full time employment was apparently as a CIA analyst at the time of the Vietnam War 
77It is unclear whether this referred to internal reelection to the remuneration committee or reelection as a director at 
the AGM – which is now an annual process. 
78‘Sir Ian is a fixture of the FTSE 100 having sat on the boards of five blue chips including Boots and Lloyds TSB. 
He is still deputy chairman of BP and is the senior independent non-executive on the board of GlaxoSmithKline, 
the drugs giant. His heroes are James Hanson, the great conglomerate builder, and Lord Browne, whose capture 
of Amoco helped transform BP's fortunes. 
People who have worked with him say those of a weak disposition easily get steamrollered in the face of Sir Ian's 
strongly held views, although a confident, well-argued case will lead to a change of mind. 
A physically imposing figure, his allies say he has great skills in chairing meetings and can be extremely charming 
when organising and cajoling for things to get done.’ 
See: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/sir-ian-prosser-chief-with-a-mission-to-win-over-
sainsburys-sceptics-569982.html 
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previously an AMOCO director, was a member from 2001 through to the 2009 AGM.79 Knight 
- an American BP board member since 1987 (and also on the IBM remuneration committee 
throughout the period)80 - was a member from 2001 to 2005. In 2004, Bryan - a director of BP 
since 1998 having previously been a director of AMOCO - joined the committee. Bryan was 
contemporaneously a non-executive director of General Motors and Goldman Sachs (where he 
was a member of the remuneration committee) and remained a member of the BP remuneration 
committee until retiring at the age of 70 in April 2007. Also in 2004 Tom McKillop joined the 
BP board and became a member of the remuneration committee. McKillop - a chemist and 
CEO of Zeneca and then AstraZeneca from 1993 to end 2005 - had been a non-executive 
director of Lloyds TSB from 1999-2004 and then became chairman of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS). He resigned from this position after the collapse and government bail-out of 
RBS in 2008 and, somewhat reluctantly, stood down as a director of BP at the 2009 AGM 
following shareholder concerns as to his suitability as a non-executive director. In 2009, there 
were two additions to the committee: Anthony Burgmans and George David. Burgmans had 
joined the BP board in 2004 having previously been an executive director and then vice-
chairman of Unilever and is a member of a number of Dutch supervisory boards. David joined 
the board in 2008 having previously been CEO of United Technologies Group (UTC) from 
1994-2008 (and chairman 1997-2007). From 2002-2008, he was a board member at Citigroup – 
leaving the board following criticism of board members’ failure to protect investors and other 
stakeholders.81 In 2010, Ian Davis joined as a new member of the BP’s remuneration 
committee. He had joined the BP’s board in April 2010 having previously pursued a career at 
                                                          
79In 2009, Erroll Davis became a board member at General Motors. 
80Knight had been a highly successful chair of a US technology firm Emerson Electric – ‘CalPERS placed Emerson 
on its "focus" list in July 2004 after becoming dissatisfied with its classified board and with a retirement package 
for Knight it maintained was excessive.’  
See: http://www.allbusiness.com/human-resources/employee-development/1052703-1.html 
81George David stepped down as the day-to-day boss of United Technologies Corp. almost two years ago, but the 
money keeps rolling in from his long run at the top. David's total compensation at UTC in 2009, his last year as 
chairman, came to $65.3 million  
(in 2004 his highest paid year total compensation from UTC had been $84m) 
See: http://www.tradingmarkets.com/news/stock-alert/utx_former-utc-chief-george-david-pulls-in-65-million-in-
2009-810020.html 
In 2009, in the rather public divorce action between him and his, thirty years younger, second wife David itemised 
his weekly expenditure as $200,000 a week – approximately half of which went on the running costs of his yacht. 
See:http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=george+david+utc+divorce&aq=1&aqi=g2&aql=&oq=George+Dav
id+UTC&gs_rfai= 
(the boat capsized in the 2011 Fastnet Race – fortunately all on board – including David - were rescued without 
serious injury). 
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Bowater and then McKinsey where he rose to be the managing partner in UK and Ireland and 
then chairman and worldwide managing director. He retired as senior partner of McKinsey in 
July 2010.  
Apart from the formal members of the committee, other interested parties were in attendance - 
perhaps most significantly the BP chairman throughout the period Peter Sutherland.82 
Sutherland’s career had taken him from a background in law and politics in Ireland, at 34 years 
old as the youngest ever Irish Attorney General, into the European Commission as its youngest 
ever Commissioner and then general director of GATT (now the World Trade Organisation). He 
was a non-executive director of BP over the period 1990-1993 and then was reappointed in 1995. 
He became chairman in 1997 and retained that post until end 2009. Sutherland was chairman of 
Allied Irish in the early 1990s and subsequently became a non-executive director and chairman 
of Goldman Sachs International - a position which he still holds. He was a non-executive director 
and member of the remuneration committee of RBS from 2001 until 2009 when he resigned 
following the government rescue operation.83 
The remuneration committee met between five (2001, 2002, 2006) six (2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 
2010) seven (2004) and eight (2009) times a year. When provided - the attendance records 
suggest that the chairman was almost invariably in attendance. There is also some evidence of 
attendance by the CEO and other executive directors: 
‘The committee consults the group chief executive on matters relating to other executive 
directors who report to him. He is not present when matters affecting his own 
remuneration are considered. The chairman of the board also attends meetings when 
appropriate.’84 
‘Lord Browne (group chief executive) was consulted on matters relating to the other 
executive directors who report to him and, together with Dr Allen (group chief of staff), 
                                                          
82‘The chairman of the board also attends committee meetings.’ (Annual Report, 2004, p.116) 
‘Mr Sutherland, as chairman of the board, attended all committee meetings.’ (Annual Report, 2006, p.73) 
83‘Described as a 'larger than life' character, he insists that his reported £150million fortune is not an important 
part of his life.’ (It is not entirely clear from his CV how he managed to amass so much money in a career, a 
significant part of which has been devoted to public service – although as he apparently gives financial advice to 
the Pope, it may be that he had divine inspiration on his side.) 
See: http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/article.html?in_article_id=491892&in_page_id=2 
See: http://www.powerbase.info/index.php?title=Peter_Sutherland for more detailed coverage of Peter 
Sutherland’s career. 
84Annual Report, (2001), p.37 
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on matters relating to the performance of the company. Neither was present when matters 
affecting his own remuneration were considered.’85 
However little detail as to executive director attendance is provided in subsequent reports. The 
committee also engaged outside advisers/consultants to provide advice on specific compensation 
issues, as follows: 
‘The committee is serviced independently of the executive management and actively seeks 
advice from external professional consultants.’86 
‘Advice is provided to the committee by the company secretary’s office, which is 
independent of executive management and reports to the non-executive chairman. Mr 
Gerrit Aronson, who is an independent consultant within the company secretary’s office, 
was appointed in 2000 by the committee as its secretary and special adviser. He does not 
provide any other services to the group.  
The committee, in consultation with Mr Aronson and the company secretary, also 
appoints external professional advisers to provide specialist advice and services on 
particular remuneration matters. This allows for a range of external independent opinion 
to be sourced by the committee. This advice is then subject to an independent review by 
Mr Aronson. The committee assesses the advice it receives, applying its own judgement. 
Procedures to ensure the independence of advice are subject to annual review.  
During 2002, the following people provided advice or services on specific matters to the 
committee that materially assisted it in its consideration of matters relating to executive 
directors’ remuneration: 
• Mr Sutherland (chairman); Lord Browne (group chief executive), who was consulted on 
matters relating to the other executive directors who report to him and on matters 
relating to the performance of the company. He was not present when matters affecting 
his own remuneration were considered; Mr Iain Macdonald (group vice president, 
planning, performance management and control, for the company), who provided to the 
committee some of the company’s calculations for the performance-related pay which 
were then subject to independent verification by Ernst & Young as auditors; Mr Aronson; 
Miss Hanratty (company secretary); and Mrs Sarah Martin (senior counsel, company 
secretary’s office). Only Mr Aronson among those above was appointed by the 
committee. 
• Towers Perrin who, during 2002, have been the committee’s principal advisers on 
matters of executive directors’ remuneration and who also provided some ad hoc 
remuneration and benefits advice to parts of the group, mainly comprising pensions 
                                                          
85Annual Report, (2003), p.109 
86Ref o/s - Annual Report, (2001), p.37 
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advice in Canada; Kepler Associates, who advised on the selection of the shareholder 
return against the market performance benchmark for the Executive Directors’ Incentive 
Plan and tracked BP’s performance against this benchmark (they provided a similar 
service in relation to the Long Term Performance Plan for senior executives); Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, Allen & Overy and Martin Moore, QC, all of whom provided legal 
advice on specific matters to the committee and who provide ad hoc legal advice to the 
group; and Ernst & Young in their capacity as auditors, who reviewed and reported to 
the committee on the calculations of BP’s performance in respect of financial targets that 
form the basis for performance-related pay for the executive directors, and who also 
provide audit, audit-related and taxation services to the group. All the above were 
appointed separately by the committee or the secretary to the committee to provide the 
advice or services that it sought, except for Kepler Associates, who were appointed by the 
group chief executive and subsequently provided information to the remuneration 
committee.’87 
In 2003, Towers Perrin became the committee’s principal adviser: 
‘The committee appointed Towers Perrin as its principal external adviser during 2003 on 
matters of executive directors’ remuneration. Towers Perrin also provided some limited 
ad hoc remuneration and benefits advice to parts of the group, mainly comprising 
pensions advice in Canada.’88 
In 2004, the remuneration committee sought outside advice in terms of the appropriate 
parameters for compensation from academic staff, as follows:  
‘In 2004, the committee consulted three independent academics, Michael Jensen, 
professor emeritus of Harvard Business School, and professors Sir Andrew Likierman 
and James Dow, both of London Business School, in connection with its fundamental 
review of remuneration policy.’89 
Subsequent disclosures as to the extent of outside support have been relatively limited – for 
example, the 2008 Annual Report states simply:  
 ‘The committee is independently advised.’90 
 
                                                          
87Annual Report, (2002), p.33 
88Annual Report, (2003), p.109 
89Annual Report, (2004), p.119 
90Annual Report, (2008), p.75 
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6.1.1.1.3 Reaction and Feedback  
Over the last fifteen years, there have been intermittent expressions of concern by the media, 
shareholders and other stakeholders as to the level of remuneration provided by BP to its 
executive directors - a number of relevant quotations are contained in Figure 9 - but it was not 
until the 2009 AGM that there was a significant organised protest against aspects of the 
directors remuneration report. As reported in one newspaper: 
‘Shareholders of BP have been urged to next week vote against the oil giant’ 
remuneration report by PIRC, the corporate governance watchdog.  
BP'S chief executive, Tony Hayward, was awarded a 41 per cent pay rise in 2009 despite 
the company's profits coming in more than 50 per cent down on the previous year. It 
said: “PIRC considers that combined remuneration was excessive in the year under 
review and is also concerned regarding the lack of transparency surrounding the 
performance conditions attached to the Executive Directors Incentive Plan.”’91 
This did in fact result in a protest vote far higher than is common with 38% of votes not 
supporting the directors’ remuneration report. 
  
                                                          
91See, the Independent report:   
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/pirc-urges-no-vote-on-bp-director-pay-1938347.html 
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Figure 9: Concerns of Relevant Parties on BP Executives’ Remuneration - Quotations 
The Independent report - under the title: “Golden handshake boosted Lord Simon's BP 
pay packet to pounds 599,000” - states the following: 
‘LORD SIMON of Highbury, who resigned as chairman of BP last May to take up a ministerial 
post in Tony Blair's government, received pounds 599,000 from the company in 1997, including 
a discretionary payment of pounds 240,000 in recognition of his 36 years service. 
Lord Simon's total pay from BP was almost six times the amount Mr Blair drew as Prime 
Minister and nearly 12 times the amount he was entitled to as a minister of state in the House 
of Lords. 
A BP spokesman said the decision to make the ex gratia payment of pounds 240,000 to Lord 
Simon was not unusual. "The board decided to give him an honorarium, which is quite common 
when people retire from BP." 
The annual report also shows John Browne, BP's chief executive, took home pounds 1.76m, 
including pounds 821,000 awarded to him under the company's long- term performance plan. 
This year he stands to receive a maximum award worth pounds 815,000 under the scheme. 
The 365 BP executives who are participate in the plan stand to receive shares worth pounds 
22m this year. Awards under the scheme are based on growth in total shareholder return. 
In the three years from 1995 to 1997 - the period over which the 1998 award will be based - 
BP's total shareholder return was 19.5 per cent, beating the market. 
In 1996 Mr Browne's total remuneration was higher at pounds 2.46m but this included a 
pounds 1.72m payment under a previous five-year incentive scheme. 
Mr Browne's remuneration, excluding his long-term share award, rose by 25 per cent to 
pounds 938,000, reflecting the bumper year enjoyed by BP.’92 
  
                                                          
92 See, the Independent report: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/golden-handshake-boosted-lord-
simons-bp-pay-packet-to-pounds-599000-1150815.html  
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The Find Article report - under the title: “executives strike rich BP bonuses” - states the 
following: 
‘Four other BP executives will earn over [pounds sterling]1m. Deputy chief executive Rodney 
Chase stands to get [pounds sterling]1.4m, finance director John Buchanan [pounds 
sterling]1m. 
Retiring directors Russell Seal and Rolf Stomberg should get [pounds sterling]1.3m and 
[pounds sterling]1.2m. 
Stomberg also gets a [pounds sterling]1.5m pension fund top-up. 
BP says: 'The company put in an all-time record performance - [pounds sterling]2.8bn profits. 
It earned the best return on capital of all major oil companies. That deserves reward, and 
rewards help to achieve performance.'’93 
 
 
The Mail Online report - under the title: “BP shareholders outrage at Lord Browne's 
£72m goodbye” - states the following: 
‘One shareholder, Mike Porter, said BP had "broadly underperformed" the FTSE 100 index. 
Another, John Farmer, added that the company's performance was "arguably pathetic" and 
called upon the board to justify pay packages. 
BP chairman Peter Sutherland said: "It is important to discuss remuneration in the context of 
overall performance. For example, our net income growth is higher than our two largest 
competitors last year. 
"We have to retain the best that we have, and we believe that they are the best."’94 
 
  
                                                          
93 See, the Find Article report: http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/daily-mail-london-england-
the/mi_8002/is_1998_March_17/executives-strike-rich-bp-bonuses/ai_n35936500/ 
94 See, the Mail Online report: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-448171/BP-shareholders-outrage-Lord-
Brownes-72m-goodbye.html 
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6.1.1.2 Case Study Report 
From a theory perspective it is difficult to find significant support in this case study for a pure 
agency theory type world in which contracts are drawn up so as to maximise effort and expertise 
on behalf of the shareholders. Of course one always has to consider the counterfactual - what 
would the position be without the remuneration packages put in place? However, it is far from 
clear what the linkages are or were between the designed packages and actual performance. 
There is perhaps stronger evidence linking toward a managerial hegemony perspective but one 
heavily mediated by the presence of powerful non-executive directors and the institutional 
presence of the remuneration committee. 
The composition of the remuneration packages available to BP executive directors remained 
broadly similar over the period, comprising basic salary, annual performance bonus payable in 
cash, fully paid shares under LTIPs in the form of ‘performance shares’. For the early part of the 
period under examination there were share options dependent upon the achievement of 
performance targets. There have also been as noted above not inconsiderable additional benefits 
in terms of pension schemes, in addition to resettlement or accommodation allowances, and one-
off payments to directors under the heading ‘retention allowances’. 
This study aims to shed some light on relevant behavioural and institutional factors, in particular 
those relating to the remuneration committee, which might have a significant role in setting the 
executive pay packages. In the outcome of the reward metrics a varying range of financial (i.e. 
SHRAM, ROAEC, EPS growth, etc) and non-financial (i.e. individual and strategic factors, 
including safety, environment, organisation, etc) targets were comfortably achieved easily and 
provided the support for the basic cash bonus - but at almost no stage were BP able to match 
competitors in respect to the total share return (TSR). Notions relating to the ‘balanced 
scorecard’ have changed in their emphasis over time more recently giving greater emphasis to 
non-financial factors (such as value creation, reinforcing safety and risk management, and 
rebuilding trust). What is intriguing is that as previously noted the BP remuneration committee 
frequently changed the manner in which it set performance targets and indeed on more than one 
occasion recommended payments to boardroom executives even when these targets had not been 
achieved. For example, in 2009 annual review BP came fourth in terms of TSR comparison with 
its four comparators (i.e. Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, and Chevron) – and on that basis no 
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performance shares should have been awarded – but in fact the four executive directors at that 
time (Conn, Dudley, Grote, and Inglis) were awarded £2.5m.  
Perhaps more importantly, in terms of personal contact and power relationships, one has to 
consider the relationship between Lord Browne and the likely influence of two highly influential 
non-executive directors (Sutherland as the company chairman, and Prosser as a significant 
member of the remuneration committee). It is difficult to assess their contributions to the 
deliberations of the remuneration committee throughout the period under examination - but it is 
possible to surmise that their role might have been more significant than it was formally set out 
to be. Further there were interlinked and complex power relationships/ networking in terms of 
common boardroom connections. These might have been particularly relevant in relation to the 
non-executive directors, who had directorships with companies (such as Lloyds TSB, Goldman 
Sachs, RBS, Boots, etc).  
To conclude - the outcomes of the archival-based case study tend to suggest rejecting the null 
proposition (i.e. that behavioural and institutional aspects and constructions relating to the 
remuneration committee have a limited/no effect on executive directors’ compensation 
packages). The case study does then lend a support to H4 which emphasises the importance of 
behavioural and institutional factors re compensation beyond pure agency or indeed other 
aspects. 
6.1.2 Practical Content Analysis for DRRs 
The majority of the discussion and analysis in the archival case study is inductive and has offered 
an overall review on what is possible to understand from the information contained in the BP 
annual reports for the period under examination. It notes but does not seek to directly investigate 
the motives which might underlie the decision of 38 per cent of the BP shareholder body to vote 
against the compensation committee’s report in April 2010 at the Annual General Meeting - 
although it might be conjectured that shareholder dissatisfaction at the share price performance 
might have been the most important factor. In order to add a little in terms of wider context the 
archival-based case study discussed above is supplemented by an exploratory and/or explanatory 
content analysis. Such an approach is consistent with the theorising of Collis and Hussey (2003) 
and Yin (2009), and seeks to relate certain keywords and the frequency of their repetition in 
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directors’ remuneration reports to the manner in which BP sought to portray its remuneration 
policies. Clearly this is an area where the analysis and its interpretation can only be indicative - it 
is all but impossible to say whether the manner in which BP sought to profile and depict its 
remuneration policies actually drove what the policies were. However it is suggested that the 
exploratory analysis is of interest and might perhaps shed some light both on how BP perceived 
itself and how it wished other interested parties and stakeholders to perceive it.  
In this section - the conceptual and relational approaches are examined by adopting three types 
of analyses (i.e. word counting analysis, matrix coding analysis, and word similarity analysis) 
utilising NVivo. A chart of pooled word-references after the conceptual approach is also 
provided. 
6.1.2.1 Analysis of Work Counting 
Table (25) demonstrates the results of searching process for a number of most repeated words via 
showing the word length, number and volume of references, and similar terms in the concept 
within BP directors’ remuneration reports over the ten year period. Here the focus has been on 
three key words - ‘Remuneration’, ’Performance’ and ‘Governance’ - although coding was also 
done for other words such as Executive, Director, Year, Committee, etc. The results suggest that 
the term ‘Performance’ related both to the overall BP activities (833 references - 0.67% of total 
word count), and to the core of the work of the executives’ role (1701 – 2.2%). The term 
‘Governance’ referred both to institutional authority and control exercised (88 – 0.04%), and to 
the corporate rules and regulations applied (137 – 0.10%). The term ‘Remuneration’ (including 
references to compensation and pay) was - perhaps not surprisingly - expressed in terms of the 
concept of what executive directors received in the form of salary (1222 – 1.92%), excluding 
other payment expressions (for example bonus, pension, option, allowance, etc.).  
6.1.2.2 Analysis of Matrix Coding  
Further matrix coding analysis as set out in Table (26) shows in more detail not only the 
frequency of terms’ existence, but also the number of instances where the coding of two or more 
documents (the sources) within the ten year span and the nodes (the terms) overlap. This form of 
analysis also provides a check on contradictions or possible overlap between terms - such as the 
case of terms: ‘Performance’ and ‘Executive’, in addition to ‘Governance’ and ‘Regulations’. 
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For example there is a ‘Performance’ overlap of 742 references in term ‘Executive’, while the 
term ‘Governance’ overlaps 21 times in term ‘Regulations’. The results suggest that there are 
742 references from the 1701 ‘Executive’ references relate to Executive Performance and the 
rest refer therefore to the non-performance role of executives. In addition there are 21 references 
from the 137 ‘Regulations’ relate to Rules of Corporate Governance and the remainder refer to 
the non-governance regulations. On the other hand the references of term ‘Remuneration’ do not 
overlap with pay components (such as allowance, award, benefits, etc.) as it combines just the 
compensation in terms of salary in ‘Remuneration’ similar terms as mentioned above. 
6.1.2.3 Chart of Pooled References 
The chart in Figure (10) illustrates in brief the frequency of pooled references for the three key 
words - ‘Remuneration’, ‘Performance’ (whatever related to BP or executive member) and 
‘Governance’ - as reported in separate in BP directors’ remuneration reports within years between 
2001 and 2010. 
In 2001, the references of remuneration package account for 195, while the BP and executive 
performance references consistent with 42 and 40, respectively. By 2002, the references of 
compensation package reach the peak of frequencies via 374, whilst in 2004 BP and executive 
performing roles reach the top numbering of references via 110 and 103, correspondingly. In 
2006, the references of pay package, as well as BP and executive performances fall down through 
248, 77, and 64, respectively, as the number of 2006 DRR pages decreased. In 2010, the relative 
weighting of remuneration references increased to 312, whilst BP and executive performance 
references received the less interest via reaching the minimum via 72 and 62, correspondingly. In 
contrast the references of ‘Governance’ have not showed a big interest by the remuneration 
committee in the DRR to link the regulations and rules - which governed the structure of board 
executive - with the executives’ pay and performance, in which the term ‘Governance’ ranged in 
declining order from 21 in 2002 till 5 in 2008 and 2010. 
As a result the term: BP Performance had more significance and awareness in references (83395 - 
0.67%96) than the term: Executive Performance (74297 - 0.96%98) in directors remuneration 
                                                          
95833: See Word Counting Analysis in Table (25) 
960.67%: See Word Counting Analysis in Table (25) 
258 
 
reports, indicating that the BP remuneration committee put more focus to link executive 
directors’ remuneration with the overall BP performance rather than the actual executive 
performance. This finding might explain - from the perspective of content analysis - why 38 
percent of BP shareholders have voted in April 2010 against the remuneration committee’s 
report. The references of term ‘Governance’ had little focus in directors remuneration reports 
(10999 - 0.055%100), while ‘Remuneration’ references had the peak interest (3015101 - 4.44%102). 
6.1.2.4 Analysis of Word Similarity 
Finally word similarity analysis as set out in Figure 11 shows a relational table analysis of 
similarity between two terms via the coefficient of Pearson correlation103. The Pearson 
coefficients between each pair in all three cases (‘Performance’ and ‘Remuneration’, 
‘Governance’ and ‘Performance’, and ‘Governance’ and ‘Remuneration’) are near to be -1, 
which means that there is least similar appearance or overlap in each case as a proof of no 
contradiction in node concepts and purposes. Two cluster analysis diagrams are created 
afterwards. First left-hand side figure is a horizontal tree diagram, which indicates how 
‘Governance’ influence and control the relationship between ‘Performance’ and ‘Remuneration’, 
while second right-hand side graph is a 3D cluster diagram, which demonstrates how far the 
distances of overlap between the three key terms are. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
97742: See Matrix Coding Analysis in Table (26) 
980.96%: (742/Executive:1701)*2.20% 
99109: Governance 88 + Overlap 21 
1000.055%: Governance 0.04% + Overlap {(21/137)*0.10%} 
1013015: Remuneration 1222 + Award 520 + Bonus 335 + Pension 259 + Option 212 + Benefits 167 + Allowance 
300 
1024.44%: Remuneration 1.92% + Award 0.74% + Bonus 0.49% + Pension 0.45% + Option 0.36% + Benefits 0.27% 
+ Allowance 0.21% 
103The Pearson correlation coefficient is a similarity metric which indicates the calculation of similarity between 
each pair of nodes by showing the number of times the first term row appears in the second term column. 
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Table 25: Analysis of Word Counting 
Word Length Count 
Weighted 
Percentage 
Similar Words 
executive 9 1701 2.20 action, actions, do, doing, executive, executives, implement, implementation, implemented, implementing, 
perform, performance, performances, performing, practicable, practice, practice’, practices, run 
directors 9 1166 1.99 director, directors, directors’, managed, management 
remuneration 12 1222 1.92 compensated, compensation, earn, earned, earning, earnings, earns, pay, remunerating, remuneration, 
salaries, salary 
year 4 940 1.55 age, ages, annual, annually, class, day, days, year, years, years’, yrs 
share 5 902 1.45 contributed, contribution, contributions, deal, divided, part, partly, parts, percentage, portion, share, 
shared, shares, sharing 
committee 9 693 1.20 commissioned, commissioning, committee, committees 
award 5 520 0.74 award, awarded, awards, grant, granted, grants, present 
plan 4 442 0.71 design, designed, plan, planned, planning, plans, prepared, programme, project, projects, provision, 
provisions 
performance 11 833 0.67 acted, acting, acts, do, doing, functional, operated, operates, operating, operation, operational, 
operationally, operations, perform, performance, performances, performing 
value 5 564 0.59 appreciation, assess, assessed, assesses, assessing, assessment, assessments, evaluate, evaluated, 
evaluation, evaluations, measure, measured, measurement, measures, measuring, rate, rated, rates, 
rating, respect, respective, respectively, respects, value, valued, values 
set 3 604 0.56 adjust, adjusted, adjusting, adjustment, adjustments, arrangement, arrangements, background, 
circumstances, context, defined, determination, determine, determined, determines, determining, do, 
doing, fixed, limit, limited, limits, local, place, placed, places, position, positioning, positions, positive, 
prepared, put, scene, scope, set, sets, setting, specified 
bonus 5 335 0.49 bonus, bonuses, incentive, incentives 
shareholders 12 272 0.47 shareholder, shareholders, shareholders’, shareholding 
pension 7 259 0.45 pension, pensionable, pensions 
option 6 212 0.36 alternative, choice, option, options, selected, selection 
measures 8 398 0.33 amount, amounting, amounts, barring, calculated, calculating, calculation, calculations, careful, carefully, 
deliberations, measure, measured, measurement, measures, measuring, metric, metrics, standard, 
standards, stepped 
contracts 9 247 0.29 contract, contracts, narrow, reduce, reduced, reducing, signed, take, takes, taking, undertaking 
benefits 8 167 0.27 benefit, benefits, gain, profit, profitability, profits 
practice 8 409 0.27 applied, applies, apply, applying, commitment, commitments, committed, do, doing, exercisable, exercise, 
exercised, exercises, exercising, good, much, operated, operates, operating, operation, operational, 
operationally, operations, practicable, practice, practice’, practices, use, used, using, virtually 
allowance 9 300 0.21 adjust, adjusted, adjusting, adjustment, adjustments, allow, allowance, allowances, allowing, allows, 
leave, leaving, margin, marginally, permits, permitted, provide, provided, provides, providing 
regulations 11 137 0.10 governance, governed, government, order, regular, regularly, regulations, regulatory, rules 
pay 3 126 0.06 compensated, compensation, give, gives, pay 
compensation 12 68 0.04 compensated, compensation, cover, covered, covering, covers, repairs, right, rights 
governance 10 88 0.04 authority, authorization, authorized, control, establish, established, establishing, establishment, 
governance, governed, government, organic, organization, regime 
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Overlap 
Overlap 
Table 26: Analysis of Matrix Coding  
 Sources Terms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
So
ur
ce
s 
1: DRR 2001 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 42 87 77 8 33 17 18 19 23 
2: DRR 2002 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 23 81 198 128 40 74 30 34 40 28 
3: DRR 2003 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 14 74 171 109 26 84 20 38 44 28 
4: DRR 2004 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 17 110 205 132 39 83 17 37 29 24 
5: DRR 2005 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 12 15 96 192 111 31 45 18 32 15 27 
6: DRR 2006 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 7 15 77 151 127 20 36 0 28 11 26 
7: DRR 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 6 14 93 185 132 34 52 0 36 14 27 
8: DRR 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 5 17 92 173 138 40 36 20 27 11 28 
9: DRR 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 6 9 96 176 136 32 35 25 41 10 23 
10: DRR2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 5 7 72 163 132 30 42 20 44 19 25 
T
er
m
s 
11: Governance 7 15 12 13 12 7 6 5 6 5 88 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12: Regulations 6 23 14 17 15 15 14 17 9 7 21 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13: Performance 42 81 74 110 96 77 93 92 96 72 0 0 833 742 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14: Executive 87 198 171 205 192 151 185 173 176 163 0 0 742 1701 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15: Remuneration 77 128 109 132 111 127 132 138 136 132 0 0 0 0 1222 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16: Allowance 8 40 26 39 31 20 34 40 32 30 0 0 0 0 0 300 0 0 0 0 0 
17: Award 33 74 84 83 45 36 52 36 35 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 520 0 0 0 0 
18: Benefits 17 30 20 17 18 0 0 20 25 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 167 0 0 0 
19: Bonus 18 34 38 37 32 28 36 27 41 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 335 0 0 
20: Option 19 40 44 29 15 11 14 11 10 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 212 0 
21: Pension 23 28 28 24 27 26 27 28 23 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 259 
 
  
 DRR 2001 
DRR 
2002 
DRR 
2003 
DRR 
2004 
DRR 
2005 
DRR 
2006 
DRR 
2007 
DRR 
2008 
DRR 
2009 
DRR 
2010 TOTAL 
‘Governance’ overlap in ‘Regulations’ 2 6 4 3 2 2 1 0 1 0 21 
‘Performance’ overlap in  ‘Executive’ 40 75 69 103 90 64 81 76 82 62 742 
Executive Performance 
BP Performance 
 
Remuneration Package 
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Figure 10: Chart of Pooled References 
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Figure 11: Analysis of Word Similarity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node A Node B Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
Performance Remuneration -0.04542 
Governance Performance -0.0927 
Governance Remuneration -0.12715 
Horizontal Dendrogram 
3D Cluster Map 
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6.1 Conclusion 
This chapter has articulated the second significant part of the research examination process re 
the archival-based case study into remuneration in one very large-sized UK based company, 
BP. Consistent with different aspects of theory and the main research purpose the inductive 
approach has been adopted so as to better understand, utilising a qualitative study, possible 
modes of response to key research questions as to whether behavioural and institutional factors, 
in particular those relating to the remuneration committee, play an important role in 
determining the composition and size of executive compensation? In this context this chapter 
has reported the results of an archival-based study supplemented by the use of empirical based 
content analysis. 
Re the underlying theoretical perspectives, the case study concludes that it is hard to find 
significant support for a pure agency theory; whilst there is perhaps stronger evidence linking 
toward a managerial hegemony perspective - but one heavily mediated by the existence of 
remuneration committee and the presence of powerful non-executive directors. Besides this, the 
case study shows little evidence that the compensation packages were dictated by mobility 
within the international labour market in the particular industry, although the retention 
payments made to both Conn and Inglis are of interest. Perhaps the most intriguing questions 
relate to the importance of personal contact and power relationships at boardroom level – but 
these are difficult to understand fully on the basis of just reported material alone. 
In summary - many have questioned the validity of a pure agency theory model either as a 
normative or explicative model of executive compensation and many have pointed to the 
importance of personality and power relations within the boardroom as determinants of the 
amount of remuneration and who actually receives it. However to date there has been much less 
questioning of the role of the remuneration committee as an institutional construct and indeed 
of whether it constrains, obscures, or adds pseudo legitimacy to in terms of boardroom and 
senior management compensation. Inter alia this case study does call into question the manner 
in which the remuneration committee at BP operated over the years under examination and 
adds some weight to the more general questioning (e.g. Gwilliam and Marnet, 2009) as to 
whether the accepted governance paradigm of non-executive directors and boardroom 
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committees (i.e. audit, nomination, and remuneration) does in fact add anything significant to 
the quality of governance – or whether indeed it acts as an unintentional smokescreen to poor 
governance behaviour. 
In the following chapter - the key research questions and findings of the current study are 
summarised, and the implications of these findings are reviewed by including those relating to 
the underlying theoretical perspectives and also those suggesting possible further study and 
research, both in the UK context and more generally. 
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Chapter Seven 
Summary, Conclusions and Implications 
7.1 Introduction 
Global concerns as to possibly excessive compensation packages of boardroom executives 
and the manner in which these packages are actually linked to corporate performance have 
provided an underlying impetus to this study. Prior literature has focused primarily on a pay-
performance framework, by which executive directors are paid well if they reach certain 
levels of corporate targets. There has been less emphasis on a performance-pay framework - 
in which the overall firm performance will be enhanced in the line with providing appropriate 
incentive schemes for their board members based on their knowledge and skills, or their 
ambition to win a prospect title in the company. Clearly executive compensation would be 
considered to be related to the enhancement of company performance but the issue 
investigated in the empirical part of this study is how the respective functional relationships 
operate.  
Although there has been quite extensive previous empirical work there has been less focus on 
prior study analysis of actual executive remuneration within specific companies and the 
manner in which remuneration committees actually set executive compensation packages. 
This study has sought to add to this literature by means of a qualitative study of executive 
compensation in one particular company, BP.  
In this concluding chapter, the research project is summarised and the main findings are 
reviewed. The work is placed in the context of prior literature with an attempt to explain its 
contribution to knowledge and highlight the research findings. In addition, the limitations of 
the work are noted and areas for forthcoming research are suggested. Finally, the implications 
of this work for practitioners are also discussed. 
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7.2 Summary of the Project 
As this project has employed two different but arguably interrelated research approaches, the 
summary of the thesis is categorised under the following separate sections: Empirical Study and 
Case Study. 
7.2.1 Empirical Study  
The key research question that formed the empirical part of this thesis is: 
Whether managerial compensation is the greater influence on firm performance or 
whether it is the latter which has the greater influence on the former? 
This question is developed based upon a number of sometimes contradictory, sometimes 
interrelated, theoretical perspectives as they relate to executive compensation within a wider 
framework of notions of corporate governance. 
Seeking to provide an at least indicative answer to the empirical research question, a deductive 
approach has been adopted to examine the interrelationships between executive compensation 
and company performance by analysing data under the frameworks of pay-performance (which 
has been intensively investigated in the literature – but studies have yielded conflicting results 
and been beset by issues of causality, timing, data availability, etc.1) and performance-pay 
(which received less attention in the literature to date). The numerics have been based on data 
from FTSE 350 companies and the analysis has adopted both fixed-effect and simultaneous 
equations modelling – an approach which has rarely been adopted before in the UK at least.  
The specific empirical research question has infrequently been addressed in the extensive body 
of prior literature in the line with the associations between executive compensation and company 
performance. The majority of previous studies have either sought to relate the amount and type 
of compensation to some company related-variables (such as company size, boardroom size, 
duality role etc), or to establish one-way linkage between the nature of compensation and 
company performance via using single equation modelling without taking into consideration 
                                                          
1However there are exceptions and it is unfair to characterise all prior empirical studies as fitting into this brief 
description which would be recognisable by a reviewer of that literature. 
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potential simultaneities among the estimated variables perhaps reflecting endogenous links. 
However, some previous academic papers (for example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Ntim et 
al. (2011)) have suggested the wider empirical framework adopted in this study. 
7.2.2 Case Study  
Here the main research direct question that the case study sought to address is: 
Do behavioural and institutional factors, in particular those relating to the remuneration 
committee, play a significant role in determining the composition and size of executive 
compensation? 
This question is of course a little different than that posed in the direct empirical study but is 
linked in that there are issues as to whether the institutional constituents are seeking to 
maximise company performance or to develop other agendas. There has been prior qualitative 
work of this nature – but again it is not the most extensive of literatures.  
In order to address the case study question a largely descriptive approach is employed – it 
would be an exaggeration to say that it is formalised grounded theory but it is within that genre. 
This approach is utilised to investigate the actual role of the remuneration committee as to 
issues respecting the setting and indeed disclosure of senior compensation packages. The 
archival-based case study focused on BP is supplemented by an exploratory content analysis. 
As noted above, prior academic literatures have been dominated by studies which have sought 
to identify associations between executive pay and performance of an entity; whilst this case 
study perhaps goes a little further in seeking to investigate on how boardroom relationships are 
shaped and formed. There have been previous studies which have sought to do this for example 
(Bender, 2003, 2007; and Main et al., 2008) and the intention has been to extend and build on 
this work. 
7.3 Research Contribution and Findings 
The current study contributes to the knowledge as to executive directors’ remuneration and their 
associations with company performance throughout two different, but complementary, modes of 
investigation. The first is empirically focused and provides updated documentary and empirical 
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evidence on the linkages between the amount and composition of managerial compensation and 
the accounting-based indicators of company performance in FTSE 350 companies, compatible 
with a number of related control variables (including those referring to corporate governance, 
ownership and other firm-specific, including boardroom, characteristics). This aspect of the 
study itself adopts two slightly separate analytic approaches. First is the fixed-effect equation 
modelling of the pay-performance and performance-pay frameworks to examine separately the 
extent of relationships between managerial remuneration and company performance. Second is 
the simultaneous equation modelling to permit not only executive pay and company performance 
to simultaneously affect each other and the mechanism of control variables - but also allows 
more in-depth investigation of how these control variables influence each other as well as 
executive compensation and firm performance.  
The second mode of investigation reviews the nature of remuneration practice at BP with an 
ambition to highlight the changes in the amount and nature of remuneration packages over the 
years under examination and to explore the role of the remuneration committee in setting the 
mechanisms and structures which determine the type and extent of those packages. This study 
employs again two slightly different, but linked, research methods. First is the archival-based 
case study to provide further insights regarding the likelihood of the presence of behavioural 
and institutional factors, particularly those relating to the remuneration committee, re the 
setting process of executive directors’ remuneration. Second is an exploratory content analysis 
to highlight the nature of the manner of disclosure adopted by BP over the period under 
examination.   
It is also suggested that this thesis makes a contribution in terms of its methodological 
approach. It adopts a mixed method (i.e. abductive) approach - via adopting both quantitative 
and qualitative research approaches - which is used extensively in pragmatically oriented fields 
of social science research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007; and Creswell 
and Clark, 2011), but to date has been more restricted in its application to executive 
compensation/corporate governance research. As mixed methods research attempt to maintain 
generalisation while capturing the specificity of the context (Johnson et al., 2007), this 
framework may be valuable to other researchers within the more general accounting discipline. 
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Finally the significant results from the two separate approaches are repeated below separately 
under the following sections: Empirical Study and Case Study. 
7.3.1 Empirical Study  
This study examines the interrelationships between executive compensation and firm 
performance (taking into account not only the remuneration measures, but also the key 
components of executive pay, particularly bonus and LTIPs). Firm performance is proxied by a 
number of accounting-based financial indicators (especially Tobin’s Q and ROA), within the 
FTSE 350 companies over the period 1999-2008. A number of related control variables 
(corporate governance features and ownership, and the board member and corporate 
characteristics) are incorporated.  
Findings, derived from the fixed-effect regression model, suggest that two-way relationships 
between executive compensation and firm performance exist but may be difficult to interpret. 
The results showed sensitivity of salary and cash-base remuneration with firm performance 
indicators is comparatively weak to bonus, LTIPs, and equity-base compensation (a finding 
consistent with prior literature (for example, Murphy, 1999; Mehran, 1995; Matolcsy, 2000; 
Conyon and Sadler, 2001; etc.)).2 This might suggest that the remuneration committees of 
FTSE 350 companies put more effort and focus to link the cash compensation of boardroom 
members to company performance than those related to non-cash compensation. The results 
also suggest a greater sensitivity of CEO remuneration package to firm performance as 
compared with the board executive directors – a result consistent with Sapp (2008).  
The performance-pay framework analysis suggests a degree of coherence with that of the pay-
performance framework. The sensitivity of Tobin’s Q in relation to the variable components of 
compensation provides strong positive and significant relationships with bonus and LTIPs of 
                                                          
2Tobin’s Q, for example, is ranging from 0.023 and 0.026 for CEO and board executive salary, respectively, and 
0.068 and 0.071 for CEO and board executive cash compensation. However - Tobin’s Q is ranging, for example, 
from 0.31 and 0.33 for CEO and board executive LTIPs, respectively, and to nearly 0.35 and 0.36 for CEO and 
board executive non-cash compensation. 
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both CEO and boardroom executives (as consistent with (Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Smith, 
2008)).3 
The findings in relation to the framework of pay-performance may be seen as in line with an 
agency theory approach whereby CEOs and boardroom executives are compensated for their 
intention to act in the best benefit of the owners based on the prior levels of corporate 
performance (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
However, the results in respect to the performance-pay framework can be seen as lending a 
support to notions of the tournament and/or stewardship whereby CEOs and board executive 
directors perform better in the future based on the prior amounts and structure of their 
compensation package (Lazear, 1998), or their actual managerial talents (Hendry and Kiel, 
2004).  
Re the results of simultaneous equations modelling these may be seen as suggesting that 
compensation of CEOs and board executives is more influential for firm performance going 
forward rather than the framework of performance-related pay. As noted before this finding 
may be seen as lending support to the stewardship and/or tournament theories as compared with 
those of agency theory – although how one actually interprets these results is fraught with 
complication.  
Perhaps a surprising outcome has been that the existence or otherwise of a remuneration 
committee is insignificantly and if anything and negatively related to total CEO/executive 
remuneration. Perhaps too much should not be read into this in that over the period under 
examination virtually all the sample did form remuneration committees so the statistical 
outcomes might be a little fragile. But possibly this finding could be seen as supporting that of 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) in terms of the existence of political reasons (such as customer 
representatives or environmental activists) relating to the expansion of board committees, 
particularly remuneration committees, which might not essentially operate to control the 
amounts and structure of executive compensation. This in turn does support the perspective that 
behavioural and institutional factors are very important in relation to the setting of executive 
compensation. 
                                                          
3Bonuses, for example, for CEOs and board executives are ranging from 0.056 to 0.104 for Tobin’s Q, respectively; 
while LTIPs for CEOs and board executives range from 0.167 and 0.096 for Tobin’s Q, respectively. 
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Reflections on the overall outcomes of interrelationships between managerial remuneration and 
company performance indicate that there is an interconnected temporal cycle between executive 
pay and performance, in which the increase in firm performance leads to an increment in 
executive pay which in turn will enhance more the levels of company efficiency afterwards as 
outlined in Figure 4 – but there is the capability for this association to be affected by a range of 
external and internal interests, including individual contact or power relationships as discussed 
further below with reference to the case study.  
7.3.2 Case Study  
The case study sheds light on the nature and changes of remuneration committee reports at BP 
from 2001 to 2010 by adopting an archival-based technique supplemented by exploratory 
content analysis. This approach is consistent with the suggestion of Bender (2004) in the 
manner in which it seeks to tease out the actual role of a remuneration committee in the 
determination of executive compensation in a specific company. 
As noted above the case study can be interpreted in a variety of ways. From a theory 
perspective it is difficult to find significant support for a pure agency theory type world in 
which contracts are drawn up so as to maximise effort and expertise on behalf of the 
shareholders. Of course one always has to consider the counterfactual - what would the position 
be without the remuneration packages put in place? However, it is far from clear what the 
linkages are or were between the designed packages and actual performance. There is perhaps 
stronger evidence linking toward a managerial hegemony perspective but one heavily mediated 
by the presence of powerful non-executive directors and the institutional presence of the 
remuneration committee.  
Other insights offered include the lack of evidence that the packages were dictated by mobility 
within the international labour market – notwithstanding the retention payments made to both 
Conn and Inglis the lack of mobility at the highest levels of the company is strikingly singular. 
It might also be considered as to whether bringing onto the board non-executives more 
accustomed to a background of very high remuneration in North America might lead to a 
situation in which remuneration packages in the UK were advanced accordingly. Perhaps the 
most significant aspects to emerge are the importance of personal relationships and power at 
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boardroom level. At one level, the social contacts binding members of the board together 
included sailing, links to Cambridge University etc - but when there was a fracture in the nature 
of these contacts there were significant implications in terms of remuneration.  
Clearly the falling out between Browne and Sutherland was a major driver in terms of the 
remuneration decisions taken in 2007. Institutionally it is difficult to say that the remuneration 
committee demonstrated any consistency of purpose – perhaps beyond that of acceding to the 
wishes of those powerful executive and non-executive directors who might be seen as acting as 
the committee’s puppet masters. Over the period under examination, the nature of the various 
incentive packages changed as did that of the targets which it was necessary to achieve in order 
to benefit from the packages. Although the rhetoric used - ‘demanding’, stretching’, ‘rigorous’ - 
suggests that the targets associated with the cash bonus were difficult to achieve the reality was 
that they appear to have been all but fully achieved in almost all the years under examination. 
However the achievement of these targets was not associated with superior share price 
performance vis-à-vis other oil majors nor indeed against the wider UK stock market. One 
might consider whether the shift away from pure share return based incentives under the Long 
Term Incentive Plan toward more of a ‘balanced scorecard’ approach might have been 
associated with the fact that these other targets were rather more arbitrary and likely to be much 
more achievable. Similarly one might wonder why the comparator group – particularly in 
relation to share return – changed so frequently over the period, and of course why having 
failed to achieve targets the remuneration committee on more than one occasion decided that 
the near achievement of a target was in fact sufficient to justify payment as if that target had 
been achieved. 
The supplementary content analysis is of course purely indicative as an interpretation of the 
manner in which BP remuneration committee and board approached issues as to the manner in 
which remuneration in the company is established and the links between performance and 
remuneration. Perhaps the most important thing that board executive members carefully 
consider these days is that institutional shareholders can make the change if they actually vote 
against their pay structure at the remuneration reports in AGMs, at this stage boardroom 
members start to be more cautious to listen to them. In BP case study, inferences can be made 
which are suggestive of a focus on BP’s overall performance rather than on the specific 
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activities and achievements of individual directors, which might explain why 38% of BP 
shareholder body voted in April 2010 against the remuneration committee’s report.  
7.4 Limitations of this Study  
Inevitably there will be limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be 
addressed in future research in the line with both empirical research and case study. In respect 
to the empirical study, there are a number of possible issues in relation to the theoretical 
perspectives, examination methods, data sample and measurement and variables, which are 
worth noting, and therefore the findings should be interpreted in this context. There may also as 
in any longitudinal study utilising company data concerns as to the effect of survivorship bias 
and the manner in which companies have reorganised themselves during the period under 
examination. 
The set of theoretical perspectives and examination approaches utilised here in this study are 
diverse and contrast in the area of executive compensation and company performance since the 
extant differences in companies are numerous and launched over several years, and therefore it 
is unlikely to depend on a particular empirical method for analysing, or on a theoretical 
explanation for interpreting the findings of all aspects within the discipline of corporate 
governance. The current study does not address in detail the FSA’s Remuneration Code (2010) 
for the financial sector as this research puts a focus on examining executive directors’ 
remuneration within the codes running before and within the overall period under investigation 
from 1999 till 2010 – however the 2010 Code has been explored in Chapter Two in terms of 
key recommendations of the Walker Report (2009), which supported to an extent by the Turner 
Report (2009). 
There are also issues as to missing data - some measures relating to both executive 
compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database. However 
the existing panel of firm-years over the period under examination are significantly large 
compared with prior literatures (such as Conyon et al., 1995; Main et al., 1996; Cosh and 
Hughes, 1997; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; etc). The sample limitation to the top 350 UK 
companies may lead to another sampling disquiet regarding the impact of corporate size and the 
possible bias that this might introduce. But inevitably given the nature of corporate data this 
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will be the case – as indeed will be the whole idiosyncratic nature of corporate practice. As in 
any other study the reality is that one just tries to seek to control for this in the most appropriate 
fashion.  
There may be limitations with respect to measures of variables - salary, bonus, and long-term 
incentive plans are the only executive pay components which are utilised in estimating the 
sensitivity relationships and it is possible that the introduction of other remuneration measures 
might have an effect although perhaps unlikely. Perhaps more importantly the findings of both 
fixed-effect and simultaneous examination analyses are restricted to a number of alternative 
mechanisms of corporate governance and related control variables. It is possible that other 
factors (such as shareholders’ ownership, executive education and qualifications as reflections 
to the quality of the boardroom member, etc.) which are not utilised (because of the lack of data 
availability and the difficulty of identifying appropriate metrics) might also lead to differences 
in result outcomes in terms of pay and performance associations. However again it can be 
claimed that the set of control variables that is included in the empirical analyses covers the 
most significant economic and human determinants according to prior theoretical and empirical 
work. 
Re the case study, this descriptive UK-based case study has examined the Directors 
Remuneration Reports in just one company, BP. Clearly single company case studies give rise 
to issues in terms of the generalisability of the results. In some ways BP might not be the most 
appropriate research site to choose – it is in a very specific industry and is highly multinational 
with particular associations in North America. But in some ways this makes it more interesting 
giving rise as it has done to fluctuating levels of executive compensation, boardroom tensions, 
the presence of both UK and US directors on the board, etc. Generalisation based on the 
circumstances of a single company is very problematic but it is contended that there is scope 
for insights and richness which can contribute to knowledge and awareness relating to the 
issues under examination. 
Overall, from the researcher’s perspective, such limitations in both empirical and case studies 
do not detract the validity of the current examination study. 
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7.5 Opportunities for Further Research 
This examination study could be extended in several ways. As research methods varies and data 
coverage develops, prospect studies may need to consider other types of examination analyses 
(for example GMM4, ranked regression technique etc), or other additional attributes of corporate 
governance and control/exogenous variables (such as the market data for corporate control) 
which might perhaps affect the quality of remuneration governance via estimating the sensitivity 
relationships between executive compensation and corporate performance or corporate 
governance. There are still significant issues relating to causation and endogeneity and although 
this study has made a significant attempt to address these it may well be that other techniques 
might be more powerful. Clearly regulatory change, market change and just the tide of human 
history will mean that results posited by this study will not necessarily hold for future time 
periods and thereby provide the opportunity for future research and inquiry. Alternative control 
measures (such as the number of meetings held, the attendance rates at meetings of board and of 
the compensation committee, the timing spent at meetings in terms of hours, etc.) might be 
utilised and there is clearly scope for further behavioural investigation into the manner in which 
remuneration committees operate and their interaction with themselves, other board members, 
and wider stakeholders. 
Researchers could possibly extend the number of case studies in different contexts and perhaps 
utilise interview technique (in this study at least one previous BP board member was approached 
but declined to participate). Also the role of the remuneration committees in setting executive 
compensation in the light of the UK Governance Code (2010) and the developed proposal for the 
reform of the disclosure and corporate governance framework for executive directors’ 
remuneration (2013) could be investigated. These would allow more detail and insight into 
questions such as why did BP stop using options, and indeed how board members and others saw 
the construction of optimal remuneration packages? Here there might be scope for investigating 
the perceptions and views of institutional shareholders – which may themselves have changed 
over time. The findings of the qualitative research could also be utilised to develop new 
empirical studies – such as develop the associations between managerial compensation and 
                                                          
4GMM refers to Generalized Method of Moments. 
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performance by utilising the actual executive performance measures instead of the overall 
company performance.  
7.6 Implications for Practice 
In spite of this research has a number of potential limitations as discussed above, it might 
perhaps worth to suggest that the findings of this examination study add to the academic debate 
in the light of theory, and has significant implications mainly for the practice of remuneration 
committee members - who are involved in the compensation-setting decision. 
In respect to the findings of the empirical examination, remuneration committees, particularly at 
large-sized companies, have to take in their considerations that the setting process of executive 
compensation should reflect not only the reimbursement of previous-period performance, but 
also a reasonable inspired pay for prospect targets - as consistent with the tournament and/or 
stewardship perspectives - in order to keep the boardroom members enthused over time to 
enhance the corporate performance. 
Re the results of the content analysis of BP case study, the members of remuneration committees 
should also take in their consideration the importance of linking the executive compensation not 
only with the overall company performance, but also with the actual executive performance 
when they are determining and designing the amount and composition of executive pay – as their 
recommendations are subject to approval by the full board and ultimately by the shareholder 
body who are increasingly keen to observe the relationship between what are they actually 
receiving in terms of returns and management compensation. 
The archival examination of BP showed the likely influence of powerful individuals and the 
interplay between those individuals at boardroom level. Whether it is possible to control via 
regulation or market forces, human nature based interaction is a difficult question to answer. The 
issues are undeniably important but it would be very difficult to frame controls which would 
prevent adverse consequences from such relationships – but might possibly be a question for 
both bodies internal to the firms and those external to consider. 
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7.7 A Final Word 
This examination has aimed to shed some light on the black box5 of executive directors' 
remuneration – perhaps looking through a glass darkly - by utilising a number of research 
techniques in order to examine the interrelationships between executive compensation and 
company performance – topics which have been extensively aired in the popular media and the 
academic literature. This thesis has added to the extant work by confirming a number of prior 
research results but also making a contribution in terms toward extending existing knowledge by 
means of focus on the level and structure of executive directors’ remuneration packages. It has 
provided in-depth consideration as to the linkages and the direction between executive pay 
packages and corporate performance, as well as discussing the role of the remuneration 
committee in setting the mechanisms and structures which determine the types of boardroom 
compensation packages.  
There is the possibility of varying interpretations of the study’s finding. The empirical results 
point quite strongly toward a framework whereby it is performance that drives pay rather than 
pay-performance. A second stage of interpretation relates to the theoretical perspectives. It is 
conjectured that the empirical results provide significantly more support for the view the 
stewardship and/or tournament perceptions are more relevant than interpretations based on pure 
agency theory. The case study evidence is suggestive of the importance/influence of managerial 
hegemony – but heavily mediated by the roles of influential non-executive directors and 
remuneration committee – it also points up the significant influence of personal contacts and 
relationships at boardroom level. In conclusion the outcomes of this research endeavour, 
although not necessarily definitive in themselves, provide a fascinating set of insights into the 
manner in which senior executive pay is set in the UK – and may indeed be of value to future 
research in this field. 
  
                                                          
5This likening is consistent with the study of Tosi and Gomez-Mejía in 1989. 
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